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Author SHA1 Message Date
Mike Reeves ee36db4dd7 Merge pull request #15817 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
soup: drop --local from postgres.telegraf_users reconcile
2026-04-23 11:28:24 -04:00
Mike Reeves 0ecc7ae594 soup: drop --local from postgres.telegraf_users reconcile
The manager's /etc/salt/minion (written by so-functions:configure_minion)
has no file_roots, so salt-call --local falls back to Salt's default
/srv/salt and fails with "No matching sls found for 'postgres.telegraf_users'
in env 'base'". || true was silently swallowing the error, which meant the
DB roles for the pillar entries just populated by the so-telegraf-cred
backfill loop never actually got created.

Route through salt-master instead; its file_roots already points at the
default/local salt trees.
2026-04-23 11:25:44 -04:00
Mike Reeves b7faa0e437 Merge pull request #15816 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
soup: bootstrap postgres pillar stubs and secret on 3.0.0 upgrade
2026-04-23 10:13:57 -04:00
Mike Reeves eadad6c163 soup: bootstrap postgres pillar stubs and secret on 3.0.0 upgrade
pillar/top.sls now references postgres.soc_postgres / postgres.adv_postgres
unconditionally, but make_some_dirs only runs at install time so managers
upgrading from 3.0.0 have no local/pillar/postgres/ and salt-master fails
pillar render on the first post-upgrade restart. Similarly, secrets_pillar
is a no-op on upgrade (secrets.sls already exists), so secrets:postgres_pass
never gets seeded and the postgres container's POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE and
SOC's PG_ADMIN_PASS would land empty after highstate.

Add ensure_postgres_local_pillar and ensure_postgres_secret to up_to_3.1.0
so the stubs and secret exist before masterlock/salt-master restart. Both
are idempotent and safe to re-run.
2026-04-23 10:01:38 -04:00
Mike Reeves fad953b2b3 Merge pull request #15812 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
so-telegraf-cred: make executable and harden error handling
2026-04-22 14:31:58 -04:00
Mike Reeves d5c0ec4404 so-yaml_test: cover loadYaml error paths
Exercises the FileNotFoundError and generic-exception branches added to
loadYaml in the previous commit, restoring 100% coverage required by
the build.
2026-04-22 14:30:51 -04:00
Mike Reeves e616b4c120 so-telegraf-cred: make executable and harden error handling
so-telegraf-cred was committed with mode 644, causing
`so-telegraf-cred add "$MINION_ID"` in so-minion's add_telegraf_to_minion
to fail with "Permission denied" and log "Failed to provision postgres
telegraf cred for <minion>". Mark it executable.

Also bail early in seed_creds_file if mkdir/printf/chmod fail, and in
so-yaml.py loadYaml surface a clear stderr message with the filename
instead of an unhandled FileNotFoundError traceback.
2026-04-22 14:25:19 -04:00
Mike Reeves 2c341e5160 Merge pull request #15810 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Split postgres auth pillar from per-minion telegraf creds
2026-04-22 11:13:55 -04:00
Mike Reeves f240a99e22 so-telegraf-cred: thin bash wrapper around so-yaml.py
Swap the ~150-line Python implementation for a 48-line bash script that
delegates YAML mutation to so-yaml.py — the same helper so-minion and
soup already use. Same semantics: seed the creds pillar on first use,
idempotent add, silent remove.

SO minion ids are dot-free by construction (setup/so-functions:1884
strips everything after the first '.'), so using the raw id as the
so-yaml.py key path is safe.
2026-04-22 11:09:53 -04:00
Mike Reeves 614f32c5e0 Split postgres auth from per-minion telegraf creds
The old flow had two writers for each per-minion Telegraf password
(so-minion wrote the minion pillar; postgres.auth regenerated any
missing aggregate entries). They drifted on first-boot and there was
no trigger to create DB roles when a new minion joined.

Split responsibilities:

- pillar/postgres/auth.sls (manager-scoped) keeps only the so_postgres
  admin cred.
- pillar/telegraf/creds.sls (grid-wide) holds a {minion_id: {user,
  pass}} map, shadowed per-install by the local-pillar copy.
- salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-telegraf-cred is the single writer:
  flock, atomic YAML write, PyYAML safe_dump so passwords never
  round-trip through so-yaml.py's type coercion. Idempotent add, quiet
  remove.
- so-minion's add/remove hooks now shell out to so-telegraf-cred
  instead of editing pillar files directly.
- postgres.telegraf_users iterates the new pillar key and CREATE/ALTERs
  roles from it; telegraf.conf reads its own entry via grains.id.
- orch.deploy_newnode runs postgres.telegraf_users on the manager and
  refreshes the new minion's pillar before the new node highstates,
  so the DB role is in place the first time telegraf tries to connect.
- soup's post_to_3.1.0 backfills the creds pillar from accepted salt
  keys (idempotent) and runs postgres.telegraf_users once to reconcile
  the DB.
2026-04-22 10:55:15 -04:00
Mike Reeves 8425ac4100 Merge pull request #15808 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Feature/postgres
2026-04-21 15:48:08 -04:00
Mike Reeves 724d76965f soup: update postgres backfill comment to reflect reactor removal
The reactor path is gone; so-minion now owns add/delete for new
minions. The backfill itself is unchanged — postgres.auth's up_minions
fallback fills the aggregate, postgres.telegraf_users creates the
roles, and the bash loop fans to per-minion pillar files — so the
pre-feature upgrade story still works end-to-end. Just refresh the
comment so it isn't misleading.
2026-04-21 15:45:05 -04:00
Mike Reeves dbf4fb66a4 Clean up postgres telegraf cred on so-minion delete
Paired with the add path in add_telegraf_to_minion: when a minion is
removed, drop its entry from the aggregate postgres pillar and drop the
matching so_telegraf_<safe> role from the database. Without this, stale
entries and DB roles accumulate over time.

Makes rotate-password and compromise-recovery both a clean delete+add:

  so-minion -o=delete -m=<id>
  so-minion -o=add    -m=<id>

The first call drops the role and clears the aggregate pillar; the
second generates a brand-new password.

The cleanup is best-effort — if so-postgres isn't running or the DROP
ROLE fails (e.g., the role owns unexpected objects), we log a warning
and continue so the minion delete itself never gets blocked by postgres
state. Admins can mop up stray roles manually if that happens.
2026-04-21 15:43:01 -04:00
Mike Reeves 5f28e9b191 Move per-minion telegraf cred provisioning into so-minion
Simpler, race-free replacement for the reactor + orch + fan-out chain.

- salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-minion: expand add_telegraf_to_minion to
  generate a random 72-char password, reuse any existing password from
  the aggregate pillar, write postgres.telegraf.{user,pass} into the
  minion's own pillar file, and update the aggregate pillar so
  postgres.telegraf_users can CREATE ROLE on the next manager apply.
  Every create<ROLE> function already calls this hook, so add / addVM /
  setup dispatches are all covered identically and synchronously.
- salt/postgres/auth.sls: strip the fanout_targets loop and the
  postgres_telegraf_minion_pillar_<safe> cmd.run block — it's now
  redundant. The state still manages the so_postgres admin user and
  writes the aggregate pillar for postgres.telegraf_users to consume.
- salt/reactor/telegraf_user_sync.sls: deleted.
- salt/orch/telegraf_postgres_sync.sls: deleted.
- salt/salt/master.sls: drop the reactor_config_telegraf block that
  registered the reactor on /etc/salt/master.d/reactor_telegraf.conf.
- salt/orch/deploy_newnode.sls: drop the manager_fanout_postgres_telegraf
  step and the require: it added to the newnode highstate. Back to its
  original 3/dev shape.

No more ephemeral postgres_fanout_minion pillar, no more async salt/key
reactor, no more so-minion setupMinionFiles race: the pillar write
happens inline inside setupMinionFiles itself.
2026-04-21 15:34:15 -04:00
Mike Reeves 1abfd77351 Hide telegraf password from console and close so-minion race
Two fixes on the postgres telegraf fan-out path:

1. postgres.auth cmd.run leaked the password to the console because
   Salt always prints the Name: field and `show_changes: False` does
   not apply to cmd.run. Move the user and password into the `env:`
   attribute so the shell body still sees them via $PG_USER / $PG_PASS
   but Salt's state reporter never renders them.

2. so-minion's addMinion -> setupMinionFiles sequence removes the
   minion pillar file and rewrites it from scratch, which wipes the
   postgres.telegraf.* entries the reactor may have already written on
   salt-key accept. Add a postgres.auth fan-out step to
   orch.deploy_newnode (the orch so-minion kicks off after
   setupMinionFiles) and require it from the new minion's highstate.
   Idempotent via the existing unless: guard in postgres.auth.
2026-04-21 15:10:57 -04:00
Mike Reeves 922fc60466 Merge pull request #15804 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres-integration
postgres integration: sync feature/postgres to bravo for automated testing
2026-04-21 11:14:56 -04:00
Mike Reeves da69f0f1a4 Merge pull request #15793 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Harden postgres secrets, TLS enforcement, and admin tooling
2026-04-20 12:38:29 -04:00
Mike Reeves 29b24fa263 Merge pull request #15788 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Wait for TCP-ready postgres, not the init-phase Unix socket
2026-04-17 16:46:59 -04:00
Mike Reeves 981d8bb805 Merge pull request #15787 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Fix Telegraf postgres template syntax, partman privileges, and idempotency
2026-04-17 15:47:35 -04:00
Mike Reeves 4e3dbd800c Merge pull request #15785 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Fix Telegraf→Postgres table creation and state.apply race
2026-04-17 13:03:26 -04:00
Mike Reeves dc998191d9 Merge pull request #15784 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Create so_telegraf DB from Salt and pin pg_partman schema
2026-04-17 10:55:00 -04:00
Mike Reeves 9cce920d78 Merge pull request #15781 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Telegraf Postgres: shared schema + JSONB storage
2026-04-16 17:29:29 -04:00
Mike Reeves a5e5f12889 Merge pull request #15779 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
so-log-check: exclude psql ON_ERROR_STOP flag
2026-04-15 19:47:44 -04:00
Mike Reeves 999f3f5b15 Merge pull request #15778 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Fix so-show-stats tag column resolution
2026-04-15 19:32:55 -04:00
Mike Reeves 6f9da893ac Merge pull request #15777 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Postgres integration: SOC module config + Telegraf dual-write backend
2026-04-15 16:22:27 -04:00
Mike Reeves 0d3e2a0708 Merge pull request #15759 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Add ES credentials to postgres SOC module config
2026-04-10 11:44:20 -04:00
Mike Reeves e339aa41d5 Merge pull request #15757 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Add postgres admin password to SOC config
2026-04-09 22:24:23 -04:00
Mike Reeves 01a24b3684 Merge pull request #15756 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Fix init-users.sh password escaping for special characters
2026-04-09 22:00:09 -04:00
Mike Reeves f1cdd265f9 Merge pull request #15755 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Only load postgres module on manager nodes
2026-04-09 21:10:57 -04:00
Mike Reeves 631f5bd754 Merge pull request #15753 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Use manager IP for postgres host in SOC config
2026-04-09 19:45:33 -04:00
Mike Reeves fb4615d5cd Merge pull request #15750 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Wire postgres credentials into SOC module config
2026-04-09 14:55:51 -04:00
Mike Reeves 6eaf22fc5a Merge pull request #15748 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Add postgres.auth to allowed_states
2026-04-09 12:47:00 -04:00
Mike Reeves 592a6a4c21 Merge pull request #15747 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Enable postgres by default for manager nodes
2026-04-09 12:24:37 -04:00
Mike Reeves 409d4fb632 Merge pull request #15746 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Add daily PostgreSQL database backup
2026-04-09 10:44:47 -04:00
Mike Reeves 9d72149fcd Merge pull request #15743 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Add so-postgres container and Salt infrastructure
2026-04-09 10:05:15 -04:00
Mike Reeves e6afecbaa9 Change version from 3.1.0 to 3.0.0-bravo 2026-04-09 09:47:53 -04:00
15 changed files with 229 additions and 167 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
3.1.0
3.0.0-bravo
+12
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
# Per-minion Telegraf Postgres credentials. so-telegraf-cred on the manager is
# the single writer; it mutates /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/telegraf/creds.sls
# under flock. Pillar_roots order (local before default) means the populated
# copy shadows this default on any real grid; this file exists so the pillar
# key is always defined on fresh installs and when no minions have creds yet.
telegraf:
postgres_creds: {}
+1
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ base:
- sensoroni.adv_sensoroni
- telegraf.soc_telegraf
- telegraf.adv_telegraf
- telegraf.creds
- versionlock.soc_versionlock
- versionlock.adv_versionlock
- soc.license
+46 -1
View File
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ function deleteMinionFiles () {
log "ERROR" "Failed to delete $PILLARFILE"
return 1
fi
rm -f $ADVPILLARFILE
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
log "ERROR" "Failed to delete $ADVPILLARFILE"
@@ -281,6 +281,39 @@ function deleteMinionFiles () {
fi
}
# Remove this minion's postgres Telegraf credential from the shared creds
# pillar and drop the matching role in Postgres. Always returns 0 so a dead
# or unreachable so-postgres doesn't block minion deletion — in that case we
# log a warning and leave the role behind for manual cleanup.
function remove_postgres_telegraf_from_minion() {
local MINION_SAFE
MINION_SAFE=$(echo "$MINION_ID" | tr '.-' '__' | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
local PG_USER="so_telegraf_${MINION_SAFE}"
log "INFO" "Removing postgres telegraf cred for $MINION_ID"
so-telegraf-cred remove "$MINION_ID" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^so-postgres$'; then
if ! docker exec -i so-postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U postgres -d so_telegraf >/dev/null 2>&1 <<EOSQL
DO \$\$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (SELECT FROM pg_catalog.pg_roles WHERE rolname = '$PG_USER') THEN
EXECUTE format('REASSIGN OWNED BY %I TO so_telegraf', '$PG_USER');
EXECUTE format('DROP OWNED BY %I', '$PG_USER');
EXECUTE format('DROP ROLE %I', '$PG_USER');
END IF;
END
\$\$;
EOSQL
then
log "WARN" "Failed to drop postgres role $PG_USER; pillar entry was removed — drop manually if the role persists"
fi
else
log "WARN" "so-postgres container is not running; skipping DB role cleanup for $PG_USER"
fi
}
# Create the minion file
function ensure_socore_ownership() {
log "INFO" "Setting socore ownership on minion files"
@@ -542,6 +575,17 @@ function add_telegraf_to_minion() {
log "ERROR" "Failed to add telegraf configuration to $PILLARFILE"
return 1
fi
# Provision the per-minion postgres Telegraf credential in the shared
# telegraf/creds.sls pillar. so-telegraf-cred is the only writer; it
# generates a password on first add and is a no-op on re-add so the cred
# is stable across repeated so-minion runs. postgres.telegraf_users on the
# manager creates/updates the DB role from the same pillar.
so-telegraf-cred add "$MINION_ID"
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
log "ERROR" "Failed to provision postgres telegraf cred for $MINION_ID"
return 1
fi
}
function add_influxdb_to_minion() {
@@ -1069,6 +1113,7 @@ case "$OPERATION" in
"delete")
log "INFO" "Removing minion $MINION_ID"
remove_postgres_telegraf_from_minion
deleteMinionFiles || {
log "ERROR" "Failed to delete minion files for $MINION_ID"
exit 1
+54
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
# Single writer for the Telegraf Postgres credentials pillar. Thin wrapper
# around so-yaml.py that generates a password on first add and no-ops on
# re-add so the cred is stable across repeated so-minion runs.
#
# Note: so-yaml.py splits keys on '.' with no escape. SO minion ids are
# dot-free by construction (setup/so-functions:1884 takes the short_name
# before the first '.'), so using the raw minion id as the key is safe.
CREDS=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/telegraf/creds.sls
usage() {
echo "Usage: $0 <add|remove> <minion_id>" >&2
exit 2
}
seed_creds_file() {
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$CREDS")" || return 1
if [[ ! -f "$CREDS" ]]; then
(umask 027 && printf 'telegraf:\n postgres_creds: {}\n' > "$CREDS") || return 1
chown socore:socore "$CREDS" 2>/dev/null || true
chmod 640 "$CREDS" || return 1
fi
}
OP=$1
MID=$2
[[ -z "$OP" || -z "$MID" ]] && usage
case "$OP" in
add)
SAFE=$(echo "$MID" | tr '.-' '__' | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
seed_creds_file || exit 1
if so-yaml.py get -r "$CREDS" "telegraf.postgres_creds.${MID}.user" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
exit 0
fi
PASS=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9~!@#^&*()_=+[]|;:,.<>?-' < /dev/urandom | head -c 72)
so-yaml.py replace "$CREDS" "telegraf.postgres_creds.${MID}.user" "so_telegraf_${SAFE}" >/dev/null
so-yaml.py replace "$CREDS" "telegraf.postgres_creds.${MID}.pass" "$PASS" >/dev/null
;;
remove)
[[ -f "$CREDS" ]] || exit 0
so-yaml.py remove "$CREDS" "telegraf.postgres_creds.${MID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
;;
*)
usage
;;
esac
+10 -3
View File
@@ -39,9 +39,16 @@ def showUsage(args):
def loadYaml(filename):
file = open(filename, "r")
content = file.read()
return yaml.safe_load(content)
try:
with open(filename, "r") as file:
content = file.read()
return yaml.safe_load(content)
except FileNotFoundError:
print(f"File not found: {filename}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
except Exception as e:
print(f"Error reading file {filename}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
def writeYaml(filename, content):
+18
View File
@@ -973,3 +973,21 @@ class TestReplaceListObject(unittest.TestCase):
expected = "key1:\n- id: '1'\n status: updated\n- id: '2'\n status: inactive\n"
self.assertEqual(actual, expected)
class TestLoadYaml(unittest.TestCase):
def test_load_yaml_missing_file(self):
with patch('sys.exit', new=MagicMock()) as sysmock:
with patch('sys.stderr', new=StringIO()) as mock_stderr:
soyaml.loadYaml("/tmp/so-yaml_test-does-not-exist.yaml")
sysmock.assert_called_with(1)
self.assertIn("File not found:", mock_stderr.getvalue())
def test_load_yaml_read_error(self):
with patch('sys.exit', new=MagicMock()) as sysmock:
with patch('sys.stderr', new=StringIO()) as mock_stderr:
with patch('builtins.open', side_effect=PermissionError("denied")):
soyaml.loadYaml("/tmp/so-yaml_test-unreadable.yaml")
sysmock.assert_called_with(1)
self.assertIn("Error reading file", mock_stderr.getvalue())
+50 -25
View File
@@ -477,7 +477,44 @@ elasticsearch_backup_index_templates() {
tar -czf /nsm/backup/3.0.0_elasticsearch_index_templates.tar.gz -C /opt/so/conf/elasticsearch/templates/index/ .
}
ensure_postgres_local_pillar() {
# Postgres was added as a service after 3.0.0, so the new pillar/top.sls
# references postgres.soc_postgres / postgres.adv_postgres unconditionally.
# Managers upgrading from 3.0.0 have no /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/
# (make_some_dirs only runs at install time), so the stubs must be created
# here before salt-master restarts against the new top.sls.
echo "Ensuring postgres local pillar stubs exist."
local dir=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres
mkdir -p "$dir"
[[ -f "$dir/soc_postgres.sls" ]] || touch "$dir/soc_postgres.sls"
[[ -f "$dir/adv_postgres.sls" ]] || touch "$dir/adv_postgres.sls"
chown -R socore:socore "$dir"
}
ensure_postgres_secret() {
# On a fresh install, generate_passwords + secrets_pillar seed
# secrets:postgres_pass in /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/secrets.sls. That
# code path is skipped on upgrade (secrets.sls already exists from 3.0.0
# with import_pass/influx_pass but no postgres_pass), so the postgres
# container's POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE and SOC's PG_ADMIN_PASS would be empty
# after highstate. Generate one now if missing.
local secrets_file=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/secrets.sls
if [[ ! -f "$secrets_file" ]]; then
echo "WARNING: $secrets_file missing; skipping postgres_pass backfill."
return 0
fi
if so-yaml.py get -r "$secrets_file" secrets.postgres_pass >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "secrets.postgres_pass already set; leaving as-is."
return 0
fi
echo "Seeding secrets.postgres_pass in $secrets_file."
so-yaml.py add "$secrets_file" secrets.postgres_pass "$(get_random_value)"
chown socore:socore "$secrets_file"
}
up_to_3.1.0() {
ensure_postgres_local_pillar
ensure_postgres_secret
determine_elastic_agent_upgrade
elasticsearch_backup_index_templates
# Clear existing component template state file.
@@ -490,31 +527,19 @@ up_to_3.1.0() {
post_to_3.1.0() {
/usr/sbin/so-kibana-space-defaults
# One-time backfill for minions that existed before the postgres Telegraf
# feature shipped. Generate the aggregate pillar on the manager and create
# the per-minion DB roles, then fan each minion's cred into its own pillar
# file. Going forward the reactor handles each new salt-key accept with a
# targeted fan-out, so a manager highstate no longer needs to iterate.
echo "Provisioning Telegraf Postgres users for existing minions."
salt-call --local state.apply postgres.auth,postgres.telegraf_users queue=True || true
AGGREGATE_PILLAR=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls
MINIONS_DIR=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions
if [[ -f "$AGGREGATE_PILLAR" && -d "$MINIONS_DIR" ]]; then
for pillar_file in "$MINIONS_DIR"/*.sls; do
[[ -f "$pillar_file" ]] || continue
mid=$(basename "$pillar_file" .sls)
[[ "$mid" == adv_* ]] && continue
safe=$(echo "$mid" | tr '.-' '__' | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
existing_user=$(so-yaml.py get -r "$pillar_file" postgres.telegraf.user 2>/dev/null || true)
[[ "$existing_user" == "so_telegraf_${safe}" ]] && continue
user=$(so-yaml.py get -r "$AGGREGATE_PILLAR" "postgres.auth.users.telegraf_${safe}.user" 2>/dev/null || true)
pass=$(so-yaml.py get -r "$AGGREGATE_PILLAR" "postgres.auth.users.telegraf_${safe}.pass" 2>/dev/null || true)
[[ -z "$user" || -z "$pass" ]] && continue
so-yaml.py replace "$pillar_file" postgres.telegraf.user "$user" >/dev/null
so-yaml.py replace "$pillar_file" postgres.telegraf.pass "$pass" >/dev/null
done
fi
# Backfill the Telegraf creds pillar for every accepted minion. so-telegraf-cred
# add is idempotent — it no-ops when an entry already exists — so this is safe
# to run on every soup. The subsequent state.apply creates/updates the matching
# Postgres roles from the reconciled pillar.
echo "Reconciling Telegraf Postgres creds for accepted minions."
for mid in $(salt-key --out=json --list=accepted 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.minions[]?' 2>/dev/null); do
[[ -n "$mid" ]] || continue
/usr/sbin/so-telegraf-cred add "$mid" || echo " warning: so-telegraf-cred add $mid failed" >&2
done
# Run through the master (not --local) so state compilation uses the
# master's configured file_roots; the manager's /etc/salt/minion has no
# file_roots of its own and --local would fail with "No matching sls found".
salt-call state.apply postgres.telegraf_users queue=True || true
POSTVERSION=3.1.0
}
+25
View File
@@ -25,8 +25,33 @@ manager_run_es_soc:
- salt: {{NEWNODE}}_update_mine
{% endif %}
# so-minion has already added the new minion's entry to telegraf/creds.sls
# via so-telegraf-cred before this orch fires. Reconcile the Postgres role
# on the manager so the new minion can authenticate on its first highstate,
# then refresh the minion's pillar so its telegraf.conf renders with the
# freshly-written cred.
manager_create_postgres_telegraf_role:
salt.state:
- tgt: {{ MANAGER }}
- sls:
- postgres.telegraf_users
- queue: True
- require:
- salt: {{NEWNODE}}_update_mine
{{NEWNODE}}_refresh_pillar:
salt.function:
- name: saltutil.refresh_pillar
- tgt: {{ NEWNODE }}
- kwarg:
wait: True
- require:
- salt: manager_create_postgres_telegraf_role
{{NEWNODE}}_run_highstate:
salt.state:
- tgt: {{ NEWNODE }}
- highstate: True
- queue: True
- require:
- salt: {{NEWNODE}}_refresh_pillar
-28
View File
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
# Fired by salt/reactor/telegraf_user_sync.sls when salt-key accepts a new
# minion. Only provisions the per-minion pillar entry and DB role on the
# manager; the minion itself will pick up its telegraf config on its first
# highstate during onboarding, so there's no need to push the telegraf state
# from here.
#
# Target the manager via role grains — same pattern as orch/delete_hypervisor.sls.
# The reactor doesn't know the manager's minion id, and grains.master on the
# runner is a hostname, not a targetable id.
{% set FANOUT_MINION = salt['pillar.get']('postgres_fanout_minion', '') %}
manager_sync_telegraf_pg_users:
salt.state:
- tgt: 'G@role:so-manager or G@role:so-managerhype or G@role:so-managersearch or G@role:so-standalone or G@role:so-eval'
- tgt_type: compound
- sls:
- postgres.auth
- postgres.telegraf_users
- queue: True
{% if FANOUT_MINION %}
- pillar:
postgres_fanout_minion: {{ FANOUT_MINION }}
{% endif %}
+2 -68
View File
@@ -13,24 +13,8 @@
{% set CHARS = DIGITS~LOWERCASE~UPPERCASE~SYMBOLS %}
{% set so_postgres_user_pass = salt['pillar.get']('postgres:auth:users:so_postgres_user:pass', salt['random.get_str'](72, chars=CHARS)) %}
{# Per-minion Telegraf Postgres credentials. Merge currently-up minions with any #}
{# previously-known entries in pillar so existing passwords persist across runs. #}
{% set existing = salt['pillar.get']('postgres:auth:users', {}) %}
{% set up_minions = salt['saltutil.runner']('manage.up') or [] %}
{% set telegraf_users = {} %}
{% for key, entry in existing.items() %}
{%- if key.startswith('telegraf_') and entry.get('user') and entry.get('pass') %}
{%- do telegraf_users.update({key: entry}) %}
{%- endif %}
{% endfor %}
{% for mid in up_minions %}
{%- set safe = mid | replace('.','_') | replace('-','_') | lower %}
{%- set key = 'telegraf_' ~ safe %}
{%- if key not in telegraf_users %}
{%- do telegraf_users.update({key: {'user': 'so_telegraf_' ~ safe, 'pass': salt['random.get_str'](72, chars=CHARS)}}) %}
{%- endif %}
{% endfor %}
# Admin cred only. Per-minion Telegraf creds live in telegraf/creds.sls,
# managed by /usr/sbin/so-telegraf-cred (called from so-minion).
postgres_auth_pillar:
file.managed:
- name: /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls
@@ -43,57 +27,7 @@ postgres_auth_pillar:
so_postgres_user:
user: so_postgres
pass: "{{ so_postgres_user_pass }}"
{% for key, entry in telegraf_users.items() %}
{{ key }}:
user: {{ entry.user }}
pass: "{{ entry.pass }}"
{% endfor %}
- show_changes: False
{# Fan a specific minion's telegraf cred out to its own pillar file.
Two triggers populate the target list:
- grains.id (always) so the manager's own pillar is populated on every
postgres.auth run — otherwise the manager's telegraf has no cred on
a fresh install and can't write to its own postgres.
- pillar postgres_fanout_minion (when the reactor fires on a new
minion's salt-key accept).
The `unless` guard keeps re-runs idempotent, so this is one so-yaml.py
check per target, not per minion in the grid. Bulk backfill for
already-accepted minions lives in soup. #}
{% set fanout_targets = [] %}
{% if grains.id %}
{%- do fanout_targets.append(grains.id) %}
{% endif %}
{% set fanout_mid = salt['pillar.get']('postgres_fanout_minion') %}
{% if fanout_mid and fanout_mid not in fanout_targets %}
{%- do fanout_targets.append(fanout_mid) %}
{% endif %}
{% for mid in fanout_targets %}
{%- set safe = mid | replace('.','_') | replace('-','_') | lower %}
{%- set key = 'telegraf_' ~ safe %}
{%- set entry = telegraf_users.get(key) %}
{%- if entry %}
postgres_telegraf_minion_pillar_{{ safe }}:
cmd.run:
- name: |
set -e
PILLAR_FILE=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/{{ mid }}.sls
if [ ! -f "$PILLAR_FILE" ]; then
echo '{}' > "$PILLAR_FILE"
chown socore:socore "$PILLAR_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true
chmod 640 "$PILLAR_FILE"
fi
/usr/sbin/so-yaml.py replace "$PILLAR_FILE" postgres.telegraf.user '{{ entry.user }}'
/usr/sbin/so-yaml.py replace "$PILLAR_FILE" postgres.telegraf.pass '{{ entry.pass }}'
- unless: |
[ "$(/usr/sbin/so-yaml.py get -r /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/{{ mid }}.sls postgres.telegraf.user 2>/dev/null)" = '{{ entry.user }}' ]
- require:
- file: postgres_auth_pillar
{%- endif %}
{% endfor %}
{% else %}
{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
+4 -4
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
{# postgres_wait_ready below requires `docker_container: so-postgres`, which is
declared in postgres.enabled. Include it here so state.apply postgres.telegraf_users
on its own (from the reactor orch or from soup) still has that ID in scope. Salt
on its own (e.g. from orch.deploy_newnode) still has that ID in scope. Salt
de-duplicates the circular include. #}
include:
- postgres.enabled
@@ -96,9 +96,9 @@ postgres_telegraf_group_role:
- require:
- cmd: postgres_create_telegraf_db
{% set users = salt['pillar.get']('postgres:auth:users', {}) %}
{% for key, entry in users.items() %}
{% if key.startswith('telegraf_') and entry.get('user') and entry.get('pass') %}
{% set creds = salt['pillar.get']('telegraf:postgres_creds', {}) %}
{% for mid, entry in creds.items() %}
{% if entry.get('user') and entry.get('pass') %}
{% set u = entry.user %}
{% set p = entry.pass | replace("'", "''") %}
-18
View File
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
{# Fires on salt/key. Only act on successful key acceptance — not reauth. #}
{% if data.get('act') == 'accept' and data.get('result') == True and data.get('id') %}
{{ data['id'] }}_telegraf_pg_sync:
runner.state.orchestrate:
- args:
- mods: orch.telegraf_postgres_sync
- pillar:
postgres_fanout_minion: {{ data['id'] }}
{% do salt.log.info('telegraf_user_sync reactor: syncing telegraf PG user for minion %s' % data['id']) %}
{% endif %}
-13
View File
@@ -62,19 +62,6 @@ engines_config:
- name: /etc/salt/master.d/engines.conf
- source: salt://salt/files/engines.conf
reactor_config_telegraf:
file.managed:
- name: /etc/salt/master.d/reactor_telegraf.conf
- contents: |
reactor:
- 'salt/key':
- /opt/so/saltstack/default/salt/reactor/telegraf_user_sync.sls
- user: root
- group: root
- mode: 644
- watch_in:
- service: salt_master_service
# update the bootstrap script when used for salt-cloud
salt_bootstrap_cloud:
file.managed:
+6 -6
View File
@@ -10,12 +10,12 @@
{%- set LOGSTASH_ENABLED = LOGSTASH_MERGED.enabled %}
{%- set TG_OUT = TELEGRAFMERGED.output | upper %}
{%- set PG_HOST = GLOBALS.manager_ip %}
{#- Per-minion telegraf creds are written into the minion's own pillar file
(/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/<id>.sls) by postgres.auth on the
manager. Each minion only sees its own password — the aggregate map in
postgres:auth:users is manager-scoped. #}
{%- set PG_USER = salt['pillar.get']('postgres:telegraf:user', '') %}
{%- set PG_PASS = salt['pillar.get']('postgres:telegraf:pass', '') %}
{#- Per-minion telegraf creds live in the grid-wide telegraf/creds.sls pillar,
written by /usr/sbin/so-telegraf-cred on the manager. Each minion looks up
its own entry by grains.id. #}
{%- set PG_ENTRY = salt['pillar.get']('telegraf:postgres_creds:' ~ grains.id, {}) %}
{%- set PG_USER = PG_ENTRY.get('user', '') %}
{%- set PG_PASS = PG_ENTRY.get('pass', '') %}
# Global tags can be specified here in key="value" format.
[global_tags]
role = "{{ GLOBALS.role.split('-') | last }}"