Merge pull request #15808 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres

Feature/postgres
This commit is contained in:
Mike Reeves
2026-04-21 15:48:08 -04:00
committed by GitHub
8 changed files with 78 additions and 98 deletions
+70 -1
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@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ function deleteMinionFiles () {
log "ERROR" "Failed to delete $PILLARFILE"
return 1
fi
rm -f $ADVPILLARFILE
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
log "ERROR" "Failed to delete $ADVPILLARFILE"
@@ -281,6 +281,43 @@ function deleteMinionFiles () {
fi
}
# Remove this minion's postgres Telegraf credential from both the aggregate
# pillar and the postgres database. Paired with add_telegraf_to_minion:
# add/delete cycle both here and in the DB. Always returns 0 so a dead or
# unreachable so-postgres doesn't block minion deletion — in that case we
# log a warning and leave the role behind for manual cleanup.
function remove_postgres_telegraf_from_minion() {
local MINION_SAFE
MINION_SAFE=$(echo "$MINION_ID" | tr '.-' '__' | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
local PG_USER="so_telegraf_${MINION_SAFE}"
local AGGREGATE=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls
log "INFO" "Removing postgres telegraf cred for $MINION_ID"
if [[ -f "$AGGREGATE" ]]; then
so-yaml.py remove "$AGGREGATE" "postgres.auth.users.telegraf_${MINION_SAFE}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
if docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^so-postgres$'; then
if ! docker exec -i so-postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U postgres -d so_telegraf >/dev/null 2>&1 <<EOSQL
DO \$\$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (SELECT FROM pg_catalog.pg_roles WHERE rolname = '$PG_USER') THEN
EXECUTE format('REASSIGN OWNED BY %I TO so_telegraf', '$PG_USER');
EXECUTE format('DROP OWNED BY %I', '$PG_USER');
EXECUTE format('DROP ROLE %I', '$PG_USER');
END IF;
END
\$\$;
EOSQL
then
log "WARN" "Failed to drop postgres role $PG_USER; aggregate pillar entry was removed — drop manually if the role persists"
fi
else
log "WARN" "so-postgres container is not running; skipping DB role cleanup for $PG_USER"
fi
}
# Create the minion file
function ensure_socore_ownership() {
log "INFO" "Setting socore ownership on minion files"
@@ -542,6 +579,37 @@ function add_telegraf_to_minion() {
log "ERROR" "Failed to add telegraf configuration to $PILLARFILE"
return 1
fi
# Provision the per-minion postgres Telegraf credential so telegraf.conf
# renders correctly on the minion's first highstate and postgres.telegraf_users
# picks up the matching aggregate entry on the next manager apply.
#
# Writes:
# - postgres.telegraf.{user,pass} into the minion's own pillar file
# (distributed to only this minion via pillar/top.sls).
# - postgres.auth.users.telegraf_<safe>.{user,pass} into the aggregate
# pillar so postgres.telegraf_users CREATE ROLE finds it.
#
# An existing password is reused if the aggregate already has one (re-add),
# so rerunning so-minion for the same minion keeps the cred stable.
local MINION_SAFE
MINION_SAFE=$(echo "$MINION_ID" | tr '.-' '__' | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
local PG_USER="so_telegraf_${MINION_SAFE}"
local AGGREGATE=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls
local PG_PASS=""
if [[ -f "$AGGREGATE" ]]; then
PG_PASS=$(so-yaml.py get -r "$AGGREGATE" "postgres.auth.users.telegraf_${MINION_SAFE}.pass" 2>/dev/null || true)
fi
if [[ -z "$PG_PASS" ]]; then
PG_PASS=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9~!@#^&*()_=+[]|;:,.<>?-' < /dev/urandom | head -c 72)
fi
so-yaml.py replace "$PILLARFILE" postgres.telegraf.user "$PG_USER" >/dev/null
so-yaml.py replace "$PILLARFILE" postgres.telegraf.pass "$PG_PASS" >/dev/null
if [[ -f "$AGGREGATE" ]]; then
so-yaml.py replace "$AGGREGATE" "postgres.auth.users.telegraf_${MINION_SAFE}.user" "$PG_USER" >/dev/null
so-yaml.py replace "$AGGREGATE" "postgres.auth.users.telegraf_${MINION_SAFE}.pass" "$PG_PASS" >/dev/null
fi
}
function add_influxdb_to_minion() {
@@ -1069,6 +1137,7 @@ case "$OPERATION" in
"delete")
log "INFO" "Removing minion $MINION_ID"
remove_postgres_telegraf_from_minion
deleteMinionFiles || {
log "ERROR" "Failed to delete minion files for $MINION_ID"
exit 1
+2 -1
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@@ -285,7 +285,8 @@ def add(args):
def removeKey(content, key):
pieces = key.split(".", 1)
if len(pieces) > 1:
removeKey(content[pieces[0]], pieces[1])
if pieces[0] in content:
removeKey(content[pieces[0]], pieces[1])
else:
content.pop(key, None)
+5 -4
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@@ -491,10 +491,11 @@ post_to_3.1.0() {
/usr/sbin/so-kibana-space-defaults
# One-time backfill for minions that existed before the postgres Telegraf
# feature shipped. Generate the aggregate pillar on the manager and create
# the per-minion DB roles, then fan each minion's cred into its own pillar
# file. Going forward the reactor handles each new salt-key accept with a
# targeted fan-out, so a manager highstate no longer needs to iterate.
# feature shipped. postgres.auth's up_minions fallback loop generates any
# missing aggregate pillar entries; postgres.telegraf_users CREATEs the
# matching DB roles; then the bash loop below copies each minion's cred
# into its own pillar file. Going forward, so-minion owns add/delete for
# every new minion, so this backfill is only needed on the upgrade boundary.
echo "Provisioning Telegraf Postgres users for existing minions."
salt-call --local state.apply postgres.auth,postgres.telegraf_users queue=True || true
-28
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@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
# Fired by salt/reactor/telegraf_user_sync.sls when salt-key accepts a new
# minion. Only provisions the per-minion pillar entry and DB role on the
# manager; the minion itself will pick up its telegraf config on its first
# highstate during onboarding, so there's no need to push the telegraf state
# from here.
#
# Target the manager via role grains — same pattern as orch/delete_hypervisor.sls.
# The reactor doesn't know the manager's minion id, and grains.master on the
# runner is a hostname, not a targetable id.
{% set FANOUT_MINION = salt['pillar.get']('postgres_fanout_minion', '') %}
manager_sync_telegraf_pg_users:
salt.state:
- tgt: 'G@role:so-manager or G@role:so-managerhype or G@role:so-managersearch or G@role:so-standalone or G@role:so-eval'
- tgt_type: compound
- sls:
- postgres.auth
- postgres.telegraf_users
- queue: True
{% if FANOUT_MINION %}
- pillar:
postgres_fanout_minion: {{ FANOUT_MINION }}
{% endif %}
-32
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@@ -49,38 +49,6 @@ postgres_auth_pillar:
pass: "{{ entry.pass }}"
{% endfor %}
- show_changes: False
{# Fan a specific minion's telegraf cred out to its own pillar file. Only
runs when postgres_fanout_minion pillar is provided — otherwise this state
is a no-op. That keeps manager highstates from doing N so-yaml.py forks
when nothing changed. The reactor passes postgres_fanout_minion through
the orch on salt-key accept; soup handles bulk backfill separately. #}
{% set fanout_mid = salt['pillar.get']('postgres_fanout_minion') %}
{% if fanout_mid %}
{%- set safe = fanout_mid | replace('.','_') | replace('-','_') | lower %}
{%- set key = 'telegraf_' ~ safe %}
{%- set entry = telegraf_users.get(key) %}
{%- if entry %}
postgres_telegraf_minion_pillar_{{ safe }}:
cmd.run:
- name: |
set -e
PILLAR_FILE=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/{{ fanout_mid }}.sls
if [ ! -f "$PILLAR_FILE" ]; then
echo '{}' > "$PILLAR_FILE"
chown socore:socore "$PILLAR_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true
chmod 640 "$PILLAR_FILE"
fi
/usr/sbin/so-yaml.py replace "$PILLAR_FILE" postgres.telegraf.user '{{ entry.user }}'
/usr/sbin/so-yaml.py replace "$PILLAR_FILE" postgres.telegraf.pass '{{ entry.pass }}'
- unless: |
[ "$(/usr/sbin/so-yaml.py get -r /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/{{ fanout_mid }}.sls postgres.telegraf.user 2>/dev/null)" = '{{ entry.user }}' ]
- require:
- file: postgres_auth_pillar
{%- endif %}
{% endif %}
{% else %}
{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
-18
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@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
{# Fires on salt/key. Only act on successful key acceptance — not reauth. #}
{% if data.get('act') == 'accept' and data.get('result') == True and data.get('id') %}
{{ data['id'] }}_telegraf_pg_sync:
runner.state.orchestrate:
- args:
- mods: orch.telegraf_postgres_sync
- pillar:
postgres_fanout_minion: {{ data['id'] }}
{% do salt.log.info('telegraf_user_sync reactor: syncing telegraf PG user for minion %s' % data['id']) %}
{% endif %}
-13
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@@ -62,19 +62,6 @@ engines_config:
- name: /etc/salt/master.d/engines.conf
- source: salt://salt/files/engines.conf
reactor_config_telegraf:
file.managed:
- name: /etc/salt/master.d/reactor_telegraf.conf
- contents: |
reactor:
- 'salt/key':
- /opt/so/saltstack/default/salt/reactor/telegraf_user_sync.sls
- user: root
- group: root
- mode: 644
- watch_in:
- service: salt_master_service
# update the bootstrap script when used for salt-cloud
salt_bootstrap_cloud:
file.managed:
+1 -1
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@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
# insecure_skip_verify = false
{%- endif %}
{%- if TG_OUT in ['POSTGRES', 'BOTH'] %}
{%- if TG_OUT in ['POSTGRES', 'BOTH'] and PG_USER and PG_PASS %}
# Configuration for sending metrics to PostgreSQL.
# options='-c role=so_telegraf' makes every connection SET ROLE to the shared
# group role so tables created on first write are owned by so_telegraf, and