mirror of
https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion.git
synced 2026-05-09 04:42:40 +02:00
Mike Reeves
3f46caaf02
Per-minion telegraf roles inherit CONNECT via PUBLIC by default and could open sessions to the SOC database (though they have no readable grants inside). Close the soft edge by revoking PUBLIC's CONNECT and re-granting it to so_postgres only.
32 lines
1.6 KiB
Bash
32 lines
1.6 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/bash
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set -e
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# Create or update application user for SOC platform access
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# This script runs on first database initialization via docker-entrypoint-initdb.d
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# The password is properly escaped to handle special characters
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psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 --username "$POSTGRES_USER" --dbname "$POSTGRES_DB" <<-EOSQL
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DO \$\$
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BEGIN
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IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT FROM pg_catalog.pg_roles WHERE rolname = '${SO_POSTGRES_USER}') THEN
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EXECUTE format('CREATE ROLE %I WITH LOGIN PASSWORD %L', '${SO_POSTGRES_USER}', '${SO_POSTGRES_PASS}');
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ELSE
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EXECUTE format('ALTER ROLE %I WITH PASSWORD %L', '${SO_POSTGRES_USER}', '${SO_POSTGRES_PASS}');
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END IF;
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END
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\$\$;
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GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON DATABASE "$POSTGRES_DB" TO "$SO_POSTGRES_USER";
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-- Lock the SOC database down at the connect layer; PUBLIC gets CONNECT
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-- by default, which would let per-minion telegraf roles open sessions
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-- here. They have no schema/table grants inside so reads fail, but
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-- revoking CONNECT closes the soft edge entirely.
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REVOKE CONNECT ON DATABASE "$POSTGRES_DB" FROM PUBLIC;
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GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE "$POSTGRES_DB" TO "$SO_POSTGRES_USER";
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EOSQL
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# Bootstrap the Telegraf metrics database. Per-minion roles + schemas are
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# reconciled on every state.apply by postgres/telegraf_users.sls; this block
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# only ensures the shared database exists on first initialization.
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if ! psql -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -tAc "SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname='so_telegraf'" | grep -q 1; then
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psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -c "CREATE DATABASE so_telegraf"
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fi
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