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Author SHA1 Message Date
Mike Reeves 3d11694d51 make so-yaml PG-canonical and add pillar-change reactor stack
Two coupled changes that together let so_pillar.* be the canonical
config store, with config edits driving service reloads automatically:

so-yaml PG-canonical mode
- Adds /opt/so/conf/so-yaml/mode (and SO_YAML_BACKEND env override) with
  three values: dual (legacy), postgres (PG-only for managed paths),
  disk (emergency rollback). Bootstrap files (secrets.sls, ca/init.sls,
  *.nodes.sls, top.sls, ...) stay disk-only regardless via the existing
  SkipPath allowlist in so_yaml_postgres.locate.
- loadYaml/writeYaml/purgeFile now route to so_pillar.* in postgres
  mode: replace/add/get all read+write the database with no disk file
  ever appearing. PG failure is fatal in postgres mode (no silent
  fallback); dual mode preserves the prior best-effort mirror.
- so_yaml_postgres gains read_yaml(path), is_pg_managed(path), and
  is_enabled() so so-yaml can answer "is this path PG-managed and is
  PG up" without reaching into private helpers.
- schema_pillar.sls writes /opt/so/conf/so-yaml/mode = postgres after
  the importer succeeds, so flipping postgres:so_pillar:enabled flips
  so-yaml's behavior in lockstep with the schema being live.

pg_notify-driven change fan-out
- 008_change_notify.sql adds so_pillar.change_queue + an AFTER trigger
  on pillar_entry that enqueues the locator and pg_notifies
  'so_pillar_change'. Queue is drained at-least-once so engine restarts
  don't lose events; pg_notify is just the wakeup signal.
- New salt-master engine pg_notify_pillar.py LISTENs on the channel,
  drains the queue with FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED, debounces bursts, and
  fires 'so/pillar/changed' events grouped by (scope, role, minion).
- Reactor so_pillar_changed.sls catches the tag and dispatches to
  orch.so_pillar_reload, which carries a DISPATCH map of pillar-path
  prefix -> (state sls, role grain set) so adding a new service to
  the auto-reload list is a one-line edit instead of a new reactor.
- Engine + reactor wiring is gated on the same postgres:so_pillar:enabled
  flag as the schema and ext_pillar config so the whole stack flips
  on/off together.

Tests: 21 new cases (112 total, all passing) covering mode resolution,
PG-managed detection, and PG-canonical read/write/purge routing with
the PG client stubbed.
2026-05-01 09:31:48 -04:00
Mike Reeves 23255f88e0 add so-yaml dual-write to so_pillar.* + purge verb
Hooks every so-yaml.py write through a new so_yaml_postgres helper that
mirrors disk YAML mutations into so_pillar.pillar_entry via docker exec
psql. Disk remains canonical during the transition; PG mirror failures
are logged only when a real write error occurs (skipped paths and
postgres-unreachable cases stay silent so existing callers don't see
new noise on stderr).

Adds a `purge YAML_FILE` verb on so-yaml that deletes the file from
disk and removes the matching pillar_entry rows. For minion files it
also drops the so_pillar.minion row, which CASCADEs to pillar_entry +
role_member. Designed for so-minion's delete path (replaces rm -f) so
the audit log captures the deletion.

setup/so-functions::generate_passwords + secrets_pillar generate
secrets:pillar_master_pass and /opt/so/conf/postgres/so_pillar.key on
fresh installs, and append the password to existing secrets.sls files
on upgrade.

- salt/manager/tools/sbin/so_yaml_postgres.py: locate(), write_yaml(),
  purge_yaml(), and a small CLI for diagnostics. Skips bootstrap and
  mine-driven paths via the same allowlist used by so-pillar-import.
- salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-yaml.py: import the helper, hook
  writeYaml() to mirror after every disk write, add purgeFile() and
  the purge verb.
- salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-yaml_test.py: 16 new tests covering the
  purge verb and the path-locator / write contract of so_yaml_postgres
  without contacting Postgres. All 91 tests pass.
- setup/so-functions: generate_passwords adds PILLARMASTERPASS and
  SO_PILLAR_KEY; secrets_pillar writes pillar_master_pass and the
  pgcrypto master key file.
2026-04-30 17:09:58 -04:00
Mike Reeves d30b52b327 add so-pillar-import — seeds so_pillar.* from on-disk pillar tree
Idempotent importer that schema_pillar.sls runs once at end of postgres
state on first install, and that so-minion can call per-minion on add /
delete. UPSERTs into so_pillar.pillar_entry; the audit trigger handles
versioning so re-runs without SLS edits produce no version bumps.

Connects via docker exec so-postgres psql, so no DSN config is required
at first-install time. Skips bootstrap files (secrets.sls, postgres/
auth.sls, etc.), mine-driven nodes.sls files, and any file containing
Jinja templates — those stay disk-authoritative and ext_pillar_first:
False means they render before the PG overlay.

Auto-syncs to /usr/sbin via the existing manager_sbin file.recurse.
2026-04-30 16:34:05 -04:00
Mike Reeves 3fad895d6a add so_pillar schema + ext_pillar wiring (postsalt foundation)
Lays the database-backed pillar foundation for the postsalt branch. Salt
continues to read on-disk SLS first; the new ext_pillar config overlays
values from the so_pillar.* schema in so-postgres.

- salt/postgres/files/schema/pillar/00{1..7}_*.sql: idempotent DDL for
  scope/role/role_member/minion/pillar_entry/pillar_entry_history/
  drift_log, secret pgcrypto helpers, RLS, pg_cron retention.
- salt/postgres/schema_pillar.sls: applies the SQL files inside the
  so-postgres container after it's healthy, configures the master_key
  GUC, and runs so-pillar-import once. Gated on
  postgres:so_pillar:enabled feature flag (default false).
- salt/salt/master/ext_pillar_postgres.{sls,conf.jinja}: drops
  /etc/salt/master.d/ext_pillar_postgres.conf with list-form ext_pillar
  queries (global/role/minion/secrets) and ext_pillar_first: False so
  bootstrap pillars on disk render before the PG overlay.
- salt/postgres/init.sls + salt/salt/master.sls: include the new states.

Both new state branches are guarded so a default install with the flag
off is a no-op.
2026-04-30 16:30:57 -04:00
Mike Reeves fa8162de02 Merge pull request #15749 from Security-Onion-Solutions/feature/postgres
Add so-postgres Salt states and infrastructure
2026-04-28 10:15:47 -04:00
Josh Patterson 33abc429d1 Merge pull request #15835 from Security-Onion-Solutions/fix/reactor/sominon_setup
fix sominion_setup reactor
2026-04-28 08:55:58 -04:00
Jorge Reyes b22585ca90 Merge pull request #15833 from Security-Onion-Solutions/reyesj2-es933
exclude more transform job errors
2026-04-27 15:05:11 -05:00
reyesj2 9f2ca7012f exclude more transform job errors 2026-04-27 15:02:13 -05:00
Mike Reeves a6948e8dcb Remove helpLink for influxdb in soc_global.yaml
Removed helpLink for influxdb from endgamehost configuration.
2026-04-23 13:56:41 -04:00
Mike Reeves 0ecc7ae594 soup: drop --local from postgres.telegraf_users reconcile
The manager's /etc/salt/minion (written by so-functions:configure_minion)
has no file_roots, so salt-call --local falls back to Salt's default
/srv/salt and fails with "No matching sls found for 'postgres.telegraf_users'
in env 'base'". || true was silently swallowing the error, which meant the
DB roles for the pillar entries just populated by the so-telegraf-cred
backfill loop never actually got created.

Route through salt-master instead; its file_roots already points at the
default/local salt trees.
2026-04-23 11:25:44 -04:00
Mike Reeves eadad6c163 soup: bootstrap postgres pillar stubs and secret on 3.0.0 upgrade
pillar/top.sls now references postgres.soc_postgres / postgres.adv_postgres
unconditionally, but make_some_dirs only runs at install time so managers
upgrading from 3.0.0 have no local/pillar/postgres/ and salt-master fails
pillar render on the first post-upgrade restart. Similarly, secrets_pillar
is a no-op on upgrade (secrets.sls already exists), so secrets:postgres_pass
never gets seeded and the postgres container's POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE and
SOC's PG_ADMIN_PASS would land empty after highstate.

Add ensure_postgres_local_pillar and ensure_postgres_secret to up_to_3.1.0
so the stubs and secret exist before masterlock/salt-master restart. Both
are idempotent and safe to re-run.
2026-04-23 10:01:38 -04:00
Mike Reeves d5c0ec4404 so-yaml_test: cover loadYaml error paths
Exercises the FileNotFoundError and generic-exception branches added to
loadYaml in the previous commit, restoring 100% coverage required by
the build.
2026-04-22 14:30:51 -04:00
Mike Reeves e616b4c120 so-telegraf-cred: make executable and harden error handling
so-telegraf-cred was committed with mode 644, causing
`so-telegraf-cred add "$MINION_ID"` in so-minion's add_telegraf_to_minion
to fail with "Permission denied" and log "Failed to provision postgres
telegraf cred for <minion>". Mark it executable.

Also bail early in seed_creds_file if mkdir/printf/chmod fail, and in
so-yaml.py loadYaml surface a clear stderr message with the filename
instead of an unhandled FileNotFoundError traceback.
2026-04-22 14:25:19 -04:00
Mike Reeves f240a99e22 so-telegraf-cred: thin bash wrapper around so-yaml.py
Swap the ~150-line Python implementation for a 48-line bash script that
delegates YAML mutation to so-yaml.py — the same helper so-minion and
soup already use. Same semantics: seed the creds pillar on first use,
idempotent add, silent remove.

SO minion ids are dot-free by construction (setup/so-functions:1884
strips everything after the first '.'), so using the raw id as the
so-yaml.py key path is safe.
2026-04-22 11:09:53 -04:00
Mike Reeves 614f32c5e0 Split postgres auth from per-minion telegraf creds
The old flow had two writers for each per-minion Telegraf password
(so-minion wrote the minion pillar; postgres.auth regenerated any
missing aggregate entries). They drifted on first-boot and there was
no trigger to create DB roles when a new minion joined.

Split responsibilities:

- pillar/postgres/auth.sls (manager-scoped) keeps only the so_postgres
  admin cred.
- pillar/telegraf/creds.sls (grid-wide) holds a {minion_id: {user,
  pass}} map, shadowed per-install by the local-pillar copy.
- salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-telegraf-cred is the single writer:
  flock, atomic YAML write, PyYAML safe_dump so passwords never
  round-trip through so-yaml.py's type coercion. Idempotent add, quiet
  remove.
- so-minion's add/remove hooks now shell out to so-telegraf-cred
  instead of editing pillar files directly.
- postgres.telegraf_users iterates the new pillar key and CREATE/ALTERs
  roles from it; telegraf.conf reads its own entry via grains.id.
- orch.deploy_newnode runs postgres.telegraf_users on the manager and
  refreshes the new minion's pillar before the new node highstates,
  so the DB role is in place the first time telegraf tries to connect.
- soup's post_to_3.1.0 backfills the creds pillar from accepted salt
  keys (idempotent) and runs postgres.telegraf_users once to reconcile
  the DB.
2026-04-22 10:55:15 -04:00
Mike Reeves 724d76965f soup: update postgres backfill comment to reflect reactor removal
The reactor path is gone; so-minion now owns add/delete for new
minions. The backfill itself is unchanged — postgres.auth's up_minions
fallback fills the aggregate, postgres.telegraf_users creates the
roles, and the bash loop fans to per-minion pillar files — so the
pre-feature upgrade story still works end-to-end. Just refresh the
comment so it isn't misleading.
2026-04-21 15:45:05 -04:00
Mike Reeves dbf4fb66a4 Clean up postgres telegraf cred on so-minion delete
Paired with the add path in add_telegraf_to_minion: when a minion is
removed, drop its entry from the aggregate postgres pillar and drop the
matching so_telegraf_<safe> role from the database. Without this, stale
entries and DB roles accumulate over time.

Makes rotate-password and compromise-recovery both a clean delete+add:

  so-minion -o=delete -m=<id>
  so-minion -o=add    -m=<id>

The first call drops the role and clears the aggregate pillar; the
second generates a brand-new password.

The cleanup is best-effort — if so-postgres isn't running or the DROP
ROLE fails (e.g., the role owns unexpected objects), we log a warning
and continue so the minion delete itself never gets blocked by postgres
state. Admins can mop up stray roles manually if that happens.
2026-04-21 15:43:01 -04:00
Mike Reeves 5f28e9b191 Move per-minion telegraf cred provisioning into so-minion
Simpler, race-free replacement for the reactor + orch + fan-out chain.

- salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-minion: expand add_telegraf_to_minion to
  generate a random 72-char password, reuse any existing password from
  the aggregate pillar, write postgres.telegraf.{user,pass} into the
  minion's own pillar file, and update the aggregate pillar so
  postgres.telegraf_users can CREATE ROLE on the next manager apply.
  Every create<ROLE> function already calls this hook, so add / addVM /
  setup dispatches are all covered identically and synchronously.
- salt/postgres/auth.sls: strip the fanout_targets loop and the
  postgres_telegraf_minion_pillar_<safe> cmd.run block — it's now
  redundant. The state still manages the so_postgres admin user and
  writes the aggregate pillar for postgres.telegraf_users to consume.
- salt/reactor/telegraf_user_sync.sls: deleted.
- salt/orch/telegraf_postgres_sync.sls: deleted.
- salt/salt/master.sls: drop the reactor_config_telegraf block that
  registered the reactor on /etc/salt/master.d/reactor_telegraf.conf.
- salt/orch/deploy_newnode.sls: drop the manager_fanout_postgres_telegraf
  step and the require: it added to the newnode highstate. Back to its
  original 3/dev shape.

No more ephemeral postgres_fanout_minion pillar, no more async salt/key
reactor, no more so-minion setupMinionFiles race: the pillar write
happens inline inside setupMinionFiles itself.
2026-04-21 15:34:15 -04:00
Mike Reeves 1abfd77351 Hide telegraf password from console and close so-minion race
Two fixes on the postgres telegraf fan-out path:

1. postgres.auth cmd.run leaked the password to the console because
   Salt always prints the Name: field and `show_changes: False` does
   not apply to cmd.run. Move the user and password into the `env:`
   attribute so the shell body still sees them via $PG_USER / $PG_PASS
   but Salt's state reporter never renders them.

2. so-minion's addMinion -> setupMinionFiles sequence removes the
   minion pillar file and rewrites it from scratch, which wipes the
   postgres.telegraf.* entries the reactor may have already written on
   salt-key accept. Add a postgres.auth fan-out step to
   orch.deploy_newnode (the orch so-minion kicks off after
   setupMinionFiles) and require it from the new minion's highstate.
   Idempotent via the existing unless: guard in postgres.auth.
2026-04-21 15:10:57 -04:00
Mike Reeves 81c0f2b464 so-yaml.py: tolerate missing ancestors in removeKey
replace calls removeKey before addKey, so running `so-yaml.py replace`
on a new dotted key whose parent doesn't exist — e.g., postgres.auth
fanning postgres.telegraf.user into a minion pillar file that has
never carried any postgres.* keys — crashed with
    KeyError: 'postgres'
from removeKey recursing into a missing parent dict.

Make removeKey a no-op when an intermediate key is absent so that:
  - `remove` has the natural "remove if exists" semantics, and
  - `replace` works for brand-new nested keys.
2026-04-21 14:43:10 -04:00
Mike Reeves d5dc28e526 Fan postgres telegraf cred for manager on every auth run
The empty-pillar case produced a telegraf.conf with `user= password=`
which libpq misparses ("password=" gets consumed as the user value),
yielding `password authentication failed for user "password="` on
every manager without a prior fan-out (fresh install, not the salt-key
path the reactor handles).

Two fixes:

- salt/postgres/auth.sls: always fan for grains.id in addition to any
  postgres_fanout_minion from the reactor, so the manager's own pillar
  is populated on every postgres.auth run. The existing `unless` guard
  keeps re-runs idempotent.
- salt/telegraf/etc/telegraf.conf: gate the [[outputs.postgresql]]
  block on PG_USER and PG_PASS being non-empty. If a minion hasn't
  received its pillar yet the output block simply isn't rendered — the
  next highstate picks up the creds once the fan-out completes, and in
  the meantime telegraf keeps running the other outputs instead of
  erroring with a malformed connection string.
2026-04-21 14:40:19 -04:00
Mike Reeves 05f6503d61 Gate postgres telegraf fan-out on reactor-provided minion id
postgres.auth was running an `unless` shell check per up-minion on every
manager highstate, even when nothing had changed — N fork+python starts
of so-yaml.py add up on large grids. The work is only needed when a
specific minion's key is accepted.

- salt/postgres/auth.sls: fan out only when postgres_fanout_minion
  pillar is set (targets that single minion). Manager highstates with
  no pillar take a zero-N code path.
- salt/reactor/telegraf_user_sync.sls: re-pass the accepted minion id
  as postgres_fanout_minion to the orch.
- salt/orch/telegraf_postgres_sync.sls: forward the pillar to the
  salt.state invocation so the state render sees it.
- salt/manager/tools/sbin/soup: for the one-time 3.1.0 backfill, drop
  the per-minion state.apply and do an in-shell loop over the minion
  pillar files using so-yaml.py directly. Skips minions that already
  have postgres.telegraf.user set.
2026-04-21 10:05:08 -04:00
Mike Reeves a149ea7e8f Skip per-minion pillar fan-out when cred is already in place
Every postgres.auth run was rewriting every minion pillar file via
two so-yaml.py replace calls, even when nothing had changed. Passwords
are only generated on first encounter (see the `if key not in
telegraf_users` guard) and never rotate, so re-writing the same values
on every apply is wasted work and noisy state output.

Add an `unless:` check that compares the already-written
postgres.telegraf.user to the one we'd set. If they match, skip the
fan-out entirely. On first apply for a new minion the key isn't there,
so the replace runs; on subsequent applies it's a no-op.
2026-04-21 09:59:46 -04:00
Mike Reeves bb71e44614 Write per-minion telegraf creds to each minion's own pillar file
pillar/top.sls only distributes postgres.auth to manager-class roles,
so sensors / heavynodes / searchnodes / receivers / fleet / idh /
hypervisor / desktop minions never received the postgres telegraf
password they need to write metrics. Broadcasting the aggregate
postgres.auth pillar to every role would leak the so_postgres admin
password and every other minion's cred.

Fan out per-minion credentials into each minion's own pillar file at
/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/<id>.sls. That file is already
distributed by pillar/top.sls exclusively to the matching minion via
`- minions.{{ grains.id }}`, so each minion sees only its own
postgres.telegraf.{user,pass} and nothing else.

- salt/postgres/auth.sls: after writing the manager-scoped aggregate
  pillar, fan the per-minion creds out via so-yaml.py replace for every
  up-minion. Creates the minion pillar file if missing. Requires
  postgres_auth_pillar so the manager pillar lands first.
- salt/telegraf/etc/telegraf.conf: consume postgres:telegraf:user and
  postgres:telegraf:pass directly from the minion's own pillar instead
  of walking postgres:auth:users which isn't visible off the manager.
2026-04-21 09:57:35 -04:00
Mike Reeves 84197fb33b Move postgres backup script and cron to the postgres states
The so-postgres-backup script and its cron were living under
salt/backup/config_backup.sls, which meant the backup script and cron
were deployed independently of whether postgres was enabled/disabled.

- Relocate salt/backup/tools/sbin/so-postgres-backup to
  salt/postgres/tools/sbin/so-postgres-backup so the existing
  postgres_sbin file.recurse in postgres/config.sls picks it up with
  everything else — no separate file.managed needed.
- Remove postgres_backup_script and so_postgres_backup from
  salt/backup/config_backup.sls.
- Add cron.present for so_postgres_backup to salt/postgres/enabled.sls
  and the matching cron.absent to salt/postgres/disabled.sls so the
  cron follows the container's lifecycle.
2026-04-21 09:42:41 -04:00
Mike Reeves 89a6e7c0dd Tidy config.sls makedirs and postgres helpLinks
- config.sls: postgresconfdir creates /opt/so/conf/postgres, so the
  two subdirectories under it (postgressecretsdir, postgresinitdir)
  don't need their own makedirs — require the parent instead.
- soc_postgres.yaml: helpLink for every annotated key now points to
  'postgres' instead of the carried-over 'influxdb' slug.
2026-04-21 09:39:58 -04:00
Mike Reeves a902f667ba Target manager by role grain in telegraf_postgres_sync orch
The previous MANAGER resolution used pillar.get('setup:manager') with a
fallback to grains.get('master'). Neither works from the reactor:
setup:manager is only populated by the setup workflow (not by reactor
runs), and grains.master returns the minion's master-hostname setting,
not a targetable minion id.

Match the pattern used by orch/delete_hypervisor.sls: compound-target
whichever minion is the manager via role grain.
2026-04-21 09:37:35 -04:00
Mike Reeves f72c30abd0 Have postgres.telegraf_users include postgres.enabled
postgres_wait_ready requires docker_container: so-postgres, which is
declared in postgres.enabled. Running postgres.telegraf_users on its own
— as the reactor orch and the soup post-upgrade step both do — errored
because Salt couldn't resolve the require.

Include postgres.enabled from postgres.telegraf_users so the container
state is always in the render. postgres.enabled already includes
telegraf_users; Salt de-duplicates the circular include and the included
states are all idempotent, so repeated application is a no-op.
2026-04-21 09:35:59 -04:00
Mike Reeves 37e9257698 Change so-postgres final_octet to 47 2026-04-21 09:33:47 -04:00
Mike Reeves 72105f1f2f Drop telegraf push from new-minion orch; highstate covers it
New minions run highstate as part of onboarding, which already applies
the telegraf state with the fresh pillar entry we just wrote. Pushing
telegraf a second time from the reactor is redundant.

- Remove the MINION-scoped salt.state block from the orch; keep only
  the manager-side postgres.auth + postgres.telegraf_users provisioning.
- Stop passing minion_id as pillar in the reactor; the orch doesn't
  reference it anymore.
2026-04-21 09:31:45 -04:00
Mike Reeves ee89b78751 Fire telegraf user sync on salt/key accept, not salt/auth
salt/auth fires on every minion authentication — including every minion
restart and every master restart — so the reactor was re-running the
postgres.auth + postgres.telegraf_users + telegraf orchestration for
every already-accepted minion on every reconnect. The underlying states
are idempotent, so this was wasted work and log noise, not a correctness
issue.

Switch the subscription to salt/key, which fires only when the master
actually changes a key's state (accept / reject / delete). Match the
pattern used by salt/reactor/check_hypervisor.sls (registered in
salt/salt/cloud/reactor_config_hypervisor.sls) and add the result==True
guard so half-failed key operations don't trigger the orchestration.
2026-04-20 19:54:06 -04:00
Mike Reeves 80bf07ffd8 Flesh out soc_postgres.yaml annotations
Add Configuration-UI annotations for every postgres pillar key defined
in defaults.yaml, not just telegraf.retention_days:

- postgres.enabled          — readonly; admin-visible but toggled via state
- postgres.telegraf.retention_days — drop advanced so user-tunable knobs
  surface in the default view
- postgres.config.max_connections, shared_buffers, log_min_messages —
  user-tunable performance/verbosity knobs, not advanced
- postgres.config.listen_addresses, port, ssl, ssl_cert_file, ssl_key_file,
  ssl_ca_file, hba_file, log_destination, logging_collector,
  shared_preload_libraries, cron.database_name — infra/Salt-managed,
  marked advanced so they're visible but out of the way

No defaults.yaml change; value-side stays the same.
2026-04-20 16:36:37 -04:00
Mike Reeves b69e50542a Use TELEGRAFMERGED for telegraf.output and de-jinja pg_hba.conf
- firewall/map.jinja and postgres/telegraf_users.sls now pull the
  telegraf output selector through TELEGRAFMERGED so the defaults.yaml
  value (BOTH) is the source of truth and pillar overrides merge in
  cleanly. pillar.get with a hardcoded fallback was brittle and would
  disagree with defaults.yaml if the two ever diverged.
- Rename salt/postgres/files/pg_hba.conf.jinja to pg_hba.conf and drop
  template: jinja from config.sls — the file has no jinja besides the
  comment header.
2026-04-20 16:06:01 -04:00
Mike Reeves 3ecd19d085 Move telegraf_output from global pillar to telegraf pillar
The Telegraf backend selector lived at global.telegraf_output but it is
a Telegraf-scoped setting, not a cross-cutting grid global. Move both
the value and the UI annotation under the telegraf pillar so it shows
up alongside the other Telegraf tuning knobs in the Configuration UI.

- salt/telegraf/defaults.yaml:    add telegraf.output: BOTH
- salt/telegraf/soc_telegraf.yaml: add telegraf.output annotation
- salt/global/defaults.yaml:      remove global.telegraf_output
- salt/global/soc_global.yaml:    remove global.telegraf_output annotation
- salt/vars/globals.map.jinja:    drop telegraf_output from GLOBALS
- salt/firewall/map.jinja:        read via pillar.get('telegraf:output')
- salt/postgres/telegraf_users.sls: read via pillar.get('telegraf:output')
- salt/telegraf/etc/telegraf.conf: read via TELEGRAFMERGED.output
- salt/postgres/tools/sbin/so-stats-show: update user-facing docs

No behavioral change — default stays BOTH.
2026-04-20 16:03:02 -04:00
Mike Reeves b6a3d1889c Fix soup state.apply args for postgres provisioning
state.apply takes a single mods argument; space-separated names are not
a list, so `state.apply postgres.auth postgres.telegraf_users` was only
applying postgres.auth and silently dropping the telegraf_users state.

Use comma-separated mods and add queue=True to match the rest of soup.
2026-04-20 14:40:32 -04:00
Mike Reeves 1cb34b089c Restore 3/dev soup and add postgres users to post_to_3.1.0
feature/postgres had rewritten the 3.1.0 upgrade block, dropping the
elastic upgrade work 3/dev landed for 9.0.8→9.3.3: elasticsearch_backup_index_templates,
the component template state cleanup, and the /usr/sbin/so-kibana-space-defaults
post-upgrade call. It also carried an older ES upgrade mapping
(8.18.8→9.0.8) that was superseded on 3/dev (9.0.8→9.3.3 for
3.0.0-20260331), and a handful of latent shell-quoting regressions in
verify_es_version_compatibility and the intermediate-upgrade helpers.

Adopt the 3/dev soup verbatim and only add the new Telegraf Postgres
provisioning to post_to_3.1.0 on top of so-kibana-space-defaults.
2026-04-20 14:38:55 -04:00
Mike Reeves 1537ba5031 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/3/dev' into feature/postgres 2026-04-20 14:32:05 -04:00
Mike Reeves 8225d41661 Harden postgres secrets, TLS enforcement, and admin tooling
- Deliver postgres super and app passwords via mounted 0600 secret files
  (POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE, SO_POSTGRES_PASS_FILE) instead of plaintext env
  vars visible in docker inspect output
- Mount a managed pg_hba.conf that only allows local trust and hostssl
  scram-sha-256 so TCP clients cannot negotiate cleartext sessions
- Restrict postgres.key to 0400 and ensure owner/group 939
- Set umask 0077 on so-postgres-backup output
- Validate host values in so-stats-show against [A-Za-z0-9._-] before SQL
  interpolation so a compromised minion cannot inject SQL via a tag value
- Coerce postgres:telegraf:retention_days to int before rendering into SQL
- Escape single quotes when rendering pillar values into postgresql.conf
- Own postgres tooling in /usr/sbin as root:root so a container escape
  cannot rewrite admin scripts
- Gate ES migration TLS verification on esVerifyCert (default false,
  matching the elastic module's existing pattern)
2026-04-20 12:36:17 -04:00
Mike Reeves 3f46caaf02 Revoke PUBLIC CONNECT on securityonion database
Per-minion telegraf roles inherit CONNECT via PUBLIC by default and
could open sessions to the SOC database (though they have no readable
grants inside). Close the soft edge by revoking PUBLIC's CONNECT and
re-granting it to so_postgres only.
2026-04-17 19:10:07 -04:00
Mike Reeves f3181b204a Remove so-telegraf-trim and update retention description
pg_partman drops old partitions hourly; row-DELETE retention is
obsolete and a confusing emergency fallback on partitioned tables.
2026-04-17 19:06:16 -04:00
Mike Reeves dd39db4584 Drop so_telegraf_trim cron.absent tombstone
feature/postgres never shipped the original cron.present, so this
cleanup state is a no-op on every fresh install. The script itself
stays on disk for emergency use.
2026-04-17 18:59:39 -04:00
Mike Reeves 759880a800 Wait for TCP-ready postgres, not the init-phase Unix socket
docker-entrypoint.sh runs the init-scripts phase with listen_addresses=''
(Unix socket only). The old pg_isready check passed there and then raced
the docker_temp_server_stop shutdown before the final postgres started.
pg_isready -h 127.0.0.1 only returns success once the real CMD binds
TCP, so downstream psql execs never land during the shutdown window.
2026-04-17 16:43:41 -04:00
Mike Reeves 31383bd9d0 Make Telegraf Postgres templates idempotent
Use CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS and a WHERE-guarded create_parent() so
a Telegraf restart can re-run the templates safely after manual DB
surgery. Add an explicit tag_table_create_templates mirroring the
plugin default with IF NOT EXISTS for the same reason.
2026-04-17 15:43:50 -04:00
Mike Reeves 21076af01e Grant so_telegraf CREATE on partman schema
pg_partman 5.x's create_partition() creates a per-parent template
table inside the partman schema at runtime, which requires CREATE on
that schema. Also extend ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES so the runtime-
created template tables are accessible to so_telegraf.
2026-04-17 15:34:19 -04:00
Mike Reeves f11e9da83a Mark time column NOT NULL before partman.create_parent
pg_partman 5.x requires the control column to be NOT NULL; Telegraf's
generated columns are nullable by default.
2026-04-17 15:27:06 -04:00
Mike Reeves 0fddcd8fe7 Pass unquoted schema.name to partman.create_parent
pg_partman 5.x splits p_parent_table on '.' and looks up the parts as
raw identifiers, so the literal must be 'schema.name' rather than the
double-quoted form quoteLiteral emits for .table.
2026-04-17 15:22:57 -04:00
Mike Reeves 927eba566c Grant so_telegraf access to partman schema
Telegraf calls partman.create_parent() on first write of each metric,
which needs USAGE on the partman schema, EXECUTE on its functions and
procedures, and DML on partman.part_config.
2026-04-17 15:13:08 -04:00
Mike Reeves af9330a9dd Escape Go-template placeholders from Jinja in telegraf.conf 2026-04-17 15:04:37 -04:00
Mike Reeves b3fbd5c7a4 Use Go-template placeholders and shell-guarded CREATE DATABASE
- Telegraf's outputs.postgresql plugin uses Go text/template syntax,
  not uppercase tokens. The {TABLE}/{COLUMNS}/{TABLELITERAL} strings
  were passed through to Postgres literally, producing syntax errors
  on every metric's first write. Switch to {{ .table }}, {{ .columns }},
  and {{ .table|quoteLiteral }} so partitioned parents and the partman
  create_parent() call succeed.
- Replace the \gexec "CREATE DATABASE ... WHERE NOT EXISTS" idiom in
  both init-users.sh and telegraf_users.sls with an explicit shell
  conditional. The prior idiom occasionally fired CREATE DATABASE even
  when so_telegraf already existed, producing duplicate-key failures.
2026-04-17 14:55:13 -04:00
Mike Reeves 5228668be0 Fix Telegraf→Postgres table creation and state.apply race
- Telegraf's partman template passed p_type:='native', which pg_partman
  5.x (the version shipped by postgresql-17-partman on Debian) rejects.
  Switched to 'range' so partman.create_parent() actually creates
  partitions and Telegraf's INSERTs succeed.
- Added a postgres_wait_ready gate in telegraf_users.sls so psql execs
  don't race the init-time restart that docker-entrypoint.sh performs.
- so-verify now ignores the literal "-v ON_ERROR_STOP=1" token in the
  setup log. Dropped the matching entry from so-log-check, which scans
  container stdout where that token never appears.
2026-04-17 13:00:12 -04:00
Mike Reeves 7d07f3c8fe Create so_telegraf DB from Salt and pin pg_partman schema
init-users.sh only runs on a fresh data dir, so upgrades onto an
existing /nsm/postgres volume never got so_telegraf. Pinning partman's
schema also makes partman.part_config reliably resolvable.
2026-04-17 10:51:08 -04:00
Mike Reeves d9a9029ce5 Adopt pg_partman + pg_cron for Telegraf metric tables
Every telegraf.* metric table is now a daily time-range partitioned
parent managed by pg_partman. Retention drops old partitions instead
of the row-by-row DELETE that so-telegraf-trim used to run nightly,
and dashboards will benefit from partition pruning at query time.

- Load pg_cron at server start via shared_preload_libraries and point
  cron.database_name at so_telegraf so job metadata lives alongside
  the metrics
- Telegraf create_templates override makes every new metric table a
  PARTITION BY RANGE (time) parent registered with partman.create_parent
  in one transaction (1 day interval, 3 premade)
- postgres_telegraf_group_role now also creates pg_partman and pg_cron
  extensions and schedules hourly partman.run_maintenance_proc
- New retention reconcile state updates partman.part_config.retention
  from postgres.telegraf.retention_days on every apply
- so_telegraf_trim cron is now unconditionally absent; script stays on
  disk as a manual fallback
2026-04-16 17:27:15 -04:00
Mike Reeves 9fe53d9ccc Use JSONB for Telegraf fields/tags to avoid 1600-column limit
High-cardinality inputs (docker, procstat, kafka) trigger ALTER TABLE
ADD COLUMN on every new field name, and with all minions writing into
a shared 'telegraf' schema the metric tables hit Postgres's 1600-column
per-table ceiling quickly. Setting fields_as_jsonb and tags_as_jsonb on
the postgresql output keeps metric tables fixed at (time, tag_id,
fields jsonb) and tag tables at (tag_id, tags jsonb).

- so-stats-show rewritten to use JSONB accessors
  ((fields->>'x')::numeric, tags->>'host', etc.) and cast memory/disk
  sizes to bigint so pg_size_pretty works
- Drop regex/regexFailureMessage from telegraf_output SOC UI entry to
  match the convention upstream used when removing them from
  mdengine/pcapengine/pipeline; options: list drives validation
2026-04-16 17:02:21 -04:00
Mike Reeves f7b80f5931 Merge branch '3/dev' into feature/postgres 2026-04-16 16:37:02 -04:00
Mike Reeves f11d315fea Fix soup 2026-04-16 16:35:24 -04:00
Mike Reeves 2013bf9e30 Fix soup 2026-04-16 16:20:25 -04:00
Mike Reeves a2ffb92b8d Fix soup 2026-04-16 16:19:53 -04:00
Mike Reeves 470b3bd4da Comingle Telegraf metrics into shared schema
Per-minion schemas cause table count to explode (N minions * M metrics)
and the per-minion revocation story isn't worth it when retention is
short. Move all minions to a shared 'telegraf' schema while keeping
per-minion login credentials for audit.

- New so_telegraf NOLOGIN group role owns the telegraf schema; each
  per-minion role is a member and inherits insert/select via role
  inheritance
- Telegraf connection string uses options='-c role=so_telegraf' so
  tables auto-created on first write belong to the group role
- so-telegraf-trim walks the flat telegraf.* table set instead of
  per-minion schemas
- so-stats-show filters by host tag; CLI arg is now the hostname as
  tagged by Telegraf rather than a sanitized schema suffix
- Also renames so-show-stats -> so-stats-show
2026-04-16 15:40:54 -04:00
Mike Reeves c124186989 so-log-check: exclude psql ON_ERROR_STOP flag
The psql invocation flag '-v ON_ERROR_STOP=1' used by the so-postgres
init script gets flagged by so-log-check because the token 'ERROR'
matches its error regex. Add to the exclusion list.
2026-04-15 19:45:42 -04:00
Mike Reeves d24808ff98 Fix so-show-stats tag column resolution
Telegraf's postgresql output stores tag values either as individual
columns on <metric>_tag or as a single JSONB 'tags' column, depending
on plugin version. Introspect information_schema.columns and build the
right accessor per tag instead of assuming one layout.
2026-04-15 19:28:10 -04:00
Mike Reeves cefbe01333 Add telegraf_output selector for InfluxDB/Postgres dual-write
Introduces global.telegraf_output (INFLUXDB|POSTGRES|BOTH, default BOTH)
so Telegraf can write metrics to Postgres alongside or instead of
InfluxDB. Each minion authenticates with its own so_telegraf_<minion>
role and writes to a matching schema inside a shared so_telegraf
database, keeping blast radius per-credential to that minion's data.

- Per-minion credentials auto-generated and persisted in postgres/auth.sls
- postgres/telegraf_users.sls reconciles roles/schemas on every apply
- Firewall opens 5432 only to minion hostgroups when Postgres output is active
- Reactor on salt/auth + orch/telegraf_postgres_sync.sls provision new
  minions automatically on key accept
- soup post_to_3.1.0 backfills users for existing minions on upgrade
- so-show-stats prints latest CPU/mem/disk/load per minion for sanity checks
- so-telegraf-trim + nightly cron prune rows older than
  postgres.telegraf.retention_days (default 14)
2026-04-15 14:32:10 -04:00
Mike Reeves 9ccd0acb4f Add ES credentials to postgres module config for migration
Postgres module now queries Elasticsearch directly via HTTP
for the chat migration (bypasses RBAC that needs user context).
Pass esHostUrl, esUsername, esPassword alongside postgres creds.
2026-04-10 11:41:33 -04:00
Mike Reeves 1ffdcab3be Add postgres adminPassword to SOC module config
Injects the postgres superuser password from secrets pillar so
SOC can run schema migrations as admin before switching to the
app user for normal operations.
2026-04-09 22:21:35 -04:00
Mike Reeves da1045e052 Fix init-users.sh password escaping for special characters
Use format() with %L for SQL literal escaping instead of raw
string interpolation. Also ALTER ROLE if user already exists
to keep password in sync with pillar.
2026-04-09 21:52:20 -04:00
Mike Reeves 55be1f1119 Only add postgres module config on manager nodes
Removed postgres from soc/defaults.yaml (shared by all nodes)
and moved it entirely into defaults.map.jinja, which only injects
the config when postgres auth pillar exists (manager-type nodes).
Sensors and other non-manager nodes will not have a postgres module
section in their sensoroni.json, so sensoroni won't try to connect.
2026-04-09 21:09:43 -04:00
Mike Reeves c1b1452bd9 Use manager IP for postgres hostUrl instead of container hostname
SOC connects to postgres via the host network, not the Docker
bridge network, so it needs the manager's IP address rather than
the container hostname.
2026-04-09 19:34:14 -04:00
Mike Reeves 2dfa83dd7d Wire postgres credentials into SOC module config
- Create vars/postgres.map.jinja for postgres auth globals
- Add POSTGRES_GLOBALS to all manager-type role vars
  (manager, eval, standalone, managersearch, import)
- Add postgres module config to soc/defaults.yaml
- Inject so_postgres credentials from auth pillar into
  soc/defaults.map.jinja (conditional on auth pillar existing)
2026-04-09 14:09:32 -04:00
Mike Reeves b87af8ea3d Add postgres.auth to allowed_states
Matches the elasticsearch.auth pattern where auth states use
the full sls path check and are explicitly listed.
2026-04-09 12:39:46 -04:00
Mike Reeves 46e38d39bb Enable postgres by default
Safe because postgres states are only applied to manager-type
nodes via top.sls and allowed_states.map.jinja.
2026-04-09 12:23:47 -04:00
Mike Reeves 61bdfb1a4b Add daily PostgreSQL database backup
- pg_dumpall piped through gzip, stored in /nsm/backup/
- Runs daily at 00:05 (4 minutes after config backup)
- 7-day retention matching existing config backup policy
- Skips gracefully if container isn't running
2026-04-09 10:29:10 -04:00
Mike Reeves 358a2e6d3f Add so-postgres to container image pull list
Add to both the import and default manager container lists so
the image gets downloaded during installation.
2026-04-09 10:02:41 -04:00
Mike Reeves 762e73faf5 Add so-postgres host management scripts
- so-postgres-manage: wraps docker exec for psql operations
  (sql, sqlfile, shell, dblist, userlist)
- so-postgres-start/stop/restart: standard container lifecycle
- Scripts installed to /usr/sbin via file.recurse in config.sls
2026-04-09 09:55:42 -04:00
Mike Reeves 868cd11874 Add so-postgres Salt states and integration wiring
Phase 1 of the PostgreSQL central data platform:
- Salt states: init, enabled, disabled, config, ssl, auth, sostatus
- TLS via SO CA-signed certs with postgresql.conf template
- Two-tier auth: postgres superuser + so_postgres application user
- Firewall restricts port 5432 to manager-only (HA-ready)
- Wired into top.sls, pillar/top.sls, allowed_states, firewall
  containers map, docker defaults, CA signing policies, and setup
  scripts for all manager-type roles
2026-04-08 10:58:52 -04:00
71 changed files with 3977 additions and 12 deletions
+12
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
# Per-minion Telegraf Postgres credentials. so-telegraf-cred on the manager is
# the single writer; it mutates /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/telegraf/creds.sls
# under flock. Pillar_roots order (local before default) means the populated
# copy shadows this default on any real grid; this file exists so the pillar
# key is always defined on fresh installs and when no minions have creds yet.
telegraf:
postgres_creds: {}
+21
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ base:
- sensoroni.adv_sensoroni
- telegraf.soc_telegraf
- telegraf.adv_telegraf
- telegraf.creds
- versionlock.soc_versionlock
- versionlock.adv_versionlock
- soc.license
@@ -38,6 +39,9 @@ base:
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/elasticsearch/auth.sls') %}
- elasticsearch.auth
{% endif %}
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls') %}
- postgres.auth
{% endif %}
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/kibana/secrets.sls') %}
- kibana.secrets
{% endif %}
@@ -60,6 +64,8 @@ base:
- redis.adv_redis
- influxdb.soc_influxdb
- influxdb.adv_influxdb
- postgres.soc_postgres
- postgres.adv_postgres
- elasticsearch.nodes
- elasticsearch.soc_elasticsearch
- elasticsearch.adv_elasticsearch
@@ -100,6 +106,9 @@ base:
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/elasticsearch/auth.sls') %}
- elasticsearch.auth
{% endif %}
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls') %}
- postgres.auth
{% endif %}
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/kibana/secrets.sls') %}
- kibana.secrets
{% endif %}
@@ -125,6 +134,8 @@ base:
- redis.adv_redis
- influxdb.soc_influxdb
- influxdb.adv_influxdb
- postgres.soc_postgres
- postgres.adv_postgres
- backup.soc_backup
- backup.adv_backup
- zeek.soc_zeek
@@ -144,6 +155,9 @@ base:
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/elasticsearch/auth.sls') %}
- elasticsearch.auth
{% endif %}
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls') %}
- postgres.auth
{% endif %}
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/kibana/secrets.sls') %}
- kibana.secrets
{% endif %}
@@ -158,6 +172,8 @@ base:
- redis.adv_redis
- influxdb.soc_influxdb
- influxdb.adv_influxdb
- postgres.soc_postgres
- postgres.adv_postgres
- elasticsearch.nodes
- elasticsearch.soc_elasticsearch
- elasticsearch.adv_elasticsearch
@@ -257,6 +273,9 @@ base:
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/elasticsearch/auth.sls') %}
- elasticsearch.auth
{% endif %}
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls') %}
- postgres.auth
{% endif %}
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/kibana/secrets.sls') %}
- kibana.secrets
{% endif %}
@@ -282,6 +301,8 @@ base:
- redis.adv_redis
- influxdb.soc_influxdb
- influxdb.adv_influxdb
- postgres.soc_postgres
- postgres.adv_postgres
- zeek.soc_zeek
- zeek.adv_zeek
- bpf.soc_bpf
+2
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
'manager',
'nginx',
'influxdb',
'postgres',
'postgres.auth',
'soc',
'kratos',
'hydra',
+1
View File
@@ -32,3 +32,4 @@ so_config_backup:
- daymonth: '*'
- month: '*'
- dayweek: '*'
+14
View File
@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ x509_signing_policies:
- extendedKeyUsage: serverAuth
- days_valid: 820
- copypath: /etc/pki/issued_certs/
postgres:
- minions: '*'
- signing_private_key: /etc/pki/ca.key
- signing_cert: /etc/pki/ca.crt
- C: US
- ST: Utah
- L: Salt Lake City
- basicConstraints: "critical CA:false"
- keyUsage: "critical keyEncipherment"
- subjectKeyIdentifier: hash
- authorityKeyIdentifier: keyid,issuer:always
- extendedKeyUsage: serverAuth
- days_valid: 820
- copypath: /etc/pki/issued_certs/
elasticfleet:
- minions: '*'
- signing_private_key: /etc/pki/ca.key
+2
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ container_list() {
"so-hydra"
"so-nginx"
"so-pcaptools"
"so-postgres"
"so-soc"
"so-suricata"
"so-telegraf"
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ container_list() {
"so-logstash"
"so-nginx"
"so-pcaptools"
"so-postgres"
"so-redis"
"so-soc"
"so-strelka-backend"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ if [[ $EXCLUDE_KNOWN_ERRORS == 'Y' ]]; then
EXCLUDED_ERRORS="$EXCLUDED_ERRORS|from NIC checksum offloading" # zeek reporter.log
EXCLUDED_ERRORS="$EXCLUDED_ERRORS|marked for removal" # docker container getting recycled
EXCLUDED_ERRORS="$EXCLUDED_ERRORS|tcp 127.0.0.1:6791: bind: address already in use" # so-elastic-fleet agent restarting. Seen starting w/ 8.18.8 https://github.com/elastic/kibana/issues/201459
EXCLUDED_ERRORS="$EXCLUDED_ERRORS|TransformTask\] \[logs-(tychon|aws_billing|microsoft_defender_endpoint).*user so_kibana lacks the required permissions \[logs-\1" # Known issue with 3 integrations using kibana_system role vs creating unique api creds with proper permissions.
EXCLUDED_ERRORS="$EXCLUDED_ERRORS|TransformTask\] \[logs-(tychon|aws_billing|microsoft_defender_endpoint|armis|o365_metrics|microsoft_sentinel|snyk).*user so_kibana lacks the required permissions \[(logs|metrics)-\1" # Known issue with integrations starting transform jobs that are explicitly not allowed to start as a system user. (installed as so_elastic / so_kibana)
EXCLUDED_ERRORS="$EXCLUDED_ERRORS|manifest unknown" # appears in so-dockerregistry log for so-tcpreplay following docker upgrade to 29.2.1-1
fi
+8
View File
@@ -237,3 +237,11 @@ docker:
extra_hosts: []
extra_env: []
ulimits: []
'so-postgres':
final_octet: 47
port_bindings:
- 0.0.0.0:5432:5432
custom_bind_mounts: []
extra_hosts: []
extra_env: []
ulimits: []
+3
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
'so-kratos',
'so-hydra',
'so-nginx',
'so-postgres',
'so-redis',
'so-soc',
'so-strelka-coordinator',
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
'so-hydra',
'so-logstash',
'so-nginx',
'so-postgres',
'so-redis',
'so-soc',
'so-strelka-coordinator',
@@ -77,6 +79,7 @@
'so-kratos',
'so-hydra',
'so-nginx',
'so-postgres',
'so-soc'
] %}
+9
View File
@@ -98,6 +98,10 @@ firewall:
tcp:
- 8086
udp: []
postgres:
tcp:
- 5432
udp: []
kafka_controller:
tcp:
- 9093
@@ -193,6 +197,7 @@ firewall:
- kibana
- redis
- influxdb
- postgres
- elasticsearch_rest
- elasticsearch_node
- localrules
@@ -379,6 +384,7 @@ firewall:
- kibana
- redis
- influxdb
- postgres
- elasticsearch_rest
- elasticsearch_node
- docker_registry
@@ -590,6 +596,7 @@ firewall:
- kibana
- redis
- influxdb
- postgres
- elasticsearch_rest
- elasticsearch_node
- docker_registry
@@ -799,6 +806,7 @@ firewall:
- kibana
- redis
- influxdb
- postgres
- elasticsearch_rest
- elasticsearch_node
- docker_registry
@@ -1011,6 +1019,7 @@ firewall:
- kibana
- redis
- influxdb
- postgres
- elasticsearch_rest
- elasticsearch_node
- docker_registry
+13
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
{% from 'vars/globals.map.jinja' import GLOBALS %}
{% from 'docker/docker.map.jinja' import DOCKERMERGED %}
{% from 'telegraf/map.jinja' import TELEGRAFMERGED %}
{% import_yaml 'firewall/defaults.yaml' as FIREWALL_DEFAULT %}
{# add our ip to self #}
@@ -55,4 +56,16 @@
{% endif %}
{# Open Postgres (5432) to minion hostgroups when Telegraf is configured to write to Postgres #}
{% set TG_OUT = TELEGRAFMERGED.output | upper %}
{% if TG_OUT in ['POSTGRES', 'BOTH'] %}
{% if role.startswith('manager') or role == 'standalone' or role == 'eval' %}
{% for r in ['sensor', 'searchnode', 'heavynode', 'receiver', 'fleet', 'idh', 'desktop', 'import'] %}
{% if FIREWALL_DEFAULT.firewall.role[role].chain["DOCKER-USER"].hostgroups[r] is defined %}
{% do FIREWALL_DEFAULT.firewall.role[role].chain["DOCKER-USER"].hostgroups[r].portgroups.append('postgres') %}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
{% endif %}
{% set FIREWALL_MERGED = salt['pillar.get']('firewall', FIREWALL_DEFAULT.firewall, merge=True) %}
+46 -1
View File
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ function deleteMinionFiles () {
log "ERROR" "Failed to delete $PILLARFILE"
return 1
fi
rm -f $ADVPILLARFILE
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
log "ERROR" "Failed to delete $ADVPILLARFILE"
@@ -281,6 +281,39 @@ function deleteMinionFiles () {
fi
}
# Remove this minion's postgres Telegraf credential from the shared creds
# pillar and drop the matching role in Postgres. Always returns 0 so a dead
# or unreachable so-postgres doesn't block minion deletion — in that case we
# log a warning and leave the role behind for manual cleanup.
function remove_postgres_telegraf_from_minion() {
local MINION_SAFE
MINION_SAFE=$(echo "$MINION_ID" | tr '.-' '__' | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
local PG_USER="so_telegraf_${MINION_SAFE}"
log "INFO" "Removing postgres telegraf cred for $MINION_ID"
so-telegraf-cred remove "$MINION_ID" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^so-postgres$'; then
if ! docker exec -i so-postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U postgres -d so_telegraf >/dev/null 2>&1 <<EOSQL
DO \$\$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (SELECT FROM pg_catalog.pg_roles WHERE rolname = '$PG_USER') THEN
EXECUTE format('REASSIGN OWNED BY %I TO so_telegraf', '$PG_USER');
EXECUTE format('DROP OWNED BY %I', '$PG_USER');
EXECUTE format('DROP ROLE %I', '$PG_USER');
END IF;
END
\$\$;
EOSQL
then
log "WARN" "Failed to drop postgres role $PG_USER; pillar entry was removed — drop manually if the role persists"
fi
else
log "WARN" "so-postgres container is not running; skipping DB role cleanup for $PG_USER"
fi
}
# Create the minion file
function ensure_socore_ownership() {
log "INFO" "Setting socore ownership on minion files"
@@ -542,6 +575,17 @@ function add_telegraf_to_minion() {
log "ERROR" "Failed to add telegraf configuration to $PILLARFILE"
return 1
fi
# Provision the per-minion postgres Telegraf credential in the shared
# telegraf/creds.sls pillar. so-telegraf-cred is the only writer; it
# generates a password on first add and is a no-op on re-add so the cred
# is stable across repeated so-minion runs. postgres.telegraf_users on the
# manager creates/updates the DB role from the same pillar.
so-telegraf-cred add "$MINION_ID"
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
log "ERROR" "Failed to provision postgres telegraf cred for $MINION_ID"
return 1
fi
}
function add_influxdb_to_minion() {
@@ -1069,6 +1113,7 @@ case "$OPERATION" in
"delete")
log "INFO" "Removing minion $MINION_ID"
remove_postgres_telegraf_from_minion
deleteMinionFiles || {
log "ERROR" "Failed to delete minion files for $MINION_ID"
exit 1
+329
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
"""
so-pillar-import — populate the so_pillar.* schema in so-postgres from the
on-disk Salt pillar tree.
Reads /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/, decomposes each .sls file into a
(scope, role|minion_id, pillar_path, data) tuple, and UPSERTs it into
so_pillar.pillar_entry. Idempotent — re-running with no SLS edits produces
no version bumps because the audit trigger only writes a row when data
actually changes.
Bootstrap and mine-driven files are skipped (see EXCLUDE_BASENAMES /
EXCLUDE_PREFIXES below). Files containing Jinja templates ({% or {{) are
also skipped — those stay disk-authoritative and ext_pillar_first: False
means they render before the PG overlay anyway.
All SQL goes through `docker exec so-postgres psql` so no separate DSN
config is required at first-install time. Designed to be called by
salt/postgres/schema_pillar.sls (initial seed) and by salt/manager/tools/
sbin/so-minion (per-minion sync on add/delete).
"""
import argparse
import json
import os
import shlex
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
import yaml
PILLAR_LOCAL_ROOT = Path("/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar")
PILLAR_DEFAULT_ROOT = Path("/opt/so/saltstack/default/pillar")
DOCKER_CONTAINER = "so-postgres"
PG_SUPERUSER = "postgres"
PG_DATABASE = "securityonion"
# Files that must NEVER move to Postgres. These are read by Salt before
# Postgres is reachable, or contain renderer-time computed values (mine, etc.).
EXCLUDE_BASENAMES = {
"secrets.sls",
"auth.sls", # postgres/auth.sls bootstrap
"top.sls",
}
# Filename prefixes to skip — these are renderer-time computed pillars
# (Salt mine, file_exists guards, etc.) that have to stay on disk.
EXCLUDE_PATH_FRAGMENTS = (
"/elasticsearch/nodes.sls",
"/redis/nodes.sls",
"/kafka/nodes.sls",
"/hypervisor/nodes.sls",
"/logstash/nodes.sls",
"/node_data/ips.sls",
"/postgres/auth.sls",
"/elasticsearch/auth.sls",
"/kibana/secrets.sls",
)
def log(level, msg):
print(f"[{level}] {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
def is_jinja_templated(content_bytes):
return b"{%" in content_bytes or b"{{" in content_bytes
def classify(path):
"""Return (scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path) for a pillar file
or None to skip it. role_name is None for now — the importer leaves role
membership to the so_pillar.minion trigger and the salt/auth reactor."""
rel_str = str(path)
if path.name in EXCLUDE_BASENAMES:
return None
for frag in EXCLUDE_PATH_FRAGMENTS:
if frag in rel_str:
return None
# /local/pillar/minions/<id>.sls or adv_<id>.sls
if path.parent.name == "minions":
stem = path.stem # filename without .sls
if stem.startswith("adv_"):
mid = stem[4:]
return ("minion", None, mid, f"minions.adv_{mid}")
return ("minion", None, stem, f"minions.{stem}")
# /local/pillar/<section>/<file>.sls
if path.parent.parent == PILLAR_LOCAL_ROOT or path.parent.parent == PILLAR_DEFAULT_ROOT:
section = path.parent.name
stem = path.stem
# Only soc_<section>.sls and adv_<section>.sls are SOC-managed pillar
# surfaces. Other files (e.g. nodes.sls, auth.sls, *.token) are
# either covered by EXCLUDE_PATH_FRAGMENTS or are bootstrap surfaces
# we leave alone for now.
if stem.startswith("soc_") or stem.startswith("adv_"):
return ("global", None, None, f"{section}.{stem}")
return None
return None
def parse_yaml_file(path):
with open(path, "rb") as f:
content = f.read()
if not content.strip():
return {}
if is_jinja_templated(content):
return None
data = yaml.safe_load(content)
if data is None:
return {}
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return {"_raw": data}
return data
def derive_node_type(minion_id):
"""Conventional Security Onion minion ids are <host>_<role>. Take the
last underscore-delimited token as the canonical role suffix."""
parts = minion_id.rsplit("_", 1)
if len(parts) == 2:
return parts[1]
return None
def docker_psql(sql, *, db=PG_DATABASE, user=PG_SUPERUSER, on_error_stop=True, capture=True):
"""Run sql via docker exec ... psql. Returns stdout as str."""
args = [
"docker", "exec", "-i", DOCKER_CONTAINER,
"psql", "-U", user, "-d", db, "-tA", "-q",
]
if on_error_stop:
args += ["-v", "ON_ERROR_STOP=1"]
proc = subprocess.run(
args, input=sql.encode(),
capture_output=capture, check=False,
)
if proc.returncode != 0:
sys.stderr.write(proc.stderr.decode(errors="replace"))
raise RuntimeError(f"docker exec psql failed (rc={proc.returncode})")
return proc.stdout.decode(errors="replace")
def upsert_minion(minion_id, node_type):
sql = (
"INSERT INTO so_pillar.minion (minion_id, node_type) "
f"VALUES ({pg_str(minion_id)}, {pg_str(node_type) if node_type else 'NULL'}) "
"ON CONFLICT (minion_id) DO UPDATE SET node_type = EXCLUDED.node_type;"
)
docker_psql(sql)
def delete_minion(minion_id):
"""CASCADE removes pillar_entry + role_member rows."""
sql = f"DELETE FROM so_pillar.minion WHERE minion_id = {pg_str(minion_id)};"
docker_psql(sql)
def upsert_pillar_entry(scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path, data, reason):
"""Insert or update the row keyed by the partial unique index that
matches scope. Audit trigger handles history; versioning trigger bumps
version only when data changes."""
data_json = json.dumps(data)
role_sql = pg_str(role_name) if role_name else "NULL"
minion_sql = pg_str(minion_id) if minion_id else "NULL"
reason_sql = pg_str(reason)
if scope == "global":
conflict = "(pillar_path) WHERE scope='global'"
elif scope == "role":
conflict = "(role_name, pillar_path) WHERE scope='role'"
elif scope == "minion":
conflict = "(minion_id, pillar_path) WHERE scope='minion'"
else:
raise ValueError(f"unknown scope {scope!r}")
sql = (
"BEGIN;\n"
f"SELECT set_config('so_pillar.change_reason', {reason_sql}, true);\n"
f"INSERT INTO so_pillar.pillar_entry "
f"(scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path, data, change_reason) "
f"VALUES ({pg_str(scope)}, {role_sql}, {minion_sql}, {pg_str(pillar_path)}, {pg_jsonb(data_json)}, {reason_sql}) "
f"ON CONFLICT {conflict} DO UPDATE "
f"SET data = EXCLUDED.data, change_reason = EXCLUDED.change_reason;\n"
"COMMIT;\n"
)
docker_psql(sql)
def pg_str(s):
"""Escape a Python str for inclusion in literal SQL. Pillar content has
already been validated as YAML; we just need standard SQL escaping."""
if s is None:
return "NULL"
return "'" + str(s).replace("'", "''") + "'"
def pg_jsonb(json_str):
return pg_str(json_str) + "::jsonb"
def walk_pillar_root(root, paths):
if not root.is_dir():
return
for path in root.rglob("*.sls"):
if path.is_file():
paths.append(path)
def import_minion(minion_id, node_type, dry_run, reason):
"""Re-import every pillar file for a single minion."""
if not minion_id:
raise ValueError("minion_id required for --scope minion")
upsert_minion(minion_id, node_type)
log("INFO", f"Upserted minion row {minion_id} (node_type={node_type})")
targets = [
PILLAR_LOCAL_ROOT / "minions" / f"{minion_id}.sls",
PILLAR_LOCAL_ROOT / "minions" / f"adv_{minion_id}.sls",
]
for path in targets:
if not path.exists():
log("INFO", f" (no file at {path})")
continue
klass = classify(path)
if not klass:
log("INFO", f" skip {path} (excluded)")
continue
scope, role, mid, pillar_path = klass
data = parse_yaml_file(path)
if data is None:
log("WARN", f" skip {path} (Jinja-templated; stays disk-only)")
continue
if dry_run:
log("DRY", f" would upsert {scope}/{pillar_path} = {len(json.dumps(data))} bytes")
continue
upsert_pillar_entry(scope, role, mid, pillar_path, data, reason)
log("INFO", f" imported {scope}/{pillar_path}")
def import_all(dry_run, reason):
"""Walk the entire local pillar tree and import every eligible file."""
paths = []
walk_pillar_root(PILLAR_LOCAL_ROOT, paths)
imported = 0
skipped = 0
minions_seen = set()
for path in sorted(paths):
klass = classify(path)
if not klass:
skipped += 1
continue
scope, role, minion_id, pillar_path = klass
data = parse_yaml_file(path)
if data is None:
log("WARN", f"skip {path} (Jinja-templated; stays disk-only)")
skipped += 1
continue
if scope == "minion" and minion_id not in minions_seen:
node_type = derive_node_type(minion_id)
if not dry_run:
upsert_minion(minion_id, node_type)
minions_seen.add(minion_id)
if dry_run:
log("DRY", f"would upsert {scope}/{pillar_path} ({len(json.dumps(data))} bytes)")
else:
upsert_pillar_entry(scope, role, minion_id, pillar_path, data, reason)
log("INFO", f"imported {scope}/{pillar_path}")
imported += 1
log("INFO", f"done: {imported} imported, {skipped} skipped")
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
ap.add_argument("--scope", choices=("global", "role", "minion", "all"), default="all")
ap.add_argument("--minion-id")
ap.add_argument("--node-type", help="override node_type for --scope minion (default: derived from minion_id)")
ap.add_argument("--delete", action="store_true",
help="With --scope minion, remove the minion row (and its pillar rows via CASCADE)")
ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--diff", action="store_true",
help="(reserved) print structural diffs vs current DB content")
ap.add_argument("--yes", action="store_true",
help="Skip confirmation prompts (currently unused; reserved)")
ap.add_argument("--reason", default="so-pillar-import",
help="change_reason recorded in pillar_entry_history")
args = ap.parse_args()
try:
if args.scope == "minion":
if not args.minion_id:
ap.error("--minion-id required when --scope minion")
if args.delete:
if args.dry_run:
log("DRY", f"would delete {args.minion_id}")
else:
delete_minion(args.minion_id)
log("INFO", f"deleted {args.minion_id}")
else:
node_type = args.node_type or derive_node_type(args.minion_id)
import_minion(args.minion_id, node_type, args.dry_run, args.reason)
elif args.scope == "all":
import_all(args.dry_run, args.reason)
else:
log("ERROR", f"--scope {args.scope} not yet implemented; use --scope all or --scope minion")
return 2
except Exception as e:
log("ERROR", str(e))
return 1
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
+54
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
# Single writer for the Telegraf Postgres credentials pillar. Thin wrapper
# around so-yaml.py that generates a password on first add and no-ops on
# re-add so the cred is stable across repeated so-minion runs.
#
# Note: so-yaml.py splits keys on '.' with no escape. SO minion ids are
# dot-free by construction (setup/so-functions:1884 takes the short_name
# before the first '.'), so using the raw minion id as the key is safe.
CREDS=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/telegraf/creds.sls
usage() {
echo "Usage: $0 <add|remove> <minion_id>" >&2
exit 2
}
seed_creds_file() {
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$CREDS")" || return 1
if [[ ! -f "$CREDS" ]]; then
(umask 027 && printf 'telegraf:\n postgres_creds: {}\n' > "$CREDS") || return 1
chown socore:socore "$CREDS" 2>/dev/null || true
chmod 640 "$CREDS" || return 1
fi
}
OP=$1
MID=$2
[[ -z "$OP" || -z "$MID" ]] && usage
case "$OP" in
add)
SAFE=$(echo "$MID" | tr '.-' '__' | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
seed_creds_file || exit 1
if so-yaml.py get -r "$CREDS" "telegraf.postgres_creds.${MID}.user" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
exit 0
fi
PASS=$(tr -dc 'A-Za-z0-9~!@#^&*()_=+[]|;:,.<>?-' < /dev/urandom | head -c 72)
so-yaml.py replace "$CREDS" "telegraf.postgres_creds.${MID}.user" "so_telegraf_${SAFE}" >/dev/null
so-yaml.py replace "$CREDS" "telegraf.postgres_creds.${MID}.pass" "$PASS" >/dev/null
;;
remove)
[[ -f "$CREDS" ]] || exit 0
so-yaml.py remove "$CREDS" "telegraf.postgres_creds.${MID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
;;
*)
usage
;;
esac
+197 -5
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,64 @@ import json
lockFile = "/tmp/so-yaml.lock"
# postsalt: so-yaml supports three backend modes for PG-managed pillar paths:
#
# dual — write disk + mirror to so_pillar.*. Reads from disk.
# Used during the migration transition when disk is still
# canonical and PG runs as a shadow.
# postgres — write to so_pillar.* only. Reads from so_pillar.*. No disk
# file is touched. The end state once cutover is complete.
# disk — disk only, no PG. Emergency rollback escape hatch.
#
# Bootstrap and mine-driven files (secrets.sls, ca/init.sls, */nodes.sls,
# top.sls, etc.) are always handled on disk regardless of mode — those paths
# are explicitly excluded by so_yaml_postgres.locate() raising SkipPath.
#
# Mode resolution: SO_YAML_BACKEND env var, then /opt/so/conf/so-yaml/mode,
# then default 'dual' (safe upgrade behavior — flipping to 'postgres' is
# done by schema_pillar.sls after the schema is in place and the importer
# has run at least once).
MODE_FILE = "/opt/so/conf/so-yaml/mode"
VALID_MODES = ("dual", "postgres", "disk")
DEFAULT_MODE = "dual"
try:
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
import so_yaml_postgres
_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE = True
except Exception as _exc:
_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE = False
def _resolveBackendMode():
env = os.environ.get("SO_YAML_BACKEND")
if env and env in VALID_MODES:
return env
try:
with open(MODE_FILE, "r") as fh:
value = fh.read().strip()
if value in VALID_MODES:
return value
except (IOError, OSError):
pass
return DEFAULT_MODE
_BACKEND_MODE = _resolveBackendMode()
def _isPgManaged(filename):
"""True when so-yaml should route this file's reads/writes through
so_pillar.*. False for bootstrap/mine-driven files that always live on
disk, and for arbitrary YAML paths outside the pillar tree."""
if not _SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE:
return False
try:
return so_yaml_postgres.is_pg_managed(filename)
except Exception:
return False
def showUsage(args):
print('Usage: {} <COMMAND> <YAML_FILE> [ARGS...]'.format(sys.argv[0]), file=sys.stderr)
@@ -25,8 +83,14 @@ def showUsage(args):
print(' get [-r] - Displays (to stdout) the value stored in the given key. Requires KEY arg. Use -r for raw output without YAML formatting.', file=sys.stderr)
print(' remove - Removes a yaml key, if it exists. Requires KEY arg.', file=sys.stderr)
print(' replace - Replaces (or adds) a new key and set its value. Requires KEY and VALUE args.', file=sys.stderr)
print(' purge - Delete the YAML file from disk and remove its rows from so_pillar.* (no KEY arg).', file=sys.stderr)
print(' help - Prints this usage information.', file=sys.stderr)
print('', file=sys.stderr)
print(' Backend mode:', file=sys.stderr)
print(' Resolved from $SO_YAML_BACKEND, then /opt/so/conf/so-yaml/mode, default "dual".', file=sys.stderr)
print(' Valid values: dual | postgres | disk. Bootstrap pillar files (secrets, ca, *.nodes.sls)', file=sys.stderr)
print(' are always handled on disk regardless of mode.', file=sys.stderr)
print('', file=sys.stderr)
print(' Where:', file=sys.stderr)
print(' YAML_FILE - Path to the file that will be modified. Ex: /opt/so/conf/service/conf.yaml', file=sys.stderr)
print(' KEY - YAML key, does not support \' or " characters at this time. Ex: level1.level2', file=sys.stderr)
@@ -39,14 +103,128 @@ def showUsage(args):
def loadYaml(filename):
file = open(filename, "r")
content = file.read()
return yaml.safe_load(content)
"""Load a YAML file's content as a dict.
PG-canonical mode (`postgres`): for PG-managed paths, read from
so_pillar.pillar_entry. A missing row is treated as an empty dict so
that `replace`/`add` on a fresh path can populate it from scratch.
Other modes / non-PG-managed paths: read from disk as today.
"""
if _BACKEND_MODE == "postgres" and _isPgManaged(filename):
try:
data = so_yaml_postgres.read_yaml(filename)
except so_yaml_postgres.SkipPath:
data = None
except Exception as e:
print(f"so-yaml: pg read failed for {filename}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
return data if data is not None else {}
try:
with open(filename, "r") as file:
content = file.read()
return yaml.safe_load(content)
except FileNotFoundError:
print(f"File not found: {filename}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
except Exception as e:
print(f"Error reading file {filename}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
def writeYaml(filename, content):
"""Persist `content` for `filename`.
PG-canonical mode + PG-managed path: write only to so_pillar.*. A PG
failure is fatal (no disk fallback) — caller must retry.
Dual mode: write disk, then mirror to PG (failures are warnings).
Disk mode or non-PG-managed path: write disk only.
"""
if _BACKEND_MODE == "postgres" and _isPgManaged(filename):
if not _SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE:
print("so-yaml: PG-canonical mode requires so_yaml_postgres module", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
ok, msg = so_yaml_postgres.write_yaml(
filename, content,
reason="so-yaml " + " ".join(sys.argv[1:2]))
if not ok:
print(f"so-yaml: pg write failed for {filename}: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
return None
file = open(filename, "w")
return yaml.safe_dump(content, file)
result = yaml.safe_dump(content, file)
file.close()
if _BACKEND_MODE == "dual":
_mirrorToPostgres(filename, content)
return result
def _mirrorToPostgres(filename, content):
"""Best-effort dual-write of a YAML mutation into so_pillar.*. Skips
files outside the PG-managed pillar surface (secrets.sls,
elasticsearch/nodes.sls, etc.) and silently degrades when so-postgres
is unreachable. Disk write is canonical in dual mode; this never
raises.
Only real PG failures (`pg write failed: ...`) are logged so the
common cases (skipped path, postgres not running) don't pollute
stderr."""
if not _SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE:
return
try:
ok, msg = so_yaml_postgres.write_yaml(filename, content,
reason="so-yaml " + " ".join(sys.argv[1:2]))
if not ok and msg.startswith("pg write failed"):
print(f"so-yaml: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
except Exception as e: # pragma: no cover — defensive: never break disk write
print(f"so-yaml: pg mirror exception: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
def purgeFile(filename):
"""Delete a YAML file from disk and remove the matching rows from
so_pillar.*. Idempotent — missing file/row counts as success.
PG-canonical mode + PG-managed path: PG delete is canonical. If a stale
disk file from the dual-write era happens to still exist, it's removed
too as a cleanup courtesy. PG failure is fatal in this mode.
Dual / disk modes: remove disk first; PG cleanup is best-effort."""
if _BACKEND_MODE == "postgres" and _isPgManaged(filename):
if not _SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE:
print("so-yaml: PG-canonical mode requires so_yaml_postgres module", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
ok, msg = so_yaml_postgres.purge_yaml(filename, reason="so-yaml purge")
if not ok:
print(f"so-yaml: pg purge failed for {filename}: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
if os.path.exists(filename):
try:
os.remove(filename)
except Exception as e:
print(f"so-yaml: warn — could not remove stale disk file {filename}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
return 0
if os.path.exists(filename):
try:
os.remove(filename)
except Exception as e:
print(f"Failed to remove {filename}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
if _BACKEND_MODE == "dual" and _SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE:
try:
ok, msg = so_yaml_postgres.purge_yaml(filename,
reason="so-yaml purge")
if not ok and msg.startswith("pg purge failed"):
print(f"so-yaml: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
except Exception as e:
print(f"so-yaml: pg purge exception: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
return 0
def appendItem(content, key, listItem):
@@ -285,7 +463,8 @@ def add(args):
def removeKey(content, key):
pieces = key.split(".", 1)
if len(pieces) > 1:
removeKey(content[pieces[0]], pieces[1])
if pieces[0] in content:
removeKey(content[pieces[0]], pieces[1])
else:
content.pop(key, None)
@@ -363,6 +542,18 @@ def get(args):
return 0
def purge(args):
"""purge YAML_FILE — delete the file from disk and remove the matching
rows from so_pillar.* in so-postgres. Used by so-minion's delete path
(in place of `rm -f`) so the audit log captures the deletion and
role_member rows get cleaned up via FK CASCADE on so_pillar.minion."""
if len(args) != 1:
print('Missing filename arg', file=sys.stderr)
showUsage(None)
return 1
return purgeFile(args[0])
def main():
args = sys.argv[1:]
@@ -380,6 +571,7 @@ def main():
"get": get,
"remove": remove,
"replace": replace,
"purge": purge,
}
code = 1
+344
View File
@@ -973,3 +973,347 @@ class TestReplaceListObject(unittest.TestCase):
expected = "key1:\n- id: '1'\n status: updated\n- id: '2'\n status: inactive\n"
self.assertEqual(actual, expected)
class TestLoadYaml(unittest.TestCase):
def test_load_yaml_missing_file(self):
with patch('sys.exit', new=MagicMock()) as sysmock:
with patch('sys.stderr', new=StringIO()) as mock_stderr:
soyaml.loadYaml("/tmp/so-yaml_test-does-not-exist.yaml")
sysmock.assert_called_with(1)
self.assertIn("File not found:", mock_stderr.getvalue())
def test_load_yaml_read_error(self):
with patch('sys.exit', new=MagicMock()) as sysmock:
with patch('sys.stderr', new=StringIO()) as mock_stderr:
with patch('builtins.open', side_effect=PermissionError("denied")):
soyaml.loadYaml("/tmp/so-yaml_test-unreadable.yaml")
sysmock.assert_called_with(1)
self.assertIn("Error reading file", mock_stderr.getvalue())
class TestPurge(unittest.TestCase):
def test_purge_missing_arg(self):
# showUsage calls sys.exit(1); patch it like the other tests do.
with patch('sys.exit', new=MagicMock()):
with patch('sys.stderr', new=StringIO()) as mock_stderr:
rc = soyaml.purge([])
self.assertEqual(rc, 1)
self.assertIn("Missing filename", mock_stderr.getvalue())
def test_purge_existing_file(self):
filename = "/tmp/so-yaml_test_purge.yaml"
with open(filename, "w") as f:
f.write("key: value\n")
# Disable PG mirror so the test doesn't shell out to docker.
with patch.object(soyaml, '_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE', False):
rc = soyaml.purge([filename])
self.assertEqual(rc, 0)
import os as _os
self.assertFalse(_os.path.exists(filename))
def test_purge_missing_file_idempotent(self):
filename = "/tmp/so-yaml_test_purge_missing.yaml"
import os as _os
if _os.path.exists(filename):
_os.remove(filename)
with patch.object(soyaml, '_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE', False):
rc = soyaml.purge([filename])
self.assertEqual(rc, 0)
class TestSoYamlPostgres(unittest.TestCase):
"""Tests the path-locator and write/purge contract of the dual-write
backend module without actually contacting Postgres."""
def setUp(self):
import importlib
self.mod = importlib.import_module("so_yaml_postgres")
def test_locate_global_soc(self):
scope, role, mid, path = self.mod.locate(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/soc/soc_soc.sls")
self.assertEqual(scope, "global")
self.assertIsNone(role)
self.assertIsNone(mid)
self.assertEqual(path, "soc.soc_soc")
def test_locate_global_advanced(self):
scope, role, mid, path = self.mod.locate(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/soc/adv_soc.sls")
self.assertEqual(scope, "global")
self.assertEqual(path, "soc.adv_soc")
def test_locate_minion(self):
scope, role, mid, path = self.mod.locate(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/h1_sensor.sls")
self.assertEqual(scope, "minion")
self.assertEqual(mid, "h1_sensor")
self.assertEqual(path, "minions.h1_sensor")
def test_locate_minion_advanced(self):
scope, role, mid, path = self.mod.locate(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/adv_h1_sensor.sls")
self.assertEqual(scope, "minion")
self.assertEqual(mid, "h1_sensor")
self.assertEqual(path, "minions.adv_h1_sensor")
def test_locate_skip_secrets(self):
with self.assertRaises(self.mod.SkipPath):
self.mod.locate("/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/secrets.sls")
def test_locate_skip_postgres_auth(self):
with self.assertRaises(self.mod.SkipPath):
self.mod.locate("/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls")
def test_locate_skip_mine_driven(self):
with self.assertRaises(self.mod.SkipPath):
self.mod.locate("/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/elasticsearch/nodes.sls")
def test_locate_skip_top(self):
with self.assertRaises(self.mod.SkipPath):
self.mod.locate("/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/top.sls")
def test_locate_skip_unrelated(self):
with self.assertRaises(self.mod.SkipPath):
self.mod.locate("/etc/hostname")
def test_pg_str_escapes(self):
self.assertEqual(self.mod._pg_str("a'b"), "'a''b'")
self.assertEqual(self.mod._pg_str(None), "NULL")
def test_conflict_target(self):
self.assertIn("scope='global'", self.mod._conflict_target("global"))
self.assertIn("scope='role'", self.mod._conflict_target("role"))
self.assertIn("scope='minion'", self.mod._conflict_target("minion"))
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
self.mod._conflict_target("bogus")
def test_write_yaml_skips_disk_only_path(self):
with patch.object(self.mod, '_is_enabled', return_value=True):
ok, msg = self.mod.write_yaml(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/secrets.sls",
{"secrets": {"foo": "bar"}})
self.assertFalse(ok)
self.assertIn("disk-only", msg)
def test_write_yaml_unreachable(self):
with patch.object(self.mod, '_is_enabled', return_value=False):
ok, msg = self.mod.write_yaml(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/soc/soc_soc.sls",
{"soc": {"foo": "bar"}})
self.assertFalse(ok)
self.assertEqual(msg, "postgres unreachable")
def test_is_pg_managed_true(self):
self.assertTrue(self.mod.is_pg_managed(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/h1_sensor.sls"))
self.assertTrue(self.mod.is_pg_managed(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/soc/soc_soc.sls"))
def test_is_pg_managed_false_for_bootstrap(self):
self.assertFalse(self.mod.is_pg_managed(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/secrets.sls"))
self.assertFalse(self.mod.is_pg_managed(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls"))
self.assertFalse(self.mod.is_pg_managed(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/elasticsearch/nodes.sls"))
def test_read_yaml_unreachable(self):
with patch.object(self.mod, '_is_enabled', return_value=False):
self.assertIsNone(self.mod.read_yaml(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/soc/soc_soc.sls"))
def test_read_yaml_skips_disk_only(self):
with patch.object(self.mod, '_is_enabled', return_value=True):
with self.assertRaises(self.mod.SkipPath):
self.mod.read_yaml(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/secrets.sls")
def test_read_yaml_returns_data(self):
with patch.object(self.mod, '_is_enabled', return_value=True):
with patch.object(self.mod, '_docker_psql',
return_value='{"soc": {"foo": "bar"}}\n'):
data = self.mod.read_yaml(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/soc/soc_soc.sls")
self.assertEqual(data, {"soc": {"foo": "bar"}})
def test_read_yaml_returns_none_when_no_row(self):
with patch.object(self.mod, '_is_enabled', return_value=True):
with patch.object(self.mod, '_docker_psql', return_value=''):
data = self.mod.read_yaml(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/soc/soc_soc.sls")
self.assertIsNone(data)
def test_read_yaml_minion_query_shape(self):
captured = {}
def fake_psql(sql):
captured['sql'] = sql
return '{"host": {"mainip": "10.0.0.1"}}'
with patch.object(self.mod, '_is_enabled', return_value=True):
with patch.object(self.mod, '_docker_psql', side_effect=fake_psql):
data = self.mod.read_yaml(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/h1_sensor.sls")
self.assertEqual(data, {"host": {"mainip": "10.0.0.1"}})
self.assertIn("scope='minion'", captured['sql'])
self.assertIn("'h1_sensor'", captured['sql'])
self.assertIn("'minions.h1_sensor'", captured['sql'])
def test_is_enabled_public_alias(self):
with patch.object(self.mod, '_is_enabled', return_value=True):
self.assertTrue(self.mod.is_enabled())
with patch.object(self.mod, '_is_enabled', return_value=False):
self.assertFalse(self.mod.is_enabled())
class TestSoYamlBackendMode(unittest.TestCase):
"""Tests so-yaml's backend-mode resolution and PG-canonical routing
for read/write/purge. The PG calls themselves are stubbed; what we're
asserting is that the right backend is chosen for each (mode, path)
combination."""
def test_resolve_mode_env_overrides_file(self):
with patch.dict('os.environ', {'SO_YAML_BACKEND': 'postgres'}):
self.assertEqual(soyaml._resolveBackendMode(), 'postgres')
with patch.dict('os.environ', {'SO_YAML_BACKEND': 'disk'}):
self.assertEqual(soyaml._resolveBackendMode(), 'disk')
def test_resolve_mode_invalid_env_falls_back(self):
with patch.dict('os.environ', {'SO_YAML_BACKEND': 'garbage'}, clear=False):
with patch('builtins.open', side_effect=IOError):
self.assertEqual(soyaml._resolveBackendMode(), 'dual')
def test_resolve_mode_default_dual(self):
env = {k: v for k, v in __import__('os').environ.items()
if k != 'SO_YAML_BACKEND'}
with patch.dict('os.environ', env, clear=True):
with patch('builtins.open', side_effect=IOError):
self.assertEqual(soyaml._resolveBackendMode(), 'dual')
def test_is_pg_managed_proxies(self):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE', True):
self.assertTrue(soyaml._isPgManaged(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/h1_sensor.sls"))
self.assertFalse(soyaml._isPgManaged(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/secrets.sls"))
def test_is_pg_managed_false_when_module_unavailable(self):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE', False):
self.assertFalse(soyaml._isPgManaged(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/h1_sensor.sls"))
def test_load_yaml_postgres_mode_reads_pg(self):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_BACKEND_MODE', 'postgres'):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE', True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'is_pg_managed',
return_value=True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'read_yaml',
return_value={"a": 1}):
result = soyaml.loadYaml(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/soc/soc_soc.sls")
self.assertEqual(result, {"a": 1})
def test_load_yaml_postgres_mode_returns_empty_when_no_row(self):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_BACKEND_MODE', 'postgres'):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE', True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'is_pg_managed',
return_value=True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'read_yaml',
return_value=None):
result = soyaml.loadYaml(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/soc/soc_soc.sls")
self.assertEqual(result, {})
def test_load_yaml_postgres_mode_reads_disk_for_bootstrap(self):
import tempfile, os as _os
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', suffix='.yaml', delete=False) as f:
f.write("foo: bar\n")
tmp = f.name
try:
with patch.object(soyaml, '_BACKEND_MODE', 'postgres'):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE', True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres,
'is_pg_managed', return_value=False):
result = soyaml.loadYaml(tmp)
self.assertEqual(result, {"foo": "bar"})
finally:
_os.unlink(tmp)
def test_write_yaml_postgres_mode_skips_disk(self):
import tempfile, os as _os
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', suffix='.yaml', delete=False) as f:
tmp = f.name
_os.unlink(tmp)
try:
with patch.object(soyaml, '_BACKEND_MODE', 'postgres'):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE', True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'is_pg_managed',
return_value=True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'write_yaml',
return_value=(True, 'ok')) as mock_w:
soyaml.writeYaml(tmp, {"x": 1})
self.assertFalse(_os.path.exists(tmp))
mock_w.assert_called_once()
finally:
if _os.path.exists(tmp):
_os.unlink(tmp)
def test_write_yaml_postgres_mode_failure_is_fatal(self):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_BACKEND_MODE', 'postgres'):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE', True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'is_pg_managed',
return_value=True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'write_yaml',
return_value=(False, 'pg write failed: connection refused')):
with patch('sys.exit', new=MagicMock()) as sysmock:
with patch('sys.stderr', new=StringIO()) as mock_err:
soyaml.writeYaml(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/soc/soc_soc.sls",
{"x": 1})
sysmock.assert_called_with(1)
def test_write_yaml_disk_mode_skips_pg(self):
import tempfile, os as _os
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', suffix='.yaml', delete=False) as f:
tmp = f.name
try:
with patch.object(soyaml, '_BACKEND_MODE', 'disk'):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE', True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'write_yaml') as mock_w:
soyaml.writeYaml(tmp, {"x": 1})
mock_w.assert_not_called()
with open(tmp) as f:
self.assertIn('x: 1', f.read())
finally:
_os.unlink(tmp)
def test_purge_postgres_mode_calls_pg_only(self):
import tempfile, os as _os
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', suffix='.yaml', delete=False) as f:
tmp = f.name
_os.unlink(tmp)
with patch.object(soyaml, '_BACKEND_MODE', 'postgres'):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE', True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'is_pg_managed',
return_value=True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'purge_yaml',
return_value=(True, 'ok')) as mock_p:
rc = soyaml.purgeFile(tmp)
self.assertEqual(rc, 0)
mock_p.assert_called_once()
def test_purge_postgres_mode_failure_returns_nonzero(self):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_BACKEND_MODE', 'postgres'):
with patch.object(soyaml, '_SO_YAML_PG_AVAILABLE', True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'is_pg_managed',
return_value=True):
with patch.object(soyaml.so_yaml_postgres, 'purge_yaml',
return_value=(False, 'pg purge failed: x')):
with patch('sys.stderr', new=StringIO()):
rc = soyaml.purgeFile(
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/h1_sensor.sls")
self.assertEqual(rc, 1)
+320
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
"""
so_yaml_postgres — Postgres-backed dual-write helpers for so-yaml.py.
so-yaml.py writes YAML pillar files on disk; this module mirrors those
writes into so_pillar.* in so-postgres so ext_pillar and the SOC
PostgresConfigstore see the same data. During the postsalt transition
disk is canonical; PG writes are best-effort and never fail the disk
operation.
Connection: shells out to `docker exec so-postgres psql -U postgres -d
securityonion`. Same pattern so-pillar-import uses; avoids needing a
separate DSN config at install time. Performance is fine because so-yaml
is invoked from infrequent code paths (setup scripts, so-minion,
so-firewall); SOC's hot path uses the in-process pgxpool in
PostgresConfigstore, not so-yaml.
Path-to-row mapping mirrors PostgresConfigstore.locateSetting in
securityonion-soc:
/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/<section>/soc_<section>.sls
-> scope=global, pillar_path=<section>.soc_<section>
/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/<section>/adv_<section>.sls
-> scope=global, pillar_path=<section>.adv_<section>
/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/<id>.sls
-> scope=minion, minion_id=<id>, pillar_path=minions.<id>
/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/adv_<id>.sls
-> scope=minion, minion_id=<id>, pillar_path=minions.adv_<id>
Files outside that mapping (notably secrets.sls, postgres/auth.sls,
elasticsearch/nodes.sls, etc.) are skipped — they stay disk-only forever
or render dynamically and don't belong in PG.
"""
import json
import os
import shlex
import subprocess
import sys
DOCKER_CONTAINER = os.environ.get("SO_PILLAR_PG_CONTAINER", "so-postgres")
PG_DATABASE = os.environ.get("SO_PILLAR_PG_DATABASE", "securityonion")
PG_USER = os.environ.get("SO_PILLAR_PG_USER", "postgres")
# File paths whose mutations stay disk-only forever. Mirrors EXCLUDE_*
# in so-pillar-import.
DISK_ONLY_PATHS = (
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/secrets.sls",
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls",
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/elasticsearch/auth.sls",
"/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/kibana/secrets.sls",
)
DISK_ONLY_FRAGMENTS = (
"/elasticsearch/nodes.sls",
"/redis/nodes.sls",
"/kafka/nodes.sls",
"/hypervisor/nodes.sls",
"/logstash/nodes.sls",
"/node_data/ips.sls",
"/top.sls",
)
class SkipPath(Exception):
"""Raised when a file path is intentionally not mirrored to PG."""
def is_enabled():
"""Public alias for callers that want to probe PG reachability without
relying on a leading-underscore private name."""
return _is_enabled()
def _is_enabled():
"""PG dual-write only fires if so-postgres is reachable. Cheap probe.
Returns True when docker exec succeeds, False otherwise. We never
want a PG hiccup to fail a disk write on a manager whose Postgres is
momentarily unreachable."""
try:
proc = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", DOCKER_CONTAINER,
"pg_isready", "-h", "127.0.0.1", "-U", PG_USER, "-q"],
capture_output=True, timeout=5, check=False,
)
return proc.returncode == 0
except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired, OSError):
return False
def locate(path):
"""Translate a so-yaml file path to (scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path).
Raises SkipPath when the file is not part of the PG-managed surface."""
norm = os.path.normpath(path)
if norm in DISK_ONLY_PATHS:
raise SkipPath(f"{path}: explicit disk-only allowlist")
for frag in DISK_ONLY_FRAGMENTS:
if frag in norm:
raise SkipPath(f"{path}: matches disk-only fragment {frag}")
parent = os.path.basename(os.path.dirname(norm))
grandparent = os.path.basename(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(norm)))
name = os.path.basename(norm)
if not name.endswith(".sls"):
raise SkipPath(f"{path}: not a .sls file")
stem = name[:-4]
if parent == "minions":
if stem.startswith("adv_"):
mid = stem[4:]
return ("minion", None, mid, f"minions.adv_{mid}")
return ("minion", None, stem, f"minions.{stem}")
# /local/pillar/<section>/<file>.sls
if grandparent == "pillar" and parent and parent != "":
if stem.startswith("soc_") or stem.startswith("adv_"):
return ("global", None, None, f"{parent}.{stem}")
raise SkipPath(f"{path}: <section>/{stem}.sls is not a soc_/adv_ file")
raise SkipPath(f"{path}: unrecognised pillar layout")
def _pg_str(s):
if s is None:
return "NULL"
return "'" + str(s).replace("'", "''") + "'"
def _docker_psql(sql):
"""Run sql via docker exec ... psql. Returns stdout. Caller catches
exceptions and downgrades to a warning."""
proc = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", "-i", DOCKER_CONTAINER,
"psql", "-U", PG_USER, "-d", PG_DATABASE,
"-tA", "-q", "-v", "ON_ERROR_STOP=1"],
input=sql.encode(), capture_output=True, check=False, timeout=30,
)
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise RuntimeError(proc.stderr.decode(errors="replace") or
f"docker exec psql exit {proc.returncode}")
return proc.stdout.decode(errors="replace")
def _conflict_target(scope):
if scope == "global":
return "(pillar_path) WHERE scope='global'"
if scope == "role":
return "(role_name, pillar_path) WHERE scope='role'"
if scope == "minion":
return "(minion_id, pillar_path) WHERE scope='minion'"
raise ValueError(f"unknown scope {scope!r}")
def is_pg_managed(path):
"""True if this path maps to a so_pillar.* row (locate() succeeds).
Bootstrap and mine-driven files return False — they always live on
disk regardless of so-yaml's backend mode."""
try:
locate(path)
return True
except SkipPath:
return False
def read_yaml(path):
"""Return the content dict stored in so_pillar.pillar_entry for `path`,
or None when no row exists. Raises SkipPath when `path` is not part of
the PG-managed surface (caller should read disk in that case).
Used by so-yaml.py PG-canonical mode so `replace`, `get`, etc. resolve
against the database rather than a stale (or absent) disk file."""
if not _is_enabled():
return None
scope, role, minion_id, pillar_path = locate(path)
if scope == "minion":
sql = ("SELECT data FROM so_pillar.pillar_entry "
"WHERE scope='minion' "
f"AND minion_id={_pg_str(minion_id)} "
f"AND pillar_path={_pg_str(pillar_path)}")
elif scope == "role":
sql = ("SELECT data FROM so_pillar.pillar_entry "
"WHERE scope='role' "
f"AND role_name={_pg_str(role)} "
f"AND pillar_path={_pg_str(pillar_path)}")
else:
sql = ("SELECT data FROM so_pillar.pillar_entry "
"WHERE scope='global' "
f"AND pillar_path={_pg_str(pillar_path)}")
try:
out = _docker_psql(sql).strip()
except Exception:
return None
if not out:
return None
try:
return json.loads(out)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return None
def write_yaml(path, content_dict, *, reason="so-yaml dual-write"):
"""Mirror the disk write at `path` (whose content was just rendered as
`content_dict`) into so_pillar.pillar_entry. Best-effort: any failure
is swallowed so the caller (so-yaml.py) does not see it as a fatal."""
if not _is_enabled():
return False, "postgres unreachable"
try:
scope, role, minion_id, pillar_path = locate(path)
except SkipPath as e:
return False, str(e)
data_json = json.dumps(content_dict if content_dict is not None else {})
role_sql = _pg_str(role)
minion_sql = _pg_str(minion_id)
reason_sql = _pg_str(reason)
conflict = _conflict_target(scope)
sql_parts = []
if scope == "minion":
# FK requires the minion row before pillar_entry can reference it.
sql_parts.append(
f"INSERT INTO so_pillar.minion (minion_id) VALUES ({minion_sql}) "
"ON CONFLICT (minion_id) DO NOTHING;"
)
sql_parts.append(
"BEGIN;\n"
f"SELECT set_config('so_pillar.change_reason', {reason_sql}, true);\n"
"INSERT INTO so_pillar.pillar_entry "
"(scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path, data, change_reason) "
f"VALUES ({_pg_str(scope)}, {role_sql}, {minion_sql}, "
f"{_pg_str(pillar_path)}, {_pg_str(data_json)}::jsonb, {reason_sql}) "
f"ON CONFLICT {conflict} DO UPDATE "
"SET data = EXCLUDED.data, change_reason = EXCLUDED.change_reason;\n"
"COMMIT;\n"
)
try:
_docker_psql("\n".join(sql_parts))
except Exception as e:
return False, f"pg write failed: {e}"
return True, "ok"
def purge_yaml(path, *, reason="so-yaml purge"):
"""Mirror the disk file deletion at `path` by deleting the matching
pillar_entry rows. For minion files also deletes the so_pillar.minion
row (CASCADE removes pillar_entry + role_member rows)."""
if not _is_enabled():
return False, "postgres unreachable"
try:
scope, role, minion_id, pillar_path = locate(path)
except SkipPath as e:
return False, str(e)
reason_sql = _pg_str(reason)
parts = ["BEGIN;",
f"SELECT set_config('so_pillar.change_reason', {reason_sql}, true);"]
if scope == "minion":
# If both <id>.sls and adv_<id>.sls are gone the trigger / CASCADE
# cleans up role_member; otherwise we just remove this one row.
parts.append(
f"DELETE FROM so_pillar.pillar_entry "
f"WHERE scope='minion' AND minion_id={_pg_str(minion_id)} "
f"AND pillar_path={_pg_str(pillar_path)};"
)
parts.append(
f"DELETE FROM so_pillar.minion WHERE minion_id={_pg_str(minion_id)} "
"AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM so_pillar.pillar_entry "
f"WHERE minion_id={_pg_str(minion_id)});"
)
else:
parts.append(
f"DELETE FROM so_pillar.pillar_entry "
f"WHERE scope={_pg_str(scope)} AND pillar_path={_pg_str(pillar_path)};"
)
parts.append("COMMIT;")
try:
_docker_psql("\n".join(parts))
except Exception as e:
return False, f"pg purge failed: {e}"
return True, "ok"
# CLI for diagnostics. Not exercised by so-yaml.py itself.
def _main(argv):
import argparse
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("op", choices=("locate", "ping"))
ap.add_argument("path", nargs="?")
args = ap.parse_args(argv)
if args.op == "ping":
ok = _is_enabled()
print("ok" if ok else "unreachable")
return 0 if ok else 1
if args.op == "locate":
if not args.path:
ap.error("locate requires PATH")
try:
scope, role, minion_id, pillar_path = locate(args.path)
print(f"scope={scope} role={role} minion_id={minion_id} pillar_path={pillar_path}")
return 0
except SkipPath as e:
print(f"SKIP: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
return 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(_main(sys.argv[1:]))
+51
View File
@@ -485,7 +485,44 @@ elasticsearch_backup_index_templates() {
tar -czf /nsm/backup/3.0.0_elasticsearch_index_templates.tar.gz -C /opt/so/conf/elasticsearch/templates/index/ .
}
ensure_postgres_local_pillar() {
# Postgres was added as a service after 3.0.0, so the new pillar/top.sls
# references postgres.soc_postgres / postgres.adv_postgres unconditionally.
# Managers upgrading from 3.0.0 have no /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/
# (make_some_dirs only runs at install time), so the stubs must be created
# here before salt-master restarts against the new top.sls.
echo "Ensuring postgres local pillar stubs exist."
local dir=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres
mkdir -p "$dir"
[[ -f "$dir/soc_postgres.sls" ]] || touch "$dir/soc_postgres.sls"
[[ -f "$dir/adv_postgres.sls" ]] || touch "$dir/adv_postgres.sls"
chown -R socore:socore "$dir"
}
ensure_postgres_secret() {
# On a fresh install, generate_passwords + secrets_pillar seed
# secrets:postgres_pass in /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/secrets.sls. That
# code path is skipped on upgrade (secrets.sls already exists from 3.0.0
# with import_pass/influx_pass but no postgres_pass), so the postgres
# container's POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE and SOC's PG_ADMIN_PASS would be empty
# after highstate. Generate one now if missing.
local secrets_file=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/secrets.sls
if [[ ! -f "$secrets_file" ]]; then
echo "WARNING: $secrets_file missing; skipping postgres_pass backfill."
return 0
fi
if so-yaml.py get -r "$secrets_file" secrets.postgres_pass >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "secrets.postgres_pass already set; leaving as-is."
return 0
fi
echo "Seeding secrets.postgres_pass in $secrets_file."
so-yaml.py add "$secrets_file" secrets.postgres_pass "$(get_random_value)"
chown socore:socore "$secrets_file"
}
up_to_3.1.0() {
ensure_postgres_local_pillar
ensure_postgres_secret
determine_elastic_agent_upgrade
elasticsearch_backup_index_templates
# Clear existing component template state file.
@@ -502,6 +539,20 @@ post_to_3.1.0() {
salt-call state.apply salt.cloud.config concurrent=True
fi
# Backfill the Telegraf creds pillar for every accepted minion. so-telegraf-cred
# add is idempotent — it no-ops when an entry already exists — so this is safe
# to run on every soup. The subsequent state.apply creates/updates the matching
# Postgres roles from the reconciled pillar.
echo "Reconciling Telegraf Postgres creds for accepted minions."
for mid in $(salt-key --out=json --list=accepted 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.minions[]?' 2>/dev/null); do
[[ -n "$mid" ]] || continue
/usr/sbin/so-telegraf-cred add "$mid" || echo " warning: so-telegraf-cred add $mid failed" >&2
done
# Run through the master (not --local) so state compilation uses the
# master's configured file_roots; the manager's /etc/salt/minion has no
# file_roots of its own and --local would fail with "No matching sls found".
salt-call state.apply postgres.telegraf_users queue=True || true
POSTVERSION=3.1.0
}
+25
View File
@@ -25,8 +25,33 @@ manager_run_es_soc:
- salt: {{NEWNODE}}_update_mine
{% endif %}
# so-minion has already added the new minion's entry to telegraf/creds.sls
# via so-telegraf-cred before this orch fires. Reconcile the Postgres role
# on the manager so the new minion can authenticate on its first highstate,
# then refresh the minion's pillar so its telegraf.conf renders with the
# freshly-written cred.
manager_create_postgres_telegraf_role:
salt.state:
- tgt: {{ MANAGER }}
- sls:
- postgres.telegraf_users
- queue: True
- require:
- salt: {{NEWNODE}}_update_mine
{{NEWNODE}}_refresh_pillar:
salt.function:
- name: saltutil.refresh_pillar
- tgt: {{ NEWNODE }}
- kwarg:
wait: True
- require:
- salt: manager_create_postgres_telegraf_role
{{NEWNODE}}_run_highstate:
salt.state:
- tgt: {{ NEWNODE }}
- highstate: True
- queue: True
- require:
- salt: {{NEWNODE}}_refresh_pillar
+112
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
# Driven by the so_pillar_changed reactor. Translates a so_pillar.pillar_entry
# change into (cache.clear_pillar -> saltutil.refresh_pillar -> state.apply)
# on the appropriate target.
#
# Routing rules live in the DISPATCH map below — one entry per
# (pillar_path prefix) -> (state sls, role grain). Add new services here
# rather than wiring more reactors.
#
# Idempotent: state.apply is idempotent; if the pillar value didn't actually
# change anything observable, the affected state runs a no-op. Bulk imports
# and replays are safe.
{% set change = salt['pillar.get']('so_pillar_change', {}) %}
{% set scope = change.get('scope') %}
{% set role = change.get('role_name') %}
{% set minion = change.get('minion_id') %}
{% set changes = change.get('changes', []) %}
{# (pillar_path prefix) -> {sls: <state to apply>, role: <role grain that runs it>}
role is a grain value (e.g. 'so-sensor'), used to compute compound targets
when the change is global or role-scoped. #}
{% set DISPATCH = {
'suricata.': {'sls': 'suricata.config', 'roles': ['so-sensor', 'so-heavynode', 'so-standalone']},
'sensor.': {'sls': 'suricata.config', 'roles': ['so-sensor', 'so-heavynode', 'so-standalone']},
'zeek.': {'sls': 'zeek.config', 'roles': ['so-sensor', 'so-heavynode', 'so-standalone']},
'stenographer.': {'sls': 'stenographer.config', 'roles': ['so-sensor', 'so-heavynode', 'so-standalone']},
'pcap.': {'sls': 'pcap.config', 'roles': ['so-sensor', 'so-heavynode', 'so-standalone']},
'logstash.': {'sls': 'logstash.config', 'roles': ['so-manager', 'so-managersearch', 'so-managerhype', 'so-receiver']},
'redis.': {'sls': 'redis.config', 'roles': ['so-manager', 'so-managersearch', 'so-managerhype', 'so-standalone']},
'kafka.': {'sls': 'kafka.config', 'roles': ['so-manager', 'so-managersearch', 'so-managerhype', 'so-receiver', 'so-searchnode']},
'elasticsearch.': {'sls': 'elasticsearch.config','roles': ['so-manager', 'so-managersearch', 'so-managerhype', 'so-searchnode', 'so-heavynode', 'so-standalone']},
'kibana.': {'sls': 'kibana.config', 'roles': ['so-manager', 'so-managersearch', 'so-managerhype', 'so-standalone']},
'soc.': {'sls': 'soc.config', 'roles': ['so-manager', 'so-managersearch', 'so-managerhype', 'so-standalone']},
'telegraf.': {'sls': 'telegraf.config', 'roles': ['*']},
'fleet.': {'sls': 'fleet.config', 'roles': ['so-fleet']},
'strelka.': {'sls': 'strelka.config', 'roles': ['so-sensor', 'so-heavynode', 'so-standalone']},
} %}
{# Collect a deduplicated set of (sls, target_kind) actions. target_kind is
either 'minion:<id>' (scope=minion) or 'roles:so-x,so-y' (scope=role/global). #}
{% set actions = {} %}
{% for c in changes %}
{% set path = c.get('pillar_path', '') %}
{% for prefix, action in DISPATCH.items() %}
{% if path.startswith(prefix) %}
{% set sls = action['sls'] %}
{% if scope == 'minion' and minion %}
{% set key = sls ~ '|minion|' ~ minion %}
{% set _ = actions.update({key: {'sls': sls, 'tgt': minion, 'tgt_type': 'glob'}}) %}
{% else %}
{% set role_targets = action['roles'] %}
{% if '*' in role_targets %}
{% set tgt = '*' %}
{% set tgt_type = 'glob' %}
{% else %}
{% set tgt = ('I@role:' ~ role_targets|join(' or I@role:')) %}
{% set tgt_type = 'compound' %}
{% endif %}
{% set key = sls ~ '|' ~ tgt %}
{% set _ = actions.update({key: {'sls': sls, 'tgt': tgt, 'tgt_type': tgt_type}}) %}
{% endif %}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
{% endfor %}
{% if actions %}
{% for key, action in actions.items() %}
{% set safe_id = loop.index0 | string %}
so_pillar_reload_clear_cache_{{ safe_id }}:
salt.runner:
- name: cache.clear_pillar
- tgt: '{{ action.tgt }}'
- tgt_type: '{{ action.tgt_type }}'
so_pillar_reload_refresh_pillar_{{ safe_id }}:
salt.function:
- name: saltutil.refresh_pillar
- tgt: '{{ action.tgt }}'
- tgt_type: '{{ action.tgt_type }}'
- kwarg:
wait: True
- require:
- salt: so_pillar_reload_clear_cache_{{ safe_id }}
so_pillar_reload_apply_state_{{ safe_id }}:
salt.state:
- tgt: '{{ action.tgt }}'
- tgt_type: '{{ action.tgt_type }}'
- sls:
- {{ action.sls }}
- queue: True
- require:
- salt: so_pillar_reload_refresh_pillar_{{ safe_id }}
{% endfor %}
{% else %}
{# No DISPATCH entry matched. Pillar still gets refreshed so any other states
read fresh values, but no service-specific reload is invoked. #}
so_pillar_reload_unmapped_path_noop:
test.nop
{% do salt.log.info('orch.so_pillar_reload: no dispatch match for %s' % changes) %}
{% endif %}
+37
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %}
{% if sls in allowed_states %}
{% set DIGITS = "1234567890" %}
{% set LOWERCASE = "qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnm" %}
{% set UPPERCASE = "QWERTYUIOPASDFGHJKLZXCVBNM" %}
{% set SYMBOLS = "~!@#^&*()-_=+[]|;:,.<>?" %}
{% set CHARS = DIGITS~LOWERCASE~UPPERCASE~SYMBOLS %}
{% set so_postgres_user_pass = salt['pillar.get']('postgres:auth:users:so_postgres_user:pass', salt['random.get_str'](72, chars=CHARS)) %}
# Admin cred only. Per-minion Telegraf creds live in telegraf/creds.sls,
# managed by /usr/sbin/so-telegraf-cred (called from so-minion).
postgres_auth_pillar:
file.managed:
- name: /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls
- mode: 640
- reload_pillar: True
- contents: |
postgres:
auth:
users:
so_postgres_user:
user: so_postgres
pass: "{{ so_postgres_user_pass }}"
- show_changes: False
{% else %}
{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
test.fail_without_changes:
- name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed
{% endif %}
+111
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %}
{% if sls.split('.')[0] in allowed_states %}
{% from 'postgres/map.jinja' import PGMERGED %}
# Postgres Setup
postgresconfdir:
file.directory:
- name: /opt/so/conf/postgres
- user: 939
- group: 939
- makedirs: True
postgressecretsdir:
file.directory:
- name: /opt/so/conf/postgres/secrets
- user: 939
- group: 939
- mode: 700
- require:
- file: postgresconfdir
postgresdatadir:
file.directory:
- name: /nsm/postgres
- user: 939
- group: 939
- makedirs: True
postgreslogdir:
file.directory:
- name: /opt/so/log/postgres
- user: 939
- group: 939
- makedirs: True
postgresinitdir:
file.directory:
- name: /opt/so/conf/postgres/init
- user: 939
- group: 939
- require:
- file: postgresconfdir
postgresinitusers:
file.managed:
- name: /opt/so/conf/postgres/init/init-users.sh
- source: salt://postgres/files/init-users.sh
- user: 939
- group: 939
- mode: 755
postgresconf:
file.managed:
- name: /opt/so/conf/postgres/postgresql.conf
- source: salt://postgres/files/postgresql.conf.jinja
- user: 939
- group: 939
- template: jinja
- defaults:
PGMERGED: {{ PGMERGED }}
postgreshba:
file.managed:
- name: /opt/so/conf/postgres/pg_hba.conf
- source: salt://postgres/files/pg_hba.conf
- user: 939
- group: 939
- mode: 640
postgres_super_secret:
file.managed:
- name: /opt/so/conf/postgres/secrets/postgres_password
- user: 939
- group: 939
- mode: 600
- contents_pillar: 'secrets:postgres_pass'
- show_changes: False
- require:
- file: postgressecretsdir
postgres_app_secret:
file.managed:
- name: /opt/so/conf/postgres/secrets/so_postgres_pass
- user: 939
- group: 939
- mode: 600
- contents_pillar: 'postgres:auth:users:so_postgres_user:pass'
- show_changes: False
- require:
- file: postgressecretsdir
postgres_sbin:
file.recurse:
- name: /usr/sbin
- source: salt://postgres/tools/sbin
- user: root
- group: root
- file_mode: 755
{% else %}
{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
test.fail_without_changes:
- name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed
{% endif %}
+19
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
postgres:
enabled: True
telegraf:
retention_days: 14
config:
listen_addresses: '*'
port: 5432
max_connections: 100
shared_buffers: 256MB
ssl: 'on'
ssl_cert_file: '/conf/postgres.crt'
ssl_key_file: '/conf/postgres.key'
ssl_ca_file: '/conf/ca.crt'
hba_file: '/conf/pg_hba.conf'
log_destination: 'stderr'
logging_collector: 'off'
log_min_messages: 'warning'
shared_preload_libraries: pg_cron
cron.database_name: so_telegraf
+33
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %}
{% if sls.split('.')[0] in allowed_states %}
include:
- postgres.sostatus
so-postgres:
docker_container.absent:
- force: True
so-postgres_so-status.disabled:
file.comment:
- name: /opt/so/conf/so-status/so-status.conf
- regex: ^so-postgres$
so_postgres_backup:
cron.absent:
- name: /usr/sbin/so-postgres-backup > /dev/null 2>&1
- identifier: so_postgres_backup
- user: root
{% else %}
{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
test.fail_without_changes:
- name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed
{% endif %}
+109
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %}
{% if sls.split('.')[0] in allowed_states %}
{% from 'vars/globals.map.jinja' import GLOBALS %}
{% from 'docker/docker.map.jinja' import DOCKERMERGED %}
{% set SO_POSTGRES_USER = salt['pillar.get']('postgres:auth:users:so_postgres_user:user', 'so_postgres') %}
include:
- postgres.auth
- postgres.ssl
- postgres.config
- postgres.sostatus
- postgres.telegraf_users
so-postgres:
docker_container.running:
- image: {{ GLOBALS.registry_host }}:5000/{{ GLOBALS.image_repo }}/so-postgres:{{ GLOBALS.so_version }}
- hostname: so-postgres
- networks:
- sobridge:
- ipv4_address: {{ DOCKERMERGED.containers['so-postgres'].ip }}
- port_bindings:
{% for BINDING in DOCKERMERGED.containers['so-postgres'].port_bindings %}
- {{ BINDING }}
{% endfor %}
- environment:
- POSTGRES_DB=securityonion
# Passwords are delivered via mounted 0600 secret files, not plaintext env vars.
# The upstream postgres image resolves POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE; entrypoint.sh and
# init-users.sh resolve SO_POSTGRES_PASS_FILE the same way.
- POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE=/run/secrets/postgres_password
- SO_POSTGRES_USER={{ SO_POSTGRES_USER }}
- SO_POSTGRES_PASS_FILE=/run/secrets/so_postgres_pass
{% if DOCKERMERGED.containers['so-postgres'].extra_env %}
{% for XTRAENV in DOCKERMERGED.containers['so-postgres'].extra_env %}
- {{ XTRAENV }}
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
- binds:
- /opt/so/log/postgres/:/log:rw
- /nsm/postgres:/var/lib/postgresql/data:rw
- /opt/so/conf/postgres/postgresql.conf:/conf/postgresql.conf:ro
- /opt/so/conf/postgres/pg_hba.conf:/conf/pg_hba.conf:ro
- /opt/so/conf/postgres/secrets:/run/secrets:ro
- /opt/so/conf/postgres/init/init-users.sh:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/init-users.sh:ro
- /etc/pki/postgres.crt:/conf/postgres.crt:ro
- /etc/pki/postgres.key:/conf/postgres.key:ro
- /etc/pki/tls/certs/intca.crt:/conf/ca.crt:ro
{% if DOCKERMERGED.containers['so-postgres'].custom_bind_mounts %}
{% for BIND in DOCKERMERGED.containers['so-postgres'].custom_bind_mounts %}
- {{ BIND }}
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
{% if DOCKERMERGED.containers['so-postgres'].extra_hosts %}
- extra_hosts:
{% for XTRAHOST in DOCKERMERGED.containers['so-postgres'].extra_hosts %}
- {{ XTRAHOST }}
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
{% if DOCKERMERGED.containers['so-postgres'].ulimits %}
- ulimits:
{% for ULIMIT in DOCKERMERGED.containers['so-postgres'].ulimits %}
- {{ ULIMIT.name }}={{ ULIMIT.soft }}:{{ ULIMIT.hard }}
{% endfor %}
{% endif %}
- watch:
- file: postgresconf
- file: postgreshba
- file: postgresinitusers
- file: postgres_super_secret
- file: postgres_app_secret
- x509: postgres_crt
- x509: postgres_key
- require:
- file: postgresconf
- file: postgreshba
- file: postgresinitusers
- file: postgres_super_secret
- file: postgres_app_secret
- x509: postgres_crt
- x509: postgres_key
delete_so-postgres_so-status.disabled:
file.uncomment:
- name: /opt/so/conf/so-status/so-status.conf
- regex: ^so-postgres$
so_postgres_backup:
cron.present:
- name: /usr/sbin/so-postgres-backup > /dev/null 2>&1
- identifier: so_postgres_backup
- user: root
- minute: '5'
- hour: '0'
- daymonth: '*'
- month: '*'
- dayweek: '*'
{% else %}
{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
test.fail_without_changes:
- name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed
{% endif %}
+34
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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
#!/bin/bash
set -e
# Create or update application user for SOC platform access
# This script runs on first database initialization via docker-entrypoint-initdb.d
# The password is properly escaped to handle special characters
if [ -z "${SO_POSTGRES_PASS:-}" ] && [ -n "${SO_POSTGRES_PASS_FILE:-}" ] && [ -r "$SO_POSTGRES_PASS_FILE" ]; then
SO_POSTGRES_PASS="$(< "$SO_POSTGRES_PASS_FILE")"
fi
psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 --username "$POSTGRES_USER" --dbname "$POSTGRES_DB" <<-EOSQL
DO \$\$
BEGIN
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT FROM pg_catalog.pg_roles WHERE rolname = '${SO_POSTGRES_USER}') THEN
EXECUTE format('CREATE ROLE %I WITH LOGIN PASSWORD %L', '${SO_POSTGRES_USER}', '${SO_POSTGRES_PASS}');
ELSE
EXECUTE format('ALTER ROLE %I WITH PASSWORD %L', '${SO_POSTGRES_USER}', '${SO_POSTGRES_PASS}');
END IF;
END
\$\$;
GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON DATABASE "$POSTGRES_DB" TO "$SO_POSTGRES_USER";
-- Lock the SOC database down at the connect layer; PUBLIC gets CONNECT
-- by default, which would let per-minion telegraf roles open sessions
-- here. They have no schema/table grants inside so reads fail, but
-- revoking CONNECT closes the soft edge entirely.
REVOKE CONNECT ON DATABASE "$POSTGRES_DB" FROM PUBLIC;
GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE "$POSTGRES_DB" TO "$SO_POSTGRES_USER";
EOSQL
# Bootstrap the Telegraf metrics database. Per-minion roles + schemas are
# reconciled on every state.apply by postgres/telegraf_users.sls; this block
# only ensures the shared database exists on first initialization.
if ! psql -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -tAc "SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname='so_telegraf'" | grep -q 1; then
psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -c "CREATE DATABASE so_telegraf"
fi
+16
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
#
# Managed by Salt — do not edit by hand.
# Client authentication config: only local (Unix socket) connections and TLS-wrapped TCP
# connections are accepted. Plain-text `host ...` lines are intentionally omitted so a
# misconfigured client with sslmode=disable cannot negotiate a cleartext session.
# Local connections (Unix socket, container-internal) use peer/trust.
local all all trust
# TCP connections MUST use TLS (hostssl) and authenticate with SCRAM.
hostssl all all 0.0.0.0/0 scram-sha-256
hostssl all all ::/0 scram-sha-256
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
{# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
Elastic License 2.0. #}
{% for key, value in PGMERGED.config.items() %}
{{ key }} = '{{ value | string | replace("'", "''") }}'
{% endfor %}
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
-- so_pillar schema: queryable, versioned, audited pillar config store.
-- Replaces flat-file Salt pillar consumed via salt.pillar.postgres ext_pillar.
-- Idempotent. Run via salt/postgres/schema_pillar.sls inside the so-postgres container.
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS so_pillar;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS so_pillar.scope (
scope_kind text PRIMARY KEY,
precedence int NOT NULL,
description text
);
INSERT INTO so_pillar.scope(scope_kind, precedence, description) VALUES
('global', 100, 'Applies to every minion'),
('role', 200, 'Applies to minions whose minion_id matches a top.sls compound role match'),
('minion', 300, 'Applies only to a single minion (per-minion overlay)')
ON CONFLICT (scope_kind) DO NOTHING;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS so_pillar.role (
role_name text PRIMARY KEY,
match_kind text NOT NULL CHECK (match_kind IN ('compound','grain','glob','list')),
match_expr text NOT NULL,
description text
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS so_pillar.minion (
minion_id text PRIMARY KEY,
node_type text,
hostname text,
extra_roles text[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
created_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
updated_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS so_pillar.role_member (
role_name text NOT NULL REFERENCES so_pillar.role(role_name) ON DELETE CASCADE,
minion_id text NOT NULL REFERENCES so_pillar.minion(minion_id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
source text NOT NULL DEFAULT 'computed' CHECK (source IN ('computed','manual','imported')),
PRIMARY KEY (role_name, minion_id)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_role_member_minion ON so_pillar.role_member(minion_id);
-- pillar_entry holds the actual data. as_json=True ext_pillar reads `data` directly.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS so_pillar.pillar_entry (
id bigserial PRIMARY KEY,
scope text NOT NULL REFERENCES so_pillar.scope(scope_kind),
role_name text REFERENCES so_pillar.role(role_name) ON DELETE CASCADE,
minion_id text REFERENCES so_pillar.minion(minion_id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
pillar_path text NOT NULL,
data jsonb NOT NULL,
is_secret boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
sort_key int NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
version int NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
updated_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
updated_by text NOT NULL DEFAULT current_user,
change_reason text,
CONSTRAINT pillar_entry_scope_target CHECK (
(scope='global' AND role_name IS NULL AND minion_id IS NULL)
OR (scope='role' AND role_name IS NOT NULL AND minion_id IS NULL)
OR (scope='minion' AND role_name IS NULL AND minion_id IS NOT NULL)
),
-- Reserved namespaces that MUST stay rendered from SLS (mine-driven). Nothing
-- under these prefixes is allowed in the database; the merge logic relies on
-- ext_pillar leaving these subtrees alone.
CONSTRAINT pillar_entry_reserved_paths CHECK (
pillar_path NOT LIKE 'elasticsearch.nodes%'
AND pillar_path NOT LIKE 'redis.nodes%'
AND pillar_path NOT LIKE 'kafka.nodes%'
AND pillar_path NOT LIKE 'hypervisor.nodes%'
AND pillar_path NOT LIKE 'logstash.nodes%'
AND pillar_path NOT LIKE 'node_data.ips%'
)
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ux_pillar_entry_global ON so_pillar.pillar_entry(pillar_path)
WHERE scope = 'global';
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ux_pillar_entry_role ON so_pillar.pillar_entry(role_name, pillar_path)
WHERE scope = 'role';
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ux_pillar_entry_minion ON so_pillar.pillar_entry(minion_id, pillar_path)
WHERE scope = 'minion';
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_pillar_entry_minion_hot ON so_pillar.pillar_entry(minion_id)
WHERE scope = 'minion';
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_pillar_entry_role_hot ON so_pillar.pillar_entry(role_name)
WHERE scope = 'role';
-- Append-only audit log for every change to pillar_entry. No FK to entry so DELETE
-- history survives the row removal.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS so_pillar.pillar_entry_history (
history_id bigserial PRIMARY KEY,
entry_id bigint,
op text NOT NULL CHECK (op IN ('INSERT','UPDATE','DELETE')),
scope text NOT NULL,
role_name text,
minion_id text,
pillar_path text NOT NULL,
old_data jsonb,
new_data jsonb,
is_secret boolean,
version int,
changed_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
changed_by text NOT NULL DEFAULT current_user,
change_reason text
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_pillar_history_entry ON so_pillar.pillar_entry_history(entry_id, changed_at DESC);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_pillar_history_minion ON so_pillar.pillar_entry_history(minion_id, changed_at DESC);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_pillar_history_role ON so_pillar.pillar_entry_history(role_name, changed_at DESC);
-- Drift watch — populated by a pg_cron job that re-renders the on-disk SLS files
-- and compares them to pillar_entry. Cleared once cutover completes.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS so_pillar.drift_log (
id bigserial PRIMARY KEY,
scope text NOT NULL,
role_name text,
minion_id text,
pillar_path text NOT NULL,
disk_data jsonb,
db_data jsonb,
detected_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_drift_log_detected ON so_pillar.drift_log(detected_at DESC);
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
-- Views consumed by the Salt master's salt.pillar.postgres ext_pillar with
-- as_json=True. Each view exposes data ordered by (sort_key, pillar_path) so
-- the deep-merge in ext_pillar resolves precedence deterministically.
--
-- ext_pillar always binds exactly one parameter to the query: (minion_id,).
-- Master-config queries reference these views and add WHERE clauses, e.g.:
-- SELECT data FROM so_pillar.v_pillar_role WHERE minion_id = %s
-- SELECT data FROM so_pillar.v_pillar_minion WHERE minion_id = %s
-- For v_pillar_global the binding is satisfied with `WHERE %s IS NOT NULL`.
CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW so_pillar.v_pillar_global AS
SELECT pillar_path, sort_key, data
FROM so_pillar.pillar_entry
WHERE scope = 'global'
AND is_secret = false
ORDER BY sort_key, pillar_path;
-- Role view exposes minion_id so the master-config WHERE clause can filter to
-- the rows that apply to the requesting minion. JOIN to role_member fans out
-- one row per (role assignment, pillar entry) tuple.
CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW so_pillar.v_pillar_role AS
SELECT rm.minion_id,
pe.role_name,
pe.pillar_path,
pe.sort_key,
pe.data
FROM so_pillar.pillar_entry pe
JOIN so_pillar.role_member rm ON rm.role_name = pe.role_name
WHERE pe.scope = 'role'
AND pe.is_secret = false;
CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW so_pillar.v_pillar_minion AS
SELECT minion_id,
pillar_path,
sort_key,
data
FROM so_pillar.pillar_entry
WHERE scope = 'minion'
AND is_secret = false;
-- v_pillar_secrets is filled in by 004_secrets.sql once pgcrypto is available;
-- placeholder here returns no rows so initial schema deploy succeeds even on a
-- container that has not yet loaded pgcrypto.
CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW so_pillar.v_pillar_secrets AS
SELECT NULL::text AS minion_id,
NULL::text AS pillar_path,
NULL::int AS sort_key,
'{}'::jsonb AS data
WHERE false;
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
-- Audit trigger: every INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE on so_pillar.pillar_entry writes a
-- row to pillar_entry_history. Captures the actor (current_user), reason
-- (passed via SET LOCAL so_pillar.change_reason), and full before/after data.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_pillar_entry_audit() RETURNS trigger
LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $fn$
DECLARE
v_reason text := current_setting('so_pillar.change_reason', true);
BEGIN
IF (TG_OP = 'INSERT') THEN
INSERT INTO so_pillar.pillar_entry_history(
entry_id, op, scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path,
old_data, new_data, is_secret, version, changed_by, change_reason)
VALUES (NEW.id, 'INSERT', NEW.scope, NEW.role_name, NEW.minion_id, NEW.pillar_path,
NULL, NEW.data, NEW.is_secret, NEW.version, NEW.updated_by, v_reason);
RETURN NEW;
ELSIF (TG_OP = 'UPDATE') THEN
IF OLD.data IS DISTINCT FROM NEW.data
OR OLD.is_secret IS DISTINCT FROM NEW.is_secret THEN
INSERT INTO so_pillar.pillar_entry_history(
entry_id, op, scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path,
old_data, new_data, is_secret, version, changed_by, change_reason)
VALUES (NEW.id, 'UPDATE', NEW.scope, NEW.role_name, NEW.minion_id, NEW.pillar_path,
OLD.data, NEW.data, NEW.is_secret, NEW.version, NEW.updated_by, v_reason);
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
ELSIF (TG_OP = 'DELETE') THEN
INSERT INTO so_pillar.pillar_entry_history(
entry_id, op, scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path,
old_data, new_data, is_secret, version, changed_by, change_reason)
VALUES (OLD.id, 'DELETE', OLD.scope, OLD.role_name, OLD.minion_id, OLD.pillar_path,
OLD.data, NULL, OLD.is_secret, OLD.version, current_user, v_reason);
RETURN OLD;
END IF;
RETURN NULL;
END
$fn$;
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS pillar_entry_audit ON so_pillar.pillar_entry;
CREATE TRIGGER pillar_entry_audit
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE ON so_pillar.pillar_entry
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_pillar_entry_audit();
-- updated_at + version maintenance: bump version on every UPDATE that changes data.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_pillar_entry_versioning() RETURNS trigger
LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $fn$
BEGIN
IF (TG_OP = 'UPDATE') THEN
IF OLD.data IS DISTINCT FROM NEW.data
OR OLD.is_secret IS DISTINCT FROM NEW.is_secret THEN
NEW.version := OLD.version + 1;
NEW.updated_at := now();
ELSE
NEW.version := OLD.version;
NEW.updated_at := OLD.updated_at;
END IF;
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
END
$fn$;
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS pillar_entry_versioning ON so_pillar.pillar_entry;
CREATE TRIGGER pillar_entry_versioning
BEFORE UPDATE ON so_pillar.pillar_entry
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_pillar_entry_versioning();
-- Recompute role_member rows for a minion based on node_type.
-- Compound matchers in pillar/top.sls are pure suffix patterns of the form
-- '*_<rolename>' plus the special multi-role 'manager/managersearch/managerhype'
-- bucket. node_type is split on common dashes/underscores; any token that
-- matches a known role_name produces a role_member row.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_recompute_role_members(p_minion_id text)
RETURNS void LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $fn$
DECLARE
v_node_type text;
v_extra text[];
v_role text;
BEGIN
SELECT node_type, extra_roles INTO v_node_type, v_extra
FROM so_pillar.minion WHERE minion_id = p_minion_id;
IF v_node_type IS NULL THEN
RETURN;
END IF;
DELETE FROM so_pillar.role_member
WHERE minion_id = p_minion_id AND source = 'computed';
-- Main role from node_type.
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM so_pillar.role WHERE role_name = lower(v_node_type)) THEN
INSERT INTO so_pillar.role_member(role_name, minion_id, source)
VALUES (lower(v_node_type), p_minion_id, 'computed')
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING;
END IF;
-- Extra roles supplied by the importer / reactor for compound matchers
-- that need to apply multiple buckets (e.g. managersearch also gets the
-- 'manager' bucket per top.sls line 36 grouping).
FOREACH v_role IN ARRAY COALESCE(v_extra, '{}'::text[]) LOOP
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM so_pillar.role WHERE role_name = v_role) THEN
INSERT INTO so_pillar.role_member(role_name, minion_id, source)
VALUES (v_role, p_minion_id, 'computed')
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING;
END IF;
END LOOP;
END
$fn$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_minion_after_change() RETURNS trigger
LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $fn$
BEGIN
PERFORM so_pillar.fn_recompute_role_members(COALESCE(NEW.minion_id, OLD.minion_id));
RETURN COALESCE(NEW, OLD);
END
$fn$;
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS minion_role_sync ON so_pillar.minion;
CREATE TRIGGER minion_role_sync
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OF node_type, extra_roles ON so_pillar.minion
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_minion_after_change();
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
-- pgcrypto-backed secret storage for pillar_entry rows where is_secret = true.
-- The plaintext value is encrypted with a symmetric key held in a server-side
-- GUC (so_pillar.master_key) which is set per-role via ALTER ROLE so the key
-- never touches a flat file readable by Salt itself.
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pgcrypto WITH SCHEMA public;
-- Encrypt a JSONB value using the configured master key. Stored as a JSONB
-- envelope {"_enc": "<armored ciphertext>"} so the same column type is reused.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_encrypt_jsonb(p_value jsonb)
RETURNS jsonb LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $fn$
DECLARE
v_key text := current_setting('so_pillar.master_key', true);
BEGIN
IF v_key IS NULL OR v_key = '' THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'so_pillar.master_key GUC not configured';
END IF;
RETURN jsonb_build_object(
'_enc',
encode(pgp_sym_encrypt(p_value::text, v_key), 'base64')
);
END
$fn$;
-- Decrypt the envelope produced by fn_encrypt_jsonb. SECURITY DEFINER so callers
-- with no direct access to pgcrypto/master_key can still pull plaintext via the
-- v_pillar_secrets view.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_decrypt_jsonb(p_envelope jsonb)
RETURNS jsonb LANGUAGE plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER AS $fn$
DECLARE
v_key text := current_setting('so_pillar.master_key', true);
v_ct text;
BEGIN
IF v_key IS NULL OR v_key = '' THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'so_pillar.master_key GUC not configured';
END IF;
v_ct := p_envelope->>'_enc';
IF v_ct IS NULL THEN
RETURN p_envelope; -- not encrypted; pass through
END IF;
RETURN pgp_sym_decrypt(decode(v_ct, 'base64'), v_key)::jsonb;
END
$fn$;
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_decrypt_jsonb(jsonb) FROM PUBLIC;
-- Secrets view consumed by ext_pillar. Decrypts at the boundary so Salt sees
-- plaintext JSONB. Filters the rows to those that apply to the requesting
-- minion via current_setting, since views can't take parameters and ext_pillar
-- can only bind one parameter per query.
--
-- Master-config query: SELECT data FROM so_pillar.v_pillar_secrets WHERE %s IS NOT NULL
-- The %s satisfies the bound parameter; the view itself reads the minion_id
-- from a session GUC set by a small wrapper function (see fn_pillar_secrets).
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_pillar_secrets(p_minion_id text)
RETURNS TABLE(data jsonb)
LANGUAGE sql STABLE SECURITY DEFINER AS $fn$
SELECT so_pillar.fn_decrypt_jsonb(pe.data)
FROM so_pillar.pillar_entry pe
WHERE pe.is_secret = true
AND ( pe.scope = 'global'
OR (pe.scope = 'role'
AND pe.role_name IN (
SELECT role_name FROM so_pillar.role_member
WHERE minion_id = p_minion_id))
OR (pe.scope = 'minion' AND pe.minion_id = p_minion_id))
ORDER BY pe.sort_key, pe.pillar_path;
$fn$;
-- Replace the placeholder view from 002 with a parameterised version. Master
-- config query becomes:
-- SELECT data FROM so_pillar.fn_pillar_secrets(%s) AS s
DROP VIEW IF EXISTS so_pillar.v_pillar_secrets;
CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW so_pillar.v_pillar_secrets AS
SELECT NULL::text AS minion_id,
NULL::text AS pillar_path,
NULL::int AS sort_key,
'{}'::jsonb AS data
WHERE false;
COMMENT ON VIEW so_pillar.v_pillar_secrets IS
'Deprecated placeholder; use SELECT data FROM so_pillar.fn_pillar_secrets(minion_id) instead';
-- Convenience helper for so-yaml.py and the importer to set a secret without
-- ever exposing the master_key to the caller. SECURITY DEFINER means the
-- caller does not need read access to so_pillar.master_key.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_set_secret(
p_scope text,
p_role_name text,
p_minion_id text,
p_pillar_path text,
p_value jsonb,
p_change_reason text DEFAULT NULL
) RETURNS bigint LANGUAGE plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER AS $fn$
DECLARE
v_envelope jsonb := so_pillar.fn_encrypt_jsonb(p_value);
v_id bigint;
BEGIN
PERFORM set_config('so_pillar.change_reason',
COALESCE(p_change_reason, 'fn_set_secret'),
true);
INSERT INTO so_pillar.pillar_entry(
scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path, data, is_secret, change_reason)
VALUES (p_scope, p_role_name, p_minion_id, p_pillar_path, v_envelope, true, p_change_reason)
ON CONFLICT (pillar_path) WHERE scope='global' DO UPDATE
SET data = EXCLUDED.data, is_secret = true, change_reason = EXCLUDED.change_reason
RETURNING id INTO v_id;
IF v_id IS NULL THEN
UPDATE so_pillar.pillar_entry
SET data = v_envelope, is_secret = true, change_reason = p_change_reason
WHERE scope = p_scope
AND COALESCE(role_name,'') = COALESCE(p_role_name,'')
AND COALESCE(minion_id,'') = COALESCE(p_minion_id,'')
AND pillar_path = p_pillar_path
RETURNING id INTO v_id;
IF v_id IS NULL THEN
INSERT INTO so_pillar.pillar_entry(
scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path, data, is_secret, change_reason)
VALUES (p_scope, p_role_name, p_minion_id, p_pillar_path, v_envelope, true, p_change_reason)
RETURNING id INTO v_id;
END IF;
END IF;
RETURN v_id;
END
$fn$;
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_set_secret(text,text,text,text,jsonb,text) FROM PUBLIC;
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
-- Seed the so_pillar.role table with the role buckets defined in pillar/top.sls.
-- The match_expr column preserves the original Salt compound expression purely
-- as documentation; PG-side membership is materialised in role_member.
-- Idempotent: ON CONFLICT lets re-application leave existing rows untouched.
INSERT INTO so_pillar.role(role_name, match_kind, match_expr, description) VALUES
('manager', 'compound', '*_manager or *_managersearch or *_managerhype',
'Manager-class node. Includes managersearch and managerhype subtypes.'),
('managersearch', 'compound', '*_managersearch',
'Combined manager + searchnode role.'),
('managerhype', 'compound', '*_managerhype',
'Combined manager + hypervisor role.'),
('sensor', 'compound', '*_sensor',
'Sensor node running zeek/suricata/strelka.'),
('eval', 'compound', '*_eval',
'Single-node evaluation install (manager + sensor + storage on one host).'),
('standalone', 'compound', '*_standalone',
'Single-node production install (no distributed cluster).'),
('heavynode', 'compound', '*_heavynode',
'Distributed manager node carrying logstash + ES.'),
('idh', 'compound', '*_idh',
'Intrusion-detection-honeypot node.'),
('searchnode', 'compound', '*_searchnode',
'Distributed Elasticsearch search node.'),
('receiver', 'compound', '*_receiver',
'Kafka receiver node.'),
('import', 'compound', '*_import',
'Single-node import-only install.'),
('fleet', 'compound', '*_fleet',
'Elastic Fleet server node.'),
('hypervisor', 'compound', '*_hypervisor',
'Hypervisor host (libvirt). Hosts VM minions.'),
('desktop', 'compound', '*_desktop',
'Desktop minion (no firewall/nginx pillars apply).'),
('not_desktop', 'compound', '* and not *_desktop',
'Pseudo-role; matches every minion that is not a desktop. Used for global firewall/nginx.'),
('libvirt', 'grain', 'salt-cloud:driver:libvirt',
'Pseudo-role; matches any minion with grain salt-cloud.driver = libvirt.')
ON CONFLICT (role_name) DO NOTHING;
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
-- Roles + Row-Level Security policies for the so_pillar schema.
-- Three roles:
-- so_pillar_master — connected by salt-master ext_pillar. Read-only.
-- RLS forces it to skip is_secret rows; reads
-- encrypted secrets only via fn_pillar_secrets().
-- so_pillar_writer — connected by so-yaml dual-write and the SOC
-- PostgresConfigstore. Read+write on pillar_entry,
-- minion, role_member.
-- so_pillar_secret_owner — owns the master encryption key GUC; sole role
-- allowed to call fn_set_secret directly. Other
-- writers reach this function only via grants.
--
-- The existing app role so_postgres_user (created by init-users.sh) is granted
-- INTO so_pillar_writer so SOC keeps using its existing connection but inherits
-- pillar-write capability.
DO $$
BEGIN
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'so_pillar_master') THEN
CREATE ROLE so_pillar_master NOLOGIN;
END IF;
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'so_pillar_writer') THEN
CREATE ROLE so_pillar_writer NOLOGIN;
END IF;
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'so_pillar_secret_owner') THEN
CREATE ROLE so_pillar_secret_owner NOLOGIN;
END IF;
END
$$;
GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA so_pillar TO so_pillar_master, so_pillar_writer, so_pillar_secret_owner;
-- Read access for ext_pillar through the views only.
GRANT SELECT ON so_pillar.v_pillar_global,
so_pillar.v_pillar_role,
so_pillar.v_pillar_minion
TO so_pillar_master;
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_pillar_secrets(text) TO so_pillar_master;
-- Engine reads + drains the change queue from the salt-master process. It
-- needs SELECT to find unprocessed rows and UPDATE to mark them processed.
-- The queue contains only locator metadata (no pillar data), so the master
-- role's existing privilege footprint is unchanged in practice.
GRANT SELECT, UPDATE ON so_pillar.change_queue TO so_pillar_master;
GRANT USAGE ON SEQUENCE so_pillar.change_queue_id_seq TO so_pillar_master;
-- Writer needs INSERT (the trigger runs as table owner, so this is just for
-- direct testing / manual replays from psql).
GRANT INSERT ON so_pillar.change_queue TO so_pillar_writer;
-- Writer needs CRUD on pillar_entry/minion/role_member plus access to seed tables.
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE
ON so_pillar.pillar_entry,
so_pillar.minion,
so_pillar.role_member
TO so_pillar_writer;
GRANT SELECT ON so_pillar.role, so_pillar.scope TO so_pillar_writer;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON so_pillar.drift_log TO so_pillar_writer;
GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON ALL SEQUENCES IN SCHEMA so_pillar TO so_pillar_writer;
GRANT SELECT ON so_pillar.pillar_entry_history TO so_pillar_writer;
-- Secret owner can call fn_set_secret directly; writer goes through it via the
-- function's SECURITY DEFINER attribute, which executes as the function owner.
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_set_secret(text,text,text,text,jsonb,text)
TO so_pillar_writer, so_pillar_secret_owner;
-- so_postgres_user (SOC's existing app user, created by init-users.sh) inherits
-- writer privilege so the PostgresConfigstore in SOC can mutate pillars without
-- a second connection pool. Inheritance is per-PG default (NOINHERIT must be
-- explicit), so this just works.
DO $$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = current_setting('so_pillar.app_role', true))
THEN
EXECUTE format('GRANT so_pillar_writer TO %I',
current_setting('so_pillar.app_role', true));
ELSIF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'so_postgres_user') THEN
GRANT so_pillar_writer TO so_postgres_user;
END IF;
END
$$;
-- RLS on pillar_entry: master sees only non-secret rows. Writer sees all
-- (it must, to UPDATE secret rows when so-yaml replaces them). Secret rows
-- still require fn_decrypt_jsonb to read plaintext.
ALTER TABLE so_pillar.pillar_entry ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE so_pillar.pillar_entry FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS pillar_entry_master_read ON so_pillar.pillar_entry;
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS pillar_entry_writer_all ON so_pillar.pillar_entry;
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS pillar_entry_owner_all ON so_pillar.pillar_entry;
CREATE POLICY pillar_entry_master_read ON so_pillar.pillar_entry
FOR SELECT TO so_pillar_master
USING (NOT is_secret);
CREATE POLICY pillar_entry_writer_all ON so_pillar.pillar_entry
FOR ALL TO so_pillar_writer
USING (true)
WITH CHECK (true);
CREATE POLICY pillar_entry_owner_all ON so_pillar.pillar_entry
FOR ALL TO so_pillar_secret_owner
USING (true)
WITH CHECK (true);
-- minion / role_member do not need RLS — they hold no secrets.
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
-- Drift detection + retention via pg_cron. Optional — the schema_pillar.sls
-- state guards this file behind the postgres:so_pillar:drift_check_enabled
-- pillar flag because pg_cron may not be loaded on every install.
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pg_cron;
-- Retention: trim pillar_entry_history older than a year. Adjustable via the
-- so_pillar.history_retention_days GUC (default 365 if unset).
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_history_retain()
RETURNS void LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $fn$
DECLARE
v_days int := COALESCE(current_setting('so_pillar.history_retention_days', true)::int, 365);
BEGIN
DELETE FROM so_pillar.pillar_entry_history
WHERE changed_at < (now() - (v_days::text || ' days')::interval);
END
$fn$;
-- Drift retention: keep two weeks of drift_log.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_drift_retain()
RETURNS void LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $fn$
BEGIN
DELETE FROM so_pillar.drift_log
WHERE detected_at < (now() - interval '14 days');
END
$fn$;
-- pg_cron schedules (idempotent — unschedule any existing same-named job first).
DO $$
DECLARE
v_jobid bigint;
BEGIN
SELECT jobid INTO v_jobid FROM cron.job WHERE jobname = 'so_pillar_history_retain';
IF v_jobid IS NOT NULL THEN PERFORM cron.unschedule(v_jobid); END IF;
PERFORM cron.schedule('so_pillar_history_retain', '15 3 * * *',
'SELECT so_pillar.fn_history_retain();');
SELECT jobid INTO v_jobid FROM cron.job WHERE jobname = 'so_pillar_drift_retain';
IF v_jobid IS NOT NULL THEN PERFORM cron.unschedule(v_jobid); END IF;
PERFORM cron.schedule('so_pillar_drift_retain', '20 3 * * *',
'SELECT so_pillar.fn_drift_retain();');
END
$$;
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
-- pg_notify-driven change fan-out for so_pillar.pillar_entry.
--
-- Two layers:
-- 1. so_pillar.change_queue — durable, drained by the salt-master
-- engine. Survives engine downtime,
-- de-duplicated by id, processed once.
-- 2. pg_notify('so_pillar_change') — wakeup signal. Payload is the
-- change_queue row id and locator
-- (no secret data — channels are
-- snoopable by anyone with LISTEN).
--
-- The salt-master engine LISTENs on the channel for low-latency wakeup,
-- then SELECTs unprocessed change_queue rows so a missed notification
-- (engine restart, network blip) self-heals on the next event.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS so_pillar.change_queue (
id bigserial PRIMARY KEY,
scope text NOT NULL,
role_name text,
minion_id text,
pillar_path text NOT NULL,
op text NOT NULL CHECK (op IN ('INSERT','UPDATE','DELETE')),
enqueued_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
processed_at timestamptz
);
-- Hot index for the engine's drain query.
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_change_queue_unprocessed
ON so_pillar.change_queue (id)
WHERE processed_at IS NULL;
-- Retention index: pg_cron job in 007 sweeps processed rows older than 7d.
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_change_queue_processed_at
ON so_pillar.change_queue (processed_at)
WHERE processed_at IS NOT NULL;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_pillar_entry_notify()
RETURNS trigger
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
v_row record;
v_id bigint;
BEGIN
IF TG_OP = 'DELETE' THEN
v_row := OLD;
ELSE
v_row := NEW;
END IF;
INSERT INTO so_pillar.change_queue
(scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path, op)
VALUES
(v_row.scope, v_row.role_name, v_row.minion_id, v_row.pillar_path, TG_OP)
RETURNING id INTO v_id;
-- Payload is the queue id + locator only. Engine joins back to
-- pillar_entry if it needs the data — keeps secrets off the wire.
PERFORM pg_notify('so_pillar_change', json_build_object(
'queue_id', v_id,
'scope', v_row.scope,
'role_name', v_row.role_name,
'minion_id', v_row.minion_id,
'pillar_path', v_row.pillar_path,
'op', TG_OP
)::text);
RETURN NULL;
END;
$$;
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS tg_pillar_entry_notify ON so_pillar.pillar_entry;
CREATE TRIGGER tg_pillar_entry_notify
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE
ON so_pillar.pillar_entry
FOR EACH ROW
EXECUTE FUNCTION so_pillar.fn_pillar_entry_notify();
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# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
{% from 'postgres/map.jinja' import PGMERGED %}
include:
{% if PGMERGED.enabled %}
- postgres.enabled
- postgres.schema_pillar
{% else %}
- postgres.disabled
{% endif %}
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{# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
Elastic License 2.0. #}
{% import_yaml 'postgres/defaults.yaml' as PGDEFAULTS %}
{% set PGMERGED = salt['pillar.get']('postgres', PGDEFAULTS.postgres, merge=True) %}
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# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %}
{% if sls.split('.')[0] in allowed_states %}
{% from 'vars/globals.map.jinja' import GLOBALS %}
# Deploys the so_pillar schema (tables, views, audit triggers, secrets,
# RLS, pg_cron retention) inside the so-postgres container. Idempotent —
# every CREATE / GRANT is wrapped in IF NOT EXISTS / ON CONFLICT or DO
# blocks so re-running the state is a no-op when the schema is current.
#
# Gated on the postgres:so_pillar:enabled feature flag (default false).
# Flip to true once the postsalt branch is ready to bring ext_pillar live.
include:
- postgres.enabled
{% set so_pillar_enabled = salt['pillar.get']('postgres:so_pillar:enabled', False) %}
{% if so_pillar_enabled %}
{% set drift_enabled = salt['pillar.get']('postgres:so_pillar:drift_check_enabled', False) %}
{% set schema_dir = '/opt/so/saltstack/default/salt/postgres/files/schema/pillar' %}
# Wait for postgres to actually accept TCP connections. Same idiom as
# telegraf_users.sls. The docker_container.running state returns earlier than
# the database is ready on first init.
so_pillar_postgres_wait_ready:
cmd.run:
- name: |
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
if docker exec so-postgres pg_isready -h 127.0.0.1 -U postgres -q 2>/dev/null; then
exit 0
fi
sleep 2
done
echo "so-postgres did not accept TCP connections within 120s" >&2
exit 1
- require:
- docker_container: so-postgres
{% set sql_files = [
'001_schema.sql',
'002_views.sql',
'003_history_trigger.sql',
'004_secrets.sql',
'005_seed_roles.sql',
'006_rls.sql',
] %}
{% if drift_enabled %}
{% do sql_files.append('007_drift_pgcron.sql') %}
{% endif %}
# 008 always applies — pg_notify-driven change fan-out is what the salt-master
# pg_notify_pillar engine consumes. Without it reactor wiring sees no events.
{% do sql_files.append('008_change_notify.sql') %}
{% for sql_file in sql_files %}
so_pillar_apply_{{ sql_file | replace('.', '_') }}:
cmd.run:
- name: |
docker exec -i so-postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U postgres -d securityonion \
< {{ schema_dir }}/{{ sql_file }}
- require:
- cmd: so_pillar_postgres_wait_ready
{% if not loop.first %}
- cmd: so_pillar_apply_{{ sql_files[loop.index0 - 1] | replace('.', '_') }}
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
# Set the master encryption key GUC on the secret-owner role. The key itself
# is generated by setup/so-functions::secrets_pillar() (extended for postsalt)
# and lives in /opt/so/conf/postgres/so_pillar.key (mode 0400) — never read by
# Salt itself; the value flows into PG via ALTER ROLE so it sits only in the
# server's role catalog.
so_pillar_master_key_configure:
cmd.run:
- name: |
if [ -r /opt/so/conf/postgres/so_pillar.key ]; then
KEY="$(< /opt/so/conf/postgres/so_pillar.key)"
docker exec -i so-postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U postgres -d securityonion <<EOSQL
ALTER ROLE so_pillar_secret_owner SET so_pillar.master_key = '$KEY';
ALTER ROLE so_pillar_master SET so_pillar.master_key = '$KEY';
ALTER ROLE so_pillar_writer SET so_pillar.master_key = '$KEY';
EOSQL
else
echo "so_pillar.key not present yet; setup/so-functions must generate it before schema_pillar.sls" >&2
exit 1
fi
- require:
- cmd: so_pillar_apply_{{ sql_files[-1] | replace('.', '_') }}
# Run the importer once after the schema is in place. Idempotent — re-runs
# with no SLS edits produce zero row changes.
so_pillar_initial_import:
cmd.run:
- name: /usr/sbin/so-pillar-import --yes --reason 'schema_pillar.sls initial import'
- require:
- cmd: so_pillar_master_key_configure
# Flip so-yaml from dual-write to PG-canonical for managed paths now that
# the schema and importer are both in place. Bootstrap files (secrets.sls,
# postgres/auth.sls, ca/init.sls, *.nodes.sls, top.sls, ...) remain on disk
# regardless because so_yaml_postgres.locate() raises SkipPath for them.
so_pillar_so_yaml_mode_dir:
file.directory:
- name: /opt/so/conf/so-yaml
- user: socore
- group: socore
- mode: '0755'
- makedirs: True
so_pillar_so_yaml_mode_postgres:
file.managed:
- name: /opt/so/conf/so-yaml/mode
- contents: postgres
- user: socore
- group: socore
- mode: '0644'
- require:
- file: so_pillar_so_yaml_mode_dir
- cmd: so_pillar_initial_import
{% else %}
so_pillar_disabled_noop:
test.nop
{% endif %}
{% else %}
{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
test.fail_without_changes:
- name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed
{% endif %}
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postgres:
enabled:
description: Whether the PostgreSQL database container is enabled on this grid. Backs the assistant store and the Telegraf metrics database.
forcedType: bool
readonly: True
helpLink: influxdb
telegraf:
retention_days:
description: Number of days of Telegraf metrics to keep in the so_telegraf database. Older partitions are dropped hourly by pg_partman.
forcedType: int
helpLink: postgres
config:
max_connections:
description: Maximum number of concurrent PostgreSQL connections.
forcedType: int
global: True
helpLink: postgres
shared_buffers:
description: Amount of memory PostgreSQL uses for shared buffers (e.g. 256MB, 1GB). Raising this improves read cache hit rate at the cost of system RAM.
global: True
helpLink: postgres
log_min_messages:
description: Minimum severity of server messages written to the PostgreSQL log.
options:
- debug1
- info
- notice
- warning
- error
- log
- fatal
global: True
helpLink: postgres
listen_addresses:
description: Interfaces PostgreSQL listens on. Must remain '*' so clients on the docker bridge network can connect.
global: True
advanced: True
helpLink: postgres
port:
description: TCP port PostgreSQL listens on inside the container. Firewall rules and container port mapping assume 5432.
forcedType: int
global: True
advanced: True
helpLink: postgres
ssl:
description: Whether PostgreSQL accepts TLS connections. Must remain 'on' — pg_hba.conf requires hostssl for TCP.
global: True
advanced: True
helpLink: postgres
ssl_cert_file:
description: Path (inside the container) to the TLS server certificate. Salt-managed.
global: True
advanced: True
helpLink: postgres
ssl_key_file:
description: Path (inside the container) to the TLS server private key. Salt-managed.
global: True
advanced: True
helpLink: postgres
ssl_ca_file:
description: Path (inside the container) to the CA bundle PostgreSQL uses to verify client certificates. Salt-managed.
global: True
advanced: True
helpLink: postgres
hba_file:
description: Path (inside the container) to the pg_hba.conf authentication file. Salt-managed — edit salt/postgres/files/pg_hba.conf.
global: True
advanced: True
helpLink: postgres
log_destination:
description: Where PostgreSQL writes its server log. 'stderr' routes to the container log stream.
global: True
advanced: True
helpLink: postgres
logging_collector:
description: Whether to run a separate logging collector process. Disabled because the docker log stream already captures stderr.
global: True
advanced: True
helpLink: postgres
shared_preload_libraries:
description: Comma-separated list of extensions loaded at server start. Required for pg_cron which drives pg_partman maintenance — do not remove.
global: True
advanced: True
helpLink: postgres
cron.database_name:
description: Database pg_cron schedules jobs in. Must be so_telegraf so partman maintenance runs in the right database context.
global: True
advanced: True
helpLink: postgres
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# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %}
{% if sls.split('.')[0] in allowed_states %}
append_so-postgres_so-status.conf:
file.append:
- name: /opt/so/conf/so-status/so-status.conf
- text: so-postgres
- unless: grep -q so-postgres /opt/so/conf/so-status/so-status.conf
{% else %}
{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
test.fail_without_changes:
- name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed
{% endif %}
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# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %}
{% if sls.split('.')[0] in allowed_states %}
{% from 'vars/globals.map.jinja' import GLOBALS %}
{% from 'ca/map.jinja' import CA %}
postgres_key:
x509.private_key_managed:
- name: /etc/pki/postgres.key
- keysize: 4096
- backup: True
- new: True
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/etc/pki/postgres.key') -%}
- prereq:
- x509: /etc/pki/postgres.crt
{%- endif %}
- retry:
attempts: 5
interval: 30
postgres_crt:
x509.certificate_managed:
- name: /etc/pki/postgres.crt
- ca_server: {{ CA.server }}
- subjectAltName: DNS:{{ GLOBALS.hostname }}, IP:{{ GLOBALS.node_ip }}
- signing_policy: postgres
- private_key: /etc/pki/postgres.key
- CN: {{ GLOBALS.hostname }}
- days_remaining: 7
- days_valid: 820
- backup: True
- timeout: 30
- retry:
attempts: 5
interval: 30
postgresKeyperms:
file.managed:
- replace: False
- name: /etc/pki/postgres.key
- mode: 400
- user: 939
- group: 939
{% else %}
{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
test.fail_without_changes:
- name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed
{% endif %}
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# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %}
{% if sls.split('.')[0] in allowed_states %}
{% from 'vars/globals.map.jinja' import GLOBALS %}
{% from 'telegraf/map.jinja' import TELEGRAFMERGED %}
{# postgres_wait_ready below requires `docker_container: so-postgres`, which is
declared in postgres.enabled. Include it here so state.apply postgres.telegraf_users
on its own (e.g. from orch.deploy_newnode) still has that ID in scope. Salt
de-duplicates the circular include. #}
include:
- postgres.enabled
{% set TG_OUT = TELEGRAFMERGED.output | upper %}
{% if TG_OUT in ['POSTGRES', 'BOTH'] %}
# docker_container.running returns as soon as the container starts, but on
# first-init docker-entrypoint.sh starts a temporary postgres with
# `listen_addresses=''` to run /docker-entrypoint-initdb.d scripts, then
# shuts it down before exec'ing the real CMD. A default pg_isready check
# (Unix socket) passes during that ephemeral phase and races the shutdown
# with "the database system is shutting down". Checking TCP readiness on
# 127.0.0.1 only succeeds after the final postgres binds the port.
postgres_wait_ready:
cmd.run:
- name: |
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
if docker exec so-postgres pg_isready -h 127.0.0.1 -U postgres -q 2>/dev/null; then
exit 0
fi
sleep 2
done
echo "so-postgres did not accept TCP connections within 120s" >&2
exit 1
- require:
- docker_container: so-postgres
# Ensure the shared Telegraf database exists. init-users.sh only runs on a
# fresh data dir, so hosts upgraded onto an existing /nsm/postgres volume
# would otherwise never get so_telegraf.
postgres_create_telegraf_db:
cmd.run:
- name: |
if ! docker exec so-postgres psql -U postgres -tAc "SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname='so_telegraf'" | grep -q 1; then
docker exec so-postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U postgres -c "CREATE DATABASE so_telegraf"
fi
- require:
- cmd: postgres_wait_ready
# Provision the shared group role and schema once. Every per-minion role is a
# member of so_telegraf, and each Telegraf connection does SET ROLE so_telegraf
# (via options='-c role=so_telegraf' in the connection string) so tables created
# on first write are owned by the group role and every member can INSERT/SELECT.
postgres_telegraf_group_role:
cmd.run:
- name: |
docker exec -i so-postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U postgres -d so_telegraf <<'EOSQL'
DO $$
BEGIN
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT FROM pg_catalog.pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'so_telegraf') THEN
CREATE ROLE so_telegraf NOLOGIN;
END IF;
END
$$;
GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE so_telegraf TO so_telegraf;
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS telegraf AUTHORIZATION so_telegraf;
GRANT USAGE, CREATE ON SCHEMA telegraf TO so_telegraf;
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS partman;
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pg_partman SCHEMA partman;
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pg_cron;
-- Telegraf (running as so_telegraf) calls partman.create_parent()
-- on first write of each metric, which needs USAGE on the partman
-- schema, EXECUTE on its functions/procedures, and write access to
-- partman.part_config so it can register new partitioned parents.
GRANT USAGE, CREATE ON SCHEMA partman TO so_telegraf;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA partman TO so_telegraf;
GRANT EXECUTE ON ALL FUNCTIONS IN SCHEMA partman TO so_telegraf;
GRANT EXECUTE ON ALL PROCEDURES IN SCHEMA partman TO so_telegraf;
-- partman creates per-parent template tables (partman.template_*) at
-- runtime; default privileges extend DML/sequence access to them.
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA partman
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON TABLES TO so_telegraf;
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES IN SCHEMA partman
GRANT USAGE, SELECT, UPDATE ON SEQUENCES TO so_telegraf;
-- Hourly partman maintenance. cron.schedule is idempotent by jobname.
SELECT cron.schedule(
'telegraf-partman-maintenance',
'17 * * * *',
'CALL partman.run_maintenance_proc()'
);
EOSQL
- require:
- cmd: postgres_create_telegraf_db
{% set creds = salt['pillar.get']('telegraf:postgres_creds', {}) %}
{% for mid, entry in creds.items() %}
{% if entry.get('user') and entry.get('pass') %}
{% set u = entry.user %}
{% set p = entry.pass | replace("'", "''") %}
postgres_telegraf_role_{{ u }}:
cmd.run:
- name: |
docker exec -i so-postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U postgres -d so_telegraf <<'EOSQL'
DO $$
BEGIN
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT FROM pg_catalog.pg_roles WHERE rolname = '{{ u }}') THEN
EXECUTE format('CREATE ROLE %I WITH LOGIN PASSWORD %L', '{{ u }}', '{{ p }}');
ELSE
EXECUTE format('ALTER ROLE %I WITH PASSWORD %L', '{{ u }}', '{{ p }}');
END IF;
END
$$;
GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE so_telegraf TO "{{ u }}";
GRANT so_telegraf TO "{{ u }}";
EOSQL
- require:
- cmd: postgres_telegraf_group_role
{% endif %}
{% endfor %}
# Reconcile partman retention from pillar. Runs after role/schema setup so
# any partitioned parents Telegraf has already created get their retention
# refreshed whenever postgres.telegraf.retention_days changes.
{% set retention = salt['pillar.get']('postgres:telegraf:retention_days', 14) | int %}
postgres_telegraf_retention_reconcile:
cmd.run:
- name: |
docker exec -i so-postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U postgres -d so_telegraf <<'EOSQL'
DO $$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_catalog.pg_extension WHERE extname = 'pg_partman') THEN
UPDATE partman.part_config
SET retention = '{{ retention }} days',
retention_keep_table = false
WHERE parent_table LIKE 'telegraf.%';
END IF;
END
$$;
EOSQL
- require:
- cmd: postgres_telegraf_group_role
{% endif %}
{% else %}
{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
test.fail_without_changes:
- name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed
{% endif %}
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
. /usr/sbin/so-common
# Backups contain role password hashes and full chat data; keep them 0600.
umask 0077
TODAY=$(date '+%Y_%m_%d')
BACKUPDIR=/nsm/backup
BACKUPFILE="$BACKUPDIR/so-postgres-backup-$TODAY.sql.gz"
MAXBACKUPS=7
mkdir -p $BACKUPDIR
# Skip if already backed up today
if [ -f "$BACKUPFILE" ]; then
exit 0
fi
# Skip if container isn't running
if ! docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' | grep -q '^so-postgres$'; then
exit 0
fi
# Dump all databases and roles, compress
docker exec so-postgres pg_dumpall -U postgres | gzip > "$BACKUPFILE"
# Retention cleanup
NUMBACKUPS=$(find $BACKUPDIR -type f -name "so-postgres-backup*" | wc -l)
while [ "$NUMBACKUPS" -gt "$MAXBACKUPS" ]; do
OLDEST=$(find $BACKUPDIR -type f -name "so-postgres-backup*" -printf '%T+ %p\n' | sort | head -n 1 | awk -F" " '{print $2}')
rm -f "$OLDEST"
NUMBACKUPS=$(find $BACKUPDIR -type f -name "so-postgres-backup*" | wc -l)
done
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
. /usr/sbin/so-common
usage() {
echo "Usage: $0 <operation> [args]"
echo ""
echo "Supported Operations:"
echo " sql Execute a SQL command, requires: <sql>"
echo " sqlfile Execute a SQL file, requires: <path>"
echo " shell Open an interactive psql shell"
echo " dblist List databases"
echo " userlist List database roles"
echo ""
exit 1
}
if [ $# -lt 1 ]; then
usage
fi
# Check for prerequisites
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "This script must be run using sudo!"
exit 1
fi
COMMAND=$(basename $0)
OP=$1
shift
set -eo pipefail
log() {
echo -e "$(date) | $COMMAND | $@" >&2
}
so_psql() {
docker exec so-postgres psql -U postgres -d securityonion "$@"
}
case "$OP" in
sql)
[ $# -lt 1 ] && usage
so_psql -c "$1"
;;
sqlfile)
[ $# -ne 1 ] && usage
if [ ! -f "$1" ]; then
log "File not found: $1"
exit 1
fi
docker cp "$1" so-postgres:/tmp/sqlfile.sql
docker exec so-postgres psql -U postgres -d securityonion -f /tmp/sqlfile.sql
docker exec so-postgres rm -f /tmp/sqlfile.sql
;;
shell)
docker exec -it so-postgres psql -U postgres -d securityonion
;;
dblist)
so_psql -c "\l"
;;
userlist)
so_psql -c "\du"
;;
*)
usage
;;
esac
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
. /usr/sbin/so-common
/usr/sbin/so-restart postgres $1
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
. /usr/sbin/so-common
/usr/sbin/so-start postgres $1
+10
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@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
. /usr/sbin/so-common
/usr/sbin/so-stop postgres $1
+157
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@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
# Point-in-time host metrics from the Telegraf Postgres backend.
# Sanity-check tool for verifying metrics are landing before the grid
# dashboards consume them.
#
# Assumes Telegraf's postgresql output is configured with
# tags_as_foreign_keys = true, tags_as_jsonb = true, fields_as_jsonb = true,
# so metric tables are (time, tag_id, fields jsonb) and tag tables are
# (tag_id, tags jsonb).
. /usr/sbin/so-common
usage() {
cat <<EOF
Usage: $0 [host]
Shows the most recent CPU, memory, disk, and load metrics for each host
from the so_telegraf Postgres database. Without an argument, reports on
every host that has data. With a host, limits output to that one.
Requires: sudo, so-postgres running, telegraf.output set to
POSTGRES or BOTH.
EOF
exit 1
}
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "This script must be run using sudo!"
exit 1
fi
case "${1:-}" in
-h|--help) usage ;;
esac
FILTER_HOST="${1:-}"
SCHEMA="telegraf"
# Host values are interpolated into SQL below. Hostnames are [A-Za-z0-9._-];
# any other character in a tag value or CLI arg is rejected to prevent a
# stored-tag (or CLI) → SQL injection via a compromised Telegraf writer.
HOST_RE='^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$'
if [ -n "$FILTER_HOST" ] && ! [[ "$FILTER_HOST" =~ $HOST_RE ]]; then
echo "Invalid host filter: $FILTER_HOST" >&2
exit 1
fi
so_psql() {
docker exec so-postgres psql -U postgres -d so_telegraf -At -F $'\t' "$@"
}
if ! docker exec so-postgres psql -U postgres -lqt 2>/dev/null | cut -d\| -f1 | grep -qw so_telegraf; then
echo "Database so_telegraf not found. Is telegraf.output set to POSTGRES or BOTH?"
exit 2
fi
table_exists() {
local table="$1"
[ -n "$(so_psql -c "SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema='${SCHEMA}' AND table_name='${table}' LIMIT 1;")" ]
}
# Discover hosts from cpu_tag (every minion reports cpu).
if ! table_exists "cpu_tag"; then
echo "${SCHEMA}.cpu_tag not found. Has Telegraf written any rows yet?"
exit 0
fi
HOSTS=$(so_psql -c "
SELECT DISTINCT tags->>'host'
FROM \"${SCHEMA}\".cpu_tag
WHERE tags ? 'host'
ORDER BY 1;")
if [ -z "$HOSTS" ]; then
echo "No hosts found in ${SCHEMA}. Is Telegraf configured to write to Postgres?"
exit 0
fi
print_metric() {
so_psql -c "$1"
}
for host in $HOSTS; do
if ! [[ "$host" =~ $HOST_RE ]]; then
echo "Skipping host with invalid characters in tag value: $host" >&2
continue
fi
if [ -n "$FILTER_HOST" ] && [ "$host" != "$FILTER_HOST" ]; then
continue
fi
echo "===================================================================="
echo " Host: $host"
echo "===================================================================="
if table_exists "cpu"; then
print_metric "
SELECT 'cpu ' AS metric,
to_char(c.time, 'YYYY-MM-DD HH24:MI:SS') AS ts,
round((100 - (c.fields->>'usage_idle')::numeric), 1) || '% used'
FROM \"${SCHEMA}\".cpu c
JOIN \"${SCHEMA}\".cpu_tag t USING (tag_id)
WHERE t.tags->>'host' = '${host}' AND t.tags->>'cpu' = 'cpu-total'
ORDER BY c.time DESC LIMIT 1;"
fi
if table_exists "mem"; then
print_metric "
SELECT 'memory ' AS metric,
to_char(m.time, 'YYYY-MM-DD HH24:MI:SS') AS ts,
round((m.fields->>'used_percent')::numeric, 1) || '% used (' ||
pg_size_pretty((m.fields->>'used')::bigint) || ' of ' ||
pg_size_pretty((m.fields->>'total')::bigint) || ')'
FROM \"${SCHEMA}\".mem m
JOIN \"${SCHEMA}\".mem_tag t USING (tag_id)
WHERE t.tags->>'host' = '${host}'
ORDER BY m.time DESC LIMIT 1;"
fi
if table_exists "disk"; then
print_metric "
SELECT 'disk ' || rpad(t.tags->>'path', 12) AS metric,
to_char(d.time, 'YYYY-MM-DD HH24:MI:SS') AS ts,
round((d.fields->>'used_percent')::numeric, 1) || '% used (' ||
pg_size_pretty((d.fields->>'used')::bigint) || ' of ' ||
pg_size_pretty((d.fields->>'total')::bigint) || ')'
FROM \"${SCHEMA}\".disk d
JOIN \"${SCHEMA}\".disk_tag t USING (tag_id)
WHERE t.tags->>'host' = '${host}'
AND d.time = (SELECT max(d2.time)
FROM \"${SCHEMA}\".disk d2
JOIN \"${SCHEMA}\".disk_tag t2 USING (tag_id)
WHERE t2.tags->>'host' = '${host}')
ORDER BY t.tags->>'path';"
fi
if table_exists "system"; then
print_metric "
SELECT 'load ' AS metric,
to_char(s.time, 'YYYY-MM-DD HH24:MI:SS') AS ts,
(s.fields->>'load1') || ' / ' ||
(s.fields->>'load5') || ' / ' ||
(s.fields->>'load15') || ' (1/5/15m)'
FROM \"${SCHEMA}\".system s
JOIN \"${SCHEMA}\".system_tag t USING (tag_id)
WHERE t.tags->>'host' = '${host}'
ORDER BY s.time DESC LIMIT 1;"
fi
echo ""
done
+27
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@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
# Fires for every event tagged 'so/pillar/changed'. Source of those events
# is the pg_notify_pillar engine on the salt-master, which in turn drains
# so_pillar.change_queue (populated by the AFTER trigger on
# so_pillar.pillar_entry — see 008_change_notify.sql).
#
# All routing logic — which pillar paths reload which services on which
# targets — lives in orch.so_pillar_reload so it stays editable as one
# YAML table without touching reactor wiring.
{% set payload = data.get('data', {}) %}
{% do salt.log.info('so_pillar_changed reactor: %s' % payload) %}
so_pillar_dispatch_reload:
runner.state.orchestrate:
- args:
- mods: orch.so_pillar_reload
- pillar:
so_pillar_change:
scope: {{ payload.get('scope') | json }}
role_name: {{ payload.get('role_name') | json }}
minion_id: {{ payload.get('minion_id') | json }}
changes: {{ payload.get('changes', []) | json }}
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
pg_notify_pillar Salt master engine that bridges so_pillar.change_queue
into the Salt event bus.
Architecture (see 008_change_notify.sql):
pillar_entry -- AFTER trigger --> change_queue (durable)
+ pg_notify('so_pillar_change') (wakeup)
|
LISTEN <-- this engine <-+
SELECT/UPDATE change_queue
|
fire_event('so/pillar/changed', ...)
|
reactor matches tag --> orch
Why a queue + notify rather than just notify: pg_notify is fire-and-forget
within a session. If the engine is down or the LISTEN connection is broken
when a write happens, the notification is lost forever. The change_queue
lets us recover on (re)connect, we drain everything still flagged
processed_at IS NULL.
Debounce: bulk operations (so-pillar-import, fresh installs) can fire
hundreds of notifications per second. The engine collects whatever lands in
a short window and emits one event per (scope, role, minion) tuple so the
reactor isn't stampeded.
"""
import json
import logging
import os
import select
import time
import salt.utils.event
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
__virtualname__ = 'pg_notify_pillar'
DEFAULT_CHANNEL = 'so_pillar_change'
DEFAULT_DEBOUNCE_MS = 500
DEFAULT_RECONNECT_BACKOFF = 5
DEFAULT_BACKLOG_INTERVAL = 30
DEFAULT_BATCH_LIMIT = 500
EVENT_TAG = 'so/pillar/changed'
def __virtual__():
try:
import psycopg2 # noqa: F401
return __virtualname__
except ImportError:
return False, 'pg_notify_pillar engine requires psycopg2'
def start(dsn=None,
host='127.0.0.1',
port=5432,
dbname='securityonion',
user='so_pillar_master',
password=None,
channel=DEFAULT_CHANNEL,
debounce_ms=DEFAULT_DEBOUNCE_MS,
reconnect_backoff=DEFAULT_RECONNECT_BACKOFF,
backlog_interval=DEFAULT_BACKLOG_INTERVAL,
batch_limit=DEFAULT_BATCH_LIMIT,
password_file=None):
"""
Run the change-queue bridge until the master shuts the engine down.
Either pass a full ``dsn`` string, or supply discrete kwargs. The
password may also be read from ``password_file`` (mode 0400) so the
engine config in ``/etc/salt/master.d/`` doesn't have to embed it
inline only the file path.
"""
import psycopg2
import psycopg2.extensions
if dsn is None:
if password is None and password_file:
try:
with open(password_file, 'r') as fh:
password = fh.read().strip()
except (IOError, OSError) as exc:
log.error('pg_notify_pillar: cannot read password_file %s: %s',
password_file, exc)
return
dsn = _build_dsn(host=host, port=port, dbname=dbname,
user=user, password=password)
bus = salt.utils.event.get_master_event(
__opts__, __opts__['sock_dir'], listen=False)
log.info('pg_notify_pillar: starting (channel=%s debounce=%dms)',
channel, debounce_ms)
while True:
conn = None
try:
conn = psycopg2.connect(dsn)
conn.set_isolation_level(
psycopg2.extensions.ISOLATION_LEVEL_AUTOCOMMIT)
cur = conn.cursor()
cur.execute('LISTEN {0}'.format(channel))
log.info('pg_notify_pillar: connected; LISTEN %s', channel)
_drain(cur, bus, batch_limit)
while True:
ready, _, _ = select.select([conn], [], [], backlog_interval)
if not ready:
_drain(cur, bus, batch_limit)
continue
conn.poll()
_consume_notifies(conn)
if debounce_ms > 0:
time.sleep(debounce_ms / 1000.0)
conn.poll()
_consume_notifies(conn)
_drain(cur, bus, batch_limit)
except Exception as exc: # psycopg2.Error subclasses + OS errors
log.error('pg_notify_pillar: %s; reconnecting in %ds',
exc, reconnect_backoff)
finally:
if conn is not None:
try:
conn.close()
except Exception:
pass
time.sleep(reconnect_backoff)
def _build_dsn(host, port, dbname, user, password):
parts = ['host={0}'.format(host),
'port={0}'.format(port),
'dbname={0}'.format(dbname),
'user={0}'.format(user)]
if password:
parts.append('password={0}'.format(password))
return ' '.join(parts)
def _consume_notifies(conn):
# We don't use the payload directly — the queue table is the source of
# truth, and draining it covers any notifications we missed. So just
# discard them; their presence already proved there's something to drain.
while conn.notifies:
conn.notifies.pop(0)
def _drain(cur, bus, batch_limit):
"""Mark unprocessed change_queue rows processed and emit one event per
(scope, role_name, minion_id) group. SKIP LOCKED so multiple masters
sharing a Postgres don't double-process."""
cur.execute("""
UPDATE so_pillar.change_queue
SET processed_at = now()
WHERE id IN (
SELECT id FROM so_pillar.change_queue
WHERE processed_at IS NULL
ORDER BY id
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED
LIMIT %s)
RETURNING id, scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path, op
""", (batch_limit,))
rows = cur.fetchall()
if not rows:
return
groups = {}
for row_id, scope, role_name, minion_id, pillar_path, op in rows:
key = (scope, role_name, minion_id)
groups.setdefault(key, []).append({
'queue_id': row_id,
'pillar_path': pillar_path,
'op': op,
})
for (scope, role_name, minion_id), changes in groups.items():
payload = {
'scope': scope,
'role_name': role_name,
'minion_id': minion_id,
'changes': changes,
}
log.debug('pg_notify_pillar: firing %s for %s',
EVENT_TAG, payload)
bus.fire_event(payload, EVENT_TAG)
+2
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@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
include:
- salt.minion
- salt.master.ext_pillar_postgres
- salt.master.pg_notify_pillar_engine
{% if 'vrt' in salt['pillar.get']('features', []) %}
- salt.cloud
- salt.cloud.reactor_config_hypervisor
+46
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@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
# Drops /etc/salt/master.d/ext_pillar_postgres.conf so the salt-master loads
# pillar overlays from the so_pillar.* schema in so-postgres alongside the
# on-disk SLS pillar tree. Gated on the postgres:so_pillar:enabled feature
# flag (default false) so the file only appears once the schema is deployed
# and the importer has run at least once.
{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %}
{% if sls.split('.')[0] in allowed_states %}
{% if salt['pillar.get']('postgres:so_pillar:enabled', False) %}
ext_pillar_postgres_config:
file.managed:
- name: /etc/salt/master.d/ext_pillar_postgres.conf
- source: salt://salt/master/files/ext_pillar_postgres.conf.jinja
- template: jinja
- mode: '0640'
- user: root
- group: salt
- watch_in:
- service: salt_master_service
{% else %}
# When the flag is off make sure any previously-deployed config is removed
# so a rollback flips behavior cleanly.
ext_pillar_postgres_config_absent:
file.absent:
- name: /etc/salt/master.d/ext_pillar_postgres.conf
- watch_in:
- service: salt_master_service
{% endif %}
{% else %}
{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
test.fail_without_changes:
- name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed
{% endif %}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
# /etc/salt/master.d/ext_pillar_postgres.conf
# Rendered by salt/salt/master/ext_pillar_postgres.sls.
# Reads the so_pillar.* schema in so-postgres and overlays it onto SLS pillar.
# SLS still renders first (ext_pillar_first: False) so bootstrap and mine-driven
# pillars work before Postgres is reachable; PG values overlay/override on top.
postgres:
host: {{ pillar.get('postgres', {}).get('host', '127.0.0.1') }}
port: {{ pillar.get('postgres', {}).get('port', 5432) }}
db: securityonion
user: so_pillar_master
pass: {{ pillar['secrets']['pillar_master_pass'] }}
ext_pillar_first: False
pillar_source_merging_strategy: smart
pillar_merge_lists: False
pillar_cache: True
pillar_cache_backend: disk
pillar_cache_ttl: {{ pillar.get('postgres', {}).get('so_pillar', {}).get('pillar_cache_ttl', 60) }}
# List form (not mapping form) so result rows merge into the pillar root rather
# than under a named subtree. Verified against salt/pillar/sql_base.py: list
# entries pass root=None to enter_root() which sets self.focus = self.result.
ext_pillar:
- postgres:
- query: "SELECT data FROM so_pillar.v_pillar_global WHERE %s IS NOT NULL ORDER BY sort_key, pillar_path"
as_json: True
ignore_null: True
- query: "SELECT data FROM so_pillar.v_pillar_role WHERE minion_id = %s ORDER BY sort_key, pillar_path"
as_json: True
ignore_null: True
- query: "SELECT data FROM so_pillar.v_pillar_minion WHERE minion_id = %s ORDER BY sort_key, pillar_path"
as_json: True
ignore_null: True
- query: "SELECT data FROM so_pillar.fn_pillar_secrets(%s)"
as_json: True
ignore_null: True
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
# /etc/salt/master.d/pg_notify_pillar_engine.conf
# Rendered by salt/salt/master/pg_notify_pillar_engine.sls.
#
# Subscribes the salt-master to so_pillar.change_queue via LISTEN
# so_pillar_change. The engine drains queued changes and re-publishes
# them on the event bus as 'so/pillar/changed'. Reactor wiring is in
# so_pillar_reactor.conf.
engines:
- pg_notify_pillar:
host: {{ pillar.get('postgres', {}).get('host', '127.0.0.1') }}
port: {{ pillar.get('postgres', {}).get('port', 5432) }}
dbname: securityonion
user: so_pillar_master
password: {{ pillar['secrets']['pillar_master_pass'] }}
channel: so_pillar_change
debounce_ms: {{ pillar.get('postgres', {}).get('so_pillar', {}).get('engine_debounce_ms', 500) }}
reconnect_backoff: {{ pillar.get('postgres', {}).get('so_pillar', {}).get('engine_reconnect_backoff', 5) }}
backlog_interval: {{ pillar.get('postgres', {}).get('so_pillar', {}).get('engine_backlog_interval', 30) }}
batch_limit: {{ pillar.get('postgres', {}).get('so_pillar', {}).get('engine_batch_limit', 500) }}
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# /etc/salt/master.d/so_pillar_reactor.conf
# Wires the so/pillar/changed event tag — emitted by the pg_notify_pillar
# engine — to the so_pillar_changed reactor, which dispatches to
# orch.so_pillar_reload.
#
# Lives in its own file (rather than appended to reactor_hypervisor.conf)
# so the postgres:so_pillar:enabled flag can flip it on/off independently
# of hypervisor reactor wiring.
reactor:
- 'so/pillar/changed':
- /opt/so/saltstack/default/salt/reactor/so_pillar_changed.sls
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
# Elastic License 2.0.
# Deploys the pg_notify_pillar engine module + its master.d config so the
# salt-master subscribes to so_pillar.change_queue and republishes changes
# on the salt event bus as so/pillar/changed. Reactor (so_pillar_changed.sls)
# matches that tag and dispatches the appropriate orch.
#
# Gated on the same postgres:so_pillar:enabled flag as the schema and
# ext_pillar config so the three components flip together.
{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %}
{% if sls.split('.')[0] in allowed_states %}
{% if salt['pillar.get']('postgres:so_pillar:enabled', False) %}
pg_notify_pillar_engine_module:
file.managed:
- name: /etc/salt/engines/pg_notify_pillar.py
- source: salt://salt/engines/master/pg_notify_pillar.py
- mode: '0644'
- user: root
- group: root
- makedirs: True
- watch_in:
- service: salt_master_service
pg_notify_pillar_engine_config:
file.managed:
- name: /etc/salt/master.d/pg_notify_pillar_engine.conf
- source: salt://salt/master/files/pg_notify_pillar_engine.conf.jinja
- template: jinja
- mode: '0640'
- user: root
- group: salt
- watch_in:
- service: salt_master_service
pg_notify_pillar_reactor_config:
file.managed:
- name: /etc/salt/master.d/so_pillar_reactor.conf
- source: salt://salt/master/files/so_pillar_reactor.conf
- mode: '0644'
- user: root
- group: root
- watch_in:
- service: salt_master_service
{% else %}
# When the flag flips off, peel everything back so a rollback returns to
# pure-disk pillar with no orphan engine churning on a dead listen socket.
pg_notify_pillar_engine_module_absent:
file.absent:
- name: /etc/salt/engines/pg_notify_pillar.py
- watch_in:
- service: salt_master_service
pg_notify_pillar_engine_config_absent:
file.absent:
- name: /etc/salt/master.d/pg_notify_pillar_engine.conf
- watch_in:
- service: salt_master_service
pg_notify_pillar_reactor_config_absent:
file.absent:
- name: /etc/salt/master.d/so_pillar_reactor.conf
- watch_in:
- service: salt_master_service
{% endif %}
{% else %}
{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
test.fail_without_changes:
- name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed
{% endif %}
+5
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@
{% do SOCDEFAULTS.soc.config.server.modules.elastic.update({'username': GLOBALS.elasticsearch.auth.users.so_elastic_user.user, 'password': GLOBALS.elasticsearch.auth.users.so_elastic_user.pass}) %}
{% if GLOBALS.postgres is defined and GLOBALS.postgres.auth is defined %}
{% set PG_ADMIN_PASS = salt['pillar.get']('secrets:postgres_pass', '') %}
{% do SOCDEFAULTS.soc.config.server.modules.update({'postgres': {'hostUrl': GLOBALS.manager_ip, 'port': 5432, 'username': GLOBALS.postgres.auth.users.so_postgres_user.user, 'password': GLOBALS.postgres.auth.users.so_postgres_user.pass, 'adminUser': 'postgres', 'adminPassword': PG_ADMIN_PASS, 'dbname': 'securityonion', 'sslMode': 'require', 'assistantEnabled': true, 'esHostUrl': 'https://' ~ GLOBALS.manager_ip ~ ':9200', 'esUsername': GLOBALS.elasticsearch.auth.users.so_elastic_user.user, 'esPassword': GLOBALS.elasticsearch.auth.users.so_elastic_user.pass, 'esVerifyCert': false}}) %}
{% endif %}
{% do SOCDEFAULTS.soc.config.server.modules.influxdb.update({'hostUrl': 'https://' ~ GLOBALS.influxdb_host ~ ':8086'}) %}
{% do SOCDEFAULTS.soc.config.server.modules.influxdb.update({'token': INFLUXDB_TOKEN}) %}
{% for tool in SOCDEFAULTS.soc.config.server.client.tools %}
+1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
telegraf:
enabled: False
output: BOTH
config:
interval: '30s'
metric_batch_size: 1000
+44
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,14 @@
{%- set ZEEK_ENABLED = salt['pillar.get']('zeek:enabled', True) %}
{%- set MDENGINE = GLOBALS.md_engine %}
{%- set LOGSTASH_ENABLED = LOGSTASH_MERGED.enabled %}
{%- set TG_OUT = TELEGRAFMERGED.output | upper %}
{%- set PG_HOST = GLOBALS.manager_ip %}
{#- Per-minion telegraf creds live in the grid-wide telegraf/creds.sls pillar,
written by /usr/sbin/so-telegraf-cred on the manager. Each minion looks up
its own entry by grains.id. #}
{%- set PG_ENTRY = salt['pillar.get']('telegraf:postgres_creds:' ~ grains.id, {}) %}
{%- set PG_USER = PG_ENTRY.get('user', '') %}
{%- set PG_PASS = PG_ENTRY.get('pass', '') %}
# Global tags can be specified here in key="value" format.
[global_tags]
role = "{{ GLOBALS.role.split('-') | last }}"
@@ -72,6 +80,7 @@
# OUTPUT PLUGINS #
###############################################################################
{%- if TG_OUT in ['INFLUXDB', 'BOTH'] %}
# Configuration for sending metrics to InfluxDB
[[outputs.influxdb_v2]]
urls = ["https://{{ INFLUXDBHOST }}:8086"]
@@ -85,6 +94,41 @@
tls_key = "/etc/telegraf/telegraf.key"
## Use TLS but skip chain & host verification
# insecure_skip_verify = false
{%- endif %}
{%- if TG_OUT in ['POSTGRES', 'BOTH'] and PG_USER and PG_PASS %}
# Configuration for sending metrics to PostgreSQL.
# options='-c role=so_telegraf' makes every connection SET ROLE to the shared
# group role so tables created on first write are owned by so_telegraf, and
# all per-minion members can INSERT/SELECT them via role inheritance.
# fields_as_jsonb/tags_as_jsonb keep metric tables at a fixed column count so
# high-cardinality inputs (docker, procstat, kafka) don't blow past the
# Postgres 1600-column-per-table limit.
[[outputs.postgresql]]
connection = "host={{ PG_HOST }} port=5432 user={{ PG_USER }} password={{ PG_PASS }} dbname=so_telegraf sslmode=verify-full sslrootcert=/etc/telegraf/ca.crt options='-c role=so_telegraf'"
schema = "telegraf"
tags_as_foreign_keys = true
tags_as_jsonb = true
fields_as_jsonb = true
# Every metric table is a daily time-range partitioned parent managed by
# pg_partman. Retention drops old partitions instead of row-by-row DELETEs.
{% raw %}
# pg_partman 5.x requires the control column (time) to be NOT NULL, so
# ALTER it before create_parent(). And create_parent() splits
# p_parent_table on '.' to look up raw identifiers, so the literal must
# be 'schema.name' (not '"schema"."name"' as .table|quoteLiteral emits).
# IF NOT EXISTS keeps the three templates idempotent so a Telegraf
# restart after any DB-side surgery re-runs them safely.
create_templates = [
'''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS {{ .table }} ({{ .columns }}) PARTITION BY RANGE ("time")''',
'''ALTER TABLE {{ .table }} ALTER COLUMN "time" SET NOT NULL''',
'''SELECT partman.create_parent(p_parent_table := {{ printf "%s.%s" .table.Schema .table.Name | quoteLiteral }}, p_control := 'time', p_type := 'range', p_interval := '1 day', p_premake := 3) WHERE NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM partman.part_config WHERE parent_table = {{ printf "%s.%s" .table.Schema .table.Name | quoteLiteral }})'''
]
tag_table_create_templates = [
'''CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS {{ .table }} ({{ .columns }}, PRIMARY KEY (tag_id))'''
]
{% endraw %}
{%- endif %}
###############################################################################
# PROCESSOR PLUGINS #
+9
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,15 @@ telegraf:
forcedType: bool
advanced: True
helpLink: influxdb
output:
description: Selects the backend(s) Telegraf writes metrics to. INFLUXDB keeps the current behavior; POSTGRES writes to the grid's Postgres instance; BOTH dual-writes for migration validation.
options:
- INFLUXDB
- POSTGRES
- BOTH
global: True
advanced: True
helpLink: influxdb
config:
interval:
description: Data collection interval.
+5
View File
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ base:
- backup.config_backup
- nginx
- influxdb
- postgres
- soc
- kratos
- hydra
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ base:
- backup.config_backup
- nginx
- influxdb
- postgres
- soc
- kratos
- hydra
@@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ base:
- registry
- nginx
- influxdb
- postgres
- strelka.manager
- soc
- kratos
@@ -153,6 +156,7 @@ base:
- registry
- nginx
- influxdb
- postgres
- strelka.manager
- soc
- kratos
@@ -181,6 +185,7 @@ base:
- manager
- nginx
- influxdb
- postgres
- strelka.manager
- soc
- kratos
+2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
{% from 'vars/elasticsearch.map.jinja' import ELASTICSEARCH_GLOBALS %}
{% from 'vars/postgres.map.jinja' import POSTGRES_GLOBALS %}
{% from 'vars/sensor.map.jinja' import SENSOR_GLOBALS %}
{% set ROLE_GLOBALS = {} %}
@@ -6,6 +7,7 @@
{% set EVAL_GLOBALS =
[
ELASTICSEARCH_GLOBALS,
POSTGRES_GLOBALS,
SENSOR_GLOBALS
]
%}
+2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
{% from 'vars/elasticsearch.map.jinja' import ELASTICSEARCH_GLOBALS %}
{% from 'vars/postgres.map.jinja' import POSTGRES_GLOBALS %}
{% from 'vars/sensor.map.jinja' import SENSOR_GLOBALS %}
{% set ROLE_GLOBALS = {} %}
@@ -6,6 +7,7 @@
{% set IMPORT_GLOBALS =
[
ELASTICSEARCH_GLOBALS,
POSTGRES_GLOBALS,
SENSOR_GLOBALS
]
%}
+3 -1
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
{% from 'vars/elasticsearch.map.jinja' import ELASTICSEARCH_GLOBALS %}
{% from 'vars/logstash.map.jinja' import LOGSTASH_GLOBALS %}
{% from 'vars/postgres.map.jinja' import POSTGRES_GLOBALS %}
{% set ROLE_GLOBALS = {} %}
{% set MANAGER_GLOBALS =
[
ELASTICSEARCH_GLOBALS,
LOGSTASH_GLOBALS
LOGSTASH_GLOBALS,
POSTGRES_GLOBALS
]
%}
+3 -1
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
{% from 'vars/elasticsearch.map.jinja' import ELASTICSEARCH_GLOBALS %}
{% from 'vars/logstash.map.jinja' import LOGSTASH_GLOBALS %}
{% from 'vars/postgres.map.jinja' import POSTGRES_GLOBALS %}
{% set ROLE_GLOBALS = {} %}
{% set MANAGERSEARCH_GLOBALS =
[
ELASTICSEARCH_GLOBALS,
LOGSTASH_GLOBALS
LOGSTASH_GLOBALS,
POSTGRES_GLOBALS
]
%}
+16
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
Elastic License 2.0. #}
{% import 'vars/init.map.jinja' as INIT %}
{%
set POSTGRES_GLOBALS = {
'postgres': {}
}
%}
{% if salt['file.file_exists']('/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls') %}
{% do POSTGRES_GLOBALS.postgres.update({'auth': INIT.PILLAR.postgres.auth}) %}
{% endif %}
+2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
{% from 'vars/elasticsearch.map.jinja' import ELASTICSEARCH_GLOBALS %}
{% from 'vars/logstash.map.jinja' import LOGSTASH_GLOBALS %}
{% from 'vars/postgres.map.jinja' import POSTGRES_GLOBALS %}
{% from 'vars/sensor.map.jinja' import SENSOR_GLOBALS %}
{% set ROLE_GLOBALS = {} %}
@@ -8,6 +9,7 @@
[
ELASTICSEARCH_GLOBALS,
LOGSTASH_GLOBALS,
POSTGRES_GLOBALS,
SENSOR_GLOBALS
]
%}
+43 -2
View File
@@ -821,6 +821,7 @@ create_manager_pillars() {
soc_pillar
idh_pillar
influxdb_pillar
postgres_pillar
logrotate_pillar
patch_pillar
nginx_pillar
@@ -1053,8 +1054,14 @@ generate_passwords(){
HYDRAKEY=$(get_random_value)
HYDRASALT=$(get_random_value)
REDISPASS=$(get_random_value)
POSTGRESPASS=$(get_random_value)
SOCSRVKEY=$(get_random_value 64)
IMPORTPASS=$(get_random_value)
# postsalt: salt-master connects to so_pillar.* as so_pillar_master, and the
# so-postgres container needs a symmetric key for pgcrypto-encrypted secrets.
# Both are generated here so they survive reinstall like the other secrets.
PILLARMASTERPASS=$(get_random_value)
SO_PILLAR_KEY=$(get_random_value 64)
}
generate_interface_vars() {
@@ -1355,6 +1362,12 @@ influxdb_pillar() {
" token: $INFLUXTOKEN" > $local_salt_dir/pillar/influxdb/token.sls
}
postgres_pillar() {
title "Create the postgres pillar file"
touch $adv_postgres_pillar_file
touch $postgres_pillar_file
}
make_some_dirs() {
mkdir -p /nsm
mkdir -p "$default_salt_dir"
@@ -1364,7 +1377,7 @@ make_some_dirs() {
mkdir -p $local_salt_dir/salt/firewall/portgroups
mkdir -p $local_salt_dir/salt/firewall/ports
for THEDIR in bpf elasticsearch ntp firewall redis backup influxdb strelka sensoroni soc docker zeek suricata nginx telegraf logstash soc manager kratos hydra idh elastalert stig global kafka versionlock hypervisor vm; do
for THEDIR in bpf elasticsearch ntp firewall redis backup influxdb postgres strelka sensoroni soc docker zeek suricata nginx telegraf logstash soc manager kratos hydra idh elastalert stig global kafka versionlock hypervisor vm; do
mkdir -p $local_salt_dir/pillar/$THEDIR
touch $local_salt_dir/pillar/$THEDIR/adv_$THEDIR.sls
touch $local_salt_dir/pillar/$THEDIR/soc_$THEDIR.sls
@@ -1844,7 +1857,35 @@ secrets_pillar(){
printf '%s\n'\
"secrets:"\
" import_pass: $IMPORTPASS"\
" influx_pass: $INFLUXPASS" > $local_salt_dir/pillar/secrets.sls
" influx_pass: $INFLUXPASS"\
" pillar_master_pass: $PILLARMASTERPASS"\
" postgres_pass: $POSTGRESPASS" > $local_salt_dir/pillar/secrets.sls
elif ! grep -q '^[[:space:]]*pillar_master_pass:' $local_salt_dir/pillar/secrets.sls; then
# Existing install pre-postsalt — append the new key without disturbing
# the values already on disk. Keys we already wrote stay; only the new
# pillar_master_pass is added.
info "Appending pillar_master_pass to existing Secrets Pillar"
if [ -z "$PILLARMASTERPASS" ]; then
PILLARMASTERPASS=$(get_random_value)
fi
printf ' pillar_master_pass: %s\n' "$PILLARMASTERPASS" >> $local_salt_dir/pillar/secrets.sls
fi
# postsalt: write the so_pillar pgcrypto master key to a 0400 file owned by
# root. The key itself is never read by Salt — schema_pillar.sls loads it
# into the so-postgres container via ALTER ROLE so_pillar_secret_owner SET
# so_pillar.master_key = '<key>'; the file just lets the value survive
# container restarts.
if [ ! -f /opt/so/conf/postgres/so_pillar.key ]; then
info "Generating so_pillar pgcrypto master key"
mkdir -p /opt/so/conf/postgres
if [ -z "$SO_PILLAR_KEY" ]; then
SO_PILLAR_KEY=$(get_random_value 64)
fi
umask 077
printf '%s' "$SO_PILLAR_KEY" > /opt/so/conf/postgres/so_pillar.key
chmod 0400 /opt/so/conf/postgres/so_pillar.key
chown root:root /opt/so/conf/postgres/so_pillar.key
fi
}
+6
View File
@@ -202,6 +202,12 @@ export influxdb_pillar_file
adv_influxdb_pillar_file="$local_salt_dir/pillar/influxdb/adv_influxdb.sls"
export adv_influxdb_pillar_file
postgres_pillar_file="$local_salt_dir/pillar/postgres/soc_postgres.sls"
export postgres_pillar_file
adv_postgres_pillar_file="$local_salt_dir/pillar/postgres/adv_postgres.sls"
export adv_postgres_pillar_file
logrotate_pillar_file="$local_salt_dir/pillar/logrotate/soc_logrotate.sls"
export logrotate_pillar_file
+2 -1
View File
@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ log_has_errors() {
grep -vE "remove_failed_vm.sls" | \
grep -vE "failed to copy: httpReadSeeker" | \
grep -vE "Error response from daemon: failed to resolve reference" | \
grep -vE "log-.*-pipeline_failed_attempts" &> "$error_log"
grep -vE "log-.*-pipeline_failed_attempts" | \
grep -vE " -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1" &> "$error_log"
if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
# This function succeeds (returns 0) if errors are detected