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updated directory structure
- signed-off-by: trimstray <trimstray@gmail.com>
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trimstray
73
lib/post_install_tasks/bootloader_configuration.md
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73
lib/post_install_tasks/bootloader_configuration.md
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### Bootloader configuration (grub)
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#### :information_source: Introduction
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Protection for the boot loader can prevent unauthorized users who have physical access to systems, e.g. attaining root privileges through single user mode.
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Basically when you want to prohibit unauthorized reconfiguring of your system, otherwise anybody could load anything on it.
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#### :eight_pointed_black_star: Protect bootloader with password
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You can set password for the bootloader for prevents users from entering single user mode, changing settings at boot time, access to the bootloader console, reset the root password, if there is no password for GRUB-menu or access to non-secure operating systems.
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###### Generate password hash
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```bash
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# Debian like distributions
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grub-mkpasswd-pbkdf2
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# RedHat like distributions
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grub2-mkpasswd-pbkdf2
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```
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###### Updated grub configuration
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```bash
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cat > /etc/grub.d/01_hash << __EOF__
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set superusers="user"
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password_pbkdf2 user
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grub.pbkdf2.sha512.<hash> # rest of your password hash
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__EOF__
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```
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And regenerate grub configuration:
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```bash
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# Debian like distributions
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grub-mkconfig > /boot/grub/grub.cfg
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# RedHat like distributions
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grub2-mkconfig > /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
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```
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#### :eight_pointed_black_star: Protect bootloader config files
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Set the owner and group of `/etc/grub.conf` to the root user:
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```bash
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chown root:root /etc/grub.conf
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```
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or
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```bash
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chown -R root:root /etc/grub.d
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```
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Set permission on the `/etc/grub.conf` or `/etc/grub.d` file to read and write for root only:
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```bash
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chmod og-rwx /etc/grub.conf
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```
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or
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```bash
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chmod -R og-rwx /etc/grub.d
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```
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#### :ballot_box_with_check: Summary checklist
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| <b>Item</b> | <b>True</b> | <b>False</b> |
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| :--- | :---: | :---: |
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| Set password for the bootloader | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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160
lib/post_install_tasks/disk_partitions.md
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lib/post_install_tasks/disk_partitions.md
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### Disk partitions
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#### :information_source: Introduction
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Critical file systems should be separated into different partitions in ways that make your system a better and more secure.
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#### :eight_pointed_black_star: Separate disk partitions
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Make sure the following filesystems are mounted on separate partitions:
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- `/boot`
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- `/tmp`
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- `/var`
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- `/var/log`
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Additionally, depending on the purpose of the server, you should consider separating the following partitions:
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- `/usr`
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- `/home`
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- `/var/www`
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You should also consider separating these partitions:
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- `/var/tmp`
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- `/var/log/audit`
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#### :eight_pointed_black_star: Mount options: nodev, nosuid and noexec
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For more security-focused situations is as follows:
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- `nodev` - specifies that the filesystem cannot contain special devices: This is a security precaution. You don't want a user world-accessible filesystem like this to have the potential for the creation of character devices or access to random device hardware
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- `nosuid` - specifies that the filesystem cannot contain set userid files. Preventing setuid binaries on a world-writable filesystem makes sense because there's a risk of root escalation or other awfulness there
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- `noexec` - this param might be useful for a partition that contains no binaries, like **/var**, or contains binaries you do not want to execute on your system (from partitions with `noexec`), or that cannot even be executed on your system
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#### :eight_pointed_black_star: Secure /boot directory
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The boot directory contains important files related to the Linux kernel, so you need to make sure that this directory is locked down to read-only permissions.
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Add **ro** option and `nodev`, `nosuid` and `noexec` to `/etc/fstab` for **/boot** entry:
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```bash
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LABEL=/boot /boot ext2 defaults,ro,nodev,nosuid,noexec 1 2
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```
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> When updating the kernel you will have to move the flag to `rw`:
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> ```bash
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> mount -o remount,defaults,rw /boot
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> ```
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#### :eight_pointed_black_star: Secure /tmp and /var/tmp
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On Linux systems, the **/tmp** and **/var/tmp** locations are world-writable.
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Several daemons/applications use the **/tmp** or **/var/tmp** directories to temporarily store data, log information, or to share information between their sub-components. However, due to the shared nature of these directories, several attacks are possible, including:
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- Leaks of confidential data via secrets in file names
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- Race-condition attacks (TOCTOU) on the integrity of processes and data
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- Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks based on race conditions and pre-allocating file/directory names
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As a rule of thumb, malicious applications usually write to **/tmp** and then attempt to run whatever was written. A way to prevent this is to mount **/tmp** on a separate partition with the options `nodev`, `nosuid` and `noexec` enabled.
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This will deny binary execution from **/tmp**, disable any binary to be suid root, and disable any block devices from being created.
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**The first possible scenario is create symlink**
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```bash
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mv /var/tmp /var/tmp.old
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ln -s /tmp /var/tmp
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cp -prf /var/tmp.old/* /tmp && rm -fr /var/tmp.old
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```
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and set properly mount params:
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```bash
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UUID=<...> /tmp ext4 defaults,nodev,nosuid,noexec 1 2
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```
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**The second scenario is a bind mount**
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The storage location **/var/tmp** should be bind mounted to **/tmp**, as having multiple locations for temporary storage is not required:
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```bash
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/tmp /var/tmp none rw,nodev,nosuid,noexec,bind 0 0
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```
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**The third scenario is setting up polyinstantiated directories**
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Create new directories:
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```bash
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mkdir --mode 000 /tmp-inst
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mkdir --mode 000 /var/tmp/tmp-inst
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```
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Edit `/etc/security/namespace.conf`:
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```bash
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/tmp /tmp-inst/ level root,adm
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/var/tmp /var/tmp/tmp-inst/ level root,adm
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```
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Set correct **SELinux** context:
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```bash
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setsebool polyinstantiation_enabled=1
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chcon --reference=/tmp /tmp-inst
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chcon --reference=/var/tmp/ /var/tmp/tmp-inst
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```
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And set `nodev`, `nosuid` and `noexec` mount options in `/etc/fstab`.
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> Alternative for **polyinstantiated directories** is **PrivateTmp** feature available from **systemd**. For more information please see: [New Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Security Feature: PrivateTmp](https://access.redhat.com/blogs/766093/posts/1976243).
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#### :eight_pointed_black_star: Secure /dev/shm
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`/dev/shm` is a temporary file storage filesystem, i.e. **tmpfs**, that uses RAM for the backing store. One of the major security issue with the `/dev/shm` is anyone can upload and execute files inside the `/dev/shm` similar to the `/tmp` partition. Further the size should be limited to avoid an attacker filling up this mountpoint to the point where applications could be affected. (normally it allows 20% or more of RAM to be used). The sticky bit should be set like for any world writeable directory.
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For applies to shared memory `/dev/shm` mount params:
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```bash
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tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs rw,nodev,nosuid,noexec,size=1024M,mode=1777 0 0
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```
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> You can also create a group named 'shm' and put application users for SHM-using applications in there. Then the access can be completely be restricted as such:
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```bash
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tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs rw,nodev,nosuid,noexec,size=1024M,mode=1770,uid=root,gid=shm 0 0
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```
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#### :eight_pointed_black_star: Secure /proc filesystem
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The proc pseudo-filesystem `/proc` should be mounted with `hidepid`. When setting `hidepid` to **2**, directories entries in `/proc` will hidden.
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```bash
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proc /proc proc defaults,hidepid=2 0 0
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```
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> Some of the services/programs operate incorrectly when the `hidepid` parameter is set, e.g. Nagios checks.
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#### :eight_pointed_black_star: Swap partition
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#### :eight_pointed_black_star: Disk quotas
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#### :ballot_box_with_check: Summary checklist
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| <b>Item</b> | <b>True</b> | <b>False</b> |
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| :--- | :---: | :---: |
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| Separate base partition scheme: `/boot`, `/tmp`, `/var`, `/var/log` | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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| Separate `/usr` partition | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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| Separate `/home` partition | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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| Separate `/var/www` partition | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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| Separate `/var/tmp` partition | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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| Separate `/var/audit` partition | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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| Secure `/boot` directory with `ro`, `nodev`, `nosuid`, `noexec` options | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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| Secure `/tmp` and `/var/tmp` directory with `nodev`, `nosuid`, `noexec` options | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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| Create symlink for `/var/tmp` in `/tmp` | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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| Setting up bind-mount `/var/tmp` to `/tmp` | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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| Setting up polyinstantiated directories for `/tmp` and `/var/tmp` | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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| Secure `/dev/shm` directory with `nodev`, `nosuid`, `noexec` options | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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| Secure `/proc` filesystem with `hidepid=2` option | :black_square_button: | :black_square_button: |
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