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f1746b0f59
Both SLS files used `sls.split('.')[0]` to derive what to look up in
allowed_states. For these files (sls='salt.master.ext_pillar_postgres'
and sls='salt.master.pg_notify_pillar_engine') that returns 'salt',
which is never in any role's allowed_states list — only specific keys
like 'salt.master', 'salt.minion', 'salt.cloud' are. The guard's else
branch fired on every highstate, emitting two cosmetic
ID: <sls>_state_not_allowed
Function: test.fail_without_changes
Comment: Failure!
entries that polluted the so-setup error summary even on green installs.
Both states drop config under /etc/salt/master.d/ and watch_in the
salt-master service, so the natural intent is "only run when this node
hosts the salt master". Switching the guard to a literal
{% if 'salt.master' in allowed_states %}
expresses that directly without string-parsing the SLS path, and
matches the existing membership in manager_states (which is in turn
included in every manager-bearing role: so-eval, so-manager,
so-managerhype, so-managersearch, so-standalone, so-import).