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Josh Patterson
a540e47672
Salt 3006.29 (saltstack/salt#70466) answered the eMudhra/emSign incident by bumping certifi to 2026.10.19, which drops the "emSign ECC Root CA - G3" root whose intermediates had recoverable private keys, and by shipping pip 26.2.2, whose vendored certifi gets the same fix. We stay on 3006.19, so apply the same two upgrades inside /opt/saltstack/salt from vendored wheels. relenv is upgraded to 0.22.27 in the same pip invocation. relenv 0.22.2's runtime wrapper hardcodes pre-26.2 pip install() signatures, so a lone pip 26.2.2 upgrade breaks every later pip run with an unexpected 'script_executable' argument. 0.22.27 is what 3006.29 builds against and its runtime diff is otherwise cosmetic. Installing all three at once under the stock pip means no host ever sits in the broken intermediate state. The state lives in salt.python_modules so new installs get it from salt_install_module_deps before salt-master starts, and existing grids get it from the soup highstate plus grid push. It is gated on saltversion 3006.19 so a future Salt bump disables it, and ordered before the docker module install so docker is always installed with the fixed pip. The docker wheel set now carries certifi 2026.10.19 instead of 2024.7.4. Verified on a fresh 3.4.0 manager + sensor grid: state applies on both, reruns are no-ops, full highstate passes on both nodes.