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https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion.git
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a149ea7e8f
Every postgres.auth run was rewriting every minion pillar file via two so-yaml.py replace calls, even when nothing had changed. Passwords are only generated on first encounter (see the `if key not in telegraf_users` guard) and never rotate, so re-writing the same values on every apply is wasted work and noisy state output. Add an `unless:` check that compares the already-written postgres.telegraf.user to the one we'd set. If they match, skip the fan-out entirely. On first apply for a new minion the key isn't there, so the replace runs; on subsequent applies it's a no-op.
95 lines
4.0 KiB
Plaintext
95 lines
4.0 KiB
Plaintext
# Copyright Security Onion Solutions LLC and/or licensed to Security Onion Solutions LLC under one
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# or more contributor license agreements. Licensed under the Elastic License 2.0 as shown at
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# https://securityonion.net/license; you may not use this file except in compliance with the
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# Elastic License 2.0.
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{% from 'allowed_states.map.jinja' import allowed_states %}
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{% if sls in allowed_states %}
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{% set DIGITS = "1234567890" %}
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{% set LOWERCASE = "qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnm" %}
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{% set UPPERCASE = "QWERTYUIOPASDFGHJKLZXCVBNM" %}
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{% set SYMBOLS = "~!@#^&*()-_=+[]|;:,.<>?" %}
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{% set CHARS = DIGITS~LOWERCASE~UPPERCASE~SYMBOLS %}
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{% set so_postgres_user_pass = salt['pillar.get']('postgres:auth:users:so_postgres_user:pass', salt['random.get_str'](72, chars=CHARS)) %}
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{# Per-minion Telegraf Postgres credentials. Merge currently-up minions with any #}
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{# previously-known entries in pillar so existing passwords persist across runs. #}
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{% set existing = salt['pillar.get']('postgres:auth:users', {}) %}
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{% set up_minions = salt['saltutil.runner']('manage.up') or [] %}
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{% set telegraf_users = {} %}
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{% for key, entry in existing.items() %}
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{%- if key.startswith('telegraf_') and entry.get('user') and entry.get('pass') %}
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{%- do telegraf_users.update({key: entry}) %}
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{%- endif %}
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{% endfor %}
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{% for mid in up_minions %}
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{%- set safe = mid | replace('.','_') | replace('-','_') | lower %}
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{%- set key = 'telegraf_' ~ safe %}
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{%- if key not in telegraf_users %}
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{%- do telegraf_users.update({key: {'user': 'so_telegraf_' ~ safe, 'pass': salt['random.get_str'](72, chars=CHARS)}}) %}
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{%- endif %}
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{% endfor %}
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postgres_auth_pillar:
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file.managed:
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- name: /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/postgres/auth.sls
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- mode: 640
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- reload_pillar: True
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- contents: |
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postgres:
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auth:
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users:
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so_postgres_user:
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user: so_postgres
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pass: "{{ so_postgres_user_pass }}"
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{% for key, entry in telegraf_users.items() %}
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{{ key }}:
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user: {{ entry.user }}
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pass: "{{ entry.pass }}"
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{% endfor %}
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- show_changes: False
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{# Fan each minion's telegraf cred out to its own pillar file. The minions/
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<id>.sls file is only served to that specific minion via pillar/top.sls
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(`- minions.{{ grains.id }}`), so sensors, heavynodes, etc. see their own
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credential without the admin password or anyone else's. Run per up-minion
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so we have the original minion id (not just the safe-normalized version). #}
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{% for mid in up_minions %}
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{%- set safe = mid | replace('.','_') | replace('-','_') | lower %}
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{%- set key = 'telegraf_' ~ safe %}
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{%- set entry = telegraf_users.get(key) %}
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{%- if entry %}
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postgres_telegraf_minion_pillar_{{ safe }}:
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cmd.run:
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- name: |
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set -e
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PILLAR_FILE=/opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/{{ mid }}.sls
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if [ ! -f "$PILLAR_FILE" ]; then
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echo '{}' > "$PILLAR_FILE"
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chown socore:socore "$PILLAR_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true
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chmod 640 "$PILLAR_FILE"
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fi
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/usr/sbin/so-yaml.py replace "$PILLAR_FILE" postgres.telegraf.user '{{ entry.user }}'
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/usr/sbin/so-yaml.py replace "$PILLAR_FILE" postgres.telegraf.pass '{{ entry.pass }}'
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{#- Skip if this minion's pillar file already carries a matching user.
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Passwords are generated once per minion (see the `if key not in telegraf_users`
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guard above) and never rotate, so once a cred is fanned out the file
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doesn't need to be rewritten on subsequent auth runs. If we ever add
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rotation, we'd need to delete postgres.telegraf to force a re-fan. #}
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- unless: |
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[ "$(/usr/sbin/so-yaml.py get -r /opt/so/saltstack/local/pillar/minions/{{ mid }}.sls postgres.telegraf.user 2>/dev/null)" = '{{ entry.user }}' ]
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- require:
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- file: postgres_auth_pillar
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{%- endif %}
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{% endfor %}
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{% else %}
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{{sls}}_state_not_allowed:
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test.fail_without_changes:
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- name: {{sls}}_state_not_allowed
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{% endif %}
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