Files
securityonion/salt
Mike Reeves 614f32c5e0 Split postgres auth from per-minion telegraf creds
The old flow had two writers for each per-minion Telegraf password
(so-minion wrote the minion pillar; postgres.auth regenerated any
missing aggregate entries). They drifted on first-boot and there was
no trigger to create DB roles when a new minion joined.

Split responsibilities:

- pillar/postgres/auth.sls (manager-scoped) keeps only the so_postgres
  admin cred.
- pillar/telegraf/creds.sls (grid-wide) holds a {minion_id: {user,
  pass}} map, shadowed per-install by the local-pillar copy.
- salt/manager/tools/sbin/so-telegraf-cred is the single writer:
  flock, atomic YAML write, PyYAML safe_dump so passwords never
  round-trip through so-yaml.py's type coercion. Idempotent add, quiet
  remove.
- so-minion's add/remove hooks now shell out to so-telegraf-cred
  instead of editing pillar files directly.
- postgres.telegraf_users iterates the new pillar key and CREATE/ALTERs
  roles from it; telegraf.conf reads its own entry via grains.id.
- orch.deploy_newnode runs postgres.telegraf_users on the manager and
  refreshes the new minion's pillar before the new node highstates,
  so the DB role is in place the first time telegraf tries to connect.
- soup's post_to_3.1.0 backfills the creds pillar from accepted salt
  keys (idempotent) and runs postgres.telegraf_users once to reconcile
  the DB.
2026-04-22 10:55:15 -04:00
..
2025-05-30 12:50:59 -04:00
2025-12-02 11:16:08 -06:00
2025-12-11 17:30:06 -05:00
2025-12-02 11:16:08 -06:00
2026-03-23 16:26:56 -04:00
2026-04-09 10:18:36 -04:00
2026-04-06 15:08:30 -05:00
2026-04-09 10:18:36 -04:00
2025-10-30 11:02:36 -04:00
2026-03-06 15:45:36 -05:00
2024-07-09 10:06:16 -04:00
2026-03-19 14:39:10 -04:00
2026-03-19 14:41:49 -04:00
2026-01-07 14:14:57 -05:00
2026-03-23 14:04:48 -05:00
2025-10-14 11:03:00 -04:00
2026-03-19 14:46:49 -04:00
2022-12-16 15:59:17 -05:00
2025-08-04 15:25:26 -04:00