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Josh Patterson
1e86be11b2
Salt installed the so-* scripts into /usr/sbin owned by unprivileged service UIDs (939/socore, plus 930-960 per service) at mode 755, while root executes those same files from cron, systemd and state cmd.run. Any file-write primitive as one of those UIDs was therefore root. Two mechanisms behind this are not visible in the diff: file.recurse also manages the destination directory, so /usr/sbin itself was chowned to whichever service UID ran last. A directory's owner may always chmod it, so that UID could replace even the scripts already declared user: root -- so-config-backup, so-suricata-eve-clean, so-nsm-mount-nvme. usr_sbin_perms now pins the directory to root:root 555, the mode the filesystem RPM ships. Omitting user:/group: is a no-op on files that already exist, because check_perms only chowns when a user is named. Explicit user: root is what lets upgraded grids self-heal on the next highstate, and what makes a revert chown back rather than silently do nothing.