Merge pull request #16125 from Security-Onion-Solutions/3/dev

3.2.0

DOWNLOAD_AND_VERIFY_ISO.md

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
-### 3.1.0-20260528 ISO image released on 2026/05/28
+### 3.2.0-20260729 ISO image released on 2026/07/29
 
 
 ### Download and Verify
 
-3.1.0-20260528 ISO image:  
+3.2.0-20260729 ISO image:  
-https://download.securityonion.net/file/securityonion/securityonion-3.1.0-20260528.iso
+https://download.securityonion.net/file/securityonion/securityonion-3.2.0-20260729.iso
  
-MD5: 9D6FF58DEEE24089D722C73169765B3E  
+MD5: B1E10F46DF872B655C29325DF965A4DB  
-SHA1: 2B8B816B6CEC3B7F96B3C5E040EBF502DD2C412F  
+SHA1: 0F3C7ED80F6D326B7A993C2F899B986320C01BF9  
-SHA256: 62FAB57E247C843D6A04F0796D8162C732B65D82FC3E4A59D087135B9FD32912  
+SHA256: 7465163C1D1ADFCDC3935530EAFB312E987C016941ADC11841B214553314D1FF  
 
 Signature for ISO image:  
-https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion/raw/3/main/sigs/securityonion-3.1.0-20260528.iso.sig
+https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion/raw/3/main/sigs/securityonion-3.2.0-20260729.iso.sig
 
 Signing key:  
 https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion/3/main/KEYS  
@@ -25,22 +25,22 @@ wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion/3/
 
 Download the signature file for the ISO:  
 ```
-wget https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion/raw/3/main/sigs/securityonion-3.1.0-20260528.iso.sig
+wget https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/securityonion/raw/3/main/sigs/securityonion-3.2.0-20260729.iso.sig
 ```
 
 Download the ISO image:  
 ```
-wget https://download.securityonion.net/file/securityonion/securityonion-3.1.0-20260528.iso
+wget https://download.securityonion.net/file/securityonion/securityonion-3.2.0-20260729.iso
 ```
 
 Verify the downloaded ISO image using the signature file:  
 ```
-gpg --verify securityonion-3.1.0-20260528.iso.sig securityonion-3.1.0-20260528.iso
+gpg --verify securityonion-3.2.0-20260729.iso.sig securityonion-3.2.0-20260729.iso
 ```
 
 The output should show "Good signature" and the Primary key fingerprint should match what's shown below:
 ```
-gpg: Signature made Wed 27 May 2026 03:03:59 PM EDT using RSA key ID FE507013
+gpg: Signature made Tue 28 Jul 2026 06:17:34 PM EDT using RSA key ID FE507013
 gpg: Good signature from "Security Onion Solutions, LLC <info@securityonionsolutions.com>"
 gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
 gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.

salt/common/tools/sbin/so-log-check

@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ if [[ $EXCLUDE_KNOWN_ERRORS == 'Y' ]]; then
     EXCLUDED_ERRORS="$EXCLUDED_ERRORS|from NIC checksum offloading" # zeek reporter.log
     EXCLUDED_ERRORS="$EXCLUDED_ERRORS|marked for removal"           # docker container getting recycled
     EXCLUDED_ERRORS="$EXCLUDED_ERRORS|tcp 127.0.0.1:6791: bind: address already in use" # so-elastic-fleet agent restarting. Seen starting w/ 8.18.8 https://github.com/elastic/kibana/issues/201459
-    EXCLUDED_ERRORS="$EXCLUDED_ERRORS|TransformTask\] \[logs-(tychon|aws_billing|microsoft_defender_endpoint|armis|o365_metrics|microsoft_sentinel|snyk|cyera|island_browser).*user so_kibana lacks the required permissions \[(logs|metrics)-\1" # Known issue with integrations starting transform jobs that are explicitly not allowed to start as a system user. This error should not be seen on fresh ES 9.3.3 installs or after SO 3.1.0 with soups addition of check_transform_health_and_reauthorize()
+    EXCLUDED_ERRORS="$EXCLUDED_ERRORS|TransformTask\] \[logs-.*user so_kibana lacks the required permissions" # Known issue with integrations starting transform jobs that are explicitly not allowed to start as a system user
     EXCLUDED_ERRORS="$EXCLUDED_ERRORS|manifest unknown"             # appears in so-dockerregistry log for so-tcpreplay following docker upgrade to 29.2.1-1
 fi
 

salt/reactor/pillar_push_map.yaml

@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ versionlock:
 # grain (compound supports nested grain matching via G@<key>:<subkey>:<value>).
 # pillar/vm/soc_vm.sls write path is referenced at salt/_runners/setup_hypervisor.py:856.
 vm:
-  - state: vm
+  - state: vm.user
     tgt: 'G@salt-cloud:driver:libvirt'
 
 # zeek: sensor_roles + so-import (5 roles).

salt/repo/client/oracle.sls

@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ so_repo:
   {% endif %}
     - enabled: 1
     - gpgcheck: 1
+  {% if not GLOBALS.is_manager %}
+    - sslverify: 0
+  {% endif %}
 
 # Only assign the kernel repo once this node's running salt matches the version this
 # SO release ships. During a soup the grid is mid-salt-upgrade; gating here keeps the
@@ -77,6 +80,9 @@ so_kernel_repo:
   {% endif %}
     - enabled: 1
     - gpgcheck: 1
+  {% if not GLOBALS.is_manager %}
+    - sslverify: 0
+  {% endif %}
     # Supplementary kernel repo: tolerate it being empty/unreachable (e.g. before the
     # manager has populated /nsm/kernelrepo) so a missing repomd.xml can't make every
     # dnf/pkg operation on the grid fail.

salt/soc/defaults.yaml

@@ -1512,6 +1512,10 @@ soc:
                 rulesetName: sos-resources-ag
                 branch: main
                 folder: securityonion-normalized
+              - repo: file:///nsm/airgap-resources/playbooks/securityonion-resources-playbooks
+                rulesetName: sos-published-ag
+                branch: published
+                folder: sigma
         assistant:
           systemPromptAddendum: ""
           systemPromptAddendumMaxLength: 50000
@@ -1530,9 +1534,9 @@ soc:
               healthTimeoutSeconds: 5
           agentic: false
           agentMapping:
-            Orchestrator: Claude Sonnet
+            Orchestrator: sonnet@SOAI
-            Investigator: Claude Sonnet
+            Investigator: gemma@SOAI
-            DetectionEngineer: Claude Sonnet
+            DetectionEngineer: gemma@SOAI
         onionconfig:
           saltstackDir: /opt/so/saltstack
           bypassEnabled: false
@@ -2714,4 +2718,14 @@ soc:
               enabled: true
               adapter: SOAI
               charsPerTokenEstimate: 4
+            - id: gemma
+              displayName: Gemma
+              origin: USA
+              contextLimitSmall: 256000
+              contextLimitLarge: 256000
+              lowBalanceColorAlert: 500000
+              enabled: true
+              adapter: SOAI
+              charsPerTokenEstimate: 4
+              
             

salt/soc/files/soc/sigma_playbook_pipeline.yaml

@@ -12,6 +12,30 @@ transformations:
         process.command_line: process.command_line.caseless
         process.parent.command_line: process.parent.command_line.caseless
         file.path: file.path.caseless
+    # entity_id pivots must also match processes that were already running when the
+    # agent started: Defend emits already_running (event.type:info), not start.
+    # Kept out of Playbook sigma query because Sysmon has no equivalent concept.
+    # contains_field is exact, so child pivots (process.parent.entity_id) stay
+    # start-only. Drop must precede add;
+    - id: playbook_process_lifecycle_drop_start_scope
+      type: drop_detection_item
+      field_name_conditions:
+        - type: include_fields
+          fields: ['event.type']
+      rule_conditions:
+        - type: logsource
+          category: process_creation
+        - type: contains_field
+          field: process.entity_id
+    - id: playbook_process_lifecycle_add-fields
+      type: add_condition
+      conditions:
+        event.type: ['start', 'info']
+      rule_conditions:
+        - type: logsource
+          category: process_creation
+        - type: contains_field
+          field: process.entity_id
     # file_activity: playbook-only pseudo-category spanning all file operations.
     - id: playbook_file_activity_add-fields
       type: add_condition

salt/soc/files/soc/sigma_so_pipeline.yaml

@@ -68,13 +68,25 @@ transformations:
       - type: logsource
         category: antivirus
     # OS-agnostic process_creation scoping for product-less (NIDS/host-pivot) rules.
+    # pySigma: rule_cond_expr requires rule_conditions as a mapping, not a list.
     - id: process_creation_os_agnostic
       type: add_condition
       conditions:
         event.category: process
       rule_conditions:
-      - type: logsource
+        pc_cat:
-        category: process_creation
+          type: logsource
+          category: process_creation
+        pc_win:
+          type: logsource
+          product: windows
+        pc_mac:
+          type: logsource
+          product: macos
+        pc_lin:
+          type: logsource
+          product: linux
+      rule_cond_expr: "pc_cat and not (pc_win or pc_mac or pc_lin)"
     # Transforms the `Hashes` field to ECS fields
     # ECS fields are used by the hash fields emitted by Elastic Defend
     # If shipped with Elastic Agent, sysmon logs will also have hashes mapped to ECS fields    
@@ -630,4 +642,4 @@ transformations:
         tags: '*file'
       rule_conditions:
       - type: logsource
-        category: file
+        category: file