These accounts existed only for container UID mapping and filesystem
ownership, but user.present omitted shell:, so Salt fell through to the
platform useradd default and every one of them got /bin/bash. Pin them to
/sbin/nologin so none can be used as an interactive login or `su -` target.
socore keeps /bin/bash: `su socore -c '/usr/sbin/so-repo-sync'` in soup and
so-kernel-upgrade execs the account's passwd shell, and operator docs tell
users to su to socore. soqemussh keeps /bin/bash as an SSH login account.
elastic-agent, elastic-agent-pr and kafka are included alongside the accounts
named in the issue, being the same class with the same unset shell, so the
default is uniform.
Cron is unaffected: cronie runs jobs via the crontab SHELL (default /bin/sh),
not the passwd shell. suricata is the only account changed here that owns a
crontab, and somon has shipped as nologin with a working cron job already.
The zeek `runuser -l zeek` calls all run inside so-zeek via docker.run/exec,
so they resolve the shell from the image, not the host.
Verified on a 3.4.0 managersearch + sensor grid: highstate converges with the
shell as the only change and no failures, is idempotent on a second run, all
containers stay up, SOC still issues a Kratos login flow, and the suricata
surilogcompress cron job runs post-change ((suricata) CMD/CMDEND in
/var/log/cron) while `su - suricata` is now refused.
Closes#16256
Salt installed the so-* scripts into /usr/sbin owned by unprivileged service
UIDs (939/socore, plus 930-960 per service) at mode 755, while root executes
those same files from cron, systemd and state cmd.run. Any file-write
primitive as one of those UIDs was therefore root.
Two mechanisms behind this are not visible in the diff:
file.recurse also manages the destination directory, so /usr/sbin itself was
chowned to whichever service UID ran last. A directory's owner may always
chmod it, so that UID could replace even the scripts already declared
user: root -- so-config-backup, so-suricata-eve-clean, so-nsm-mount-nvme.
usr_sbin_perms now pins the directory to root:root 555, the mode the
filesystem RPM ships.
Omitting user:/group: is a no-op on files that already exist, because
check_perms only chowns when a user is named. Explicit user: root is what
lets upgraded grids self-heal on the next highstate, and what makes a
revert chown back rather than silently do nothing.
Josh Patterson
reyesj2
Jason Ertel
Wes