The UEK8 rollout installs the new kernel and flips the boot default, but
leaves the stock EL9 (RHCK) packages behind: disk in /boot and a stale
GRUB entry on every upgraded node.
They cannot be removed in the same pass that installs UEK8. dnf's
protect_running_kernel refuses to erase the booted kernel-core, so the
removal has to wait until the node has rebooted onto 6.x. Waiting is the
safer sequencing anyway -- the node proves it comes up on UEK8 before its
fallback is deleted -- so this does not remove RHCK from the uek7 branch
either, where dnf would allow it.
so-kernel-upgrade grows a --cleanup mode that does only the removal and
no-ops (exit 0, with a log line) on a node not yet running UEK8. Its uek8
branch, which previously reported "nothing to do", now runs that cleanup
along with set_default_kernel_conf -- which also closes a gap where a node
that came up on UEK8 straight from a fresh install never had
DEFAULTKERNEL=kernel-uek-core written.
The common highstate calls --cleanup gated on the running kernel, so the
cleanup lands grid-wide as each node reboots: fresh installs reboot at the
end of setup, upgraded nodes whenever the admin schedules it. The rpm
check inside the script is the idempotency guard, so subsequent highstates
cost an rpm query rather than a dnf transaction, and the package list is
not duplicated into the state where it could drift.
Add so-nic-pin, which writes by-MAC persistent-net udev rules pinning each
physical NIC to its current name so a kernel upgrade can't renumber the
interfaces Security Onion binds by name (host:mainint, sensor:mainint, bond0).
Gated by the drop file /opt/so/state/nic_names_pinned: run-once on highstate,
and an admin can pre-create the marker to opt out. Wired into common/init.sls
as pin_nic_names, guarded by a matching unless.
Mike Reeves
Josh Patterson
Jason Ertel
Mike Reeves
defensivedepth
Wes
Jason Ertel
Doug Burks
William Wernert