/opt/so/saltstack/default holds the source for every root-executed script --
/usr/sbin, the reactors, _runners/_modules/_beacons, the master engines and
salt-relay.sh -- plus every state the root master renders. SOC mounts
/opt/so/saltstack rw as uid 939, so root-owning /usr/sbin alone was not
enough: the next highstate would copy attacker-controlled bytes out of the
tree into the root-owned destination and run them.
SOC never writes under default/, it only reads it. Every SOC write targets
local/, which stays socore-owned, as does /opt/so/state. No mode is enforced
on default/ -- SOC reads that tree, and 750/640 would break its config load.
Also stops copy_new_files(), so-saltstack-update and setup from chowning the
tree back to socore, and replaces preserve: True in soup_scripts.sls, which
carried uid/gid in from the /tmp staging tree and would have undone the
ownership before the first post-soup highstate.
Salt installed the so-* scripts into /usr/sbin owned by unprivileged service
UIDs (939/socore, plus 930-960 per service) at mode 755, while root executes
those same files from cron, systemd and state cmd.run. Any file-write
primitive as one of those UIDs was therefore root.
Two mechanisms behind this are not visible in the diff:
file.recurse also manages the destination directory, so /usr/sbin itself was
chowned to whichever service UID ran last. A directory's owner may always
chmod it, so that UID could replace even the scripts already declared
user: root -- so-config-backup, so-suricata-eve-clean, so-nsm-mount-nvme.
usr_sbin_perms now pins the directory to root:root 555, the mode the
filesystem RPM ships.
Omitting user:/group: is a no-op on files that already exist, because
check_perms only chowns when a user is named. Explicit user: root is what
lets upgraded grids self-heal on the next highstate, and what makes a
revert chown back rather than silently do nothing.
2 new config fields. Batch size is used to limit how many message turns we put in the transcript when we ask the memory agent to extract facts. The retries helps limit how many times we ask the memory agent to process a problematic session.
When auto approving tools, we might approve a tool_request before it's been saved to ES. These vars describe some leniency in retrying when the message can't be found before giving up.
Double quoted stings in yaml allow for escape sequences like `\n` and `\t` but when used around a regex, salt will hang up on `\d` not being a valid escape sequence. Switching to single quotes so escapes aren't processed.
New field that'll stop the memory scanner from scanning before an indicated date. Leaving it empty lets the scanner scan everything.
The regex for it allows YYYY-MM-DD and ensures months only allow the max number of days (no June the 43rd).
Added `memoryScanIntervalSeconds` with a default of 5 mins.
Opted to set `useMemoryScanner` to false so by default our user's sessions are not sent to the cloud before they have a chance to configure the new setting.
The agent name is also the agentMapping config key and a SOC setting id
segment, so the space made it awkward to target. Matches the rename in
securityonion-soc.
agentMapping values are model displayNames (the canonical selector); the
stock config used the model id, which only resolved via the legacy
id@adapter fallback. Use the Claude Sonnet displayName so agent-to-model
resolution matches the documented contract.
Josh Patterson
Mike Reeves
Corey Ogburn
Matthew Wright
Josh Brower
Jason Ertel
Mike Reeves
coreyogburn
reyesj2