init-db.sh only runs on a fresh PGDATA (docker-entrypoint-initdb.d), so a
cluster left partially initialized -- e.g. the container restarted mid first-init
by a watch trigger -- never recovered: the so_postgres role existed but its
schema grants and the so_telegraf database were missing, breaking SOC with
"permission denied for schema public".
- init-db.sh: make the role upsert race-safe. Try CREATE ROLE and fall back to
ALTER on duplicate_object/unique_violation instead of IF NOT EXISTS, so a
concurrent creator no longer aborts the script (set -e + ON_ERROR_STOP=1)
before the grants and so_telegraf creation run. The whole script is now
idempotent and safe to re-run.
- postgres/enabled.sls: move postgres_wait_ready here (was telegraf-gated in
telegraf_users.sls) and add postgres_bootstrap_soc_db, which re-runs init-db.sh
every highstate so a partially-initialized cluster self-heals.
- telegraf_users.sls: drop its now-duplicate postgres_wait_ready definition; it
resolves from postgres.enabled via the existing include.
- soup: remove bootstrap_so_soc_database and its post_to_3.2.0 call. The
highstates soup runs before postupgrade now reconcile the SOC DB, making the
one-shot bootstrap redundant.
PostgreSQL's log_min_error_statement defaults to 'error', so whenever a
CREATE/ALTER ROLE ... PASSWORD statement errored, the full statement text --
including the plaintext password -- was written to /opt/so/log/postgres/postgres.log.
The role-provisioning paths (init-db.sh for so_postgres, so-telegraf-postgres
for per-minion telegraf roles) both dispatch such DDL, the latter on every
state.apply.
- init-db.sh / so-telegraf-postgres: SET log_min_error_statement = panic before
the password-bearing DDL so an error no longer emits the STATEMENT line. The
ERROR message itself (no password) still logs, preserving debuggability.
- logrotate: add a postgres stanza (daily, keep 14, copytruncate, compress) so
postgres.log is rotated like every other service and leaked content can't
persist indefinitely. copytruncate is required because the container holds the
log open via redirected stderr.
- soup: scrub any already-logged PASSWORD lines from postgres.log during
post_to_3.2.0, rewriting in place to preserve the inode postgres is writing to.
- firewall/map.jinja and postgres/telegraf_users.sls now pull the
telegraf output selector through TELEGRAFMERGED so the defaults.yaml
value (BOTH) is the source of truth and pillar overrides merge in
cleanly. pillar.get with a hardcoded fallback was brittle and would
disagree with defaults.yaml if the two ever diverged.
- Rename salt/postgres/files/pg_hba.conf.jinja to pg_hba.conf and drop
template: jinja from config.sls — the file has no jinja besides the
comment header.
- Deliver postgres super and app passwords via mounted 0600 secret files
(POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE, SO_POSTGRES_PASS_FILE) instead of plaintext env
vars visible in docker inspect output
- Mount a managed pg_hba.conf that only allows local trust and hostssl
scram-sha-256 so TCP clients cannot negotiate cleartext sessions
- Restrict postgres.key to 0400 and ensure owner/group 939
- Set umask 0077 on so-postgres-backup output
- Validate host values in so-stats-show against [A-Za-z0-9._-] before SQL
interpolation so a compromised minion cannot inject SQL via a tag value
- Coerce postgres:telegraf:retention_days to int before rendering into SQL
- Escape single quotes when rendering pillar values into postgresql.conf
- Own postgres tooling in /usr/sbin as root:root so a container escape
cannot rewrite admin scripts
- Gate ES migration TLS verification on esVerifyCert (default false,
matching the elastic module's existing pattern)
Per-minion telegraf roles inherit CONNECT via PUBLIC by default and
could open sessions to the SOC database (though they have no readable
grants inside). Close the soft edge by revoking PUBLIC's CONNECT and
re-granting it to so_postgres only.
- Telegraf's outputs.postgresql plugin uses Go text/template syntax,
not uppercase tokens. The {TABLE}/{COLUMNS}/{TABLELITERAL} strings
were passed through to Postgres literally, producing syntax errors
on every metric's first write. Switch to {{ .table }}, {{ .columns }},
and {{ .table|quoteLiteral }} so partitioned parents and the partman
create_parent() call succeed.
- Replace the \gexec "CREATE DATABASE ... WHERE NOT EXISTS" idiom in
both init-users.sh and telegraf_users.sls with an explicit shell
conditional. The prior idiom occasionally fired CREATE DATABASE even
when so_telegraf already existed, producing duplicate-key failures.
Introduces global.telegraf_output (INFLUXDB|POSTGRES|BOTH, default BOTH)
so Telegraf can write metrics to Postgres alongside or instead of
InfluxDB. Each minion authenticates with its own so_telegraf_<minion>
role and writes to a matching schema inside a shared so_telegraf
database, keeping blast radius per-credential to that minion's data.
- Per-minion credentials auto-generated and persisted in postgres/auth.sls
- postgres/telegraf_users.sls reconciles roles/schemas on every apply
- Firewall opens 5432 only to minion hostgroups when Postgres output is active
- Reactor on salt/auth + orch/telegraf_postgres_sync.sls provision new
minions automatically on key accept
- soup post_to_3.1.0 backfills users for existing minions on upgrade
- so-show-stats prints latest CPU/mem/disk/load per minion for sanity checks
- so-telegraf-trim + nightly cron prune rows older than
postgres.telegraf.retention_days (default 14)
Use format() with %L for SQL literal escaping instead of raw
string interpolation. Also ALTER ROLE if user already exists
to keep password in sync with pillar.
Phase 1 of the PostgreSQL central data platform:
- Salt states: init, enabled, disabled, config, ssl, auth, sostatus
- TLS via SO CA-signed certs with postgresql.conf template
- Two-tier auth: postgres superuser + so_postgres application user
- Firewall restricts port 5432 to manager-only (HA-ready)
- Wired into top.sls, pillar/top.sls, allowed_states, firewall
containers map, docker defaults, CA signing policies, and setup
scripts for all manager-type roles
Mike Reeves
Jason Ertel