These accounts existed only for container UID mapping and filesystem
ownership, but user.present omitted shell:, so Salt fell through to the
platform useradd default and every one of them got /bin/bash. Pin them to
/sbin/nologin so none can be used as an interactive login or `su -` target.
socore keeps /bin/bash: `su socore -c '/usr/sbin/so-repo-sync'` in soup and
so-kernel-upgrade execs the account's passwd shell, and operator docs tell
users to su to socore. soqemussh keeps /bin/bash as an SSH login account.
elastic-agent, elastic-agent-pr and kafka are included alongside the accounts
named in the issue, being the same class with the same unset shell, so the
default is uniform.
Cron is unaffected: cronie runs jobs via the crontab SHELL (default /bin/sh),
not the passwd shell. suricata is the only account changed here that owns a
crontab, and somon has shipped as nologin with a working cron job already.
The zeek `runuser -l zeek` calls all run inside so-zeek via docker.run/exec,
so they resolve the shell from the image, not the host.
Verified on a 3.4.0 managersearch + sensor grid: highstate converges with the
shell as the only change and no failures, is idempotent on a second run, all
containers stay up, SOC still issues a Kratos login flow, and the suricata
surilogcompress cron job runs post-change ((suricata) CMD/CMDEND in
/var/log/cron) while `su - suricata` is now refused.
Closes#16256
Salt installed the so-* scripts into /usr/sbin owned by unprivileged service
UIDs (939/socore, plus 930-960 per service) at mode 755, while root executes
those same files from cron, systemd and state cmd.run. Any file-write
primitive as one of those UIDs was therefore root.
Two mechanisms behind this are not visible in the diff:
file.recurse also manages the destination directory, so /usr/sbin itself was
chowned to whichever service UID ran last. A directory's owner may always
chmod it, so that UID could replace even the scripts already declared
user: root -- so-config-backup, so-suricata-eve-clean, so-nsm-mount-nvme.
usr_sbin_perms now pins the directory to root:root 555, the mode the
filesystem RPM ships.
Omitting user:/group: is a no-op on files that already exist, because
check_perms only chowns when a user is named. Explicit user: root is what
lets upgraded grids self-heal on the next highstate, and what makes a
revert chown back rather than silently do nothing.
- schedule highstate every 2 hours (was 15 minutes); interval lives in
global:push:highstate_interval_hours so the SOC admin UI can tune it and
so-salt-minion-check derives its threshold as (interval + 1) * 3600
- add inotify beacon on the manager + master reactor + orch.push_batch that
writes per-app intent files, with a so-push-drainer schedule on the manager
that debounces, dedupes, and dispatches a single orchestration
- pillar_push_map.yaml allowlists the apps whose pillar changes trigger an
immediate targeted state.apply (targets verified against salt/top.sls);
edits under pillar/minions/ trigger a state.highstate on that one minion
- host-batch every push orchestration (batch: 25%, batch_wait: 15) so rule
changes don't thundering-herd large fleets
- new global:push:enabled kill-switch tears down the beacon, reactor config,
and drainer schedule on the next highstate for operators who want to keep
highstate-only behavior
- set restart_policy: unless-stopped on 23 container states so docker
recovers crashes without waiting for the next highstate; leave registry
(always), strelka/backend (on-failure), kratos, and hydra alone with
inline comments explaining why
Add ulimits as a configurable advanced setting for every container,
allowing customization through the web UI. Move hardcoded ulimits
from elasticsearch and zeek into defaults.yaml and fix elasticsearch
ulimits that were incorrectly nested under the environment key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Josh Patterson
Mike Reeves
Doug Burks
Mike ReevesandClaude Opus 4.6
reyesj2
Jason Ertel
weslambert
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