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FIX: root-own the Salt default tree so a SOC file-write cannot reach root code
/opt/so/saltstack/default holds the source for every root-executed script -- /usr/sbin, the reactors, _runners/_modules/_beacons, the master engines and salt-relay.sh -- plus every state the root master renders. SOC mounts /opt/so/saltstack rw as uid 939, so root-owning /usr/sbin alone was not enough: the next highstate would copy attacker-controlled bytes out of the tree into the root-owned destination and run them. SOC never writes under default/, it only reads it. Every SOC write targets local/, which stays socore-owned, as does /opt/so/state. No mode is enforced on default/ -- SOC reads that tree, and 750/640 would break its config load. Also stops copy_new_files(), so-saltstack-update and setup from chowning the tree back to socore, and replaces preserve: True in soup_scripts.sls, which carried uid/gid in from the /tmp staging tree and would have undone the ownership before the first post-soup highstate.
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@@ -2105,6 +2105,8 @@ setup_salt_master_dirs() {
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info "Chown the salt dirs on the manager for socore"
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logCmd "chown -R socore:socore /opt/so"
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# The default tree is root-executed code; SOC reads it but never writes it.
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logCmd "chown -R root:root $default_salt_dir"
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}
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set_progress_str() {
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