39 lines
1.3 KiB
YAML
39 lines
1.3 KiB
YAML
title: Suspicious Auditpol Usage
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author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps)
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date: 2021/02/02
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description: Threat actors can use auditpol binary to change audit policy configuration
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to impair detection capability. This can be carried out by selectively disabling/removing
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certain audit policies as well as restoring a custom policy owned by the threat
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actor.
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detection:
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SELECTION_1:
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EventID: 1
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SELECTION_2:
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Image: '*\auditpol.exe'
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SELECTION_3:
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CommandLine: '*disable*'
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SELECTION_4:
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CommandLine: '*clear*'
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SELECTION_5:
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CommandLine: '*remove*'
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SELECTION_6:
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CommandLine: '*restore*'
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condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and (SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4 or SELECTION_5
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or SELECTION_6))
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falsepositives:
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- Admin activity
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id: 0a13e132-651d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
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level: high
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logsource:
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category: process_creation
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product: windows
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modified: 2021/02/02
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references:
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- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
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tags:
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- attack.defense_evasion
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- attack.t1562.002
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yml_filename: win_sus_auditpol_usage.yml
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yml_path: /Users/user/Documents/YamatoSecurity/sigma/rules/windows/process_creation
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