Files
hayabusa/rules/sigma/process_creation/win_ad_find_discovery.yml
itiB 83d891b2fa Feature/rm submodule (#312)
* rm: submodule

* Add: rules

* Fix: hayabusa-rules to c9c10a
2021-12-20 21:14:32 +09:00

49 lines
1.3 KiB
YAML

title: AdFind Usage Detection
ruletype: Sigma
author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps)
date: 2021/02/02
description: AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to
domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 1
SELECTION_2:
CommandLine:
- '*domainlist*'
- '*trustdmp*'
- '*dcmodes*'
- '*adinfo*'
- '* dclist *'
- '*computer_pwdnotreqd*'
- '*objectcategory=*'
- '*-subnets -f*'
- '*name="Domain Admins"*'
- '*-sc u:*'
- '*domainncs*'
- '*dompol*'
- '* oudmp *'
- '*subnetdmp*'
- '*gpodmp*'
- '*fspdmp*'
- '*users_noexpire*'
- '*computers_active*'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
falsepositives:
- Admin activity
id: 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
level: high
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
modified: 2021/02/02
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1482
- attack.t1018