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hayabusa/rules/sigma/builtin/win_petitpotam_susp_tgt_request.yml
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* added ruletype to SIGMA rule converter tool #231
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YAML

title: PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request
author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag
date: 2021/09/02
description: Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests. Once an attacer obtains a computer
certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with
PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes.
One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool
like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending
on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name
to the Domain Controller computer accounts.
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 4768
SELECTION_2:
TargetUserName: '*$'
SELECTION_3:
CertThumbprint: '*'
SELECTION_4:
IpAddress: ::1
SELECTION_5:
CertThumbprint: ''
condition: (((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
and not (SELECTION_5))
falsepositives:
- False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication.
We recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts.
id: 6a53d871-682d-40b6-83e0-b7c1a6c4e3a5
level: high
logsource:
definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Account Logon > Kerberos Authentication
Service" must be configured for Success/Failure
product: windows
service: security
modified: 2021/09/07
references:
- https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/
- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1187
ruletype: SIGMA