42 lines
1.5 KiB
YAML
42 lines
1.5 KiB
YAML
title: Detection of PowerShell Execution via Sqlps.exe
|
|
author: Agro (@agro_sev) oscd.community
|
|
date: 2020/10/10
|
|
description: This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqlps.exe
|
|
utility, which is included in the standard set of utilities supplied with the
|
|
MSSQL Server. Script blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps
|
|
to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs.
|
|
detection:
|
|
SELECTION_1:
|
|
EventID: 1
|
|
SELECTION_2:
|
|
Image: '*\sqlps.exe'
|
|
SELECTION_3:
|
|
ParentImage: '*\sqlps.exe'
|
|
SELECTION_4:
|
|
OriginalFileName: \sqlps.exe
|
|
SELECTION_5:
|
|
ParentImage: '*\sqlagent.exe'
|
|
condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4 and not
|
|
(SELECTION_5))))
|
|
falsepositives:
|
|
- Direct PS command execution through SQLPS.exe is uncommon, childprocess sqlps.exe
|
|
spawned by sqlagent.exe is a legitimate action.
|
|
id: 0152550d-3a26-4efd-9f0e-54a0b28ae2f3
|
|
level: medium
|
|
logsource:
|
|
category: process_creation
|
|
product: windows
|
|
references:
|
|
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/tools/sqlps-utility?view=sql-server-ver15
|
|
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Sqlps/
|
|
- https://twitter.com/bryon_/status/975835709587075072
|
|
status: experimental
|
|
tags:
|
|
- attack.execution
|
|
- attack.t1059.001
|
|
- attack.defense_evasion
|
|
- attack.t1127
|
|
yml_filename: win_susp_use_of_sqlps_bin.yml
|
|
yml_path: /Users/user/Documents/YamatoSecurity/sigma/rules/windows/process_creation
|
|
|