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hayabusa/rules/Sigma/sysmon_susp_winword_wmidll_load.yml
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2021-11-14 11:00:56 +09:00

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1.6 KiB
YAML

title: Windows Management Instrumentation DLL Loaded Via Microsoft Word
author: Michael R. (@nahamike01)
date: 2019/12/26
description: Detects DLL's Loaded Via Word Containing VBA Macros Executing WMI Commands
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 7
SELECTION_10:
ImageLoaded: '*\wbemsvc.dll'
SELECTION_2:
Image: '*\winword.exe'
SELECTION_3:
Image: '*\powerpnt.exe'
SELECTION_4:
Image: '*\excel.exe'
SELECTION_5:
Image: '*\outlook.exe'
SELECTION_6:
ImageLoaded: '*\wmiutils.dll'
SELECTION_7:
ImageLoaded: '*\wbemcomn.dll'
SELECTION_8:
ImageLoaded: '*\wbemprox.dll'
SELECTION_9:
ImageLoaded: '*\wbemdisp.dll'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4 or SELECTION_5)
and (SELECTION_6 or SELECTION_7 or SELECTION_8 or SELECTION_9 or SELECTION_10))
falsepositives:
- Possible. Requires further testing.
id: a457f232-7df9-491d-898f-b5aabd2cbe2f
level: high
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
references:
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
- https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/04/24/cb-tau-threat-intelligence-notification-emotet-utilizing-wmi-to-launch-powershell-encoded-code/
- https://media.cert.europa.eu/static/SecurityAdvisories/2019/CERT-EU-SA2019-021.pdf
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
yml_filename: sysmon_susp_winword_wmidll_load.yml
yml_path: /Users/user/Documents/YamatoSecurity/sigma/rules/windows/image_load