title: Suspicious Driver Loaded By User author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes) date: 2019/04/08 description: Detects the loading of drivers via 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' required to load or unload a device driver. With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode. This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers. If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers. This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff. detection: SELECTION_1: EventID: 4673 SELECTION_10: ProcessName: '*\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe' SELECTION_11: ProcessName: '*\procexp64.exe' SELECTION_12: ProcessName: '*\procexp.exe' SELECTION_13: ProcessName: '*\procmon64.exe' SELECTION_14: ProcessName: '*\procmon.exe' SELECTION_15: ProcessName: '*\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe' SELECTION_2: PrivilegeList: SeLoadDriverPrivilege SELECTION_3: Service: '-' SELECTION_4: ProcessName: '*\Windows\System32\Dism.exe' SELECTION_5: ProcessName: '*\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe' SELECTION_6: ProcessName: '*\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe' SELECTION_7: ProcessName: '*\Windows\HelpPane.exe' SELECTION_8: ProcessName: '*\Windows\System32\mmc.exe' SELECTION_9: ProcessName: '*\Windows\System32\svchost.exe' condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not ((SELECTION_4 or SELECTION_5 or SELECTION_6 or SELECTION_7 or SELECTION_8 or SELECTION_9 or SELECTION_10 or SELECTION_11 or SELECTION_12 or SELECTION_13 or SELECTION_14 or SELECTION_15))) falsepositives: - 'Other legimate tools loading drivers. There are some: Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. - but not much. You have to baseline this according to your used products and allowed tools. Also try to exclude users, which are allowed to load drivers.' id: f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612 level: medium logsource: product: windows service: security references: - https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/ - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673 status: experimental tags: - attack.t1089 - attack.defense_evasion - attack.t1562.001 yml_filename: win_user_driver_loaded.yml yml_path: /Users/user/Documents/YamatoSecurity/sigma/rules/windows/builtin