title: Suspicious Service Path Modification
author: Victor Sergeev, oscd.community
date: 2019/10/21
description: Detects service path modification to PowerShell or cmd.
detection:
    SELECTION_1:
        EventID: 1
    SELECTION_2:
        Image: '*\sc.exe'
    SELECTION_3:
        CommandLine: '*config*'
    SELECTION_4:
        CommandLine: '*binpath*'
    SELECTION_5:
        CommandLine: '*powershell*'
    SELECTION_6:
        CommandLine: '*cmd*'
    condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and (SELECTION_5
        or SELECTION_6))
falsepositives:
- Unknown
fields:
- CommandLine
- ParentCommandLine
id: 138d3531-8793-4f50-a2cd-f291b2863d78
level: high
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
modified: 2020/08/28
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1543.003
- attack.t1031
yml_filename: win_susp_service_path_modification.yml
yml_path: /Users/user/Documents/YamatoSecurity/sigma/rules/windows/process_creation