title: Suspicious PsExec Execution
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019/04/03
description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this
    rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if
    attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
detection:
    SELECTION_1:
        EventID: 5145
    SELECTION_2:
        ShareName: \\*\IPC$
    SELECTION_3:
        RelativeTargetName: '*-stdin'
    SELECTION_4:
        RelativeTargetName: '*-stdout'
    SELECTION_5:
        RelativeTargetName: '*-stderr'
    SELECTION_6:
        EventID: 5145
    SELECTION_7:
        ShareName: \\*\IPC$
    SELECTION_8:
        RelativeTargetName: PSEXESVC*
    condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and (SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4 or SELECTION_5))
        and  not (SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7 and SELECTION_8))
falsepositives:
- nothing observed so far
id: c462f537-a1e3-41a6-b5fc-b2c2cef9bf82
level: high
logsource:
    definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed
        File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure
    product: windows
    service: security
references:
- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1077
- attack.t1021.002
yml_filename: win_susp_psexec.yml
yml_path: /Users/user/Documents/YamatoSecurity/sigma/rules/windows/builtin