title: MSHTA Suspicious Execution 01
author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule)
date: 2019/02/22
description: Detection for mshta.exe suspicious execution patterns sometimes involving
    file polyglotism
detection:
    SELECTION_1:
        EventID: 1
    SELECTION_2:
        Image: '*\mshta.exe'
    SELECTION_3:
        CommandLine: '*vbscript*'
    SELECTION_4:
        CommandLine: '*.jpg*'
    SELECTION_5:
        CommandLine: '*.png*'
    SELECTION_6:
        CommandLine: '*.lnk*'
    SELECTION_7:
        CommandLine: '*.xls*'
    SELECTION_8:
        CommandLine: '*.doc*'
    SELECTION_9:
        CommandLine: '*.zip*'
    condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and (SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4 or SELECTION_5
        or SELECTION_6 or SELECTION_7 or SELECTION_8 or SELECTION_9))
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored
    environment
id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3
level: high
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
modified: 2020/08/23
references:
- http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files
- https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script
- https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1140
- attack.t1218.005
yml_filename: win_susp_mshta_execution.yml
yml_path: /Users/user/Documents/YamatoSecurity/sigma/rules/windows/builtin