diff --git a/.github/workflows/rust.yml b/.github/workflows/rust.yml
index 2138ab8e..121f514c 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/rust.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/rust.yml
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ jobs:
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
+ with:
+ submodules: recursive
- uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
with:
toolchain: nightly
diff --git a/.gitmodules b/.gitmodules
index e69de29b..ece4fc11 100644
--- a/.gitmodules
+++ b/.gitmodules
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[submodule "rules"]
+ path = rules
+ url = https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules.git
diff --git a/CHANGELOG-Japanese.md b/CHANGELOG-Japanese.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..51465e81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CHANGELOG-Japanese.md
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# 変更点
+
+##v1.1.0 [2022/03/03]
+**新機能:**
+- `-r / --rules`オプションで一つのルール指定が可能。(ルールをテストする際に便利!) (@kazuminn)
+- ルール更新オプション (`-u / --update-rules`): [hayabusa-rules](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules)レポジトリにある最新のルールに更新できる。 (@hitenkoku)
+- ライブ調査オプション (`-l / --live-analysis`): Windowsイベントログディレクトリを指定しないで、楽にWindows端末でライブ調査ができる。(@hitenkoku)
+
+**改善:**
+- ドキュメンテーションの更新。 (@kazuminn、@itiB、@hitenkoku、@YamatoSecurity)
+- ルールの更新。(Hayabusaルール: 20個以上、Sigmaルール: 200個以上) (@YamatoSecurity)
+- Windowsバイナリは静的でコンパイルしているので、Visual C++ 再頒布可能パッケージをインストールする必要はない。(@hitenkoku)
+- カラー出力 (`-c / --color`) True Colorに対応しているターミナル(Windows Terminal、iTerm2等々)ではカラーで出力できる。(@hitenkoku)
+- MITRE ATT&CK戦略が出力される。(@hitenkoku)
+- パフォーマンスの改善。(@hitenkoku)
+- exclude_rules.txtとnoisy_rules.txtの設定ファイルのコメント対応。(@kazuminn)
+- より速いメモリアロケータの利用。 (Windowsの場合はrpmalloc、macOS/Linuxの場合は、jemalloc) (@kazuminn)
+- Cargo crateの更新。 (@YamatoSecurity)
+
+**バグ修正:**
+- `cargo update`がより安定するために、clapのバージョンを固定した。(@hitenkoku)
+- フィールドのタブや改行がある場合に、ルールが検知しなかったので、修正した。(@hitenkoku)
+
+## v1.0.0-Release 2 [2022/01/27]
+- アンチウィルスに誤検知されたExcelの結果ファイルの削除。(@YamatoSecurity)
+- Rustのevtxライブラリを0.7.2に更新。 (@YamatoSecurity)
+
+## v1.0.0 [2021/12/25]
+- 最初のリリース
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dee69d2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Changes
+
+##v1.1.0 [2022/03/03]
+**New Features:**
+- Can specify a single rule with the `-r / --rules` option. (Great for testing rules!) (@kazuminn)
+- Rule update option (`-u / --update-rules`): Update to the latest rules in the [hayabusa-rules](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules) repository. (@hitenkoku)
+- Live analysis option (`-l / --live-analysis`): Can easily perform live analysis on Windows machines without specifying the Windows event log directory. (@hitenkoku)
+
+**Enhancements:**
+- Updated documentation. (@kazuminn , @hitenkoku , @YamatoSecurity)
+- Updated rules. (20+ Hayabusa rules, 200+ Sigma rules) (@YamatoSecurity)
+- Windows binaries are now statically compiled so installing Visual C++ Redistributable is not required. (@hitenkoku)
+- Color output (`-c / --color`) for terminals that support True Color (Windows Terminal, iTerm2, etc...). (@hitenkoku)
+- MITRE ATT&CK tactics are included in the saved CSV output. (@hitenkoku)
+- Performance improvement. (@hitenkoku)
+- Comments added to exclusion and noisy config files. (@kazuminn)
+- Using faster memory allocators (rpmalloc for Windows, jemalloc for macOS and Linux.) (@kazuminn)
+- Updated cargo crates. (@YamatoSecurity)
+
+**Bug Fixes:**
+- Made the clap library version static to make `cargo update` more stable. (@hitenkoku)
+- Some rules were not alerting if there were tabs or carriage returns in the fields. (@hitenkoku)
+
+## v1.0.0-Release 2 [2022/01/27]
+- Removed Excel result sample files as they were being flagged by anti-virus. (@YamatoSecurity)
+- Updated the Rust evtx library to 0.7.2 (@YamatoSecurity)
+
+## v1.0.0 [2021/12/25]
+- Initial release.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock
index cab6a4bf..b72f2889 100644
--- a/Cargo.lock
+++ b/Cargo.lock
@@ -4,26 +4,26 @@ version = 3
[[package]]
name = "addr2line"
-version = "0.13.0"
+version = "0.17.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "1b6a2d3371669ab3ca9797670853d61402b03d0b4b9ebf33d677dfa720203072"
+checksum = "b9ecd88a8c8378ca913a680cd98f0f13ac67383d35993f86c90a70e3f137816b"
dependencies = [
"gimli",
]
[[package]]
name = "adler"
-version = "0.2.3"
+version = "1.0.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ee2a4ec343196209d6594e19543ae87a39f96d5534d7174822a3ad825dd6ed7e"
+checksum = "f26201604c87b1e01bd3d98f8d5d9a8fcbb815e8cedb41ffccbeb4bf593a35fe"
[[package]]
name = "ahash"
-version = "0.7.4"
+version = "0.7.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "43bb833f0bf979d8475d38fbf09ed3b8a55e1885fe93ad3f93239fc6a4f17b98"
+checksum = "fcb51a0695d8f838b1ee009b3fbf66bda078cd64590202a864a8f3e8c4315c47"
dependencies = [
- "getrandom 0.2.3",
+ "getrandom",
"once_cell",
"version_check",
]
@@ -39,18 +39,18 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "ansi_term"
-version = "0.11.0"
+version = "0.12.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ee49baf6cb617b853aa8d93bf420db2383fab46d314482ca2803b40d5fde979b"
+checksum = "d52a9bb7ec0cf484c551830a7ce27bd20d67eac647e1befb56b0be4ee39a55d2"
dependencies = [
"winapi 0.3.9",
]
[[package]]
name = "anyhow"
-version = "1.0.32"
+version = "1.0.53"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "6b602bfe940d21c130f3895acd65221e8a61270debe89d628b9cb4e3ccb8569b"
+checksum = "94a45b455c14666b85fc40a019e8ab9eb75e3a124e05494f5397122bc9eb06e0"
[[package]]
name = "atty"
@@ -77,12 +77,13 @@ checksum = "cdb031dd78e28731d87d56cc8ffef4a8f36ca26c38fe2de700543e627f8a464a"
[[package]]
name = "backtrace"
-version = "0.3.50"
+version = "0.3.64"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "46254cf2fdcdf1badb5934448c1bcbe046a56537b3987d96c51a7afc5d03f293"
+checksum = "5e121dee8023ce33ab248d9ce1493df03c3b38a659b240096fcbd7048ff9c31f"
dependencies = [
"addr2line",
- "cfg-if 0.1.10",
+ "cc",
+ "cfg-if 1.0.0",
"libc",
"miniz_oxide",
"object",
@@ -105,16 +106,22 @@ dependencies = [
]
[[package]]
-name = "bitflags"
-version = "1.2.1"
+name = "base64"
+version = "0.13.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "cf1de2fe8c75bc145a2f577add951f8134889b4795d47466a54a5c846d691693"
+checksum = "904dfeac50f3cdaba28fc6f57fdcddb75f49ed61346676a78c4ffe55877802fd"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "bitflags"
+version = "1.3.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "bef38d45163c2f1dde094a7dfd33ccf595c92905c8f8f4fdc18d06fb1037718a"
[[package]]
name = "bstr"
-version = "0.2.13"
+version = "0.2.17"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "31accafdb70df7871592c058eca3985b71104e15ac32f64706022c58867da931"
+checksum = "ba3569f383e8f1598449f1a423e72e99569137b47740b1da11ef19af3d5c3223"
dependencies = [
"lazy_static",
"memchr",
@@ -124,27 +131,27 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "build_const"
-version = "0.2.1"
+version = "0.2.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "39092a32794787acd8525ee150305ff051b0aa6cc2abaf193924f5ab05425f39"
+checksum = "b4ae4235e6dac0694637c763029ecea1a2ec9e4e06ec2729bd21ba4d9c863eb7"
[[package]]
name = "bumpalo"
-version = "3.8.0"
+version = "3.9.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8f1e260c3a9040a7c19a12468758f4c16f31a81a1fe087482be9570ec864bb6c"
+checksum = "a4a45a46ab1f2412e53d3a0ade76ffad2025804294569aae387231a0cd6e0899"
[[package]]
name = "bytecount"
-version = "0.4.0"
+version = "0.6.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b92204551573580e078dc80017f36a213eb77a0450e4ddd8cfa0f3f2d1f0178f"
+checksum = "72feb31ffc86498dacdbd0fcebb56138e7177a8cc5cea4516031d15ae85a742e"
[[package]]
name = "byteorder"
-version = "1.3.4"
+version = "1.4.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "08c48aae112d48ed9f069b33538ea9e3e90aa263cfa3d1c24309612b1f7472de"
+checksum = "14c189c53d098945499cdfa7ecc63567cf3886b3332b312a5b4585d8d3a6a610"
[[package]]
name = "bytes"
@@ -159,28 +166,49 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "bytes"
-version = "1.0.1"
+version = "1.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b700ce4376041dcd0a327fd0097c41095743c4c8af8887265942faf1100bd040"
+checksum = "c4872d67bab6358e59559027aa3b9157c53d9358c51423c17554809a8858e0f8"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "camino"
+version = "1.0.7"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "6f3132262930b0522068049f5870a856ab8affc80c70d08b6ecb785771a6fc23"
+dependencies = [
+ "serde",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "cargo-platform"
+version = "0.1.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "cbdb825da8a5df079a43676dbe042702f1707b1109f713a01420fbb4cc71fa27"
+dependencies = [
+ "serde",
+]
[[package]]
name = "cargo_metadata"
-version = "0.6.4"
+version = "0.14.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "e5d1b4d380e1bab994591a24c2bdd1b054f64b60bef483a8c598c7c345bc3bbe"
+checksum = "ba2ae6de944143141f6155a473a6b02f66c7c3f9f47316f802f80204ebfe6e12"
dependencies = [
- "error-chain 0.12.4",
- "semver",
+ "camino",
+ "cargo-platform",
+ "semver 1.0.4",
"serde",
- "serde_derive",
"serde_json",
]
[[package]]
name = "cc"
-version = "1.0.59"
+version = "1.0.72"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "66120af515773fb005778dc07c261bd201ec8ce50bd6e7144c927753fe013381"
+checksum = "22a9137b95ea06864e018375b72adfb7db6e6f68cfc8df5a04d00288050485ee"
+dependencies = [
+ "jobserver",
+]
[[package]]
name = "cfg-if"
@@ -210,9 +238,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "clap"
-version = "2.33.3"
+version = "2.34.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "37e58ac78573c40708d45522f0d80fa2f01cc4f9b4e2bf749807255454312002"
+checksum = "a0610544180c38b88101fecf2dd634b174a62eef6946f84dfc6a7127512b381c"
dependencies = [
"ansi_term",
"atty",
@@ -233,27 +261,36 @@ dependencies = [
]
[[package]]
-name = "console"
-version = "0.11.3"
+name = "colored"
+version = "2.0.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8c0994e656bba7b922d8dd1245db90672ffb701e684e45be58f20719d69abc5a"
+checksum = "b3616f750b84d8f0de8a58bda93e08e2a81ad3f523089b05f1dffecab48c6cbd"
+dependencies = [
+ "atty",
+ "lazy_static",
+ "winapi 0.3.9",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "console"
+version = "0.14.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "3993e6445baa160675931ec041a5e03ca84b9c6e32a056150d3aa2bdda0a1f45"
dependencies = [
"encode_unicode",
"lazy_static",
"libc",
"regex",
"terminal_size",
- "termios",
"unicode-width",
"winapi 0.3.9",
- "winapi-util",
]
[[package]]
name = "const_fn"
-version = "0.4.8"
+version = "0.4.9"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f92cfa0fd5690b3cf8c1ef2cabbd9b7ef22fa53cf5e1f92b05103f6d5d1cf6e7"
+checksum = "fbdcdcb6d86f71c5e97409ad45898af11cbc995b4ee8112d59095a28d376c935"
[[package]]
name = "cookie"
@@ -285,9 +322,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "core-foundation"
-version = "0.9.1"
+version = "0.9.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "0a89e2ae426ea83155dccf10c0fa6b1463ef6d5fcb44cee0b224a408fa640a62"
+checksum = "6888e10551bb93e424d8df1d07f1a8b4fceb0001a3a4b048bfc47554946f47b3"
dependencies = [
"core-foundation-sys",
"libc",
@@ -295,9 +332,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "core-foundation-sys"
-version = "0.8.2"
+version = "0.8.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ea221b5284a47e40033bf9b66f35f984ec0ea2931eb03505246cd27a963f981b"
+checksum = "5827cebf4670468b8772dd191856768aedcb1b0278a04f989f7766351917b9dc"
[[package]]
name = "crc"
@@ -310,44 +347,45 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "crc32fast"
-version = "1.2.0"
+version = "1.3.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ba125de2af0df55319f41944744ad91c71113bf74a4646efff39afe1f6842db1"
-dependencies = [
- "cfg-if 0.1.10",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "crossbeam-channel"
-version = "0.4.4"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b153fe7cbef478c567df0f972e02e6d736db11affe43dfc9c56a9374d1adfb87"
-dependencies = [
- "crossbeam-utils 0.7.2",
- "maybe-uninit",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "crossbeam-channel"
-version = "0.5.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "06ed27e177f16d65f0f0c22a213e17c696ace5dd64b14258b52f9417ccb52db4"
+checksum = "a2209c310e29876f7f0b2721e7e26b84aff178aa3da5d091f9bfbf47669e60e3"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if 1.0.0",
- "crossbeam-utils 0.8.5",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "crossbeam-channel"
+version = "0.5.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e54ea8bc3fb1ee042f5aace6e3c6e025d3874866da222930f70ce62aceba0bfa"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if 1.0.0",
+ "crossbeam-utils 0.8.6",
]
[[package]]
name = "crossbeam-deque"
-version = "0.7.3"
+version = "0.7.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9f02af974daeee82218205558e51ec8768b48cf524bd01d550abe5573a608285"
+checksum = "c20ff29ded3204c5106278a81a38f4b482636ed4fa1e6cfbeef193291beb29ed"
dependencies = [
- "crossbeam-epoch",
+ "crossbeam-epoch 0.8.2",
"crossbeam-utils 0.7.2",
"maybe-uninit",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "crossbeam-deque"
+version = "0.8.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "6455c0ca19f0d2fbf751b908d5c55c1f5cbc65e03c4225427254b46890bdde1e"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if 1.0.0",
+ "crossbeam-epoch 0.9.6",
+ "crossbeam-utils 0.8.6",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "crossbeam-epoch"
version = "0.8.2"
@@ -359,7 +397,20 @@ dependencies = [
"crossbeam-utils 0.7.2",
"lazy_static",
"maybe-uninit",
- "memoffset",
+ "memoffset 0.5.6",
+ "scopeguard",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "crossbeam-epoch"
+version = "0.9.6"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "97242a70df9b89a65d0b6df3c4bf5b9ce03c5b7309019777fbde37e7537f8762"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if 1.0.0",
+ "crossbeam-utils 0.8.6",
+ "lazy_static",
+ "memoffset 0.6.5",
"scopeguard",
]
@@ -387,9 +438,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "crossbeam-utils"
-version = "0.8.5"
+version = "0.8.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d82cfc11ce7f2c3faef78d8a684447b40d503d9681acebed6cb728d45940c4db"
+checksum = "cfcae03edb34f947e64acdb1c33ec169824e20657e9ecb61cef6c8c74dcb8120"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if 1.0.0",
"lazy_static",
@@ -397,13 +448,13 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "csv"
-version = "1.1.3"
+version = "1.1.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "00affe7f6ab566df61b4be3ce8cf16bc2576bca0963ceb0955e45d514bf9a279"
+checksum = "22813a6dc45b335f9bade10bf7271dc477e81113e89eb251a0bc2a8a81c536e1"
dependencies = [
"bstr",
"csv-core",
- "itoa",
+ "itoa 0.4.8",
"ryu",
"serde",
]
@@ -419,13 +470,14 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "dialoguer"
-version = "0.6.2"
+version = "0.8.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f4aa86af7b19b40ef9cbef761ed411a49f0afa06b7b6dcd3dfe2f96a3c546138"
+checksum = "c9dd058f8b65922819fabb4a41e7d1964e56344042c26efbccd465202c23fa0c"
dependencies = [
"console",
"lazy_static",
"tempfile",
+ "zeroize",
]
[[package]]
@@ -448,9 +500,9 @@ checksum = "56899898ce76aaf4a0f24d914c97ea6ed976d42fec6ad33fcbb0a1103e07b2b0"
[[package]]
name = "either"
-version = "1.6.0"
+version = "1.6.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "cd56b59865bce947ac5958779cfa508f6c3b9497cc762b7e24a12d11ccde2c4f"
+checksum = "e78d4f1cc4ae33bbfc157ed5d5a5ef3bc29227303d595861deb238fcec4e9457"
[[package]]
name = "encode_unicode"
@@ -524,9 +576,9 @@ checksum = "a246d82be1c9d791c5dfde9a2bd045fc3cbba3fa2b11ad558f27d01712f00569"
[[package]]
name = "encoding_rs"
-version = "0.8.28"
+version = "0.8.30"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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+ "bitflags",
"byteorder",
"chrono",
"clap",
@@ -578,7 +630,7 @@ dependencies = [
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@@ -612,12 +664,21 @@ dependencies = [
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+
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[[package]]
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "6690e3e9f692504b941dc6c3b188fd28df054f7fb8469ab40680df52fdcc842b"
+checksum = "8a65b3f4ffa0092e9887669db0eae07941f023991ab58ea44da8fe8e2d511c6b"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
@@ -2047,9 +2131,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "synstructure"
-version = "0.12.5"
+version = "0.12.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "474aaa926faa1603c40b7885a9eaea29b444d1cb2850cb7c0e37bb1a4182f4fa"
+checksum = "f36bdaa60a83aca3921b5259d5400cbf5e90fc51931376a9bd4a0eb79aa7210f"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
@@ -2057,58 +2141,39 @@ dependencies = [
"unicode-xid",
]
-[[package]]
-name = "tempdir"
-version = "0.3.7"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "15f2b5fb00ccdf689e0149d1b1b3c03fead81c2b37735d812fa8bddbbf41b6d8"
-dependencies = [
- "rand 0.4.6",
- "remove_dir_all",
-]
-
[[package]]
name = "tempfile"
-version = "3.1.0"
+version = "3.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7a6e24d9338a0a5be79593e2fa15a648add6138caa803e2d5bc782c371732ca9"
+checksum = "5cdb1ef4eaeeaddc8fbd371e5017057064af0911902ef36b39801f67cc6d79e4"
dependencies = [
- "cfg-if 0.1.10",
+ "cfg-if 1.0.0",
+ "fastrand",
"libc",
- "rand 0.7.3",
- "redox_syscall 0.1.57",
+ "redox_syscall 0.2.10",
"remove_dir_all",
"winapi 0.3.9",
]
[[package]]
name = "termcolor"
-version = "1.1.0"
+version = "1.1.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "bb6bfa289a4d7c5766392812c0a1f4c1ba45afa1ad47803c11e1f407d846d75f"
+checksum = "2dfed899f0eb03f32ee8c6a0aabdb8a7949659e3466561fc0adf54e26d88c5f4"
dependencies = [
"winapi-util",
]
[[package]]
name = "terminal_size"
-version = "0.1.13"
+version = "0.1.17"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9a14cd9f8c72704232f0bfc8455c0e861f0ad4eb60cc9ec8a170e231414c1e13"
+checksum = "633c1a546cee861a1a6d0dc69ebeca693bf4296661ba7852b9d21d159e0506df"
dependencies = [
"libc",
"winapi 0.3.9",
]
-[[package]]
-name = "termios"
-version = "0.3.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "6f0fcee7b24a25675de40d5bb4de6e41b0df07bc9856295e7e2b3a3600c400c2"
-dependencies = [
- "libc",
-]
-
[[package]]
name = "textwrap"
version = "0.11.0"
@@ -2120,18 +2185,18 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "thiserror"
-version = "1.0.20"
+version = "1.0.30"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7dfdd070ccd8ccb78f4ad66bf1982dc37f620ef696c6b5028fe2ed83dd3d0d08"
+checksum = "854babe52e4df1653706b98fcfc05843010039b406875930a70e4d9644e5c417"
dependencies = [
"thiserror-impl",
]
[[package]]
name = "thiserror-impl"
-version = "1.0.20"
+version = "1.0.30"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "bd80fc12f73063ac132ac92aceea36734f04a1d93c1240c6944e23a3b8841793"
+checksum = "aa32fd3f627f367fe16f893e2597ae3c05020f8bba2666a4e6ea73d377e5714b"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
@@ -2145,7 +2210,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6db9e6914ab8b1ae1c260a4ae7a49b6c5611b40328a735b21862567685e73255"
dependencies = [
"libc",
- "wasi 0.10.0+wasi-snapshot-preview1",
+ "wasi",
"winapi 0.3.9",
]
@@ -2189,9 +2254,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "tinyvec"
-version = "1.4.0"
+version = "1.5.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "5241dd6f21443a3606b432718b166d3cedc962fd4b8bea54a8bc7f514ebda986"
+checksum = "2c1c1d5a42b6245520c249549ec267180beaffcc0615401ac8e31853d4b6d8d2"
dependencies = [
"tinyvec_macros",
]
@@ -2223,18 +2288,17 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "tokio"
-version = "1.3.0"
+version = "1.16.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8d56477f6ed99e10225f38f9f75f872f29b8b8bd8c0b946f63345bb144e9eeda"
+checksum = "0c27a64b625de6d309e8c57716ba93021dccf1b3b5c97edd6d3dd2d2135afc0a"
dependencies = [
- "autocfg 1.0.1",
- "bytes 1.0.1",
+ "bytes 1.1.0",
"libc",
"memchr",
- "mio 0.7.10",
+ "mio 0.7.14",
"num_cpus",
"once_cell",
- "parking_lot 0.11.1",
+ "parking_lot 0.11.2",
"pin-project-lite",
"signal-hook-registry",
"tokio-macros",
@@ -2285,9 +2349,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "tokio-macros"
-version = "1.1.0"
+version = "1.7.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "caf7b11a536f46a809a8a9f0bb4237020f70ecbf115b842360afb127ea2fda57"
+checksum = "b557f72f448c511a979e2564e55d74e6c4432fc96ff4f6241bc6bded342643b7"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
@@ -2343,7 +2407,7 @@ version = "0.1.18"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "df720b6581784c118f0eb4310796b12b1d242a7eb95f716a8367855325c25f89"
dependencies = [
- "crossbeam-deque",
+ "crossbeam-deque 0.7.4",
"crossbeam-queue",
"crossbeam-utils 0.7.2",
"futures",
@@ -2392,9 +2456,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "unicode-bidi"
-version = "0.3.6"
+version = "0.3.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "246f4c42e67e7a4e3c6106ff716a5d067d4132a642840b242e357e468a2a0085"
+checksum = "1a01404663e3db436ed2746d9fefef640d868edae3cceb81c3b8d5732fda678f"
[[package]]
name = "unicode-normalization"
@@ -2407,21 +2471,21 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "unicode-width"
-version = "0.1.8"
+version = "0.1.9"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9337591893a19b88d8d87f2cec1e73fad5cdfd10e5a6f349f498ad6ea2ffb1e3"
+checksum = "3ed742d4ea2bd1176e236172c8429aaf54486e7ac098db29ffe6529e0ce50973"
[[package]]
name = "unicode-xid"
-version = "0.2.1"
+version = "0.2.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f7fe0bb3479651439c9112f72b6c505038574c9fbb575ed1bf3b797fa39dd564"
+checksum = "8ccb82d61f80a663efe1f787a51b16b5a51e3314d6ac365b08639f52387b33f3"
[[package]]
name = "unindent"
-version = "0.1.6"
+version = "0.1.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "af41d708427f8fd0e915dcebb2cae0f0e6acb2a939b2d399c265c39a38a18942"
+checksum = "f14ee04d9415b52b3aeab06258a3f07093182b88ba0f9b8d203f211a7a7d41c7"
[[package]]
name = "url"
@@ -2462,7 +2526,7 @@ version = "0.7.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "90dbc611eb48397705a6b0f6e917da23ae517e4d127123d2cf7674206627d32a"
dependencies = [
- "rand 0.6.5",
+ "rand",
]
[[package]]
@@ -2479,15 +2543,15 @@ checksum = "f1bddf1187be692e79c5ffeab891132dfb0f236ed36a43c7ed39f1165ee20191"
[[package]]
name = "version_check"
-version = "0.9.2"
+version = "0.9.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b5a972e5669d67ba988ce3dc826706fb0a8b01471c088cb0b6110b805cc36aed"
+checksum = "49874b5167b65d7193b8aba1567f5c7d93d001cafc34600cee003eda787e483f"
[[package]]
name = "walkdir"
-version = "2.3.1"
+version = "2.3.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "777182bc735b6424e1a57516d35ed72cb8019d85c8c9bf536dccb3445c1a2f7d"
+checksum = "808cf2735cd4b6866113f648b791c6adc5714537bc222d9347bb203386ffda56"
dependencies = [
"same-file",
"winapi 0.3.9",
@@ -2505,12 +2569,6 @@ dependencies = [
"try-lock",
]
-[[package]]
-name = "wasi"
-version = "0.9.0+wasi-snapshot-preview1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "cccddf32554fecc6acb585f82a32a72e28b48f8c4c1883ddfeeeaa96f7d8e519"
-
[[package]]
name = "wasi"
version = "0.10.0+wasi-snapshot-preview1"
@@ -2519,9 +2577,9 @@ checksum = "1a143597ca7c7793eff794def352d41792a93c481eb1042423ff7ff72ba2c31f"
[[package]]
name = "wasm-bindgen"
-version = "0.2.72"
+version = "0.2.79"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8fe8f61dba8e5d645a4d8132dc7a0a66861ed5e1045d2c0ed940fab33bac0fbe"
+checksum = "25f1af7423d8588a3d840681122e72e6a24ddbcb3f0ec385cac0d12d24256c06"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if 1.0.0",
"wasm-bindgen-macro",
@@ -2529,9 +2587,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "wasm-bindgen-backend"
-version = "0.2.72"
+version = "0.2.79"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "046ceba58ff062da072c7cb4ba5b22a37f00a302483f7e2a6cdc18fedbdc1fd3"
+checksum = "8b21c0df030f5a177f3cba22e9bc4322695ec43e7257d865302900290bcdedca"
dependencies = [
"bumpalo",
"lazy_static",
@@ -2544,9 +2602,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "wasm-bindgen-macro"
-version = "0.2.72"
+version = "0.2.79"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "0ef9aa01d36cda046f797c57959ff5f3c615c9cc63997a8d545831ec7976819b"
+checksum = "2f4203d69e40a52ee523b2529a773d5ffc1dc0071801c87b3d270b471b80ed01"
dependencies = [
"quote",
"wasm-bindgen-macro-support",
@@ -2554,9 +2612,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "wasm-bindgen-macro-support"
-version = "0.2.72"
+version = "0.2.79"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "96eb45c1b2ee33545a813a92dbb53856418bf7eb54ab34f7f7ff1448a5b3735d"
+checksum = "bfa8a30d46208db204854cadbb5d4baf5fcf8071ba5bf48190c3e59937962ebc"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
@@ -2567,9 +2625,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "wasm-bindgen-shared"
-version = "0.2.72"
+version = "0.2.79"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b7148f4696fb4960a346eaa60bbfb42a1ac4ebba21f750f75fc1375b098d5ffa"
+checksum = "3d958d035c4438e28c70e4321a2911302f10135ce78a9c7834c0cab4123d06a2"
[[package]]
name = "winapi"
@@ -2653,9 +2711,15 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "yaml-rust"
-version = "0.4.4"
+version = "0.4.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "39f0c922f1a334134dc2f7a8b67dc5d25f0735263feec974345ff706bcf20b0d"
+checksum = "56c1936c4cc7a1c9ab21a1ebb602eb942ba868cbd44a99cb7cdc5892335e1c85"
dependencies = [
"linked-hash-map",
]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "zeroize"
+version = "1.5.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "7c88870063c39ee00ec285a2f8d6a966e5b6fb2becc4e8dac77ed0d370ed6006"
diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml
index b0b69351..5450e18d 100644
--- a/Cargo.toml
+++ b/Cargo.toml
@@ -1,40 +1,41 @@
[package]
name = "hayabusa"
-version = "1.0.0"
-authors = ["Yamato Security @yamatosecurity"]
+version = "1.1.0"
+authors = ["Yamato Security @SecurityYamato"]
edition = "2021"
# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html
[dependencies]
-evtx = { git = "https://github.com/omerbenamram/evtx.git" }
-quick-xml = {version = "0.17", features = ["serialize"] }
-serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
+evtx = { git = "https://github.com/omerbenamram/evtx.git" , rev = "95a8ca6" , features = ["fast-alloc"]}
+quick-xml = {version = "0.22.0", features = ["serialize"] }
+serde = { version = "1.0.*", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = { version = "1.0"}
-serde_derive = "1.0"
+serde_derive = "1.0.*"
clap = "2.*"
-regex = "1.5.4"
-csv = "1.1"
+regex = "1.5.*"
+csv = "1.1.*"
base64 = "*"
-flate2 = "1.0"
+flate2 = "1.0.*"
lazy_static = "1.4.0"
chrono = "0.4.19"
-yaml-rust = "0.4"
-linked-hash-map = "0.5.3"
+yaml-rust = "0.4.*"
+linked-hash-map = "0.5.*"
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["full"] }
-num_cpus = "1.13.0"
-mopa = "0.2.2"
+num_cpus = "1.13.*"
+mopa = "0.2.*"
slack-hook = "0.8"
-dotenv = "0.15.0"
+dotenv = "0.15.*"
hhmmss = "*"
pbr = "*"
-hashbrown = "0.11.2"
+hashbrown = "0.12.*"
+colored = "2.*"
+hex = "0.4.*"
+git2="0.13"
-[target.x86_64-pc-windows-gnu]
-linker = "x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc"
-
-[target.i686-pc-windows-gnu]
-linker = "i686-w64-mingw32-gcc"
+[target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]
+is_elevated = "0.1.2"
+static_vcruntime = "1.5.*"
[profile.release]
lto = true
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/README-English.md b/README-English.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 96233055..00000000
--- a/README-English.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,341 +0,0 @@
-
-
-
- 
-
-
-
-
-# About Hayabusa
-Hayabusa is a **Windows event log fast forensics timeline generator** and **threat hunting tool** created by the [Yamato Security](https://yamatosecurity.connpass.com/) group in Japan. Hayabusa means ["peregrine falcon"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peregrine_falcon") in Japanese and was chosen as peregrine falcons are the fastest animal in the world, great at hunting and highly trainable. It is written in [Rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/) and supports multi-threading in order to be as fast as possible. We have provided a [tool](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/tree/main/tools/sigmac) to convert [sigma](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma) rules into hayabusa rule format. The hayabusa detection rules, like sigma, are also written in YML in order to be as easily customizable and extensible as possible. It can be run either on running systems for live analysis or by gathering logs from multiple systems for offline analysis. (At the moment, it does not support real-time alerting or periodic scans.) The output will be consolidated into a single CSV timeline for easy analysis in Excel or [Timeline Explorer](https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md).
-
-## Main goals
-
-### Threat hunting
-Hayabusa currently has over 1000 sigma rules and around 50 hayabusa rules with more rules being added regularly. The ultimate goal is to be able to push out hayabusa agents to all Windows endpoints after an incident or for periodic threat hunting and have them alert back to a central server.
-
-### Fast forensics timeline generation
-Windows event log analysis has traditionally been a very long and tedious process because Windows event logs are 1) in a data format that is hard to analyze and 2) the majority of data is noise and not useful for investigations. Hayabusa's main goal is to extract out only useful data and present it in an easy-to-read format that is usable not only by professionally trained analysts but also by any Windows system administrator.
-Hayabusa is not intended to be a replacement for tools like [Evtx Explorer](https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md) or [Event Log Explorer](https://eventlogxp.com/) for more deep-dive analysis but is intended for letting analysts get 80% of their work done in 20% of the time.
-
-# About the development
- First inspired by the [DeepBlueCLI](https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI) Windows event log analyzer, we started in 2020 porting it over to Rust for the [RustyBlue](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/RustyBlue) project, then created sigma-like flexible detection signatures written in YML, and then added a backend to sigma to support converting sigma rules into our hayabusa rule format.
-
-# Screenshots
-## Startup:
-
-
-
-
-## Terminal output:
-
-
-
-
-## Results summary:
-
-
-
-## Analysis in Excel:
-
-
-
-## Analysis in Timeline Explorer:
-
-
-
-## Critical alert filtering and computer grouping in Timeline Explorer:
-
-
-
-# Sample timeline results
-You can check out sample CSV and manually edited XLSX timeline results [here](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/tree/main/sample-results).
-
-You can learn how to analyze CSV timelines in Excel and Timeline Explorer [here](doc/CSV-AnalysisWithExcelAndTimelineExplorer-English.pdf).
-
-# Features
-* Cross-platform support: Windows, Linux, macOS
-* Developed in Rust to be memory safe and faster than a hayabusa falcon!
-* Multi-thread support delivering up to a 5x speed improvement!
-* Creates a single easy-to-analyze CSV timeline for forensic investigations and incident response
-* Threat hunting based on IoC signatures written in easy to read/create/edit YML based hayabusa rules
-* Sigma rule support to convert sigma rules to hayabusa rules
-* Currently it supports the most sigma rules compared to other similar tools and even supports count rules
-* Event log statistics (Useful for getting a picture of what types of events there are and for tuning your log settings)
-* Rule tuning configuration by excluding bad rules or noisy rules
-
-# Planned Features
-* Enterprise-wide hunting on all endpoints
-* Japanese language support
-* MITRE ATT&CK mapping
-* MITRE ATT&CK heatmap generation
-* User logon and failed logon summary
-* Input from JSON logs
-* JSON support for sending alerts to Elastic Stack/Splunk, etc...
-
-# Downloads
-You can download the latest Hayabusa version from the [Releases](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/releases) page.
-
-You can also `git clone` the repository with the following command and compile binary from source code.:
-
-```bash
-git clone https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa.git
-```
-
-# Compiling from source (Optional)
-If you have rust installed, you can compile from source with the following command:
-
-```bash
-cargo clean
-cargo build --release
-```
-
-## Advanced: Updating Rust packages
-You can update to the latest rust crates before compiling to get the latest libraries:
-
-```bash
-cargo update
-```
-
-Please let us know if anything breaks after you update.
-
-## Testing hayabusa out on sample evtx files
-We have provided some sample evtx files for you to test hayabusa and/or create new rules at [https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-sample-evtx](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-sample-evtx)
-
-You can download the sample evtx files to a new `hayabusa-sample-evtx` sub-directory with the following command:
-```bash
-git clone https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-sample-evtx.git
-```
-
-> Note: You need to run the binary from the Hayabusa root directory.
-
-# Usage
-> Note: You need to run the Hayabusa binary from the Hayabusa root directory. Example: `.\hayabusa.exe`
-
-## Command line options
-```bash
-USAGE:
- -d --directory=[DIRECTORY] 'Directory of multiple .evtx files'
- -f --filepath=[FILEPATH] 'File path to one .evtx file'
- -r --rules=[RULEDIRECTORY] 'Rule file directory (default: ./rules)'
- -o --output=[CSV_TIMELINE] 'Save the timeline in CSV format. Example: results.csv'
- -v --verbose 'Output verbose information'
- -D --enable-deprecated-rules 'Enable sigma rules marked as deprecated'
- -n --enable-noisy-rules 'Enable rules marked as noisy'
- -m --min-level=[LEVEL] 'Minimum level for rules (default: informational)'
- --start-timeline=[STARTTIMELINE] 'Start time of the event to load from event file. Example: '2018/11/28 12:00:00 +09:00''
- --end-timeline=[ENDTIMELINE] 'End time of the event to load from event file. Example: '2018/11/28 12:00:00 +09:00''
- --rfc-2822 'Output date and time in RFC 2822 format. Example: Mon, 07 Aug 2006 12:34:56 -0600'
- --rfc-3339 'Output date and time in RFC 3339 format. Example: 2006-08-07T12:34:56.485214 -06:00'
- -u --utc 'Output time in UTC format (default: local time)'
- -t --thread-number=[NUMBER] 'Thread number (default: optimal number for performance)'
- -s --statistics 'Prints statistics of event IDs'
- -q --quiet 'Quiet mode. Do not display the launch banner'
- -Q --quiet-errors 'Quiet errors mode. Do not save error logs.'
- --contributors 'Prints the list of contributors'
-```
-
-## Usage examples
-* Run hayabusa against one Windows event log file:
-```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -f eventlog.evtx
-```
-
-* Run hayabusa against the sample-evtx directory with multiple Windows event log files:
-```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx
-```
-
-* Export to a single CSV file for further analysis with excel or timeline explorer:
-```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -o results.csv
-```
-
-* Only run hayabusa rules (the default is to run all the rules in `-r .\rules`):
-```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa -o results.csv
-```
-
-* Only run hayabusa rules for logs that are enabled by default on Windows:
-```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa\default -o results.csv
-```
-
-* Only run hayabusa rules for sysmon logs:
-```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa\sysmon -o results.csv
-```
-
-* Only run sigma rules:
-```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\sigma -o results.csv
-```
-
-* Enable deprecated rules (those with `status` marked as `deprecated`) and noisy rules (those whose rule ID is listed in `.\config\noisy-rules.txt`):
-```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx --enable-noisy-rules --enable-deprecated-rules -o results.csv
-```
-
-* Only run rules to analyze logons and output in the UTC timezone:
-```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa\default\events\Security\Logons -u -o results.csv
-```
-
-* Run on a live Windows machine (requires Administrator privileges) and only detect alerts (potentially malicious behavior):
-```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -d C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs -m low
-```
-
-* Get event ID statistics:
-```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -f Security.evtx -s
-```
-
-* Print verbose information (useful for determining which files take long to process, parsing errors, etc...):
-```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -v
-```
-
-* Verbose output example:
-```bash
-Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/YamatoSecurity/T1027.004_Obfuscated Files or Information\u{a0}Compile After Delivery/sysmon.evtx"
-1 / 509 [>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------] 0.20 % 1s
-Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/YamatoSecurity/T1558.004_Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets AS-REP Roasting/Security.evtx"
-2 / 509 [>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------] 0.39 % 1s
-Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/YamatoSecurity/T1558.003_Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets\u{a0}Kerberoasting/Security.evtx"
-3 / 509 [>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------] 0.59 % 1s
-Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/YamatoSecurity/T1197_BITS Jobs/Windows-BitsClient.evtx"
-4 / 509 [=>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------] 0.79 % 1s
-Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/YamatoSecurity/T1218.004_Signed Binary Proxy Execution\u{a0}InstallUtil/sysmon.evtx"
-5 / 509 [=>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------] 0.98 % 1s
-```
-
-* Quiet error mode:
-By default, hayabusa will save error messages to error log files.
-If you do not want to save error messages, please add `-Q`.
-
-# Hayabusa output
-When Hayabusa output is being displayed to the screen (the default), it will display the following information:
-
-* `Timestamp`: Default is `YYYY-MM-DD HH:mm:ss.sss +hh:mm` format. This comes from the `` field in the event log. The default timezone will be the local timezone but you can change the timezone to UTC with the `--utc` option.
-* `Computer`: This comes from the `` field in the event log.
-* `Event ID`: This comes from the `` field in the event log.
-* `Level`: This comes from the `level` field in the YML detection rule. (`informational`, `low`, `medium`, `high`, `critical`) By default, all level alerts will be displayed but you can set the minimum level with `-m`. For example, you can set `-m high`) in order to only scan for and display high and critical alerts.
-* `Title`: This comes from the `title` field in the YML detection rule.
-* `Details`: This comes from the `details` field in the YML detection rule, however, only Hayabusa rules have this field. This field gives extra information about the alert or event and can extract useful data from the `` portion of the log. For example, usernames, command line information, process information, etc...
-
-When saving to a CSV file an additional two fields will be added:
-* `Rule Path`: The path to the detection rule that generated the alert or event.
-* `File Path`: The path to the evtx file that caused the alert or event.
-
-## Progress bar
-The progress bar will only work with multiple evtx files.
-It will display in real time the number and percent of evtx files that it has analyzed.
-
-# Hayabusa rules
-Hayabusa detection rules are written in a sigma-like YML format and are located in the `rules` folder. In the future, we plan to host the rules at [https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules) so please send any issues and pull requests for rules there instead of the main hayabusa repository.
-
-Please read [AboutRuleCreation-English.md](./doc/AboutRuleCreation-English.md) to understand about the rule format how to create rules.
-
-All of the rules from the hayabusa-rules repository should be placed in the `rules` folder.
-`informational` level rules are considered `events`, while anything with a `level` of `low` and higher are considered `alerts`.
-
-The hayabusa rule directory structure is separated into 3 directories:
- * `default`: logs that are turned on in Windows by default.
- * `non-default`: logs that need to be turned on through group policy, security baselines, etc...
- * `sysmon`: logs that are generated by [sysmon](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon).
- * `testing`: a temporary directory to put rules that you are currently testing
-
-Rules are further seperated into directories by log type (Example: Security, System, etc...) and are named in the following format:
- * Alert format: `__.yml`
- * Alert example: `1102_IndicatorRemovalOnHost-ClearWindowsEventLogs_SecurityLogCleared.yml`
- * Event format: `_.yml`
- * Event example: `4776_NTLM-LogonToLocalAccount.yml`
-
-Please check out the current rules to use as a template in creating new ones or for checking the detection logic.
-
-## Hayabusa v.s. converted Sigma rules
-Sigma rules need to first be converted to hayabusa rule format explained [here](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/blob/main/tools/sigmac/README-English.md). Hayabusa rules are designed solely for Windows event log analysis and have the following benefits:
-1. An extra `details` field to display additional information taken from only the useful fields in the log.
-2. They are all tested against sample logs and are known to work.
- > Some sigma rules may not work as intended due to bugs in the conversion process, unsupported features, or differences in implementation (such as in regular expressions).
-
-**Limitations**: To our knowledge, hayabusa provides the greatest support for sigma rules out of any open source Windows event log analysis tool, however, there are still rules that are not supported:
-1. Rules that use regular expressions that do not work with the [Rust regex crate](https://docs.rs/regex/1.5.4/regex/)
-2. Aggregation expressions besides `count` in the [sigma rule specification](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/wiki/Specification).
-
-> Note: the limitation is in the sigma rule converter and not in hayabusa itself.
-
-## Detection rule tuning
-Like firewalls and IDSes, any signature-based tool will require some tuning to fit your environment so you may need to permanently or temporarily exclude certain rules.
-
-You can add a rule ID (Example: `4fe151c2-ecf9-4fae-95ae-b88ec9c2fca6`) to `config/exclude-rules.txt` in order to ignore any rule that you do not need or cannot be used.
-
-You can also add a rule ID to `config/noisy-rules.txt` in order to ignore the rule by default but still be able to use the rule with the `-n` or `--enable-noisy-rules` option.
-
-## Event ID filtering
-You can filter on event IDs by placing event ID numbers in `config/target_eventids.txt`.
-This will increase performance so it is recommended if you only need to search for certain IDs.
-
-We have provided a sample ID filter list at [`config/target_eventids_sample.txt`](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/blob/main/config/target_eventids_sample.txt) created from the `EventID` fields in all of the rules as well as IDs seen in actual results.
-
-Please use this list if you want the best performance but be aware that there is a slight possibility for missing events (false negatives).
-
-# Other Windows event log analyzers and related projects
-There is no "one tool to rule them all" and we have found that each has its own merits so we recommend checking out these other great tools and projects and seeing which ones you like.
-
-- [APT-Hunter](https://github.com/ahmedkhlief/APT-Hunter) - Attack detection tool written in Python.
-- [Chainsaw](https://github.com/countercept/chainsaw) - A similar sigma-based attack detection tool written in Rust.
-- [DeepBlueCLI](https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI) - Attack detection tool written in Powershell by [Eric Conrad](https://twitter.com/eric_conrad).
-- [EventList](https://github.com/miriamxyra/EventList/) - Map security baseline event IDs to MITRE ATT&CK by [Miriam Wiesner](https://github.com/miriamxyra)
-- [EVTXtract](https://github.com/williballenthin/EVTXtract) - Recover EVTX log files from unallocated space and memory images.
-- [EvtxToElk](https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/evtxtoelk-a-python-module-to-load-windows-event-logs-into-elasticsearch/) - Python tool to send Evtx data to Elastic Stack.
-- [EVTX ATTACK Samples](https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES) - EVTX attack sample event log files by [SBousseaden](https://twitter.com/SBousseaden).
-- [EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack](https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack) - Another great repository of EVTX attack sample logs mapped to ATT&CK.
-- [EVTX parser](https://github.com/omerbenamram/evtx) - the Rust library we used written by [@OBenamram](https://twitter.com/obenamram).
-- [LogonTracer](https://github.com/JPCERTCC/LogonTracer) - A graphical interface to visualize logons to detect lateral movement by [JPCERTCC](https://twitter.com/jpcert_en).
-- [RustyBlue](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/RustyBlue) - Rust port of DeepBlueCLI by Yamato Security.
-- [Sigma](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma) - Community based generic SIEM rules.
-- [so-import-evtx](https://docs.securityonion.net/en/2.3/so-import-evtx.html) - Import evtx files into Security Onion.
-- [Timeline Explorer](https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md) - The best CSV timeline analyzer by [Eric Zimmerman](https://twitter.com/ericrzimmerman).
-- [Windows Event Log Analysis - Analyst Reference](https://www.forwarddefense.com/media/attachments/2021/05/15/windows-event-log-analyst-reference.pdf) - by Forward Defense's Steve Anson.
-- [WELA (Windows Event Log Analyzer)](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/WELA) - The swiff-army knife for Windows event logs by [Yamato Security](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/)
-- [Zircolite](https://github.com/wagga40/Zircolite) - Sigma-based attack detection tool written in Python.
-
-## Comparison to other similar tools that support sigma
-Please understand that it is not possible to do a perfect comparison as results will differ based on the target sample data, command-line options, rule tuning, etc...
-In our tests, we have found hayabusa to support the largest number of sigma rules out of all the tools while still maintaining very fast speeds and does not require a great amount of memory.
-
-The following benchmarks were taken on a Lenovo P51 based on approximately 500 evtx files (130MB) from our [sample-evtx repository](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-sample-evtx) at 2021/12/23 with Hayabusa version 1.0.0.
-
-| | Elapsed Time | Memory Usage | Unique Sigma Rules With Detections |
-| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
-| Chainsaw | 7.5 seconds | 75 MB | 170 |
-| Hayabusa | 7.8 seconds | 340 MB | 267 |
-| Zircolite | 34 seconds | 380 MB (normally requires 3 times the size of the log files) | 237 |
-
-* With hayabusa rules enabled, it will detect around 300 unique alerts and events.
-* When tested on many event logs files totaling 7.5 GB, it finished in under 7 minutes and used around 1 GB of memory. The amount of memory consumed is based on the size of the results, not on the size of the target evtx files.
-* It is the only tool that provides a consolidated single CSV timeline to analysis in tools like [Timeline Explorer](https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md).
-
-# Community Documentation
-
-## English
-
- - 2022/01/24 [Graphing Hayabusa results in neo4j](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7sQqz2ek-ko) by Matthew Seyer ([@forensic_matt](https://twitter.com/forensic_matt))
-
-## Japanese
-
- - 2022/01/22 [Visualizing Hayabusa results in Elastic Stack](https://qiita.com/kzzzzo2/items/ead8ccc77b7609143749) by [@kzzzzo2](https://qiita.com/kzzzzo2)
- - 2021/12/31 [Intro to Hayabusa](https://itib.hatenablog.com/entry/2021/12/31/222946) by itiB ([@itiB_S144](https://twitter.com/itiB_S144))
- - 2021/12/27 [Hayabusa internals](https://kazuminkun.hatenablog.com/entry/2021/12/27/190535) by Kazuminn ([@k47_um1n](https://twitter.com/k47_um1n))
-
-# Contribution
-
-We would love any form of contribution. Pull requests, rule creation and sample evtx logs are the best but feature requests, notifying us of bugs, etc... are also very welcome.
-
-At the least, if you like our tool then please give us a star on Github and show your support!
-
-# License
-
-Hayabusa is released under [GPLv3](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html) and all rules are released under the [Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.1](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/README-Japanese.md b/README-Japanese.md
index e3d23710..a32ba89f 100644
--- a/README-Japanese.md
+++ b/README-Japanese.md
@@ -1,20 +1,75 @@
-
- 
-
+
+ [
English] | [
日本語]
+---
+
+[tag-1]: https://img.shields.io/github/downloads/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/total?style=plastic&label=GitHub%F0%9F%A6%85DownLoads
+[tag-2]: https://img.shields.io/github/stars/Yamato-Security/hayabusa?style=plastic&label=GitHub%F0%9F%A6%85Stars
+[tag-3]: https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/Yamato-Security/hayabusa?display_name=tag&label=latest-version&style=plastic
+
+![tag-1] ![tag-2] ![tag-3]
+
# Hayabusa について
+
Hayabusaは、日本の[Yamato Security](https://yamatosecurity.connpass.com/)グループによって作られた**Windowsイベントログのファストフォレンジックタイムライン生成**および**スレットハンティングツール**です。 Hayabusaは日本語で[「ハヤブサ」](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peregrine_falcon)を意味し、ハヤブサが世界で最も速く、狩猟(hunting)に優れ、とても訓練しやすい動物であることから選ばれました。[Rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/) で開発され、マルチスレッドに対応し、可能な限り高速に動作するよう配慮されています。[Sigma](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Sigma)ルールをHayabusaルール形式に変換する[ツール](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/tree/main/tools/Sigmac)も提供しています。Hayabusaの検知ルールもSigmaと同様にYML形式であり、カスタマイズ性や拡張性に優れます。稼働中のシステムで実行してライブ調査することも、複数のシステムからログを収集してオフライン調査することも可能です。(※現時点では、リアルタイムアラートや定期的なスキャンには対応していません。) 出力は一つのCSVタイムラインにまとめられ、Excelや[Timeline Explorer](https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md)で簡単に分析できるようになります。
+## 目次
+
+- [Hayabusa について](#hayabusa-について)
+ - [目次](#目次)
+ - [主な目的](#主な目的)
+ - [スレット(脅威)ハンティング](#スレット脅威ハンティング)
+ - [フォレンジックタイムラインの高速生成](#フォレンジックタイムラインの高速生成)
+- [開発について](#開発について)
+- [スクリーンショット](#スクリーンショット)
+ - [起動画面:](#起動画面)
+ - [ターミナル出力画面:](#ターミナル出力画面)
+ - [結果サマリ画面:](#結果サマリ画面)
+ - [Excelでの解析:](#excelでの解析)
+ - [Timeline Explorerでの解析:](#timeline-explorerでの解析)
+ - [Criticalアラートのフィルタリングとコンピュータごとのグルーピング:](#criticalアラートのフィルタリングとコンピュータごとのグルーピング)
+- [タイムラインのサンプル結果](#タイムラインのサンプル結果)
+- [特徴](#特徴)
+- [予定されている機能](#予定されている機能)
+- [ダウンロード](#ダウンロード)
+- [ソースコードからのコンパイル(任意)](#ソースコードからのコンパイル任意)
+ - [32ビットWindowsバイナリのクロスコンパイル](#32ビットwindowsバイナリのクロスコンパイル)
+ - [macOSでのコンパイルの注意点](#macosでのコンパイルの注意点)
+ - [Linuxでのコンパイルの注意点](#linuxでのコンパイルの注意点)
+ - [アドバンス: Rustパッケージの更新](#アドバンス-rustパッケージの更新)
+ - [サンプルevtxファイルでHayabusaをテストする](#サンプルevtxファイルでhayabusaをテストする)
+- [使用方法](#使用方法)
+ - [Windows Terminalで利用する際の注意事項](#windows-terminalで利用する際の注意事項)
+ - [コマンドラインオプション](#コマンドラインオプション)
+ - [使用例](#使用例)
+- [Hayabusaの出力](#hayabusaの出力)
+ - [プログレスバー](#プログレスバー)
+ - [標準出力へのカラー設定](#標準出力へのカラー設定)
+- [Hayabusa ルール](#hayabusa-ルール)
+ - [Hayabusa v.s. 変換されたSigmaルール](#hayabusa-vs-変換されたsigmaルール)
+ - [検知ルールのチューニング](#検知ルールのチューニング)
+ - [イベントIDフィルタリング](#イベントidフィルタリング)
+- [その他のWindowsイベントログ解析ツールおよび関連プロジェクト](#その他のwindowsイベントログ解析ツールおよび関連プロジェクト)
+ - [Sigmaをサポートする他の類似ツールとの比較](#sigmaをサポートする他の類似ツールとの比較)
+- [コミュニティによるドキュメンテーション](#コミュニティによるドキュメンテーション)
+ - [英語](#英語)
+ - [日本語](#日本語)
+- [貢献](#貢献)
+- [バグの報告](#バグの報告)
+- [ライセンス](#ライセンス)
+
## 主な目的
### スレット(脅威)ハンティング
+
Hayabusa には現在、1000以上のSigmaルールと約50のHayabusa検知ルールがあり、定期的にルールが追加されています。 最終的な目標はインシデントレスポンスや定期的なスレットハンティングのために、HayabusaエージェントをすべてのWindows端末にインストールして、中央サーバーにアラートを返す仕組みを作ることです。
### フォレンジックタイムラインの高速生成
+
Windowsのイベントログは、
1)解析が困難なデータ形式であること
2)データの大半がノイズであり調査に有用でないこと
@@ -22,9 +77,11 @@ Windowsのイベントログは、
[Evtx Explorer](https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md)や[Event Log Explorer](https://eventlogxp.com/)のような深掘り分析を行うツールの代替ではなく、分析者が20%の時間で80%の作業を行えるようにすることを目的としています。
# 開発について
+
[DeepBlueCLI](https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI)というWindowsイベントログ解析ツールに触発されて、2020年に[RustyBlue](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/RustyBlue)プロジェクト用にRustに移植することから始めました。その後、YMLで書かれたSigmaのような柔軟な検知シグネチャを作り、SigmaルールをHayabusaルール形式へ変換するツールも作成しました。
# スクリーンショット
+
## 起動画面:

@@ -50,11 +107,13 @@ Windowsのイベントログは、

# タイムラインのサンプル結果
+
CSVと手動で編集したXLSXのタイムライン結果のサンプルは[こちら](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/tree/main/sample-results)で確認できます。
CSVのタイムラインをExcelやTimeline Explorerで分析する方法は[こちら](doc/CSV-AnalysisWithExcelAndTimelineExplorer-Japanese.pdf)で紹介しています。
# 特徴
+
* クロスプラットフォーム対応: Windows, Linux, macOS
* Rustで開発され、メモリセーフでハヤブサよりも高速です!
* マルチスレッド対応により、最大5倍のスピードアップを実現!
@@ -64,34 +123,88 @@ CSVのタイムラインをExcelやTimeline Explorerで分析する方法は[こ
* 現在、他の類似ツールに比べ最も多くのSigmaルールをサポートしており、カウントルールにも対応しています。
* イベントログの統計(どのような種類のイベントがあるのかを把握し、ログ設定のチューニングに有効です。)
* 不良ルールやノイズの多いルールを除外するルールチューニング設定が可能です。
+* MITRE ATT&CKとのマッピング
# 予定されている機能
+
* すべてのエンドポイントでの企業全体のスレットハンティング
* 日本語対応
-* MITRE ATT&CK とのマッピング
-* MITRE ATT&CK ヒートマップ生成機能
+* MITRE ATT&CKのヒートマップ生成機能
* ユーザーログオンと失敗したログオンのサマリー
* JSONログからの入力
* JSONへの出力→Elastic Stack/Splunkへのインポート
# ダウンロード
+
Hayabusaの[Releases](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/releases)から最新版をダウンロードできます。
または、以下の`git clone`コマンドでレポジトリをダウンロードし、ソースコードからコンパイルして使用することも可能です。
```bash
-git clone https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa.git
+git clone https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa.git --recursive
+```
+
+--recursive をつけ忘れた場合、サブモジュールとして管理されている rules/ 内のファイルが取得できません。
+Hayabusaでは検知ルールを`rules/`フォルダの取得はコンパイル後に以下のコマンドでルールの最新版を取得することができます。
+rulesフォルダ配下でファイルを削除や更新をしていた場合は更新されないのでその場合はrulesフォルダを他の名前にリネームしたうえで以下のコマンドを打ってください。
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -u
```
# ソースコードからのコンパイル(任意)
-rustがインストールされている場合、以下のコマンドでソースコードからコンパイルすることができます:
+
+Rustがインストールされている場合、以下のコマンドでソースコードからコンパイルすることができます:
```bash
cargo clean
cargo build --release
```
+以下のコマンドで定期的にRustをアップデートしてください:
+```bash
+rustup update
+```
+
+コンパイルされたバイナリは`target/release`フォルダ配下で作成されます。
+
+## 32ビットWindowsバイナリのクロスコンパイル
+
+以下のコマンドで64ビットのWindows端末で32ビットのバイナリをクロスコンパイルできます:
+
+```bash
+rustup install stable-i686-pc-windows-msvc
+rustup target add i686-pc-windows-msvc
+rustup run stable-i686-pc-windows-msvc cargo build --release
+```
+
+## macOSでのコンパイルの注意点
+
+opensslについてのコンパイルエラーが表示される場合は、[Homebrew](https://brew.sh/)をインストールしてから、以下のパッケージをインストールする必要があります:
+
+```bash
+brew install pkg-config
+brew install openssl
+```
+
+## Linuxでのコンパイルの注意点
+
+opensslについてのコンパイルエラーが表示される場合は、以下のパッケージをインストールする必要があります。
+
+Ubuntu系のディストロ:
+
+```bash
+sudo apt install libssl-dev
+```
+
+Fedora系のディストロ:
+
+```bash
+sudo yum install openssl-devel
+```
+
## アドバンス: Rustパッケージの更新
+
コンパイル前に最新のRust crateにアップデートすることで、最新のライブラリを利用することができます:
```bash
@@ -101,9 +214,11 @@ cargo update
※ アップデート後、何か不具合がありましたらお知らせください。
## サンプルevtxファイルでHayabusaをテストする
+
Hayabusaをテストしたり、新しいルールを作成したりするためのサンプルevtxファイルをいくつか提供しています: [https://github.com/Yamato-Security/Hayabusa-sample-evtx](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/Hayabusa-sample-evtx)
以下のコマンドで、サンプルのevtxファイルを新しいサブディレクトリ `hayabusa-sample-evtx` にダウンロードすることができます:
+
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-sample-evtx.git
```
@@ -111,93 +226,117 @@ git clone https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-sample-evtx.git
> ※ 以下の例でHayabusaを試したい方は、上記コマンドをhayabusaのルートフォルダから実行してください。
# 使用方法
+
> 注意: Hayabusaのルートディレクトリから、バイナリを実行する必要があります。例:`.\hayabusa.exe`
+## Windows Terminalで利用する際の注意事項
+
+2021/02/01現在、Windows Terminalから標準出力でhayabusaを使ったときに、コントロールコード(0x9D等)が検知結果に入っていると出力が止まることが確認されています。
+Windows Terminalからhayabusaを標準出力で解析させたい場合は、 `-c` (カラー出力)のオプションをつければ出力が止まることを回避できます。
+
## コマンドラインオプション
+
```bash
USAGE:
- -d --directory=[DIRECTORY] 'Directory of multiple .evtx files'
- -f --filepath=[FILEPATH] 'File path to one .evtx file'
- -r --rules=[RULEDIRECTORY] 'Rule file directory (default: ./rules)'
- -o --output=[CSV_TIMELINE] 'Save the timeline in CSV format. Example: results.csv'
- -v --verbose 'Output verbose information'
- -D --enable-deprecated-rules 'Enable sigma rules marked as deprecated'
- -n --enable-noisy-rules 'Enable rules marked as noisy'
- -m --min-level=[LEVEL] 'Minimum level for rules (default: informational)'
- --start-timeline=[STARTTIMELINE] 'Start time of the event to load from event file. Example: '2018/11/28 12:00:00 +09:00''
- --end-timeline=[ENDTIMELINE] 'End time of the event to load from event file. Example: '2018/11/28 12:00:00 +09:00''
- --rfc-2822 'Output date and time in RFC 2822 format. Example: Mon, 07 Aug 2006 12:34:56 -0600'
- --rfc-3339 'Output date and time in RFC 3339 format. Example: 2006-08-07T12:34:56.485214 -06:00'
- -u --utc 'Output time in UTC format (default: local time)'
- -t --thread-number=[NUMBER] 'Thread number (default: optimal number for performance)'
- -s --statistics 'Prints statistics of event IDs'
- -q --quiet 'Quiet mode. Do not display the launch banner'
- -Q --quiet-errors 'Quiet errors mode. Do not save error logs.'
- --contributors 'Prints the list of contributors'
+ -d --directory=[DIRECTORY] '.evtxファイルを持つディレクトリのパス。'
+ -f --filepath=[FILEPATH] '1つの.evtxファイルのパス。'
+ -r --rules=[RULEFILE/RULEDIRECTORY] 'ルールファイルまたはルールファイルを持つディレクトリ。(デフォルト: ./rules)'
+ -c --color 'カラーで出力する。 (ターミナルはTrue Colorに対応する必要がある。)'
+ -o --output=[CSV_TIMELINE] 'タイムラインをCSV形式で保存する。(例: results.csv)'
+ -v --verbose '詳細な情報を出力する。'
+ -D --enable-deprecated-rules 'Deprecatedルールを有効にする。'
+ -n --enable-noisy-rules 'Noisyルールを有効にする。'
+ -u --update-rules 'rulesフォルダをhayabusa-rulesのgithubリポジトリの最新版に更新する。'
+ -m --min-level=[LEVEL] '結果出力をするルールの最低レベル。(デフォルト: informational)'
+ -l --live-analysis 'ローカル端末のC:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logsフォルダを解析する。(Windowsのみ。管理者権限が必要。)'
+ --start-timeline=[STARTTIMELINE] '解析対象とするイベントログの開始時刻。(例: '2018/11/28 12:00:00 +09:00')'
+ --end-timeline=[ENDTIMELINE] '解析対象とするイベントログの終了時刻。(例: '2018/11/28 12:00:00 +09:00')'
+ --rfc-2822 'RFC 2822形式で日付と時刻を出力する。(例: Mon, 07 Aug 2006 12:34:56 -0600)'
+ --rfc-3339 'RFC 3339形式で日付と時刻を出力する。 (例: 2006-08-07T12:34:56.485214 -06:00)'
+ -U --utc 'UTC形式で日付と時刻を出力する。(デフォルト: 現地時間)'
+ -t --thread-number=[NUMBER] 'スレッド数。(デフォルト: パフォーマンスに最適な数値)'
+ -s --statistics 'イベント ID の統計情報を表示する。'
+ -q --quiet 'Quietモード。起動バナーを表示しない。'
+ -Q --quiet-errors 'Quiet errorsモード。エラーログを保存しない。'
+ --contributors 'コントリビュータの一覧表示。'
```
## 使用例
-* 1 つのWindowsイベントログファイルに対してHayabusaを実行します:
+
+* 1つのWindowsイベントログファイルに対してHayabusaを実行します:
+
```bash
.\hayabusa.exe -f eventlog.evtx
```
* 複数のWindowsイベントログファイルのあるsample-evtxディレクトリに対して、Hayabusaを実行します:
+
```bash
.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx
```
-* 1 つのCSVファイルにエクスポートして、EXCELやTimeline Explorerでさらに分析することができます:
+* 1つのCSVファイルにエクスポートして、EXCELやTimeline Explorerでさらに分析することができます:
+
```bash
.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -o results.csv
```
* Hayabusaルールのみを実行します(デフォルトでは `-r .\rules` にあるすべてのルールが利用されます):
+
```bash
.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa -o results.csv
```
* Windowsでデフォルトで有効になっているログに対してのみ、Hayabusaルールを実行します:
+
```bash
.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa\default -o results.csv
```
* Sysmonログに対してのみHayabusaルールを実行します:
+
```bash
.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa\sysmon -o results.csv
```
* Sigmaルールのみを実行します:
+
```bash
.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\sigma -o results.csv
```
-* 廃棄(deprecated)されたルール(`status`が`deprecated`になっているルール)とノイジールール(`.\config\noisy-rules.txt`にルールIDが書かれているルール)を有効にします:
+* 廃棄(deprecated)されたルール(`status`が`deprecated`になっているルール)とノイジールール(`.\rules\config\noisy_rules.txt`にルールIDが書かれているルール)を有効にします:
+
```bash
.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx --enable-deprecated-rules --enable-noisy-rules -o results.csv
```
* ログオン情報を分析するルールのみを実行し、UTCタイムゾーンで出力します:
+
```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r ./rules/Hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons -u -o results.csv
+.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r ./rules/Hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons -U -o results.csv
```
* 起動中のWindows端末上で実行し(Administrator権限が必要)、アラート(悪意のある可能性のある動作)のみを検知します:
+
```bash
-.\hayabusa.exe -d C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs -m low
+.\hayabusa.exe -l -m low
```
* イベントIDの統計情報を取得します:
+
```bash
.\hayabusa.exe -f Security.evtx -s
```
* 詳細なメッセージを出力します(処理に時間がかかるファイル、パースエラー等を特定するのに便利):
+
```bash
.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -v
```
* Verbose出力の例:
+
```bash
Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/YamatoSecurity/T1027.004_Obfuscated Files or Information\u{a0}Compile After Delivery/sysmon.evtx"
1 / 509 [>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------] 0.20 % 1s
@@ -216,6 +355,7 @@ Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/YamatoSecurity/T1218.004_
エラーメッセージを保存したくない場合は、`-Q`を追加してください。
# Hayabusaの出力
+
Hayabusaの結果を標準出力に表示しているとき(デフォルト)は、以下の情報を表示します:
* `Timestamp`: デフォルトでは`YYYY-MM-DD HH:mm:ss.sss +hh:mm`形式になっています。イベントログの``フィールドから来ています。デフォルトのタイムゾーンはローカルのタイムゾーンになりますが、`--utc` オプションで UTC に変更することができます。
@@ -226,56 +366,74 @@ Hayabusaの結果を標準出力に表示しているとき(デフォルト)
* `Details`: YML検知ルールの`details`フィールドから来ていますが、このフィールドはHayabusaルールにしかありません。このフィールドはアラートとイベントに関する追加情報を提供し、ログの``部分から有用なデータを抽出することができます。
CSVファイルとして保存する場合、以下の2つのフィールドが追加されます:
+
* `Rule Path`: アラートまたはイベントを生成した検知ルールへのパス。
* `File Path`: アラートまたはイベントを起こしたevtxファイルへのパス。
## プログレスバー
+
プログレス・バーは、複数のevtxファイルに対してのみ機能します。
解析したevtxファイルの数と割合をリアルタイムで表示します。
+## 標準出力へのカラー設定
+
+`-c`または`--color`を指定することで、Hayabusaの結果は`level`毎に文字色を変えることができます。
+`./config/level_color.txt`の値を変更することで文字色を変えることができます。
+形式は`level名,(6桁のRGBのカラーhex)`です。
+注意: True Colorに対応しているターミナルが必要です。
+例: [Windows Terminal](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/install) またはmacOSの[iTerm2](https://iterm2.com/)。
+
# Hayabusa ルール
+
Hayabusa検知ルールはSigmaのようなYML形式で記述されています。`rules`ディレクトリに入っていますが、将来的には[https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules)のレポジトリで管理する予定なので、ルールのissueとpull requestはhayabusaのレポジトリではなく、ルールレポジトリへお願いします。
-ルールの作成方法については、[AboutRuleCreation-Japanese.md](./doc/AboutRuleCreation-Japanese.md) をお読みください。
+ルールの作成方法については、[hayabusa-rulesレポジトリのREADME](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules/blob/main/README-Japanese.md) をお読みください。
[hayabusa-rulesレポジトリ](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules)にあるすべてのルールは、`rules`フォルダに配置する必要があります。
`level`がinformationのルールは `events` とみなされ、`low` 以上は `alerts` とみなされます。
Hayabusaルールのディレクトリ構造は、3つのディレクトリに分かれています。
- * `default`: Windows OSでデフォルトで記録されるログ
- * `non-default`: グループポリシーやセキュリティベースラインの適用でオンにする必要があるログ
- * `sysmon`: [sysmon](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon)によって生成されるログ。
- * `testing`: 現在テストしているルールを配置するための一時ディレクトリ
+
+* `default`: Windows OSでデフォルトで記録されるログ
+* `non-default`: グループポリシーやセキュリティベースラインの適用でオンにする必要があるログ
+* `sysmon`: [sysmon](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon)によって生成されるログ。
+* `testing`: 現在テストしているルールを配置するための一時ディレクトリ
ルールはさらにログタイプ(例:Security、Systemなど)によってディレクトリに分けられ、次の形式で名前が付けられます。
- * アラート形式: `<イベントID>__<詳細>.yml`
- * アラート例: `1102_IndicatorRemovalOnHost-ClearWindowsEventLogs_SecurityLogCleared.yml`
- * イベント形式: `<イベントID>_<詳細>.yml`
- * イベント例: `4776_NTLM-LogonToLocalAccount.yml`
+
+* アラート形式: `<イベントID>__<詳細>.yml`
+* アラート例: `1102_IndicatorRemovalOnHost-ClearWindowsEventLogs_SecurityLogCleared.yml`
+* イベント形式: `<イベントID>_<詳細>.yml`
+* イベント例: `4776_NTLM-LogonToLocalAccount.yml`
現在のルールをご確認いただき、新規作成時のテンプレートとして、また検知ロジックの確認用としてご利用ください。
## Hayabusa v.s. 変換されたSigmaルール
+
Sigmaルールは、最初にHayabusaルール形式に変換する必要があります。変換のやり方は[ここ](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/Hayabusa/blob/main/tools/Sigmac/README-Japanese.md)で説明されています。Hayabusaルールは、Windowsのイベントログ解析専用に設計されており、以下のような利点があります:
+
1. ログの有用なフィールドのみから抽出された追加情報を表示するための `details`フィールドを追加しています。
2. Hayabusaルールはすべてサンプルログに対してテストされ、検知することが確認されています。
> 変換処理のバグ、サポートされていない機能、実装の違い(正規表現など)により、一部のSigmaルールは意図したとおりに動作しない可能性があります。
-
+
**制限事項**: 私たちの知る限り、Hayabusa はオープンソースの Windows イベントログ解析ツールの中でSigmaルールを最も多くサポートしていますが、まだサポートされていないルールもあります。
+
1. [Rust正規表現クレート](https://docs.rs/regex/1.5.4/regex/)では機能しない正規表現を使用するルール。
2. [Sigmaルール仕様](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Sigma/wiki/Specification)の`count`以外の集計式。
> 注意:この制限はSigmaルールの変換ツールにあり、Hayabusa自身にあるわけではありません。
## 検知ルールのチューニング
+
ファイアウォールやIDSと同様に、シグネチャベースのツールは、環境に合わせて調整が必要になるため、特定のルールを永続的または一時的に除外する必要がある場合があります。
-ルールID(例: `4fe151c2-ecf9-4fae-95ae-b88ec9c2fca6`) を `config/exclude-rules.txt`に追加すると、不要なルールや利用できないルールを無視することができます。
+ルールID(例: `4fe151c2-ecf9-4fae-95ae-b88ec9c2fca6`) を `rules/config/exclude_rules.txt`に追加すると、不要なルールや利用できないルールを無視することができます。
-ルールIDを `config/noisy-rules.txt`に追加して、デフォルトでルールを無視することもできますが、` -n`または `--enable-noisy-rules`オプションを指定してルールを使用することもできます。
+ルールIDを `rules/config/noisy_rules.txt`に追加して、デフォルトでルールを無視することもできますが、` -n`または `--enable-noisy-rules`オプションを指定してルールを使用することもできます。
## イベントIDフィルタリング
+
`config/target_eventids.txt`にイベントID番号を追加することで、イベントIDでフィルタリングすることができます。
これはパフォーマンスを向上させるので、特定のIDだけを検索したい場合に推奨されます。
@@ -284,36 +442,41 @@ Sigmaルールは、最初にHayabusaルール形式に変換する必要があ
最高のパフォーマンスを得たい場合はこのリストを使用してください。ただし、検出漏れの可能性が若干あることにご注意ください。
# その他のWindowsイベントログ解析ツールおよび関連プロジェクト
+
「すべてを統治する1つのツール」というものはなく、それぞれにメリットがあるため、これらの他の優れたツールやプロジェクトをチェックして、どれが気に入ったかを確認することをお勧めします。
-- [APT-Hunter](https://github.com/ahmedkhlief/APT-Hunter) - Pythonで開発された攻撃検知ツール。
-- [Chainsaw](https://github.com/countercept/chainsaw) - Rustで開発された同様のSigmaベースの攻撃検知ツール。
-- [DeepBlueCLI](https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI) - [Eric Conrad](https://twitter.com/eric_conrad) によってPowershellで開発された攻撃検知ツール。
-- [EventList](https://github.com/miriamxyra/EventList/) - [Miriam Wiesner](https://github.com/miriamxyra)によるセキュリティベースラインの有効なイベントIDをMITRE ATT&CKにマッピングするPowerShellツール。
-- [EvtxToElk](https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/evtxtoelk-a-python-module-to-load-windows-event-logs-into-elasticsearch/) - Elastic StackにEvtxデータを送信するPythonツール。
-- [EVTX ATTACK Samples](https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES) - [SBousseaden](https://twitter.com/SBousseaden) によるEVTX攻撃サンプルイベントログファイル。
-- [EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack](https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack) - ATT&CKにマッピングされたEVTX攻撃サンプルログのもう一つの素晴らしいレポジトリ。
-- [EVTX parser](https://github.com/omerbenamram/evtx) - [@OBenamram](https://twitter.com/obenamram) によって書かれた、私たちが使用したRustライブラリ。
-- [LogonTracer](https://github.com/JPCERTCC/LogonTracer) - [JPCERTCC](https://twitter.com/jpcert) による、横方向の動きを検知するためにログオンを視覚化するグラフィカルなインターフェース。
-- [RustyBlue](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/RustyBlue) - 大和セキュリティによるDeepBlueCLIのRust版。
-- [Sigma](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Sigma) - コミュニティベースの汎用SIEMルール。
-- [so-import-evtx](https://docs.securityonion.net/en/2.3/so-import-evtx.html) - evtxファイルをSecurityOnionにインポートするツール。
-- [Timeline Explorer](https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md) - [Eric Zimmerman](https://twitter.com/ericrzimmerman) による最高のCSVタイムラインアナライザ。
-- [Windows Event Log Analysis - Analyst Reference](https://www.forwarddefense.com/media/attachments/2021/05/15/windows-event-log-analyst-reference.pdf) - Forward DefenseのSteve AnsonによるWindowsイベントログ解析の参考資料。
-- [WELA (Windows Event Log Analyzer)](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/WELA/) - [Yamato Security](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/)によるWindowsイベントログ解析のマルチツール。
-- [Zircolite](https://github.com/wagga40/Zircolite) - Pythonで書かれたSigmaベースの攻撃検知ツール。
+* [APT-Hunter](https://github.com/ahmedkhlief/APT-Hunter) - Pythonで開発された攻撃検知ツール。
+* [Awesome Event IDs](https://github.com/stuhli/awesome-event-ids) - フォレンジック調査とインシデント対応に役立つイベントIDのリソース。
+* [Chainsaw](https://github.com/countercept/chainsaw) - Rustで開発された同様のSigmaベースの攻撃検知ツール。
+* [DeepBlueCLI](https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI) - [Eric Conrad](https://twitter.com/eric_conrad) によってPowershellで開発された攻撃検知ツール。
+* [EventList](https://github.com/miriamxyra/EventList/) - [Miriam Wiesner](https://github.com/miriamxyra)によるセキュリティベースラインの有効なイベントIDをMITRE ATT&CKにマッピングするPowerShellツール。
+* [EvtxECmd](https://github.com/EricZimmerman/evtx) - [Eric Zimmerman](https://twitter.com/ericrzimmerman)によるEvtxパーサー。
+* [EVTXtract](https://github.com/williballenthin/EVTXtract) - 未使用領域やメモリダンプからEVTXファイルを復元するツール。
+* [EvtxToElk](https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/evtxtoelk-a-python-module-to-load-windows-event-logs-into-elasticsearch/) - Elastic StackにEvtxデータを送信するPythonツール。
+* [EVTX ATTACK Samples](https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES) - [SBousseaden](https://twitter.com/SBousseaden) によるEVTX攻撃サンプルイベントログファイル。
+* [EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack](https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack) - ATT&CKにマッピングされたEVTX攻撃サンプルログのもう一つの素晴らしいレポジトリ。
+* [EVTX parser](https://github.com/omerbenamram/evtx) - [@OBenamram](https://twitter.com/obenamram) によって書かれた、私たちが使用したRustライブラリ。
+* [LogonTracer](https://github.com/JPCERTCC/LogonTracer) - [JPCERTCC](https://twitter.com/jpcert) による、横方向の動きを検知するためにログオンを視覚化するグラフィカルなインターフェース。
+* [RustyBlue](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/RustyBlue) - 大和セキュリティによるDeepBlueCLIのRust版。
+* [Sigma](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Sigma) - コミュニティベースの汎用SIEMルール。
+* [so-import-evtx](https://docs.securityonion.net/en/2.3/so-import-evtx.html) - evtxファイルをSecurityOnionにインポートするツール。
+* [Timeline Explorer](https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md) - [Eric Zimmerman](https://twitter.com/ericrzimmerman) による最高のCSVタイムラインアナライザ。
+* [Windows Event Log Analysis - Analyst Reference](https://www.forwarddefense.com/media/attachments/2021/05/15/windows-event-log-analyst-reference.pdf) - Forward DefenseのSteve AnsonによるWindowsイベントログ解析の参考資料。
+* [WELA (Windows Event Log Analyzer)](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/WELA/) - [Yamato Security](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/)によるWindowsイベントログ解析のマルチツール。
+* [Zircolite](https://github.com/wagga40/Zircolite) - Pythonで書かれたSigmaベースの攻撃検知ツール。
## Sigmaをサポートする他の類似ツールとの比較
+
対象となるサンプルデータ、コマンドラインオプション、ルールのチューニング等によって結果が異なるため、完全な比較はできませんが、ご了承ください。
我々のテストでは、Hayabusaはすべてのツールの中で最も多くのSigmaルールをサポートしながらも、非常に高速な速度を維持し、大量のメモリを必要としないことが分かっています。
以下のベンチマークは、2021/12/23に [sample-evtx repository](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/Hayabusa-sample-evtx) から約500個のevtxファイル(130MB)を基に、Lenovo P51で計測したものです。Hayabusa 1.0.0を使いました。
-| | 経過時間 | メモリ使用量 | 利用可能のSigmaルール数 |
-| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
-| Chainsaw | 7.5 seconds | 70 MB | 170 |
-| Hayabusa | 7.8 seconds | 340 MB | 267 |
-| Zircolite | 34 seconds | 380 MB (通常、ログファイルの3倍のサイズが必要) | 237 |
+| | 経過時間 | メモリ使用量 | 利用可能のSigmaルール数 |
+| :-------: | :---------: | :--------------------------------------------: | :---------------------: |
+| Chainsaw | 7.5 seconds | 70 MB | 170 |
+| Hayabusa | 7.8 seconds | 340 MB | 267 |
+| Zircolite | 34 seconds | 380 MB (通常、ログファイルの3倍のサイズが必要) | 237 |
* Hayabusaルールも有効にすると、約300のユニークなアラートとイベントを検知します。
* 合計7.5GBの多数のイベントログファイルでテストしたところ、7分以内に終了し、1GB以上のメモリを使用しませんでした。消費されるメモリ量は、ターゲットのevtxファイルのサイズではなく、結果のサイズによって増えます。
@@ -323,13 +486,13 @@ Sigmaルールは、最初にHayabusaルール形式に変換する必要があ
## 英語
-- 2022/01/24 [Hayabusa結果をneo4jで可視化する方法](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7sQqz2ek-ko) by Matthew Seyer ([@forensic_matt](https://twitter.com/forensic_matt))
+* 2022/01/24 [Hayabusa結果をneo4jで可視化する方法](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7sQqz2ek-ko) by Matthew Seyer ([@forensic_matt](https://twitter.com/forensic_matt))
## 日本語
- - 2022/01/22 [Hayabusa結果をElastic Stackで可視化する方法](https://qiita.com/kzzzzo2/items/ead8ccc77b7609143749) by [@kzzzzo2](https://qiita.com/kzzzzo2)
- - 2021/12/31 [Windowsイベントログ解析ツール「Hayabusa」を使ってみる](https://itib.hatenablog.com/entry/2021/12/31/222946) by itiB ([@itiB_S144](https://twitter.com/itiB_S144))
- - 2021/12/27 [Hayabusaの中身](https://kazuminkun.hatenablog.com/entry/2021/12/27/190535) by Kazuminn ([@k47_um1n](https://twitter.com/k47_um1n))
+* 2022/01/22 [Hayabusa結果をElastic Stackで可視化する方法](https://qiita.com/kzzzzo2/items/ead8ccc77b7609143749) by [@kzzzzo2](https://qiita.com/kzzzzo2)
+* 2021/12/31 [Windowsイベントログ解析ツール「Hayabusa」を使ってみる](https://itib.hatenablog.com/entry/2021/12/31/222946) by itiB ([@itiB_S144](https://twitter.com/itiB_S144))
+* 2021/12/27 [Hayabusaの中身](https://kazuminkun.hatenablog.com/entry/2021/12/27/190535) by Kazuminn ([@k47_um1n](https://twitter.com/k47_um1n))
# 貢献
@@ -337,6 +500,10 @@ Sigmaルールは、最初にHayabusaルール形式に変換する必要があ
少なくとも、私たちのツールを気に入っていただけたなら、Githubで星を付けて、あなたのサポートを表明してください。
+# バグの報告
+
+見つけたバグを[こちら](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/issues/new?assignees=&labels=bug&template=bug_report.md&title=%5Bbug%5D)でご連絡ください。報告されたバグを喜んで修正します!
+
# ライセンス
Hayabusaは[GPLv3](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html)で公開され、すべてのルールは[Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.1](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md)で公開されています。
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index f05c1ca8..bc9d9c3f 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -1,5 +1,506 @@
-Hayabusa Readme:
+
+
+
+
+ [
English ] | [
日本語]
+
-[English](README-English.md)
+---
-[Japanese](README-Japanese.md)
\ No newline at end of file
+[tag-1]: https://img.shields.io/github/downloads/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/total?style=plastic&label=GitHub%F0%9F%A6%85DownLoads
+[tag-2]: https://img.shields.io/github/stars/Yamato-Security/hayabusa?style=plastic&label=GitHub%F0%9F%A6%85Stars
+[tag-3]: https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/Yamato-Security/hayabusa?display_name=tag&label=latest-version&style=plastic
+
+![tag-1] ![tag-2] ![tag-3]
+
+# About Hayabusa
+
+Hayabusa is a **Windows event log fast forensics timeline generator** and **threat hunting tool** created by the [Yamato Security](https://yamatosecurity.connpass.com/) group in Japan. Hayabusa means ["peregrine falcon"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peregrine_falcon") in Japanese and was chosen as peregrine falcons are the fastest animal in the world, great at hunting and highly trainable. It is written in [Rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/) and supports multi-threading in order to be as fast as possible. We have provided a [tool](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/tree/main/tools/sigmac) to convert [sigma](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma) rules into hayabusa rule format. The hayabusa detection rules, like sigma, are also written in YML in order to be as easily customizable and extensible as possible. It can be run either on running systems for live analysis or by gathering logs from multiple systems for offline analysis. (At the moment, it does not support real-time alerting or periodic scans.) The output will be consolidated into a single CSV timeline for easy analysis in Excel or [Timeline Explorer](https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md).
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+- [About Hayabusa](#about-hayabusa)
+ - [Table of Contents](#table-of-contents)
+ - [Main goals](#main-goals)
+ - [Threat hunting](#threat-hunting)
+ - [Fast forensics timeline generation](#fast-forensics-timeline-generation)
+- [About the development](#about-the-development)
+- [Screenshots](#screenshots)
+ - [Startup](#startup)
+ - [Terminal output](#terminal-output)
+ - [Results summary](#results-summary)
+ - [Analysis in Excel](#analysis-in-excel)
+ - [Analysis in Timeline Explorer](#analysis-in-timeline-explorer)
+ - [Critical alert filtering and computer grouping in Timeline Explorer](#critical-alert-filtering-and-computer-grouping-in-timeline-explorer)
+- [Sample timeline results](#sample-timeline-results)
+- [Features](#features)
+- [Planned Features](#planned-features)
+- [Downloads](#downloads)
+- [Compiling from source (Optional)](#compiling-from-source-optional)
+ - [Cross-compiling 32-bit Windows binaries](#cross-compiling-32-bit-windows-binaries)
+ - [Notes on compiling on macOS](#notes-on-compiling-on-macos)
+ - [Notes on compiling on Linux](#notes-on-compiling-on-linux)
+ - [Advanced: Updating Rust packages](#advanced-updating-rust-packages)
+ - [Testing hayabusa out on sample evtx files](#testing-hayabusa-out-on-sample-evtx-files)
+- [Usage](#usage)
+ - [Caution: Output printed to screen may stop in Windows Terminal](#caution-output-printed-to-screen-may-stop-in-windows-terminal)
+ - [Command line options](#command-line-options)
+ - [Usage examples](#usage-examples)
+- [Hayabusa output](#hayabusa-output)
+ - [Progress bar](#progress-bar)
+ - [Color Output](#color-output)
+- [Hayabusa rules](#hayabusa-rules)
+ - [Hayabusa v.s. converted Sigma rules](#hayabusa-vs-converted-sigma-rules)
+ - [Detection rule tuning](#detection-rule-tuning)
+ - [Event ID filtering](#event-id-filtering)
+- [Other Windows event log analyzers and related projects](#other-windows-event-log-analyzers-and-related-projects)
+ - [Comparison to other similar tools that support sigma](#comparison-to-other-similar-tools-that-support-sigma)
+- [Community Documentation](#community-documentation)
+ - [English](#english)
+ - [Japanese](#japanese)
+- [Contribution](#contribution)
+- [Bug Submission](#bug-submission)
+- [License](#license)
+
+## Main goals
+
+### Threat hunting
+
+Hayabusa currently has over 1000 sigma rules and around 50 hayabusa rules with more rules being added regularly. The ultimate goal is to be able to push out hayabusa agents to all Windows endpoints after an incident or for periodic threat hunting and have them alert back to a central server.
+
+### Fast forensics timeline generation
+
+Windows event log analysis has traditionally been a very long and tedious process because Windows event logs are 1) in a data format that is hard to analyze and 2) the majority of data is noise and not useful for investigations. Hayabusa's main goal is to extract out only useful data and present it in an easy-to-read format that is usable not only by professionally trained analysts but any Windows system administrator.
+Hayabusa is not intended to be a replacement for tools like [Evtx Explorer](https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md) or [Event Log Explorer](https://eventlogxp.com/) for more deep-dive analysis but is intended for letting analysts get 80% of their work done in 20% of the time.
+
+# About the development
+
+First inspired by the [DeepBlueCLI](https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI) Windows event log analyzer, we started in 2020 porting it over to Rust for the [RustyBlue](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/RustyBlue) project, then created sigma-like flexible detection signatures written in YML, and then added a backend to sigma to support converting sigma rules into our hayabusa rule format.
+
+# Screenshots
+
+## Startup
+
+
+
+## Terminal output
+
+
+
+
+## Results summary
+
+
+
+## Analysis in Excel
+
+
+
+## Analysis in Timeline Explorer
+
+
+
+## Critical alert filtering and computer grouping in Timeline Explorer
+
+
+
+# Sample timeline results
+
+You can check out sample CSV and manually edited XLSX timeline results [here](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/tree/main/sample-results).
+
+You can learn how to analyze CSV timelines in Excel and Timeline Explorer [here](doc/CSV-AnalysisWithExcelAndTimelineExplorer-English.pdf).
+
+# Features
+
+* Cross-platform support: Windows, Linux, macOS
+* Developed in Rust to be memory safe and faster than a hayabusa falcon!
+* Multi-thread support delivering up to a 5x speed improvement!
+* Creates a single easy-to-analyze CSV timeline for forensic investigations and incident response
+* Threat hunting based on IoC signatures written in easy to read/create/edit YML based hayabusa rules
+* Sigma rule support to convert sigma rules to hayabusa rules
+* Currently it supports the most sigma rules compared to other similar tools and even supports count rules
+* Event log statistics (Useful for getting a picture of what types of events there are and for tuning your log settings)
+* Rule tuning configuration by excluding unneeded or noisy rules
+* MITRE ATT&CK mapping
+
+# Planned Features
+
+* Enterprise-wide hunting on all endpoints
+* Japanese language support
+* MITRE ATT&CK heatmap generation
+* User logon and failed logon summary
+* Input from JSON logs
+* JSON support for sending alerts to Elastic Stack/Splunk, etc...
+
+# Downloads
+
+You can download the latest Hayabusa version from the [Releases](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/releases) page.
+
+You can also `git clone` the repository with the following command and compile binary from source code.:
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa.git --recursive
+```
+
+If you forget to use --recursive option, rules/ files which managed in submodule did not cloned.
+You can get latest Hayabusa rules with the execute following command.
+
+When you modified or erased in rules/ , update is failed.
+In this case, you can get latest Hayabusa if you renamed rules folder and execute following command.
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -u
+```
+
+# Compiling from source (Optional)
+
+If you have Rust installed, you can compile from source with the following command:
+
+```bash
+cargo clean
+cargo build --release
+```
+
+Be sure to periodically update Rust with:
+
+```bash
+rustup update
+```
+
+The compiled binary will be outputted in the `target/release` folder.
+
+## Cross-compiling 32-bit Windows binaries
+
+You can create 32-bit binaries on 64-bit Windows systems with the following:
+```bash
+rustup install stable-i686-pc-windows-msvc
+rustup target add i686-pc-windows-msvc
+rustup run stable-i686-pc-windows-msvc cargo build --release
+```
+
+## Notes on compiling on macOS
+
+If you receive compile errors about openssl, you will need to install [Homebrew](https://brew.sh/) and then install the following packages:
+```bash
+brew install pkg-config
+brew install openssl
+```
+
+## Notes on compiling on Linux
+
+If you receive compile errors about openssl, you will need to install the following package.
+
+Ubuntu-based distros:
+```bash
+sudo apt install libssl-dev
+```
+
+Fedora-based distros:
+```bash
+sudo yum install openssl-devel
+```
+
+## Advanced: Updating Rust packages
+
+You can update to the latest Rust crates before compiling to get the latest libraries:
+
+```bash
+cargo update
+```
+
+Please let us know if anything breaks after you update.
+
+## Testing hayabusa out on sample evtx files
+
+We have provided some sample evtx files for you to test hayabusa and/or create new rules at [https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-sample-evtx](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-sample-evtx)
+
+You can download the sample evtx files to a new `hayabusa-sample-evtx` sub-directory with the following command:
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-sample-evtx.git
+```
+
+> Note: You need to run the binary from the Hayabusa root directory.
+
+# Usage
+
+> Note: You need to run the Hayabusa binary from the Hayabusa root directory. Example: `.\hayabusa.exe`
+
+## Caution: Output printed to screen may stop in Windows Terminal
+
+As of Feb 1, 2022, Windows Terminal will freeze midway when displaying results to the screen when run against the sample evtx files.
+This is because there is a control code (0x9D) in the output.
+This is known Windows Terminal bug which will eventually be fixed but for the meantime, you can avoid this bug by adding the `-c` (colored output) option when you run hayabusa.
+
+## Command line options
+
+```bash
+USAGE:
+ -d --directory=[DIRECTORY] 'Directory of multiple .evtx files.'
+ -f --filepath=[FILEPATH] 'File path to one .evtx file.'
+ -r --rules=[RULEFILE/RULEDIRECTORY] 'Rule file or directory. (Default: ./rules)'
+ -c --color 'Output with color. (Terminal needs to support True Color.)'
+ -o --output=[CSV_TIMELINE] 'Save the timeline in CSV format. (Example: results.csv)'
+ -v --verbose 'Output verbose information.'
+ -D --enable-deprecated-rules 'Enable rules marked as deprecated.'
+ -n --enable-noisy-rules 'Enable rules marked as noisy.'
+ -u --update-rules 'Update to the latest rules in the hayabusa-rules github repository.'
+ -m --min-level=[LEVEL] 'Minimum level for rules. (Default: informational)'
+ -l --live-analysis 'Analyze the local C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs folder (Windows Only. Administrator privileges required.)'
+ --start-timeline=[STARTTIMELINE] 'Start time of the event logs to load. (Example: '2018/11/28 12:00:00 +09:00')'
+ --end-timeline=[ENDTIMELINE] 'End time of the event logs to load. (Example: '2018/11/28 12:00:00 +09:00')'
+ --rfc-2822 'Output date and time in RFC 2822 format. (Example: Mon, 07 Aug 2006 12:34:56 -0600)'
+ --rfc-3339 'Output date and time in RFC 3339 format. (Example: 2006-08-07T12:34:56.485214 -06:00)'
+ -U --utc 'Output time in UTC format. (Default: local time)'
+ -t --thread-number=[NUMBER] 'Thread number. (Default: Optimal number for performance.)'
+ -s --statistics 'Prints statistics of event IDs.'
+ -q --quiet 'Quiet mode. Do not display the launch banner.'
+ -Q --quiet-errors 'Quiet errors mode. Do not save error logs.'
+ --contributors 'Prints the list of contributors.'
+```
+
+## Usage examples
+
+* Run hayabusa against one Windows event log file:
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -f eventlog.evtx
+```
+
+* Run hayabusa against the sample-evtx directory with multiple Windows event log files:
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx
+```
+
+* Export to a single CSV file for further analysis with excel or timeline explorer:
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -o results.csv
+```
+
+* Only run hayabusa rules (the default is to run all the rules in `-r .\rules`):
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa -o results.csv
+```
+
+* Only run hayabusa rules for logs that are enabled by default on Windows:
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa\default -o results.csv
+```
+
+* Only run hayabusa rules for sysmon logs:
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa\sysmon -o results.csv
+```
+
+* Only run sigma rules:
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\sigma -o results.csv
+```
+
+* Enable deprecated rules (those with `status` marked as `deprecated`) and noisy rules (those whose rule ID is listed in `.\rules\config\noisy_rules.txt`):
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx --enable-noisy-rules --enable-deprecated-rules -o results.csv
+```
+
+* Only run rules to analyze logons and output in the UTC timezone:
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa\default\events\Security\Logons -U -o results.csv
+```
+
+* Run on a live Windows machine (requires Administrator privileges) and only detect alerts (potentially malicious behavior):
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -l -m low
+```
+
+* Get event ID statistics:
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -f Security.evtx -s
+```
+
+* Print verbose information (useful for determining which files take long to process, parsing errors, etc...):
+
+```bash
+.\hayabusa.exe -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -v
+```
+
+* Verbose output example:
+
+```bash
+Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/YamatoSecurity/T1027.004_Obfuscated Files or Information\u{a0}Compile After Delivery/sysmon.evtx"
+1 / 509 [>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------] 0.20 % 1s
+Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/YamatoSecurity/T1558.004_Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets AS-REP Roasting/Security.evtx"
+2 / 509 [>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------] 0.39 % 1s
+Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/YamatoSecurity/T1558.003_Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets\u{a0}Kerberoasting/Security.evtx"
+3 / 509 [>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------] 0.59 % 1s
+Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/YamatoSecurity/T1197_BITS Jobs/Windows-BitsClient.evtx"
+4 / 509 [=>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------] 0.79 % 1s
+Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/YamatoSecurity/T1218.004_Signed Binary Proxy Execution\u{a0}InstallUtil/sysmon.evtx"
+5 / 509 [=>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------] 0.98 % 1s
+```
+
+* Quiet error mode:
+By default, hayabusa will save error messages to error log files.
+If you do not want to save error messages, please add `-Q`.
+
+# Hayabusa output
+
+When Hayabusa output is being displayed to the screen (the default), it will display the following information:
+
+* `Timestamp`: Default is `YYYY-MM-DD HH:mm:ss.sss +hh:mm` format. This comes from the `` field in the event log. The default timezone will be the local timezone but you can change the timezone to UTC with the `--utc` option.
+* `Computer`: This comes from the `` field in the event log.
+* `Event ID`: This comes from the `` field in the event log.
+* `Level`: This comes from the `level` field in the YML detection rule. (`informational`, `low`, `medium`, `high`, `critical`) By default, all level alerts will be displayed but you can set the minimum level with `-m`. For example, you can set `-m high`) in order to only scan for and display high and critical alerts.
+* `Title`: This comes from the `title` field in the YML detection rule.
+* `Details`: This comes from the `details` field in the YML detection rule, however, only Hayabusa rules have this field. This field gives extra information about the alert or event and can extract useful data from the `` portion of the log. For example, usernames, command line information, process information, etc...
+
+When saving to a CSV file an additional two fields will be added:
+
+* `Rule Path`: The path to the detection rule that generated the alert or event.
+* `File Path`: The path to the evtx file that caused the alert or event.
+
+## Progress bar
+
+The progress bar will only work with multiple evtx files.
+It will display in real time the number and percent of evtx files that it has finished analyzing.
+
+## Color Output
+
+You can output the alerts in color based on the alert `level` by specifying `-c` or `--color`.
+You can change the default colors in the config file at `./config/level_color.txt` in the format of `level,(RGB 6-digit ColorHex)`.
+Note: Color can only be displayed in terminals that support [True Color](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_depth#True_color_(24-bit)).
+Example: [Windows Terminal](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/install) or [iTerm2](https://iterm2.com/) for macOS.
+
+# Hayabusa rules
+
+Hayabusa detection rules are written in a sigma-like YML format and are located in the `rules` folder. In the future, we plan to host the rules at [https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules) so please send any issues and pull requests for rules there instead of the main hayabusa repository.
+
+Please read [the hayabusa-rules repository README](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules/blob/main/README.md) to understand about the rule format and how to create rules.
+
+All of the rules from the hayabusa-rules repository should be placed in the `rules` folder.
+`informational` level rules are considered `events`, while anything with a `level` of `low` and higher are considered `alerts`.
+
+The hayabusa rule directory structure is separated into 3 directories:
+
+* `default`: logs that are turned on in Windows by default.
+* `non-default`: logs that need to be turned on through group policy, security baselines, etc...
+* `sysmon`: logs that are generated by [sysmon](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon).
+* `testing`: a temporary directory to put rules that you are currently testing
+
+Rules are further seperated into directories by log type (Example: Security, System, etc...) and are named in the following format:
+
+* Alert format: `__.yml`
+* Alert example: `1102_IndicatorRemovalOnHost-ClearWindowsEventLogs_SecurityLogCleared.yml`
+* Event format: `_.yml`
+* Event example: `4776_NTLM-LogonToLocalAccount.yml`
+
+Please check out the current rules to use as a template in creating new ones or for checking the detection logic.
+
+## Hayabusa v.s. converted Sigma rules
+
+Sigma rules need to first be converted to hayabusa rule format explained [here](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/blob/main/tools/sigmac/README-English.md). Hayabusa rules are designed solely for Windows event log analysis and have the following benefits:
+
+1. An extra `details` field to display additional information taken from only the useful fields in the log.
+2. They are all tested against sample logs and are known to work.
+ > Some sigma rules may not work as intended due to bugs in the conversion process, unsupported features, or differences in implementation (such as in regular expressions).
+
+**Limitations**: To our knowledge, hayabusa provides the greatest support for sigma rules out of any open source Windows event log analysis tool, however, there are still rules that are not supported:
+
+1. Rules that use regular expressions that do not work with the [Rust regex crate](https://docs.rs/regex/1.5.4/regex/)
+2. Aggregation expressions besides `count` in the [sigma rule specification](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/wiki/Specification).
+
+> Note: the limitation is in the sigma rule converter and not in hayabusa itself.
+
+## Detection rule tuning
+
+Like firewalls and IDSes, any signature-based tool will require some tuning to fit your environment so you may need to permanently or temporarily exclude certain rules.
+
+You can add a rule ID (Example: `4fe151c2-ecf9-4fae-95ae-b88ec9c2fca6`) to `rules/config/exclude_rules.txt` in order to ignore any rule that you do not need or cannot be used.
+
+You can also add a rule ID to `rules/config/noisy_rules.txt` in order to ignore the rule by default but still be able to use the rule with the `-n` or `--enable-noisy-rules` option.
+
+## Event ID filtering
+
+You can filter on event IDs by placing event ID numbers in `config/target_eventids.txt`.
+This will increase performance so it is recommended if you only need to search for certain IDs.
+
+We have provided a sample ID filter list at [`config/target_eventids_sample.txt`](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/blob/main/config/target_eventids_sample.txt) created from the `EventID` fields in all of the rules as well as IDs seen in actual results.
+
+Please use this list if you want the best performance but be aware that there is a slight possibility for missing events (false negatives).
+
+# Other Windows event log analyzers and related projects
+
+There is no "one tool to rule them all" and we have found that each has its own merits so we recommend checking out these other great tools and projects and seeing which ones you like.
+
+* [APT-Hunter](https://github.com/ahmedkhlief/APT-Hunter) - Attack detection tool written in Python.
+* [Awesome Event IDs](https://github.com/stuhli/awesome-event-ids) - Collection of Event ID resources useful for Digital Forensics and Incident Response
+* [Chainsaw](https://github.com/countercept/chainsaw) - A similar sigma-based attack detection tool written in Rust.
+* [DeepBlueCLI](https://github.com/sans-blue-team/DeepBlueCLI) - Attack detection tool written in Powershell by [Eric Conrad](https://twitter.com/eric_conrad).
+* [EventList](https://github.com/miriamxyra/EventList/) - Map security baseline event IDs to MITRE ATT&CK by [Miriam Wiesner](https://github.com/miriamxyra).
+* [EvtxECmd](https://github.com/EricZimmerman/evtx) - Evtx parser by [Eric Zimmerman](https://twitter.com/ericrzimmerman).
+* [EVTXtract](https://github.com/williballenthin/EVTXtract) - Recover EVTX log files from unallocated space and memory images.
+* [EvtxToElk](https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/evtxtoelk-a-python-module-to-load-windows-event-logs-into-elasticsearch/) - Python tool to send Evtx data to Elastic Stack.
+* [EVTX ATTACK Samples](https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES) - EVTX attack sample event log files by [SBousseaden](https://twitter.com/SBousseaden).
+* [EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack](https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack) - Another great repository of EVTX attack sample logs mapped to ATT&CK.
+* [EVTX parser](https://github.com/omerbenamram/evtx) - the Rust library we used written by [@OBenamram](https://twitter.com/obenamram).
+* [LogonTracer](https://github.com/JPCERTCC/LogonTracer) - A graphical interface to visualize logons to detect lateral movement by [JPCERTCC](https://twitter.com/jpcert_en).
+* [RustyBlue](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/RustyBlue) - Rust port of DeepBlueCLI by Yamato Security.
+* [Sigma](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma) - Community based generic SIEM rules.
+* [so-import-evtx](https://docs.securityonion.net/en/2.3/so-import-evtx.html) - Import evtx files into Security Onion.
+* [Timeline Explorer](https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md) - The best CSV timeline analyzer by [Eric Zimmerman](https://twitter.com/ericrzimmerman).
+* [Windows Event Log Analysis - Analyst Reference](https://www.forwarddefense.com/media/attachments/2021/05/15/windows-event-log-analyst-reference.pdf) - by Forward Defense's Steve Anson.
+* [WELA (Windows Event Log Analyzer)](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/WELA) - The swiff-army knife for Windows event logs by [Yamato Security](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/)
+* [Zircolite](https://github.com/wagga40/Zircolite) - Sigma-based attack detection tool written in Python.
+
+## Comparison to other similar tools that support sigma
+
+Please understand that it is not possible to do a perfect comparison as results will differ based on the target sample data, command-line options, rule tuning, etc...
+In our tests, we have found hayabusa to support the largest number of sigma rules out of all the tools while still maintaining very fast speeds and does not require a great amount of memory.
+
+The following benchmarks were taken on a Lenovo P51 based on approximately 500 evtx files (130MB) from our [sample-evtx repository](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-sample-evtx) at 2021/12/23 with Hayabusa version 1.0.0.
+
+| | Elapsed Time | Memory Usage | Unique Sigma Rules With Detections |
+| :-------: | :----------: | :----------------------------------------------------------: | :--------------------------------: |
+| Chainsaw | 7.5 seconds | 75 MB | 170 |
+| Hayabusa | 7.8 seconds | 340 MB | 267 |
+| Zircolite | 34 seconds | 380 MB (normally requires 3 times the size of the log files) | 237 |
+
+* With hayabusa rules enabled, it will detect around 300 unique alerts and events.
+* When tested on many event logs files totaling 7.5 GB, it finished in under 7 minutes and used around 1 GB of memory. The amount of memory consumed is based on the size of the results, not on the size of the target evtx files.
+* It is the only tool that provides a consolidated single CSV timeline to analysis in tools like [Timeline Explorer](https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md).
+
+# Community Documentation
+
+## English
+
+* 2022/01/24 [Graphing Hayabusa results in neo4j](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7sQqz2ek-ko) by Matthew Seyer ([@forensic_matt](https://twitter.com/forensic_matt))
+
+## Japanese
+
+* 2022/01/22 [Visualizing Hayabusa results in Elastic Stack](https://qiita.com/kzzzzo2/items/ead8ccc77b7609143749) by [@kzzzzo2](https://qiita.com/kzzzzo2)
+* 2021/12/31 [Intro to Hayabusa](https://itib.hatenablog.com/entry/2021/12/31/222946) by itiB ([@itiB_S144](https://twitter.com/itiB_S144))
+* 2021/12/27 [Hayabusa internals](https://kazuminkun.hatenablog.com/entry/2021/12/27/190535) by Kazuminn ([@k47_um1n](https://twitter.com/k47_um1n))
+
+# Contribution
+
+We would love any form of contribution. Pull requests, rule creation and sample evtx logs are the best but feature requests, notifying us of bugs, etc... are also very welcome.
+
+At the least, if you like our tool then please give us a star on Github and show your support!
+
+# Bug Submission
+
+Please submit any bugs you find [here.](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/issues/new?assignees=&labels=bug&template=bug_report.md&title=%5Bbug%5D)
+This project is currently actively maintained and we are happy to fix any bugs reported.
+
+# License
+
+Hayabusa is released under [GPLv3](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html) and all rules are released under the [Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.1](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/config/eventkey_alias.txt b/config/eventkey_alias.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 99a4b293..00000000
--- a/config/eventkey_alias.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
-AccessList,Event.EventData.AccessList
-AccessMask,Event.EventData.AccessMask
-Accesses,Event.EventData.Accesses
-AccountName,Event.EventData.AccountName
-Account_Name,Event.EventData.Account_Name
-AllowedToDelegateTo,Event.EventData.AllowedToDelegateTo
-AttributeLDAPDisplayName,Event.EventData.AttributeLDAPDisplayName
-AttributeValue,Event.EventData.AttributeValue
-AuditPolicyChanges,Event.EventData.AuditPolicyChanges
-AuditSourceName,Event.EventData.AuditSourceName
-AuthenticationPackageName,Event.EventData.AuthenticationPackageName
-CallTrace,Event.EventData.CallTrace
-CallerProcessName,Event.EventData.CallerProcessName
-Caller_Process_Name,Event.EventData.Caller_Process_Name
-CallingProcessName,Event.EventData.CallingProcessName
-CategoryName,Event.EventData.Category Name
-CertThumbprint,Event.EventData.CertThumbprint
-Channel,Event.System.Channel
-ClassName,Event.EventData.ClassName
-Client_Address,Event.EventData.Client_Address
-CommandLine,Event.EventData.CommandLine
-Company,Event.EventData.Company
-Computer,Event.System.Computer
-ComputerName,Event.System.Computer
-ContextInfo,Event.EventData.ContextInfo
-CurrentDirectory,Event.EventData.CurrentDirectory
-Description,Event.EventData.Description
-DestAddress,Event.EventData.DestAddress
-DestPort,Event.EventData.DestPort
-Destination,Event.EventData.Destination
-DestinationAddress,Event.EventData.DestinationAddress
-DestinationHostname,Event.EventData.DestinationHostname
-DestinationIp,Event.EventData.DestinationIp
-DestinationIsIpv6,Event.EventData.DestinationIsIpv6
-DestinationPort,Event.EventData.DestinationPort
-Details,Event.EventData.Details
-DetectionSource,Event.EventData.DetectionSource
-DetectionUser,Event.EventData.Detection User
-Device,Event.EventData.Device
-DeviceClassName,Event.EventData.DeviceClassName
-DeviceDescription,Event.EventData.DeviceDescription
-DeviceName,Event.EventData.DeviceName
-DomainName,Event.EventData.SubjectDomainName
-EngineVersion,Event.EventData.EngineVersion
-ErrorCode,Event.EventData.ErrorCode
-EventID,Event.System.EventID
-EventType,Event.EventData.EventType
-FailureCode,Event.EventData.FailureCode
-FilePath,Event.EventData.FilePath
-FileVersion,Event.EventData.FileVersion
-Filename,Event.EventData.Filename
-GrantedAccess,Event.EventData.GrantedAccess
-GroupName,Event.EventData.GroupName
-GroupSid,Event.EventData.GroupSid
-Hashes,Event.EventData.Hashes
-HiveName,Event.EventData.HiveName
-HostApplication,Event.EventData.HostApplication
-HostName,Event.EventData.HostName
-HostVersion,Event.EventData.HostVersion
-Image,Event.EventData.Image
-ImageLoaded,Event.EventData.ImageLoaded
-ImagePath,Event.EventData.ImagePath
-Imphash,Event.EventData.Hashes
-Initiated,Event.EventData.Initiated
-IntegrityLevel,Event.EventData.IntegrityLevel
-IpAddress,Event.EventData.IpAddress
-IpPort,Event.EventData.IpPort
-JobTitle,Event.EventData.name
-KeyLength,Event.EventData.KeyLength
-Keywords,Event.System.Keywords
-LDAPDisplayName,Event.EventData.LDAPDisplayName
-LayerRTID,Event.EventData.LayerRTID
-Level,Event.System.Level
-LogFileClearedSubjectUserName,Event.UserData.LogFileCleared.SubjectUserName
-LogonId,Event.EventData.LogonId
-LogonProcessName,Event.EventData.LogonProcessName
-LogonType,Event.EventData.LogonType
-Logon_Account,Event.EventData.Logon_Account
-MachineName,Event.EventData.MachineName
-MemberName,Event.EventData.MemberName
-MemberSid,Event.EventData.MemberSid
-Message,Event.EventData
-NewName,Event.EventData.NewName
-NewTemplateContent, Event.EventData.NewTemplateContent
-NewUacValue,Event.EventData.NewUacValue
-NewValue,Event.EventData.NewValue
-New_Value,Event.EventData.New Value
-ObjectClass,Event.EventData.ObjectClass
-ObjectName,Event.EventData.ObjectName
-ObjectServer,Event.EventData.ObjectServer
-ObjectType,Event.EventData.ObjectType
-ObjectValueName,Event.EventData.ObjectValueName
-OldUacValue,Event.EventData.OldUacValue
-Origin,Event.EventData.Origin
-OriginalFilename,Event.EventData.OriginalFileName
-ParentCommandLine,Event.EventData.ParentCommandLine
-ParentImage,Event.EventData.ParentImage
-ParentIntegrityLevel,Event.EventData.ParentIntegrityLevel
-ParentProcessName,Event.EventData.ParentProcessName
-ParentUser,Event.EventData.ParentUser
-PasswordLastSet,Event.EventData.PasswordLastSet
-Path,Event.EventData.Path
-Payload,Event.EventData.Payload
-PipeName,Event.EventData.PipeName
-PreAuthType,Event.EventData.PreAuthType
-PrivilegeList,Event.EventData.PrivilegeList
-ProcessCommandLine,Event.EventData.ProcessCommandLine
-ProcessId,Event.EventData.ProcessId
-ProcessName,Event.EventData.ProcessName
-Product,Event.EventData.Product
-Properties,Event.EventData.Properties
-ProviderName,Event.System.Provider_Name
-Provider_Name,Event.System.Provider_Name
-QNAME,Event.EventData.QNAME
-QueryName,Event.EventData.QueryName
-QueryResults,Event.EventData.QueryResults
-QueryStatus,Event.EventData.QueryStatus
-RelativeTargetName,Event.EventData.RelativeTargetName
-RuleName,Event.EventData.RuleName
-SAMAccountName,Event.EventData.SamAccountName
-ScriptBlockText,Event.EventData.ScriptBlockText
-SearchFilter,Event.System.SearchFilter
-ServerName,Event.System.ServerName
-Service,Event.EventData.Service
-ServiceFileName,Event.EventData.ServiceFileName
-ServiceName,Event.EventData.ServiceName
-ServicePrincipalNames,Event.EventData.ServicePrincipalNames
-ServiceStartType,Event.EventData.ServiceStartType
-ServiceType,Event.EventData.ServiceType
-SeverityName,Event.EventData.Severity Name
-ShareLocalPath,Event.EventData.ShareLocalPath
-ShareName,Event.EventData.ShareName
-SidHistory,Event.EventData.SidHistory
-Signature,Event.EventData.Signature
-Signed,Event.EventData.Signed
-Source,Event.System.Provider_Name
-SourceAddress,Event.EventData.SourceAddress
-SourceImage,Event.EventData.SourceImage
-SourceNetworkAddress,Event.EventData.SourceNetworkAddress
-SourcePort,Event.EventData.SourcePort
-Source_Name,Event.EventData.Source Name
-Source_Network_Address,Event.EventData.Source_Network_Address
-Source_WorkStation,Event.EventData.Source_WorkStation
-StartAddress,Event.EventData.StartAddress
-StartFunction,Event.EventData.StartFunction
-StartModule,Event.EventData.StartModule
-State,Event.EventData.State
-Status,Event.EventData.Status
-SubStatus,Event.EventData.SubStatus
-SubjectDomainName,Event.EventData.SubjectDomainName
-SubjectLogonId,Event.EventData.SubjectLogonId
-SubjectUserName,Event.EventData.SubjectUserName
-SubjectUserSid,Event.EventData.SubjectUserSid
-TargetDomainName,Event.EventData.TargetDomainName
-TargetFilename,Event.EventData.TargetFilename
-TargetInfo,Event.EventData.TargetInfo
-TargetImage,Event.EventData.TargetImage
-TargetLogonId,Event.EventData.TargetLogonId
-TargetName,Event.EventData.TargetServerName
-TargetObject,Event.EventData.TargetObject
-TargetProcessAddress,Event.EventData.TargetProcessAddress
-TargetServerName,Event.EventData.TargetServerName
-TargetSid,Event.EventData.TargetSid
-TargetUserName,Event.EventData.TargetUserName
-TaskName,Event.EventData.TaskName
-TemplateContent,Event.EventData.TemplateContent
-ThreatName,Event.EventData.Threat Name
-TicketEncryptionType,Event.EventData.TicketEncryptionType
-TicketOptions,Event.EventData.TicketOptions
-Url,Event.EventData.url
-User,Event.EventData.User
-UserName,Event.EventData.UserName
-Value, Event.EventData.Value
-WindowsDefenderProcessName,Event.EventData.Process Name
-Workstation,Event.EventData.Workstation
-WorkstationName,Event.EventData.WorkstationName
-param1,Event.EventData.param1
-param2,Event.EventData.param2
-provider_Name,Event.EventData.Provider_Name
-service,Event.EventData.Service
-sha1,Event.EventData.Hashes_sha1
diff --git a/config/exclude-rules-full.txt b/config/exclude-rules-full.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 8191c667..00000000
--- a/config/exclude-rules-full.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-4fe151c2-ecf9-4fae-95ae-b88ec9c2fca6 # ./rules/sigma/other/msexchange/win_exchange_transportagent.yml
-c92f1896-d1d2-43c3-92d5-7a5b35c217bb # ./rules/sigma/other/msexchange/win_exchange_cve_2021_42321.yml
-9f7aa113-9da6-4a8d-907c-5f1a4b908299 # ./rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_syncappvpublishingserver_exe.yml
-
-# Replaced by hayabusa rules
-c265cf08-3f99-46c1-8d59-328247057d57 # ./rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_added_to_local_administrators.yml
-66b6be3d-55d0-4f47-9855-d69df21740ea # ./rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_creation.yml
-7b449a5e-1db5-4dd0-a2dc-4e3a67282538 # ./rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_hidden_user_creation.yml
-b20f6158-9438-41be-83da-a5a16ac90c2b # ./rules/sigma/other/taskscheduler/win_rare_schtask_creation.yml
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/config/exclude-rules.txt b/config/exclude-rules.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 7e948104..00000000
--- a/config/exclude-rules.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-4fe151c2-ecf9-4fae-95ae-b88ec9c2fca6
-c92f1896-d1d2-43c3-92d5-7a5b35c217bb
-7b449a5e-1db5-4dd0-a2dc-4e3a67282538
-c265cf08-3f99-46c1-8d59-328247057d57
-66b6be3d-55d0-4f47-9855-d69df21740ea
-9f7aa113-9da6-4a8d-907c-5f1a4b908299
-b20f6158-9438-41be-83da-a5a16ac90c2b
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/config/level_color.txt b/config/level_color.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b01047b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/config/level_color.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+level,colorcode
+critical,ff0000
+high,ffff00
+medium,00ffff
+low,00ff00
+
diff --git a/config/noisy-rules-full.txt b/config/noisy-rules-full.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index abadf989..00000000
--- a/config/noisy-rules-full.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-0f06a3a5-6a09-413f-8743-e6cf35561297 # ./rules/sigma/wmi_event/sysmon_wmi_event_subscription.yml
-b0d77106-7bb0-41fe-bd94-d1752164d066 # ./rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rare_schtasks_creations.yml
-66bfef30-22a5-4fcd-ad44-8d81e60922ae # ./rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_rare_service_installs.yml
-e98374a6-e2d9-4076-9b5c-11bdb2569995 # ./rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml
-6309ffc4-8fa2-47cf-96b8-a2f72e58e538 # ./rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source2.yml
-61ab5496-748e-4818-a92f-de78e20fe7f1 # ./rules/sigma/process_creation/win_multiple_suspicious_cli.yml
-add2ef8d-dc91-4002-9e7e-f2702369f53a # ./rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_remote_logons_single_source.yml
-196a29c2-e378-48d8-ba07-8a9e61f7fab9 # ./rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_explicit_credentials.yml
-72124974-a68b-4366-b990-d30e0b2a190d # ./rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_metasploit_authentication.yml
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/config/noisy-rules.txt b/config/noisy-rules.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 2ead055d..00000000
--- a/config/noisy-rules.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-0f06a3a5-6a09-413f-8743-e6cf35561297
-b0d77106-7bb0-41fe-bd94-d1752164d066
-66bfef30-22a5-4fcd-ad44-8d81e60922ae
-e98374a6-e2d9-4076-9b5c-11bdb2569995
-6309ffc4-8fa2-47cf-96b8-a2f72e58e538
-61ab5496-748e-4818-a92f-de78e20fe7f1
-add2ef8d-dc91-4002-9e7e-f2702369f53a
-196a29c2-e378-48d8-ba07-8a9e61f7fab9
-72124974-a68b-4366-b990-d30e0b2a190d
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/config/regex/allowlist_legitimate_services.txt b/config/regex/allowlist_legitimate_services.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 4a160ef0..00000000
--- a/config/regex/allowlist_legitimate_services.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-^"C:\\Program Files\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome\.exe"
-^"C:\\Program Files\\Google\\Update\\GoogleUpdate\.exe"
diff --git a/config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt b/config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index a643b343..00000000
--- a/config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-^cmd.exe /c echo [a-z]{6} > \\\\.\\pipe\\[a-z]{6}$
-^%SYSTEMROOT%\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.exe$
-powershell.*FromBase64String.*IO.Compression.GzipStream
-DownloadString\(.http
-mimikatz
-Invoke-Mimikatz.ps
-PowerSploit.*ps1
-User-Agent
-[a-zA-Z0-9/+=]{500}
-powershell.exe.*Hidden.*Enc
-\\csc\.exe
-\\csc\.exe.*\\Appdata\\Local\\Temp\\[a-z0-9]{8}\.cmdline
-# Generic cvtres.exe alert
-\\cvtres\.exe.*
-\\cvtres\.exe.*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\[A-Z0-9]{7}\.tmp
-^[a-zA-Z]{22}$
-^[a-zA-Z]{16}$
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/contributors.txt b/contributors.txt
index 7b557d8d..1aae846b 100644
--- a/contributors.txt
+++ b/contributors.txt
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
Hayabusa was possible thanks to the following people (in alphabetical order):
Akira Nishikawa (@nishikawaakira): Previous lead developer, core hayabusa rule support, etc...
+DustInDark (@hitenkoku): Core developer (too many contributions to list up)
Garigariganzy (@garigariganzy31): Developer, event ID statistics implementation, etc...
ItiB (@itiB_S144) : Core developer, sigmac hayabusa backend, rule creation, etc...
James Takai / hachiyone(@hach1yon): Current lead developer, tokio multi-threading, sigma aggregation logic, sigmac backend, rule creation, sigma count implementation etc…
-Kazuminn (@k47_um1n): Developer
+Kazuminn (@k47_um1n): Core Developer
Tsubokku (@ytsuboi0322): Translations
Yusuke Matsui (@apt773): AD hacking working group leader, rule testing, documentation, research, support, etc...
Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity, Yamato Security Founder): Project leader, tool and concept design, rule creation and tuning, etc…
diff --git a/doc/AboutRuleCreation-English.md b/doc/AboutRuleCreation-English.md
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-## About rule files
-Hayabusa detection rules are written in [YAML](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YAML) format.
-They are a subset of sigma rules with some additions. We are trying to make them as close to sigma rules as possible so that it is easy to convert Hayabusa rules back to sigma to give back to the community.
-Hayabusa rules can express complex detection rules by combining not only simple string matching but also regular expressions, `AND`, `OR`, and other conditions.
-In this section, we will explain how to write Hayabusa detection rules.
-
-# Rule file format
-Example:
-
-```yaml
-#Author section
-author: Eric Conrad, Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-#Alert section
-title: User added to local Administrators group
-title_jp: ユーザがローカル管理者グループに追加された
-details: 'User: %SubjectUserName% : Group: %TargetUserName% : LogonID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %SubjectUserName% : グループ名: %TargetUserName% : ログオンID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-description: A user was added to the local Administrators group.
-description_jp: ユーザがローカル管理者グループに追加された。
-
-#Rule section
-id: 611e2e76-a28f-4255-812c-eb8836b2f5bb
-level: high
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4732
- TargetUserName: Administrators
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - system administrator
-tags:
- - attack.persistence
- - attack.t1098
-references:
- - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4732
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account manipulation/ID4732-User added to local admin groups.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
-```
-
-> ## Author section
-* **author [required]**: Name of the author(s).
-* **contributor** [optional]: Name of any contributor(s) (anyone who made any minor corrections).
-* **date [required]**: Date the rule was made.
-* **modified** [optional]: Date the rule was updated.
-
-> ## Alert section
-* **title [required]**: Rule file title. This will also be the name of the alert that gets displayed so the briefer the better. (Should not be longer than 85 characters.)
-* **title_jp** [optional]: The title in Japanese.
-* details [optional]: The details of the alert that gets displayed. Please output any fields in the Windows event log that are useful for analysis. Fields are seperated by `" : "` (two spaces on both sides). Field placeholders are enclosed with a `%` (Example: `%MemberName%`) and need to be defined in `config\eventkey_alias.txt`. (Explained below.)
-* **details_jp** [optional]: The details message in Japanese.
-* **description** [optional]: A description of the rule. This does not get displayed so you can make this long and detailed.
-* **description_jp** [optional]: The description in Japanese.
-
-> ## Rule section
-* **id [required]**: A randomly generated version 4 UUID used to uniquely identify the rule. You can generate one [here](https://www.uuidgenerator.net/version4).
-* **level [required]**: Severity level based on [sigma's definition](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/wiki/Specification). Please write one of the following: `informational`,`low`,`medium`,`high`,`critical`
-* **status[required]**: `stable` for tested rules and `testing` for rules that need to be tested.
-* **detection [required]**: The detection logic goes here. (Explained below.)
-* **falsepositives [required]**: The possibilities for false positives. For example: `system administrator`, `normal user usage`, `normal system usage`, `legacy application`, `security team`, `none`. If it is unknown, please write `unknown`.
-* **tags** [optional]: If the technique is a [LOLBINS/LOLBAS](https://lolbas-project.github.io/) technique, please add the `lolbas` tag. If the alert can be mapped to a technique in the [MITRE ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) framework, please add the tactic ID (Example: `attack.t1098`) and any applicable tactics below:
- * `attack.impact` -> Impact
- * `attack.initial_access` -> Initial Access
- * `attack.execution` -> Execution
- * `attack.lateral_movement` -> Lateral Movement
- * `attack.persistence` -> Persistence
- * `attack.privilege_escalation` -> Privilege Escalation
- * `attack.reconnaissance` -> Reconnaissance
- * `attack.collection` -> Collection
- * `attack.command_and_control` -> Command and Control
- * `attack.credential_access` -> Credential Access
- * `attack.defense_evasion` -> Defense Evasion
- * `attack.discovery` -> Discovery
- * `attack.exfiltration` -> Exfiltration
- * `attack.resource_development` -> Resource Development
-* **references** [optional]: Any links to references.
-* **sample-evtx [required]**: File path or URL to an event log file that this rule will detect.
-* **logsource [required]**: The source of where the log comes from. Please specify one of the following:
- * `default`: For logs that are turned on in Windows by default.
- * `non-default`: For logs that need to be turned on through group policy, security baselines, etc...
- * `sysmon`: Logs that require sysmon to be installed.
-* **non-default-setting** [optional]: Explanation of how to turn on the log setting for `non-default` log sources.
-* **ruletype [required]**: `Hayabusa` for hayabusa rules. Rules automatically converted from sigma Windows rules will be `Sigma`.
-
-# Detection field
-## Selection fundamentals
-First, the fundamentals of how to create a selection rule will be explained.
-
-### How to write AND and OR logic
-To write AND logic, we use nested dictionaries.
-The detection rule below defines that **both conditions** have to be true in order for the rule to match.
-* EventID has to exactly be `7040`.
-* **AND**
-* Channel has to exactly be `System`.
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Event.System.EventID: 7040
- Event.System.Channel: System
- condition: selection
-```
-
-To write OR logic, we use lists (Dictionaries that start with `- `).
-In the detection rule below, **either one** of the conditions will result in the rule being triggered.
-* EventID has to exactly be `7040`.
-* **OR**
-* Channel has to exactly be `System`.
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- - Event.System.EventID: 7040
- - Event.System.Channel: System
- condition: selection
-```
-
-We can also combine `AND` and `OR` logic as shown below.
-In this case, the rule matches when the following two conditions are both true.
-* EventID is either exactly `7040` **OR** `7041`.
-* **AND**
-* Channel is exactly `System`.
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Event.System.EventID:
- - 7040
- - 7041
- Event.System.Channel: System
- condition: selection
-```
-
-### Eventkeys
-The following is an excerpt of a Windows event log, formatted in the original XML. The `Event.System.Channel` field in the rule file example above refers to the original XML tag: `System`. Nested XML tags are replaced by tag names seperated by dots (`.`). In hayabusa rules, these field strings connected together with dots are refered to as `eventkeys`.
-
-```xml
-
-
- 7040
- System
-
-
- Background Intelligent Transfer Service
- auto start
-
-
-```
-
-#### Eventkey Aliases
-Long eventkeys with many `.` seperations are common, so hayabusa will use aliases to make them easier to work with. Aliases are defined in the `config\eventkey_alias.txt` file. This file is a CSV file made up of `alias` and `event_key` mappings. You can rewrite the rule above as shown below with aliases making the rule easier to read.
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: System
- EventID: 7040
- condition: selection
-```
-
-#### Caution: Undefined Eventkey Aliases
-Not all eventkey aliases are defined in `config\eventkey_alias.txt`. If you are not getting the correct data in the `details`(Alert details) message, and instead are getting results like `%EventID%` or if the selection in your detection logic is not working properly, then you need to update `config\eventkey_alias.txt` with a new alias.
-
-### How to use XML attributes in conditions
-XML elements may have attributes set by adding a space to the element. For example, `Name` in `Provider Name` below is an XML attribute of the `Provider` element.
-
-```xml
-
-
-
- 4672
- 607469
- Security
-
-
-
-```
-To specify XML attributes in an eventkey, use the format `{eventkey}_attributes.{attribute_name}`. For example, to specify the `Name` attribute of the `Provider` element in a rule file, it would look like this:
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4672
- Event.System.Provider_attributes.Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing'
- condition: selection
-```
-
-### grep search
-Hayabusa can perform grep searches in Windows event log files by not specifying any eventkeys.
-
-To do a grep search, specify the detection as shown below. In this case, if the strings `mimikatz` or `metasploit` are included in the Windows Event log, it will match. It is also possible to specify wildcards.
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- - mimikatz
- - metasploit
-```
-
-> Note: Hayabusa internally converts Windows event log data to JSON format before processing the data so it is not possible to match on XML tags.
-
-### EventData
-Windows event logs are divided into two parts: the `System` part where the fundamental data (Event ID, Timestamp, Record ID, Log name (Channel)) is written, and the `EventData` part where arbitrary data is written depending on the Event ID. The problem is that the names of the tags nested in EventData are all called `Data` so the eventkeys described so far cannot distinguish between `SubjectUserSid` and `SubjectUserName`.
-
-```xml
-
-
- 5379
-
- 607469
- Security
-
-
-
- S-1-1-11-1111111111-111111111-1111111111-1111
- hayabusa
- DESKTOP-HAYABUSA
- 0x11111111
-
-
-```
-
-To deal with this problem, you can specify the value assigned in `Data Name`. For example, if you want to use `SubjectUserName` and `SubjectDomainName` in the EventData as a condition of a rule, you can describe it as follows:
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: System
- EventID: 7040
- Event.EventData.SubjectUserName: hayabusa
- Event.EventData.SubjectDomainName: DESKTOP-HAYBUSA
- condition: selection
-```
-
-### Abnormal patterns in EventData
-Some of the tags nested in `EventData` do not have a `Name` attribute.
-
-```xml
-
-
- 5379
- Security
-
-
-
- Available
- None
- NewEngineState=Available PreviousEngineState=None SequenceNumber=9 HostName=ConsoleHost HostVersion=2.0 HostId=5cbb33bf-acf7-47cc-9242-141cd0ba9f0c EngineVersion=2.0 RunspaceId=c6e94dca-0daf-418c-860a-f751a9f2cbe1 PipelineId= CommandName= CommandType= ScriptName= CommandPath= CommandLine=
-
-
-```
-
-To detect an event log like the one above, you can specify an eventkey named `EventData`. In this case, the condition will match as long as any one of the nested tags without a `Name` attribute matches.
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 5379
- EventData: None
- condition: selection
-```
-
-## Pipes
-A pipe can be used with eventkeys as shown below for matching strings. All of the conditions we have described so far use exact matches, but by using pipes, you can describe more flexible detection rules. In the following example, if the value of `EventData` matches the regular expression `[\s\S]*EngineVersion=2\.0[\s\S]*`, it will match the condition.
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
- EventID: 400
- EventData|re: '[\s\S]*EngineVersion=2\.0[\s\S]*'
- condition: selection
-```
-
-This is a list of what you can specify after the pipe. At the moment, hayabusa does not support chaining multiple pipes together.
-* startswith: Checks the string from the beginning
-* endswith: Checks the end of the string
-* contains: Checks if a word is contained in the data
-* re: Use regular expressions. (We are using the regex crate so please out the documentation at https://docs.rs/regex/1.5.4/regex/ to know how to write correct regular expressions.)
- > Caution: Some sigma rules that use regular expressions may fail to detect due to differences in how rust uses regular expressions.
-
-## Wildcards
-Wildcards can be used in eventkeys. In the example below, if `ProcessCommandLine` starts with the string "malware", the rule will match.
-The specification is fundamentally the same as sigma rule wildcards.
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4688
- ProcessCommandLine: malware*
- condition: selection
-```
-
-The following two wildcards can be used.
-* `*`: Matches any string of zero or more characters. (Internally it is converted to the regular expression `.*`)
-* `?`: Matches any single character. (Internally converted to the regular expression `.`)
-
-About escaping wildcards:
-* Wildcards (`*` and `?`) can be escaped by using a backslash: `\*`, `\?`.
-* If you want to use a backslash right before a wildcard then write `\\*` or `\\?`.
-* Escaping is not required if you are using backslashes by themselves.
-
-## Nesting keywords inside eventkeys
-Eventkeys can be nested with specific keywords.
-In the example below, the rule will match if the following are true:
-* `ServiceName` is called `malicious-service` or contains a regular expression in `./config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt`.
-* `ImagePath` has a minimum of 1000 characters.
-* `ImagePath` does not have any matches in the `allowlist`.
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: System
- EventID: 7045
- ServiceName:
- - value: malicious-service
- - regexes: ./config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt
- ImagePath:
- min_length: 1000
- allowlist: ./config/regex/allowlist_legitimate_services.txt
- condition: selection
-```
-
-Currently, the following keywords can be specified:
-* `value`: matches by string (wildcards and pipes can also be specified).
-* `min_length`: matches when the number of characters is greater than or equal to the specified number.
-* `regexes`: matches if one of the regular expressions in the file that you specify in this field matches.
-* `allowlist`: rule will be skipped if there is any match found in the list of regular expressions in the file that you specify in this field.
-
-### regexes and allowlist keywords
-Hayabusa has two built-in regular expression files used for the `.\rules\hayabusa\default\alerts\System\7045_CreateOrModiftySystemProcess-WindowsService_MaliciousServiceInstalled.yml` file:
-* `./config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt`: to detect suspicious service names
-* `./config/regex/allowlist_legitimate_services.txt`: to allow legitimate services
-
-Files defined in `regexes` and `allowlist` can be edited to change the behavior of all rules that reference them without having to change any rule file itself.
-
-You can also use different detectlist and allowlist textfiles that you create.
-Please refer to the built-in `./config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt` and `./config/regex/allowlist_legitimate_services.txt` when creating your own.
-
-## condition
-With the notation we explained above, you can express `AND` and `OR` logic but it will be confusing if you are trying to define complex logic.
-When you want to make more complex rules, you should use the `condition` keyword as shown below.
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_3:
- DestinationPort:
- - '4444'
- - '666'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image: '*\Program Files*'
- SELECTION_5:
- DestinationIp:
- - 10.*
- - 192.168.*
- - 172.16.*
- - 127.*
- SELECTION_6:
- DestinationIsIpv6: 'false'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not ((SELECTION_4 or (SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6))))
-```
-
-The following expressions can be used for `condition`.
-* `{expression1} and {expression2}`: Require both {expression1} AND {expression2}
-* `{expression1} or {expression2}`: Require either {expression1} OR {expression2}
-* `not {expression}`: Reverse the logic of {expression}
-* `( {expression} )`: Set precedance of {expression}. It follows the same precedance logic as in mathematics.
-
-In the above example, selection names such as `SELECTION_1`, `SELECTION_2`, etc... are used but they can be named anything as long as they only contain the following characters: `a-z A-Z 0-9 _`
-> However, please use the standard convention of `selection_1`, `selection_2`, `filter_1`, `filter_2`, etc... to make things easy to read whenever possible.
-
-## not logic
-Many rules will result in false positives so it is very common to have a selection for signatures to search for but also a filter selection to not alert on false positives.
-For example:
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4673
- filter:
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\audiodg.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\SettingSyncHost.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe
- - ProcessName|startswith: C:\Program Files
- - SubjectUserName: LOCAL SERVICE
- condition: selection and not filter
-```
-
-## Aggregation conditions (Count rules)
-### Basics
-The `condition` keyword described above implements not only `AND` and `OR` logic, but is also able to count or "aggregate" events.
-This function is called the "aggregation condition" and is specified by connecting a condition with a pipe.
-In this password spray detection example below, a conditional expression is used to determine if there are 5 or more `TargetUserName` values from one source `IpAddress` within a timeframe of 5 minutes.
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4648
- condition: selection | count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress > 5
- timeframe: 5m
-```
-
-Aggregation conditions can be defined in the following format:
-* `count() {operator} {number}`: For log events that match the first condition before the pipe, the condition will match if the number of matched logs satisfies the condition expression specified by `{operator}` and `{number}`.
-
-`{operator}` can be one of the following:
-* `==`: If the value is equal to the specified value, it is treated as matching the condition.
-* `>=`: If the value is greater than or equal to the specified value, the condition is considered to have been met.
-* `>`: If the value is greater than the specified value, the condition is considered to have been met.
-* `<=`: If the value is less than or equal to the specified value, the condition is considered to have been met.
-* `<`: If the value is less than the specified value, it will be treated as if the condition is met.
-
-`{number}` must be a number.
-
-`timeframe` can be defined in the following:
-* `15s`: 15 seconds
-* `30m`: 30 minutes
-* `12h`: 12 hours
-* `7d`: 7 days
-* `3M`: 3 months
-
-
-### Four patterns for aggregation conditions:
-1. No count argument or `by` keyword. Example: `selection | count() > 10`
- > If `selection` matches more than 10 times within the timeframe, the condition will match.
-2. No count argument but there is a `by` keyword. Example: `selection | count() by IpAddress > 10`
- > `selection` will have to be true more than 10 times for the **same** `IpAddress`.
-3. There is a count argument but no `by` keyword. Example: `selection | count(TargetUserName) > 10`
- > If `selection` matches and `TargetUserName` is **different** more than 10 times within the timeframe, the condition will match.
-4. There is both a count argument and `by` keyword. Example: `selection | count(Users) by IpAddress > 10`
- > For the **same** `IpAddress`, there will need to be more than 10 **different** `TargetUserName` in order for the condition to match.
-
-### Pattern 1 example:
-This is the most basic pattern: `count() {operator} {number}`. The rule below will match if `selection` happens 3 or more times.
-
-
-
-### Pattern 2 example:
-`count() by {eventkey} {operator} {number}`: Log events that match the `condition` before the pipe are grouped by the **same** `{eventkey}`. If the number of matched events for each grouping satisfies the condition specified by `{operator}` and `{number}`, then the condition will match.
-
-
-
-### Pattern 3 example:
-`count({eventkey}) {operator} {number}`: Counts how many **different** values of `{eventkey}` exist in the log event that match the condition before the condition pipe. If the number satisfies the conditional expression specified in `{operator}` and `{number}`, the condition is considered to have been met.
-
-
-
-### Pattern 4 example:
-`count({eventkey_1}) by {eventkey_2} {operator} {number}`: The logs that match the condition before the condition pipe are grouped by the **same** `{eventkey_2}`, and the number of **different** values of `{eventkey_1}` in each group is counted. If the values counted for each grouping satisfy the conditional expression specified by `{operator}` and `{number}`, the condition will match.
-
-
-
-### Count rule output:
-The details output for count rules is fixed and will print the original count condition in `[condition]` followed by the recorded eventkeys in `[result]`.
-
-In the example below, a list of `TargetUserName` usernames that were being bruteforced followed by the source `IpAddress`:
-```
-[condition] count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress >= 5 in timeframe [result] count:41 TargetUserName:jorchilles/jlake/cspizor/lpesce/bgalbraith/jkulikowski/baker/eskoudis/dpendolino/sarmstrong/lschifano/drook/rbowes/ebooth/melliott/econrad/sanson/dmashburn/bking/mdouglas/cragoso/psmith/bhostetler/zmathis/thessman/kperryman/cmoody/cdavis/cfleener/gsalinas/wstrzelec/jwright/edygert/ssims/jleytevidal/celgee/Administrator/mtoussain/smisenar/tbennett/bgreenwood IpAddress:10.10.2.22 timeframe:5m
-```
-The timestamp of the alert will be the time from the first event detected.
-
-# Rule creation advice
-1. **When possible, always specify `Channel` and `EventID` name.** In the future, we may filter on channel names and event IDs so your rule may be ignored if this is not set.
-
-2. **Please do not use multiple `selection` or `filter` fields and excessive grouping when it is not needed.** For example:
-
-### Instead of:
-```yaml
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Channnel: Security
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4625
- SELECTION_3:
- LogonType: 3
- FILTER_1:
- SubStatus: "0xc0000064" #Non-existent user
- FILTER_2:
- SubStatus: "0xc000006a" #Wrong password
- condition: SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and not (FILTER_1 or FILTER_2)
-```
-
-### Please do this:
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4625
- LogonType: 3
- filter:
- - SubStatus: "0xc0000064" #Non-existent user
- - SubStatus: "0xc000006a" #Wrong password
- condition: selection and not filter
-```
-
-3. **When you need multiple sections, please name the first section with channel and event ID information in the `section_basic_info` section and other selections with meaningful names after `section_` and `filter_`, or use the notation `section_1`, `filter_1`, etc... Also, please write comments to explain anything difficult to understand.**
-
-### Instead of:
-```yaml
-detection:
- Takoyaki:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4648
- Naruto:
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- IpAddress: "-"
- Sushi:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetInfo|endswith: "$"
- Godzilla:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- Ninja:
- TargetUserName|re: "(DWM|UMFD)-([0-9]|1[0-2])$"
- IpAddress: "-"
- Daisuki:
- - ProcessName|endswith: "powershell.exe"
- - ProcessName|endswith: "WMIC.exe"
- condition: Takoyaki and Daisuki and not (Naruto and not Godzilla) and not Ninja and not Sushi
-```
-
-### Please do this:
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection_1:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4648
- selection_2:
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- IpAddress: "-"
- filter_1: #Filter system noise
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetInfo|endswith: "$"
- filter_2:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- filter_3:
- TargetUserName|re: "(DWM|UMFD)-([0-9]|1[0-2])$" #Filter out default Desktop Windows Manager and User Mode Driver Framework accounts
- IpAddress: "-" #Don't filter if the IP address is remote to catch attackers who created backdoor accounts that look like DWM-12, etc..
- selection_4:
- - ProcessName|endswith: "powershell.exe"
- - ProcessName|endswith: "WMIC.exe"
- condition: selection_1 and selection_4 and not (selection_2 and not filter_2) and not filter_3 and not filter_1
-```
-
-### Or ideally something like this:
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection_BasicInfo:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4648
- selection_TargetUserIsComputerAccount:
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- IpAddress: "-"
- filter_UsersAndTargetServerAreComputerAccounts: #Filter system noise
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetInfo|endswith: "$"
- filter_SubjectUserIsComputerAccount:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- filter_SystemAccounts:
- TargetUserName|re: "(DWM|UMFD)-([0-9]|1[0-2])$" #Filter out default Desktop Windows Manager and User Mode Driver Framework accounts
- IpAddress: "-" #Don't filter if the IP address is remote to catch attackers who created backdoor accounts that look like DWM-12, etc..
- selection_SuspiciousProcess:
- - ProcessName|endswith: "powershell.exe"
- - ProcessName|endswith: "WMIC.exe"
- condition: selection_basic and selection_SuspiciousProcess and not (selection_TargetUserIsComputerAccount
- and not filter_SubjectUserIsComputerAccount) and not filter_SystemAccounts and not filter_UsersAndTargetServerAreComputerAccounts
-```
-
-# Converting sigma rules to hayabusa format
-We have created a backend for sigmac to convert rules from sigma to hayabusa format [here](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/blob/main/tools/sigmac/).
-
-The documentation for how to use it is [here](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/blob/main/tools/sigmac/README-English.md).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/doc/AboutRuleCreation-Japanese.md b/doc/AboutRuleCreation-Japanese.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 570caf6d..00000000
--- a/doc/AboutRuleCreation-Japanese.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,592 +0,0 @@
-# ルールファイルについて
-Hayabusaの検知ルールは[YAML](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YAML) 形式で記述されています。
-単純な文字列のマッチングだけでなく、正規表現や`AND`、`OR`などの条件を組み合わせて複雑な検知ルールを表現することができます。
-本節ではHayabusaの検知ルールの書き方について説明します。
-
-## ルールファイル形式
-記述例:
-
-```yaml
-#Author section
-author: Eric Conrad, Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-#Alert section
-title: User added to local Administrators group
-title_jp: ユーザがローカル管理者グループに追加された
-details: 'User: %SubjectUserName% : Group: %TargetUserName% : LogonID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %SubjectUserName% : グループ名: %TargetUserName% : ログオンID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-description: A user was added to the local Administrators group.
-description_jp: ユーザがローカル管理者グループに追加された。
-
-#Rule section
-id: 611e2e76-a28f-4255-812c-eb8836b2f5bb
-level: high
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4732
- TargetUserName: Administrators
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - system administrator
-tags:
- - attack.persistence
- - attack.t1098
-references:
- - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4732
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account manipulation/ID4732-User added to local admin groups.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
-```
-
-> ## 著者名欄
-* **author [必須]**: 著者名(複数可)。
-* **contributor** [オプション]: 寄稿者の名前(細かい修正をした人)。
-* **date [必須]**: ルールが作成された日付。
-* **modified** [オプション]: ルールが更新された日付。
-
-> ## アラートセクション
-* **title [必須]**: ルールファイルのタイトル。これは表示されるアラートの名前にもなるので、簡潔であるほどよいです。(85文字以下でなければなりません。)
-* **title_jp** [オプション]: 日本語のタイトルです。
-* **details** [オプション]: 表示されるアラートの詳細です。Windowsイベントログの中で解析に有効なフィールドがあれば出力してください。フィールドは `" : "` で区切られます(両側ともスペース2つ)。フィールドのプレースホルダは `%` で囲まれ (例: `%MemberName%`) 、`config_eventkey_alias.txt` で定義する必要があります。(以下で説明します)
-* **details_jp** [オプション]: 日本語の出力メッセージ。
-* **description** [オプション]: ルールの説明。これは表示されないので、長く詳細に記述することができます。
-* **description_jp** [オプション]: 日本語の説明文です。
-
-> ## ルールセクション
-* **id [必須]**: ルールを一意に識別するために使用される、ランダムに生成されたバージョン4のUUIDです。 [ここ](https://www.uuidgenerator.net/version4) で生成することができます。
-* **level [必須]**: [sigmaルールの定義](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/wiki/Specification)に基づく重要度レベル。 以下のいずれかを記述してください。 `informational`,`low`,`medium`,`high`,`critical`
-* **status[必須]**: テスト済みのルールには `stable` を、テストが必要なルールには `testing` を指定します。
-* **detection [必須]**: 検知ロジックはここに入ります。(以下で説明します。)
-* **falsepositives [必須]**: 誤検知の可能性について記載を行います。例: `system administrator`, `normal user usage`, `normal system usage`, `legacy application`, `security team`, `none`。 不明な場合は `unknown` と記述してください。
-* **tags** [オプション]: [LOLBINS/LOLBAS](https://lolbas-project.github.io/)という手法を利用している場合、`lolbas` タグを追加してください。アラートを[MITRE ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/) フレームワークにマッピングできる場合は、以下のリストから該当するものを追加してください。戦術ID(例:`attack.t1098`)を指定することも可能です。
- * `attack.impact` -> Impact
- * `attack.initial_access` -> Initial Access
- * `attack.execution` -> Execution
- * `attack.lateral_movement` -> Lateral Movement
- * `attack.persistence` -> Persistence
- * `attack.privilege_escalation` -> Privilege Escalation
- * `attack.reconnaissance` -> Reconnaissance
- * `attack.collection` -> Collection
- * `attack.command_and_control` -> Command and Control
- * `attack.credential_access` -> Credential Access
- * `attack.defense_evasion` -> Defense Evasion
- * `attack.discovery` -> Discovery
- * `attack.exfiltration` -> Exfiltration
- * `attack.resource_development` -> Resource Development
-* **references** [オプション]: 参考文献への任意のリンク。
-* **sample-evtx [必須]**: このルールが検知するイベントログファイルへのファイルパスまたはURL。
-* **logsource [必須]**: ログの出所。以下のいずれかを指定してください。
- * `default`: Windowsでデフォルトで有効になっているログの場合等
- * `non-default`: グループポリシーやセキュリティベースラインなどで有効にする必要があるログ用。
- * `sysmon`: sysmonのインストールが必要なログ。
-* **non-default-setting** [オプション]: `non-default` のログソースのログ設定をオンにする方法の説明です。
-* **ruletype [必須]**: Hayabusaルールには `Hayabusa` を指定します。SigmaのWindowsルールから自動変換されたルールは `Sigma` になります。
-
-# detectionフィールド
-## selectionの基礎知識
-まず、selectionの作り方の基本を説明します。
-
-
-### 論理積(AND)と論理和(OR)の書き方
-ANDを表現するには辞書(YAMLでは辞書を`:`で表します)を使用します。
-このルールでログが検知されるには、**両方の条件**が真である必要があります。
-
-* イベントIDが `7040` であること。
-* チャンネルが `System` であること。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Event.System.EventID: 7040
- Event.System.Channel: System
- condition: selection
-```
-
-ORを表現するには、配列(YAMLでは配列を`- `で表します)を使用します。
-このルールでログが検知されるには、**片方の条件**が真である必要があります。
-
-* イベントIDが `7040` であること。
-* チャンネルが `System` であること。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- - Event.System.EventID: 7040
- - Event.System.Channel: System
- condition: selection
-```
-
-また、以下のように「AND」と「OR」を組み合わせることも可能です。
-この場合、以下の2つの条件が両方成立したときに、このルールでログが検知されます。
-
-* イベントIDが `7040` **または** `7041` のどちらかであること。
-* チャンネルが `System` であること。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Event.System.EventID:
- - 7040
- - 7041
- Event.System.Channel: System
- condition: selection
-```
-
-### イベントキー
-WindowsイベントログをXML形式で出力すると下記のようになります。
-
-```xml
-
-
- 7040
- System
-
-
- Background Intelligent Transfer Service
- auto start
-
-
-```
-
-論理和の例で示したルールの `Event.System.Channel` フィールドは、下記のXMLタグで囲まれた値を参照しています。 ネストされたXMLタグはドット(`.`)で区切られたタグ名で置き換えられます。Hayabusaのルールでは、このドットでつながれた文字列のことをイベントキーと呼んでいます。
-
-`System`
-
-#### イベントキーエイリアス
-`.`の区切りが多くて長いイベントキーが一般的であるため、Hayabusaはエイリアスを使って簡単に扱えるようにします。エイリアスは `config\eventkey_alias.txt`ファイルで定義されています。このファイルは `alias` と `event_key` のマッピングで構成されるCSVファイルです。以下に示すように、エイリアスを使用して上記のルールを書き直し、ルールを読みやすくすることができます。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: System
- EventID: 7040
- condition: selection
-```
-
-#### 注意: 未定義のイベントキーエイリアスについて
-すべてのイベントキーエイリアスが `config\eventkey_alias.txt`に定義されているわけではありません。検知するはずのルールが検知しない場合や、`details`(アラートの詳細)メッセージに`%EventID%`のようなプレースホルダーが表示されている場合、`config\eventkey_alias.txt`の設定を確認してください。
-
-### XML属性を条件に使用する方法
-XMLのタグにはタグ名とは別に属性を設定できます。例えば、以下の `Provider Name` の `Name` は `Provider` タグの属性です。
-
-```xml
-
-
-
- 4672
- 607469
- Security
-
-
-
-```
-
-イベントキーでXMLの属性を指定するには、`{eventkey}_attributes.{attribute_name}`という形式で記述します。例えば、ルールファイルの `Provider` 要素の `Name` 属性を指定する場合は、以下のようになります。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4672
- Event.System.Provider_attributes.Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing'
- condition: selection
-```
-
-### grep検索
-Hayabusaではeventkeyを指定せず、WindowsEventログに含まれる文字列にマッチするかどうかを判定する機能も用意されています。この機能をHayabusaではgrep検索と呼んでいます。
-
-grep検索をするには下記のようにdetectionを指定します。この場合、`mimikatz`または`metasploit`という文字列がWindowsEventログに含まれる場合に、ルールが検知されます。また、grep検索にはワイルドカードを指定することも可能です。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- - `mimikatz`
- - `metasploit`
-```
-
-> ※ Hayabusaでは内部的にWindowsEventログをJSON形式に変換しています。そのため、grep検索ではXMLのタグをマッチさせることはできません。
-
-### EventData
-Windowsのイベントログは、基本データ(イベントID、タイムスタンプ、レコードID、ログ名(チャンネル))が書き込まれる`System`タグと、イベントIDに応じて任意のデータが書き込まれる`EventData`タグの2つに分けられます。その内、`EventData`タグ はネストされたタグの名前がすべて `Data` であり、これまで説明したイベントキーでは `SubjectUserSid` と `SubjectUserName` を区別できません。
-
-```xml
-
-
- 5379
-
- 607469
- Security
-
-
-
- S-1-1-11-1111111111-111111111-1111111111-1111
- Hayabusa
- DESKTOP-Hayabusa
- 0x11111111
-
-
-```
-
-この問題に対処するため、`Data`タグの`Name`属性に指定された値をイベントキーとして利用できます。例えば、EventData の `SubjectUserName` と `SubjectDomainName` を条件として利用する場合、以下のように記述することが可能です。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: System
- EventID: 7040
- Event.EventData.SubjectUserName: Hayabusa
- Event.EventData.SubjectDomainName: DESKTOP-HAYBUSA
- condition: selection
-```
-
-### EventDataの例外的なパターン
-`EventData` タグにネストされたいくつかのタグは `Name` 属性を持ちません。
-
-```xml
-
-
- 5379
- Security
-
-
-
- Available
- None
- NewEngineState=Available PreviousEngineState=None SequenceNumber=9 HostName=ConsoleHost HostVersion=2.0 HostId=5cbb33bf-acf7-47cc-9242-141cd0ba9f0c EngineVersion=2.0 RunspaceId=c6e94dca-0daf-418c-860a-f751a9f2cbe1 PipelineId= CommandName= CommandType= ScriptName= CommandPath= CommandLine=
-
-
-```
-
-上記のようなイベントログを検知するには、`EventData`というイベントキーを指定します。この場合、`EventData`にネストされたタグの内、値がNoneになるタグが1つ以上存在すれば、条件にマッチすることになります。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 5379
- EventData: None
- condition: selection
-```
-
-## パイプ
-イベントキーにはパイプを指定することができます。ここまで説明した書き方では完全一致しか表現できませんでしたが、パイプを使うことでより柔軟な検知ルールを記載できるようになります。以下の例では、`EventData`の値が正規表現 `[\s\S]*EngineVersion=2.0[\s\S]*` に当てはまる場合、条件にマッチすることになります。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
- EventID: 400
- EventData|re: '[\s\S]*EngineVersion=2\.0[\s\S]*'
- condition: selection
-```
-
-パイプには以下のキーワードを指定できます。v1の時点で複数のパイプを連結することはできません。
-* startswith: 指定された文字列で始まることをチェックします。
-* endswith: 指定された文字列で終わることをチェックします。
-* contains: 指定された文字列が含まれることをチェックします。
-* re: 正規表現を使用します。(正規表現の書き方については https://docs.rs/regex/1.5.4/regex/ を参照してください)。
- > 注意: SigmaルールとHayabusaルールは正規表現の記法に一部差異があります。そのため、HayabusaではSigmaルールを正しく検知できない場合があります。
-
-## ワイルドカード
-Hayabusaルールではワイルドカードを使用することができます。以下の例では、`ProcessCommandLine` が "malware" という文字列で始まる場合、このルールでログが検知されます。この仕様はSigmaルールのワイルドカードと同じです。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4688
- ProcessCommandLine: malware*
- condition: selection
-```
-
-以下の2つのワイルドカードを使用することができます。
-* `*`: 0文字以上の任意の文字列にマッチします。(内部的には`.*`という正規表現に変換されます)。
-* `?`: 任意の1文字にマッチします。(内部的には`.`という正規表現に変換されます)。
-
-ワイルドカードのエスケープについて
-* ワイルドカード(`*`と`?`)はバックスラッシュでエスケープできます: `\*` と `\?`.
-* ワイルドカードの直前にバックスラッシュを使用する場合、 `\\*` または `\\?` と記述してください。
-* バックスラッシュを単独で使用する場合、エスケープは不要です。
-
-## イベントキー内のキーワードのネスト
-イベントキーには特定のキーワードをネストすることができます。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: System
- EventID: 7045
- ServiceName:
- - value: malicious-service
- - regexes: ./config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt
- ImagePath:
- min_length: 1000
- allowlist: ./config/regex/allowlist_legitimate_services.txt
- condition: selection
-```
-
-現在、指定できるキーワードは以下の通りです。
-* `value`: 文字列によるマッチング (ワイルドカードやパイプも指定可能)。
-* `min_length`: 指定された文字数以上の場合にマッチします。
-* `regexes`: 指定されたファイルに定義された正規表現に1つ以上に一致する場合、**条件にマッチした**ものとして扱われます。
-* `allowlist`: 指定されたファイルに定義された正規表現に1つ以上に一致する場合、**条件にマッチしてない**ものとして扱われます。
-
-### regexesとallowlistキーワード
-Hayabusaに`.\rules\hayabusa\default\alerts\System\7045_CreateOrModiftySystemProcess-WindowsService_MaliciousServiceInstalled.yml`のルールのために使う2つの正規表現ファイルが用意されています。
-* `./config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt`: 怪しいサービス名を検知するためのものです。
-* `./config/regex/allowlist_legitimate_services.txt`: 正規のサービスを許可するためのものです。
-
-`regexes` と `allowlist` で定義されたファイルの正規表現を変更すると、それらを参照するすべてのルールの動作を一度に変更できます。
-
-また、`regexes` と `allowlist` にはユーザーが独自で作成したファイルを指定することも可能です。
-デフォルトの `./config/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt` と `./config/allowlist_legitimate_services.txt` を参考にして、独自のファイルを作成してください。
-
-## condition (条件)
-これまで説明した記法では簡単な`AND`や`OR`であれば表現可能ですが、複雑な条件は定義できません。そのような場合、`condition` キーワードを使用します。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_3:
- DestinationPort:
- - '4444'
- - '666'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image: '*\Program Files*'
- SELECTION_5:
- DestinationIp:
- - 10.*
- - 192.168.*
- - 172.16.*
- - 127.*
- SELECTION_6:
- DestinationIsIpv6: 'false'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not ((SELECTION_4 or (SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6))))
-```
-
- `condition`には、以下の式を用いることができます。
-* `{expression1} and {expression2}`: {expression1} と {expression2} の両方が真である場合にマッチします。
-* `{expression1} or {expression2}`: {expression1} または {expression2} のどちらかが真である場合にマッチします。
-* `not {expression}`: {expression} の真偽を反転させます。
-* `( {expression} )`: `()`で囲まれた {expression} を先に評価します。数学と同じ優先順位に従います。
-
-上記の例では、 `SELECTION_1`、` SELECTION_2`などの名前が使用されていますが、名前には `a-z A-Z 0-9 _`の文字を使用可能です。ただし、`selection_1`、` selection_2`、 `filter_1`、` filter_2`などの標準的な規則の利用を推奨します。
-
-## notロジック
-ルールを作成する場合、誤検知を減らすためにフィルターを作成することはよくあります。以下に利用例を示します。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4673
- filter:
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\audiodg.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\SettingSyncHost.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe
- - ProcessName|startswith: C:\Program Files
- - SubjectUserName: LOCAL SERVICE
- condition: selection and not filter
-```
-
-## aggregation condition
-### 基本事項
-上記の `condition` キーワードは `AND` や `OR` だけでなく、マッチしたイベントの集計も可能です。この機能を利用するには`aggregation condition`を利用します。指定するには条件をパイプでつなぎます。
-以下のパスワードスプレー攻撃の例では、5分以内に同じ送信元の`IpAddress`で5個以上の `TargetUserName`があるかどうかを判断します。
-
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4648
- condition: selection | count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress > 5
- timeframe: 5m
-```
-
-`aggregation condition`は以下の形式で定義します。
-* `count() {operator} {number}`: パイプの前の最初の条件にマッチするログイベントに対して、マッチしたログの数が `{operator}` と `{number}` で指定した条件式を満たす場合に条件がマッチします。
-
-`{operator}` は以下のいずれかになります。
-* `==`: 指定された値と等しい場合、条件にマッチしたものとして扱われる。
-* `>=`: 指定された値以上であれば、条件にマッチしたものとして扱われる。
-* `>`: 指定された値以上であれば、条件にマッチしたものとして扱われる。
-* `<=`: 指定された値以下の場合、条件にマッチしたものとして扱われる。
-* `<`: 指定された値より小さい場合、条件にマッチしたものとして扱われる。
-
-`{number}` は数値である必要があります。
-
-`timeframe` は以下のように定義することができます。
-* `15s`: 15秒
-* `30m`: 30分
-* `12h`: 12時間
-* `7d`: 7日間
-* `3M`: 3ヶ月
-
-
-### countの4パターン
-1. countの引数と`by` キーワード共に指定しないパターン。例: `selection | count() > 10`
- > `selection`にマッチしたログが10件以上ある場合、このルールは検知します。
-2. countの引数はないが、`by` キーワードはある。例: `selection | count() by date > 10`
- > `selection`にマッチするログが10件以上あるかどうか、日付毎にチェックします。
-3. countの引数があるが、`by` キーワードがない場合。例: `selection | count(TargetUserName) > 10`
- > `selection`に一致する`TargetUserName`が10人以上存在する場合、このルールは検知します。
-4. count 引数と `by` キーワードの両方が存在する。例: `selection | count(TargetUserName) by date > 10`
- > `selection`に一致する`TargetUserName`が10人以上存在するかどうか、日付毎にチェックします。
-
-
-### パターン1の例:
-これは最も基本的なパターンです:`count() {operator} {number}`. 以下のルールは、`selection`にマッチしたログが3つ以上である場合、このルールが検知されます。
-
-
-
-### パターン2の例:
-`count() by {eventkey} {operator} {number}`: `selection`にマッチしたログは、`{eventkey}`の値が**同じログ毎にグルーピング**されます。各グループにおいて、マッチしたイベントの数が`{operator}`と`{number}`で指定した条件を満たした場合、このルールが検知されます。
-
-
-
-### パターン3の例:
-`count({eventkey}) {operator} {number}`:`selection`にマッチしたログの内、 `{eventkey}` が**異なる**値の数をカウントします。そのカウントされた値が`{operator}`と`{number}`で指定された条件式を満たす場合、このルールが検知されます。
-
-
-
-### パターン4の例:
-`count({eventkey_1}) by {eventkey_2} {operator} {number}`: `selection`にマッチしたログは、`{eventkey}`の値が**同じログ毎にグルーピングし**、各グループに含まれる`{eventkey_1}`が**異なる**値の数をカウントします。各グループでカウントされた値が`{operator}`と`{number}`で指定された条件式を満たした場合、このルールが検知されます。
-
-
-
-### Countルールの出力:
-CountルールのDetails出力は固定で、`[condition]`にcount条件と`[result]`に記録されたイベントキーが出力されます。
-
-以下の例では、ブルートフォースされた`TargetUserName`のユーザ名のリストと送信元の`IpAddress`が出力されます:
-```
-[condition] count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress >= 5 in timeframe [result] count:41 TargetUserName:jorchilles/jlake/cspizor/lpesce/bgalbraith/jkulikowski/baker/eskoudis/dpendolino/sarmstrong/lschifano/drook/rbowes/ebooth/melliott/econrad/sanson/dmashburn/bking/mdouglas/cragoso/psmith/bhostetler/zmathis/thessman/kperryman/cmoody/cdavis/cfleener/gsalinas/wstrzelec/jwright/edygert/ssims/jleytevidal/celgee/Administrator/mtoussain/smisenar/tbennett/bgreenwood IpAddress:10.10.2.22 timeframe:5m
-```
-アラートのタイムスタンプには、timeframe内で最初に検知されたイベントの時間が表示されます。
-
-# ルール作成のアドバイス
-1. **可能な場合は、常に `Channel`と`EventID`を指定してください。** 将来的には、チャネル名とイベンドIDでフィルタリングする可能性があるため、適切な` Channel`と`EventID`が設定されていない場合はルールが無視される可能性があります。
-
-2. **不要な場合は複数の `selection`と`filter`セクションを使用しないでください。**
-
-### 悪い例:
-```yaml
-detection:
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Channnel: Security
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4625
- SELECTION_3:
- LogonType: 3
- FILTER_1:
- SubStatus: "0xc0000064"
- FILTER_2:
- SubStatus: "0xc000006a"
- condition: SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and not (FILTER_1 or FILTER_2)
-```
-
-### 良い例:
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4625
- LogonType: 3
- filter:
- - SubStatus: "0xc0000064" #Non-existent user
- - SubStatus: "0xc000006a" #Wrong password
- condition: selection and not filter
-```
-
-3. **複数のセクションが必要な場合は、チャンネル名とイベントIDの情報を記入する最初のセクションを `section_basic_info` セクションに、その他のセクションを `section_` と `filter_` の後に意味のある名前を付けるか、または `section_1`, `filter_1` などの記法を用いてください。また、分かりにくいところはコメントを書いて説明してください。**
-
-### 悪い例:
-```yaml
-detection:
- Takoyaki:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4648
- Naruto:
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- IpAddress: "-"
- Sushi:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetInfo|endswith: "$"
- Godzilla:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- Ninja:
- TargetUserName|re: "(DWM|UMFD)-([0-9]|1[0-2])$"
- IpAddress: "-"
- Daisuki:
- - ProcessName|endswith: "powershell.exe"
- - ProcessName|endswith: "WMIC.exe"
- condition: Takoyaki and Daisuki and not (Naruto and not Godzilla) and not Ninja and not Sushi
-```
-
-### OKな例:
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection_1:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4648
- selection_2:
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- IpAddress: "-"
- filter_1: #Filter system noise
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetInfo|endswith: "$"
- filter_2:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- filter_3:
- TargetUserName|re: "(DWM|UMFD)-([0-9]|1[0-2])$" #Filter out default Desktop Windows Manager and User Mode Driver Framework accounts
- IpAddress: "-" #Don't filter if the IP address is remote to catch attackers who created backdoor accounts that look like DWM-12, etc..
- selection_4:
- - ProcessName|endswith: "powershell.exe"
- - ProcessName|endswith: "WMIC.exe"
- condition: selection_1 and selection_4 and not (selection_2 and not filter_2) and not filter_3 and not filter_1
-```
-
-### 良い例:
-```yaml
-detection:
- selection_BasicInfo:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4648
- selection_TargetUserIsComputerAccount:
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- IpAddress: "-"
- filter_UsersAndTargetServerAreComputerAccounts: #Filter system noise
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetInfo|endswith: "$"
- filter_SubjectUserIsComputerAccount:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- filter_SystemAccounts:
- TargetUserName|re: "(DWM|UMFD)-([0-9]|1[0-2])$" #Filter out default Desktop Windows Manager and User Mode Driver Framework accounts
- IpAddress: "-" #Don't filter if the IP address is remote to catch attackers who created backdoor accounts that look like DWM-12, etc..
- selection_SuspiciousProcess:
- - ProcessName|endswith: "powershell.exe"
- - ProcessName|endswith: "WMIC.exe"
- condition: selection_basic and selection_SuspiciousProcess and not (selection_TargetUserIsComputerAccount
- and not filter_SubjectUserIsComputerAccount) and not filter_SystemAccounts and not filter_UsersAndTargetServerAreComputerAccounts
-```
-
-# SigmaルールからHayabusaルール形式への自動変換
-SigmaルールからHayabusaルール形式に自動で変換する[ツール](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/tree/main/tools/sigmac)を作成しました。
-
-使用方法は[Readme](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa/blob/main/tools/sigmac/README-Japanese.md)を参照してください。
\ No newline at end of file
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diff --git a/rules b/rules
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index 00000000..6d9781e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rules
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Subproject commit 6d9781e349ef3a9f8210a758b52f0c59d6e7e37b
diff --git a/rules/README.md b/rules/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0b94ffac..00000000
--- a/rules/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-# hayabusa-rules
-Detection rules for hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/1102_IndicatorRemovalOnHost-ClearWindowsEventLogs_SecurityLogCleared.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/1102_IndicatorRemovalOnHost-ClearWindowsEventLogs_SecurityLogCleared.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3da6b51f..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/1102_IndicatorRemovalOnHost-ClearWindowsEventLogs_SecurityLogCleared.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-author: Eric Conrad, Yamato Security
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/25
-
-title: Security log was cleared
-title_jp: セキュリティログがクリアされた
-details: "User: %LogFileClearedSubjectUserName%"
-details_jp: "ユーザ: %LogFileClearedSubjectUserName%"
-description: Somebody has cleared the Security event log.
-description_jp: 誰かがセキュリティログをクリアした。
-
-id: c2f690ac-53f8-4745-8cfe-7127dda28c74
-level: high
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 1102
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - system administrator
-tags:
- - attack.defense_evasion
- - attack.t1070.001
-references:
- - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/DeepBlueCLI/mimikatz-privesc-hashdump.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_BruteForce_PasswordGuessingDetect.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_BruteForce_PasswordGuessingDetect.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index cac597a1..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_BruteForce_PasswordGuessingDetect.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2021/12/20
-modified: 2021/12/22
-
-title: Password Guessing Attack
-title_jp: パスワード推測攻撃
-details: '' #Cannot be used because this is a count rule
-details_jp: ''
-description: Search for many 4625 wrong password failed logon attempts in a short period of time.
-description_jp:
-
-id: 35e8a0fc-60c2-46d7-ba39-aafb15b9854e
-level: medium
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4625
- SubStatus: "0xc000006a" #Wrong password
- condition: selection | count() by IpAddress >= 5
- timeframe: 5m
-falsepositives:
- - User mistyping password
-tags:
- - attack.t1110.003
- - attack.credential_access
-references: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
-sample-evtx: ./hayabusa-sample-evtx/DeepBlueCLI/smb-password-guessing-security.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_BruteForce_UserGuessingDetect.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_BruteForce_UserGuessingDetect.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index dd59a2ce..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_BruteForce_UserGuessingDetect.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2021/12/20
-modified: 2021/12/22
-
-title: User Guessing Attempt
-title_jp: ユーザ名推測の試行
-details: '' #Cannot be used because this is a count rule
-details_jp: ''
-description: Search for many 4625 failed logon attempts due to wrong usernames in a short period of time.
-description_jp:
-
-id: 4574194d-e7ca-4356-a95c-21b753a1787e
-level: medium
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4625
- SubStatus: "0xc0000064" #Username does not exist
- condition: selection | count() by IpAddress >= 5
- timeframe: 5m
-falsepositives:
-tags:
- - attack.t1110.003
- - attack.credential_access
-references: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
-sample-evtx: ./hayabusa-sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0006-Credential Access/T1110.xxx-Bruteforce/ID4625-OpenSSH brutforce with non existing user.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_LateralMovement_LogonFailure-UnknownError.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_LateralMovement_LogonFailure-UnknownError.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 64963c2f..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_LateralMovement_LogonFailure-UnknownError.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/12/22
-
-title: Logon Failure - Unknown Reason
-title_jp: ログオンに失敗 - 不明な理由
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Type: %LogonType% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : AuthPackage: %AuthenticationPackageName%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : タイプ: %LogonType% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : 認証パッケージ: %AuthenticationPackageName%'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: a85096da-be85-48d7-8ad5-2f957cd74daa
-level: low
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4625
- filter:
- - SubStatus: "0xc0000064" #Non-existent user
- - SubStatus: "0xc000006a" #Wrong password
- condition: selection and not filter
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/DeepBlueCLI/smb-password-guessing-security.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_LateralMovement_LogonFailure-WrongPassword.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_LateralMovement_LogonFailure-WrongPassword.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 0f6b7f68..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_LateralMovement_LogonFailure-WrongPassword.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Failure - Wrong Password
-title_jp: ログオンに失敗 - パスワードが間違っている
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Type: %LogonType% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : AuthPackage: %AuthenticationPackageName%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : タイプ: %LogonType% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : 認証パッケージ: %AuthenticationPackageName%'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: e87bd730-df45-4ae9-85de-6c75369c5d29
-level: low
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4625
- SubStatus: "0xc000006a"
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - user mistypes password
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/DeepBlueCLI/smb-password-guessing-security.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_LateralMovement_LogonFailure-WrongUsername.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_LateralMovement_LogonFailure-WrongUsername.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 97008a02..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4625_LateralMovement_LogonFailure-WrongUsername.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Failure - Username does not exist
-title_jp: ログオンに失敗 - ユーザ名は存在しない
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Type: %LogonType% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : AuthPackage: %AuthenticationPackageName%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : タイプ: %LogonType% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : 認証パッケージ: %AuthenticationPackageName%'
-description: Prints failed logons
-description_jp: ログオンに失敗したイベントを出力する
-
-id: 8afa97ce-a217-4f7c-aced-3e320a57756d
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4625
- SubStatus: "0xc0000064"
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - user mistypes username
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0006-Credential Access/T1110.xxx-Bruteforce/ID4625-OpenSSH brutforce with non existing user.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4648_BruteForce_PasswordSprayDetect.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4648_BruteForce_PasswordSprayDetect.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4122b5a2..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4648_BruteForce_PasswordSprayDetect.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2021/12/20
-modified: 2021/12/20
-
-title: Password Spray
-title_jp: パスワードスプレー攻撃
-details: '' #Cannot be used because this is a count rule
-details_jp: ''
-description: Search for many 4648 explicit credential logon attempts in a short period of time.
-description_jp:
-
-id: ffd622af-d049-449f-af5a-0492fdcc3a58
-level: medium
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4648
- condition: selection | count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress >= 5
- timeframe: 5m
-falsepositives:
-tags:
- - attack.t1110.003
- - attack.credential_access
-references: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
-sample-evtx: ./hayabusa-sample-evtx/DeepBlueCLI/password-spray.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4648_ExplicitLogonSuspiciousProcess.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4648_ExplicitLogonSuspiciousProcess.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c54c8f1a..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4648_ExplicitLogonSuspiciousProcess.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2021/12/17
-modified: 2021/12/17
-
-title: "Explicit Logon: Suspicious Process"
-title_jp: "不審なプロセスからの明示的なログオン"
-details: 'Source User: %SubjectUserName% : Target User: %TargetUserName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : Process: %ProcessName% : Target Server: %TargetInfo%'
-details_jp: 'ソースユーザ: %SubjectUserName% : ターゲットユーザ: %TargetUserName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : プロセス: %ProcessName% : ターゲットサーバ: %TargetInfo%'
-description: Alter on explicit credential logons with suspicous processes like powershell and wmic which are often abused by malware like Cobalt Strike.
-description_jp:
-
-id: 7616e857-8e41-4976-bc21-811d122b9fc9
-level: medium
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection_basic_info:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4648
- selection_TargetUserIsComputerAccount:
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- IpAddress: "-"
- filter_UsersAndTargetServerAreComputerAccounts: #Filter system noise
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetInfo|endswith: "$"
- filter_SubjectUserIsComputerAccount:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- filter_SystemAccounts:
- TargetUserName|re: "(DWM|UMFD)-([0-9]|1[0-2])$" #Filter out default Desktop Windows Manager and User Mode Driver Framework accounts
- IpAddress: "-" #Don't filter if the IP address is remote to catch attackers who created backdoor accounts that look like DWM-12, etc..
- selection_SuspiciousProcess:
- - ProcessName|endswith: "powershell.exe"
- - ProcessName|endswith: "WMIC.exe"
- condition: selection_basic_info and selection_SuspiciousProcess and not (selection_TargetUserIsComputerAccount
- and not filter_SubjectUserIsComputerAccount) and not filter_SystemAccounts and not filter_UsersAndTargetServerAreComputerAccounts
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
- - attack.privilege_escalation
- - attack.lateral_movement
-references:
- - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4648
-sample-evtx: ./EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/Privilege Escalation/Runas_4624_4648_Webshell_CreateProcessAsUserA.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4673_Multiple_UnknownProcessUsedHighPrivilege.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4673_Multiple_UnknownProcessUsedHighPrivilege.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 34e532c6..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4673_Multiple_UnknownProcessUsedHighPrivilege.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/12/22
-
-title: Unknown process used a high privilege
-title_jp: 不明なプロセスが高い権限を使った
-details: 'Process: %ProcessName% : User: %SubjectUserName% : LogonID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'プロセス名: %ProcessName% : ユーザ名: %SubjectUserName% : ログオンID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-description: |
- Malware may generate a 4673 event (A privileged service was called) when dumping hashes or wiping disk.
- For example, mimikatz will generate 4 logs using SeTcbPrivilege (Act as part of the OS.)
- Disk wipers like bcwipe will also generate this.
- More legitimate filepaths may have to be added to the filter.
- This is marked as a medium alert as there is a high possibility for false positives.
-description_jp:
-
-id: 5b6e58ee-c231-4a54-9eee-af2577802e08
-level: medium
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4673
- filter:
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\audiodg.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\SettingSyncHost.exe
- - ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe
- - ProcessName|startswith: C:\Program Files
- - SubjectUserName: LOCAL SERVICE
- condition: selection and not filter
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
- - attack.credential_access
- - attack.t1003.001
- - attack.t1561
- - attack.impact
-references:
- - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4673
- - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/DeepBlueCLI/mimikatz-privesc-hashdump.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4720_CreateAccount-LocalAccount_ComputerAccountCreated.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4720_CreateAccount-LocalAccount_ComputerAccountCreated.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c69f1bcd..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4720_CreateAccount-LocalAccount_ComputerAccountCreated.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-creation_date: 2020/11/08
-uodated_date: 2021/12/22
-
-title: Hidden user account created! (Possible Backdoor)
-title_jp: 隠しユーザアカウントが作成された!(バックドアの可能性あり)
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : SID: %TargetSid%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ名: %TargetUserName% : SID: %TargetSid%'
-description: A computer account (an account that ends with a $) was created. These accounts are not displayed by default so will be hidden.
-description_jp: A computer account (an account that ends with a $) was created. These accounts are not displayed by default so will be hidden.
-
-id: 70b8b1bd-c107-4b1a-8b1e-5b0f9f57930a
-level: high
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4720
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$" #Any user account that ends with a $ will be treated as a machine account and be hidden by default.
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - machine/computer accounts being created
-tags:
- - attack.persistence
- - attack.11136.001
-references:
- - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0003-Persistence/T1136-Create account/ID4720-Fake computer account created.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4720_CreateAccount-LocalAccount_UserAccountCreated.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4720_CreateAccount-LocalAccount_UserAccountCreated.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 62947d6f..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4720_CreateAccount-LocalAccount_UserAccountCreated.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-author: Eric Conrad, Yamato Security
-creation_date: 2020/11/08
-uodated_date: 2021/12/22
-
-title: Local user account created
-title_jp: ローカルユーザアカウントが作成された
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : SID: %TargetSid%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ名: %TargetUserName% : SID: %TargetSid%'
-description: A local user account was created.
-description_jp: ローカルユーザアカウントが作成された.
-
-id: 13edce80-2b02-4469-8de4-a3e37271dcdb
-level: medium
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4720
- filter:
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$" #Filter out machine/computer accounts
- condition: selection and not filter
-falsepositives:
- - system administrator
-tags:
- - attack.persistence
- - attack.11136.001
-references:
- - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/DeepBlueCLI/new-user-security.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4728-AccountManipulation_UserAddedToLocalDomainAdminsGroup.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4728-AccountManipulation_UserAddedToLocalDomainAdminsGroup.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6a368892..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4728-AccountManipulation_UserAddedToLocalDomainAdminsGroup.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-creation_date: 2020/11/08
-updated_date: 2021/12/22
-
-title: User added to local Domain Admins group
-title_jp: ユーザがローカルドメイン管理者グループに追加された
-details: 'User: %SubjectUserName% : Group: %TargetUserName% : LogonID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %SubjectUserName% : グループ名: %TargetUserName% : ログオンID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-description: A user was added to the local Domain Admins group.
-description_jp: ユーザがドメイン管理者グループに追加された。
-
-id: bc58e432-959f-464d-812e-d60ce5d46fa1
-level: high
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4728
- TargetUserName: Domain Admins
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - system administrator
-tags:
- - attack.persistence
- - attack.t1098
-references:
- - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4732
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account manipulation/ID4728-4756-Member added to sensitive domain groups.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4728-AccountManipulation_UserAddedToLocalSecurityGroup.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4728-AccountManipulation_UserAddedToLocalSecurityGroup.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 67cf6778..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4728-AccountManipulation_UserAddedToLocalSecurityGroup.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-author: Eric Conrad, Zach Mathis
-creation_date: 2020/11/08
-updated_date: 2021/12/22
-
-title: User added to local security group
-title_jp: ユーザがローカルセキュリティグループに追加された
-details: 'User: %SubjectUserName% : Group: %TargetUserName% : LogonID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %SubjectUserName% : グループ名: %TargetUserName% : ログオンID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-description: A user was added to a security-enabled local group.
-description_jp: ユーザがローカルセキュリティグループに追加された。
-
-id: 2f04e44e-1c79-4343-b4ab-ba670ee10aa0
-level: low
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4728
- filter:
- - TargetUserName: Administrators
- - TargetUserName: None
- - TargetUserName: Domain Admins
- condition: selection and not filter
-falsepositives:
- - system administrator
-tags:
- - attack.persistence
- - attack.t1098
-references:
- - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4732
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account manipulation/ID4728-Massive account group membership change.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4728_AccountManipulation_UserAddedToGlobalDomainAdmins.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4728_AccountManipulation_UserAddedToGlobalDomainAdmins.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 380fbe2b..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4728_AccountManipulation_UserAddedToGlobalDomainAdmins.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-creation_date: 2020/11/08
-updated_date: 2021/12/22
-
-title: User added to the global Domain Admins group
-title_jp: ユーザがグローバルドメイン管理者グループに追加された
-details: 'User: %SubjectUserName% : Group: %TargetUserName% : LogonID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %SubjectUserName% : グループ: %TargetUserName% : ログオンID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-description: A user was added to the Domain Admins group.
-description_jp: ユーザがドメイン管理者グループに追加された。
-
-id: 4bb89c86-a138-42a0-baaf-fc2f777a4506
-level: high
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4728
- TargetUserName: Domain Admins
- filter:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: $
- condition: selection and not filter
-falsepositives:
- - system administrator
-tags:
- - attack.persistence
- - attack.t1098
-references:
- - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4728
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account manipulation/ID4728-Massive account group membership change.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4728_AccountManipulation_UserAddedToGlobalSecurityGroup.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4728_AccountManipulation_UserAddedToGlobalSecurityGroup.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 13415051..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4728_AccountManipulation_UserAddedToGlobalSecurityGroup.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-author: Eric Conrad, Zach Mathis
-creation_date: 2020/11/08
-updated_date: 2021/12/22
-
-title: User added to global security group
-title_jp: ユーザがグローバルセキュリティグループに追加された
-details: 'User: %SubjectUserName% : Group: %TargetUserName% : LogonID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %SubjectUserName% : グループ: %TargetUserName% : ログオンID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-description: A user was added to a security-enabled global group. Global means the group can be granted access in any trusting domain but may only have members from its own domain. Subjet user is the user that performed the action.
-description_jp: ユーザがグローバルのセキュリティグループに追加された。
-
-id: 0db443ba-561c-4a04-b349-d74ce1c5fc8b
-level: medium
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4728
- filter:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: $
- condition: selection and not filter
-falsepositives:
- - system administrator
-tags:
- - attack.persistence
- - attack.t1098
-references:
- - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4728
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account manipulation/ID4728-Massive account group membership change.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4732-AccountManipulation_UserAddedToLocalAdministratorsGroup.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4732-AccountManipulation_UserAddedToLocalAdministratorsGroup.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 08106022..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4732-AccountManipulation_UserAddedToLocalAdministratorsGroup.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-author: Eric Conrad, Zach Mathis
-creation_date: 2020/11/08
-updated_date: 2021/12/22
-
-title: User added to local Administrators group
-title_jp: ユーザがローカル管理者グループに追加された
-details: 'User: %SubjectUserName% : Group: %TargetUserName% : LogonID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %SubjectUserName% : グループ名: %TargetUserName% : ログオンID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-description: A user was added to the local Administrators group.
-description_jp: ユーザがローカル管理者グループに追加された。
-
-id: 611e2e76-a28f-4255-812c-eb8836b2f5bb
-level: high
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4732
- TargetUserName: Administrators
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - system administrator
-tags:
- - attack.persistence
- - attack.t1098
-references:
- - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4732
-sample-evtx: ./sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0003-Persistence/T1098.xxx-Account manipulation/ID4732-User added to local admin groups.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4768_StealOrForgeKerberosTickets_AS-REP-Roasting.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4768_StealOrForgeKerberosTickets_AS-REP-Roasting.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3eded635..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4768_StealOrForgeKerberosTickets_AS-REP-Roasting.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-author: Yusuke Matsui, Yamato Security
-creation_date: 2020/11/08
-updated_date: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Possible AS-REP Roasting
-title_jp: AS-REPロースティングの可能性
-details: 'Possible AS-REP Roasting'
-details_jp: 'AS-REPロースティングのリスクがある'
-description: For each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure algorithm such as RC4.
-description_jp: For each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure algorithm such as RC4.
-
-id: dee2a01e-5d7c-45b4-aec3-ad9722f2165a
-level: medium
-status: testing
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4768
- TicketEncryptionType: '0x17' #RC4-HMAC
- PreAuthType: 0 #Logon without pre-authentication
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - legacy application
-tags:
- - attack.credential_access
- - attack.t1558.004
-references:
- - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4768_StealOrForgeKerberosTickets_Kerberoasting.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4768_StealOrForgeKerberosTickets_Kerberoasting.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4e579897..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/Security/4768_StealOrForgeKerberosTickets_Kerberoasting.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-author: Yusuke Matsui, Yamato Security
-creation_date: 2020/11/08
-updated_date: 2021/12/22
-
-title: Kerberoasting
-title_jp: Kerberoast攻撃
-details: 'Possible Kerberoasting Risk Activity.'
-details_jp: 'Kerberoast攻撃のリスクがある'
-description: Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.
-description_jp: Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.
-
-id: f19849e7-b5ba-404b-a731-9b624d7f6d19
-level: medium
-status: testing
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4768
- TicketEncryptionType: '0x17' #RC4-HMAC
- PreAuthType: 2 #Standard password authentication
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - legacy application
-tags:
- - attack.credential_access
- - attack.t1558.003
-references:
- - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/System/104_IndicatorRemovalOnHost-ClearWindowsEventLogs_SystemLogCleared.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/System/104_IndicatorRemovalOnHost-ClearWindowsEventLogs_SystemLogCleared.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1a8d1d5b..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/System/104_IndicatorRemovalOnHost-ClearWindowsEventLogs_SystemLogCleared.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-author: Eric Conrad, Yamato Security
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/25
-
-title: System log file was cleared
-title_jp: システムログがクリアされた
-details: "User: %LogFileClearedSubjectUserName%"
-details_jp: "ユーザ: %LogFileClearedSubjectUserName%"
-description: Somebody has cleared the System event log.
-description_jp: 誰かがシステムログをクリアした。
-
-id: f481a1f3-969e-4187-b3a5-b47c272bfebd
-level: high
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: System
- EventID: 104
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - system administrator
-tags:
- - attack.defense_evasion
- - attack.t1070.001
-references:
- - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001/
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/System/7040_ImpairDefenses-DisableWindowsEventLogging_EventLogServiceStartupDisabled.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/System/7040_ImpairDefenses-DisableWindowsEventLogging_EventLogServiceStartupDisabled.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a1d7020f..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/System/7040_ImpairDefenses-DisableWindowsEventLogging_EventLogServiceStartupDisabled.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-author: Eric Conrad, Zach Mathis
-creation_date: 2020/11/08
-updated_date: 2021/11/22
-
-title: Event log service startup type changed to disabled
-title_jp: イベントログサービスのスタートアップの種類が無効に変更された
-details: 'Old setting: %param2% : New setting: %param3%'
-details_jp: '設定前: %param2% : 設定後: %param3%'
-
-id: ab3507cf-5231-4af6-ab1d-5d3b3ad467b5
-level: medium
-status: test
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: System
- EventID: 7040
- param1: 'Windows Event Log'
- param3: "disabled"
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - system administrator
-tags:
- - attack.defense_evasion
- - attack.t1562.002
-references:
- - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002/
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/System/7045_CreateOrModiftySystemProcess-WindowsService_MaliciousServiceInstalled.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/System/7045_CreateOrModiftySystemProcess-WindowsService_MaliciousServiceInstalled.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index aa6b08e3..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/System/7045_CreateOrModiftySystemProcess-WindowsService_MaliciousServiceInstalled.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-author: Eric Conrad, Zach Mathis
-creation_date: 2020/11/08
-updated_date: 2021/11/23
-
-title: Malicious service installed
-title_jp: 悪意のあるサービスがインストールされた
-details: 'Service: %ServiceName% : Path: %ImagePath%'
-details_jp: 'サービス: %ServiceName% : パス: %ImagePath%'
-description: Malicious service was installed based on suspicious entries in ./config/regex/regexes_suspicous_service.txt
-description_jp: Malicious service was installed based on suspicious entries in ./config/regex/regexes_suspicous_service.txt
-
-id: dbbfd9f3-9508-478b-887e-03ddb9236909
-level: high
-status: test
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: System
- EventID: 7045
- ServiceName:
- regexes: ./config/regex/detectlist_suspicous_services.txt
- ImagePath:
- min_length: 1000
- allowlist: ./config/regex/allowlist_legitimate_services.txt
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
- - attack.persistence
- - attack.t1543.003
-references:
- - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/WindowsDefender/1116_Multiple_WindowsDefenderAlert.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/WindowsDefender/1116_Multiple_WindowsDefenderAlert.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1077e7e7..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/alerts/WindowsDefender/1116_Multiple_WindowsDefenderAlert.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2021/12/01
-modified: 2021/12/01
-
-title: Windows Defender Alert
-title_jp: Windows Defenderアラート
-details: 'Threat: %ThreatName% : Severity: %SeverityName% : Type: %CategoryName% : User: %DetectionUser% : Path: %Path% : Process: %WindowsDefenderProcessName%'
-details_jp: '脅威: %ThreatName% : 深刻度: %SeverityName% : 種類: %CategoryName% : ユーザ: %DetectionUser% : パス: %Path% : プロセス: %WindowsDefenderProcessName%'
-description: Windows defender malware detection
-description_jp: Windows defenderのマルウェア検知
-
-id: 810bfd3a-9fb3-44e0-9016-8cdf785fddbf
-level: high
-status: test
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational
- EventID: 1116
-falsepositives:
- - bad signature
-tags:
- - malware
-references:
- - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus?view=o365-worldwide
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/BitsClientOperational/59_BITS-Jobs_BitsJobCreation.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/BitsClientOperational/59_BITS-Jobs_BitsJobCreation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 65f80d65..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/BitsClientOperational/59_BITS-Jobs_BitsJobCreation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-author: Yamato Security
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/22
-
-title: Bits Job Creation
-title_jp: Bits Jobの作成
-details: 'Job Title: %JobTitle% : URL: %Url%'
-details_jp: 'Job名: %JobTitle% : URL: %Url%'
-description: Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.
-description_jp: Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.
-
-id: 18e6fa4a-353d-42b6-975c-bb05dbf4a004
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational
- EventID: 59
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
- - attack.defense_evasion
- - attack.persistence
- - attack.t1197
- - lolbas
-references:
- - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/
- - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-0-System.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-0-System.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a4d420f1..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-0-System.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Type 0 - System
-title_jp: ログオンタイプ 0 - System
-details: 'Bootup'
-details_jp: 'システム起動'
-description: Prints logon information
-description_jp: Prints logon information
-
-id: 9fa273cc-bcb2-4789-85e3-14ca253ac7f4
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4624
- LogonType: 0
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-10-RemoteInteractive.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-10-RemoteInteractive.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c279547d..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-10-RemoteInteractive.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Type 10 - RDP (Remote Interactive)
-title_jp: ログオンタイプ 10 - RDP (リモートインタラクティブ)
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId% : (Warning: Credentials are stored in memory)'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId% : (注意: 資格情報がメモリに格納される)'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: a4e05f05-ff88-48b9-8524-a88c1c32fe19
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4624
- LogonType: 10
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-11-CachedInteractive.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-11-CachedInteractive.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1642e99f..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-11-CachedInteractive.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Type 11 - CachedInteractive
-title_jp: ログオンタイプ 11 - キャッシュされたインタラクティブ
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId% : (Warning: Credentials are stored in memory)'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId% : (注意: 資格情報がメモリに格納される)'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: fbbe9d3f-ed1f-49a9-9446-726e349f5fba
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4624
- LogonType: 11
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-12-CachedRemoteInteractive.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-12-CachedRemoteInteractive.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c8477c96..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-12-CachedRemoteInteractive.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Type 12 - CachedRemoteInteractive
-title_jp: ログオンタイプ 12 - キャッシュされたリモートインタラクティブ
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId% : (Warning: Credentials are stored in memory)'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId% : (注意: 資格情報がメモリに格納される)'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: f4b46dd3-63d6-4c75-a54c-9f6bd095cd6f
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4624
- LogonType: 12
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-13-CachedUnlock.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-13-CachedUnlock.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index fb2e875e..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-13-CachedUnlock.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Type 13 - CachedUnlock
-title_jp: ログオンタイプ 13 - キャッシュされたアンロック
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId% : (Warning: Credentials are stored in memory)'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId% : (注意: 資格情報がメモリに格納される)'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: e50e3952-06d9-44a8-ab07-7a41c9801d78
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4624
- LogonType: 13
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-2-Interactive.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-2-Interactive.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index bf3d0cf3..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-2-Interactive.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Type 2 - Interactive
-title_jp: ログオンタイプ 2 - インタラクティブ
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId% : (Warning: Credentials are stored in memory)'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId% : (注意: 資格情報がメモリに格納される)'
-description: Prints logon information
-description_jp: Prints logon information
-
-id: 7beb4832-f357-47a4-afd8-803d69a5c85c
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4624
- LogonType: 2
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-3-Network.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-3-Network.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 09736bca..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-3-Network.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Type 3 - Network
-title_jp: ログオンタイプ 3 - ネットワーク
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId%'
-description: Prints logon information
-description_jp: Prints logon information
-
-id: c7b22878-e5d8-4c30-b245-e51fd354359e
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4624
- LogonType: 3
- filter:
- - IpAddress: "-"
- - IpAddress: "127.0.0.1"
- - IpAddress: "::1"
- condition: selection and not filter
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-4-Batch.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-4-Batch.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index d3388e8c..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-4-Batch.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Type 4 - Batch
-title_jp: ログオンタイプ 4 - バッチ
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId%'
-description: Prints logon information
-description_jp: Prints logon information
-
-id: 8ad8b25f-6052-4cfd-9a50-717cb514af13
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4624
- LogonType: 4
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-5-Service.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-5-Service.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 5495fa0c..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-5-Service.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Type 5 - Service
-title_jp: ログオンタイプ 5 - サービス
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId%'
-description: Prints logon information
-description_jp: Prints logon information
-
-id: 408e1304-51d7-4d3e-ab31-afd07192400b
-level: low
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4624
- LogonType: 5
- filter:
- - TargetUserName: "SYSTEM"
- - TargetUserName: "NETWORK SERVICE"
- - TargetUserName: "LOCAL SERVICE"
- condition: selection and not filter
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-7-Unlock.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-7-Unlock.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 42431dc5..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-7-Unlock.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Type 7 - Unlock
-title_jp: ログオンタイプ 7 - アンロック
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId%'
-description: Prints logon information
-description_jp: Prints logon information
-
-id: b61bfa39-48ec-4bdf-9d4e-e7205f49acd2
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4624
- LogonType: 7
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-8-NetworkCleartext.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-8-NetworkCleartext.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ad032abf..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-8-NetworkCleartext.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Type 8 - NetworkCleartext
-title_jp: ログオンタイプ 8 - ネットワーク平文
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId%'
-description: Prints logon information. Despite the naming NetworkCleartext, the password is not unhashed. It is usually for IIS Basic Authentication.
-description_jp: Prints logon information
-
-id: 7ff51227-6a10-49e6-a58b-b9f4ac32b138
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4624
- LogonType: 8
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-9-NewInteractive.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-9-NewInteractive.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 5accd9a2..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4624_LogonType-9-NewInteractive.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logon Type 9 - NewCredentials
-title_jp: ログオンタイプ 9 - 新しい資格情報
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Workstation: %WorkstationName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId% : (Warning: Credentials are stored in memory)'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : 端末: %WorkstationName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId% : (注意: 資格情報がメモリに格納される)'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: d80facaa-ca97-47bb-aed2-66362416eb49
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4624
- LogonType: 9
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4634_Logoff.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4634_Logoff.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2d35217c..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4634_Logoff.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logoff
-title_jp: ログオフ
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId%'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: 7309e070-56b9-408b-a2f4-f1840f8f1ebf
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4634
- filter:
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$" #filter out computer/machine accounts
- condition: selection and not filter
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4647_LogoffUserInitiated.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4647_LogoffUserInitiated.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index eac3cf28..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4647_LogoffUserInitiated.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Logoff - User Initiated
-title_jp: ログオフ - ユーザが行った
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : LogonID: %TargetLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : ログオンID: %TargetLogonId%'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: 6bad16f1-02c4-4075-b414-3cd16944bc65
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4647
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4648_ExplicitLogon.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4648_ExplicitLogon.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8b08ca3a..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4648_ExplicitLogon.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2021/12/17
-modified: 2021/12/17
-
-title: Explicit Logon
-title_jp: 明示的なログオン
-details: 'Source User: %SubjectUserName% : Target User: %TargetUserName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : Process: %ProcessName% : Target Server: %TargetInfo%'
-details_jp: 'ソースユーザ: %SubjectUserName% : ターゲットユーザ: %TargetUserName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : プロセス: %ProcessName% : ターゲットサーバ: %TargetInfo%'
-description: |
- (From ultimatewindowsecurity.com)
- This log is generated when
- 1. A user connects to a server or runs a program locally using alternate credentials.
- For instance a user maps a drive to a server but specifies a different user's credentials or opens a shortcut under RunAs by shift-control-right-clicking on the shortcut,
- selecting Run as..., and then filling in a different user's credentials in the dialog box that appears. Or a user logs on to a web site using new specific credentials.
- 2. When a process logs on as a different account such as when the Scheduled Tasks service starts a task as the specified user.
- 3. With User Account Control enabled, an end user runs a program requiring admin authority. You will get this event where the process information is consent.exe.
- Unfortunately the Subject does not identify the end user.
- 4. Logging on interactively to a server with a domain account. (Two 4624 events will also be generated.)
-description_jp:
-
-id: 8c1899fe-493d-4faf-aae1-0853a33a3278
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection_basic_info:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4648
- selection_TargetUserIsComputerAccount:
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- IpAddress: "-"
- filter_SuspiciousProcess:
- - ProcessName|endswith: "powershell.exe"
- - ProcessName|endswith: "WMIC.exe"
- filter_UsersAndTargetServerAreComputerAccounts: #Filter system noise
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetUserName|endswith: "$"
- TargetInfo|endswith: "$"
- filter_SubjectUserIsComputerAccount:
- SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- filter_SystemAccounts:
- TargetUserName|re: "(DWM|UMFD)-([0-9]|1[0-2])$" #Filter out default Desktop Windows Manager and User Mode Driver Framework accounts
- IpAddress: "-" #Don't filter if the IP address is remote to catch attackers who created backdoor accounts that look like DWM-12, etc..
- condition: selection_basic_info and not (selection_TargetUserIsComputerAccount and not filter_SubjectUserIsComputerAccount) and not filter_SystemAccounts
- and not filter_UsersAndTargetServerAreComputerAccounts and not filter_SuspiciousProcess
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
- - attack.privilege_escalation
- - attack.lateral_movement
-references:
- - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4648
-sample-evtx: ./EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/Privilege Escalation/Runas_4624_4648_Webshell_CreateProcessAsUserA.evtx
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4672_AdminLogon.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4672_AdminLogon.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 23f40e75..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4672_AdminLogon.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Admin Logon
-title_jp: 管理者ログオン
-details: 'User: %SubjectUserName% : LogonID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %SubjectUserName% : ログオンID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: fdd0b325-8b89-469c-8b0c-e5ddfe39b62e
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4672
- filter:
- - SubjectUserName: "SYSTEM"
- - SubjectUserName: "LOCAL SERVICE"
- - SubjectUserName: "NETWORK SERVICE"
- - SubjectUserName|endswith: "$"
- condition: selection and not filter
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4768_KerberosTGT-Request.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4768_KerberosTGT-Request.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index fdace3ba..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4768_KerberosTGT-Request.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Kerberos TGT was requested
-title_jp: Kerberos TGTが要求された
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Service: %ServiceName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : Status: %Status% : PreAuthType: %PreAuthType%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : サービス: %ServiceName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ステータス: %Status% : 事前認証タイプ: %PreAuthType%'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: d9f336ea-bb16-4a35-8a9c-183216b8d59c
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4768
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4769_KerberosServiceTicketRequest.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4769_KerberosServiceTicketRequest.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6d5b1c0c..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4769_KerberosServiceTicketRequest.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Kerberos Service Ticket Requested
-title_jp: Kerberosサービスチケットが要求された
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Service: %ServiceName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : Status: %Status%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : サービス: %ServiceName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ステータス: %Status%'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: da6257f3-cf49-464a-96fc-c84a7ce20636
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4769
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4776_NTLM-LogonToLocalAccount.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4776_NTLM-LogonToLocalAccount.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2e4f86c6..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/Logons/4776_NTLM-LogonToLocalAccount.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: NTLM Logon to Local Account
-title_jp: ローカルアカウントへのNTLMログオン
-details: 'User: %TargetUserName% : Workstation %Workstation% : Status: %Status%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %TargetUserName% : 端末: %Workstation% : ステータス: %Status%'
-description: Prints logon information.
-description_jp: Prints logon information.
-
-id: 4fbe94b0-577a-4f77-9b13-250e27d440fa
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 4776
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/WirelessAccess/8001_WirelessAP-Connect.yml b/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/WirelessAccess/8001_WirelessAP-Connect.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 579948ed..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/default/events/Security/WirelessAccess/8001_WirelessAP-Connect.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/26
-
-title: Connection to wireless access point
-title_jp: ローカルアカウントへのNTLMログオン
-details: 'SSID: %SSID% : Type: %AuthenticationAlgorithm% : BSSType: %BSSType%'
-details_jp: 'SSID: %SSID% : タイプ: %AuthenticationAlgorithm% : BSSタイプ: %BSSType%'
-description: Prints connection info to wireless access points.
-description_jp: Prints connection info to wireless access points.
-
-id: 90dd0797-f481-453d-a97e-dd78436893f9
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Microsoft-Windows-WLAN-AutoConfig
- EventID: 8001
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/non-default/alerts/PowershellOperational/400_ImpairDefenses-DowngradeAttack_PowershellV2DowngradeAttack.yml b/rules/hayabusa/non-default/alerts/PowershellOperational/400_ImpairDefenses-DowngradeAttack_PowershellV2DowngradeAttack.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index dfb03692..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/non-default/alerts/PowershellOperational/400_ImpairDefenses-DowngradeAttack_PowershellV2DowngradeAttack.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-author: Yusuke Matsui, Yamato Security
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/22
-
-title: Powershell 2.0 Downgrade Attack
-title_jp: Powershell 2.0へのダウングレード攻撃
-details: 'Powershell 2.0 downgrade attack detected!'
-details_jp: 'Powershell 2.0へのダウングレード攻撃が検知されました!'
-description: An attacker may have started Powershell 2.0 to evade detection.
-description_jp: 攻撃者は検知されないようにPowershell 2.0を起動したリスクがある。
-
-id: bc082394-73e6-4d00-a9af-e7b524ef5085
-level: medium
-status: testing
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
- EventID: 400
- EventData|re: '[\s\S]*EngineVersion=2\.0[\s\S]*'
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - legacy application
-tags:
- - attack.defense_evasion
- - attack.t1562.010
- - lolbas
-references:
- - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010/
- - https://kurtroggen.wordpress.com/2017/05/17/powershell-security-powershell-downgrade-attacks/
-logsource: non-default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/non-default/events/PowerShellOperational/4103_CommandAndScriptingInterpreter-PowerShell_PowershellExecutionPipeline.yml b/rules/hayabusa/non-default/events/PowerShellOperational/4103_CommandAndScriptingInterpreter-PowerShell_PowershellExecutionPipeline.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index cdb394f5..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/non-default/events/PowerShellOperational/4103_CommandAndScriptingInterpreter-PowerShell_PowershellExecutionPipeline.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-author: Eric Conrad, Yamato Security
-date: 2020/11/08
-modified: 2021/11/22
-
-title: PowerShell Execution Pipeline
-title_jp: PowerShellパイプライン実行
-details: 'Command: %CommandLine%'
-details_jp: 'コマンド: %CommandLine%'
-description: Displays powershell execution
-description_jp: Powershellの実行を出力する。
-
-id: d3fb8f7b-88b0-4ff4-bf9b-ca286ce19031
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
- EventID: 4103
- ContextInfo:
- - Host Application
- - ホスト アプリケーション
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
- - attack.defense_evasion
- - attack.t1059.001
- - lolbas
-references:
-logsource: non-default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/non-default/events/Security/5140_NetworkShareAccess.yml b/rules/hayabusa/non-default/events/Security/5140_NetworkShareAccess.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e1a5430e..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/non-default/events/Security/5140_NetworkShareAccess.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2021/12/16
-modified: 2021/12/16
-
-title: Network Share Access
-title_jp: ネットワーク共有へのアクセス
-details: 'User: %SubjectUserName% : Share Name: %ShareName% : Share Path: %ShareLocalPath% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %SubjectUserName% : 共有名: %ShareName% : 共有パス: %ShareLocalPath% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-description:
-description_jp:
-
-id: 15d042c1-07c6-4e16-ae7d-e0e556ccd9a8
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 5140
- condition: selection
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
- - attack.t1039 # Data from network shared drive
- - attack.collection
-references:
-sample-evtx: ./EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0007-Discovery/T1135.xxx-Network Share Discovery/ID5140-5145-Bloodhound-SharpHound enumeration via SMB.evtx
-logsource: non-default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/non-default/events/Security/5145_NetworkShareFileAccess.yml b/rules/hayabusa/non-default/events/Security/5145_NetworkShareFileAccess.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 9669da48..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/non-default/events/Security/5145_NetworkShareFileAccess.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2021/12/16
-modified: 2021/12/16
-
-title: Network Share File Access
-title_jp: ネットワーク共有へのアクセス
-details: 'User: %SubjectUserName% : Share Name: %ShareName% : Share Path: %ShareLocalPath% : File: %RelativeTargetName% : IP Address: %IpAddress% : LogonID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-details_jp: 'ユーザ: %SubjectUserName% : 共有名: %ShareName% : 共有パス: %ShareLocalPath% : ファイル: %RelativeTargetName% : IPアドレス: %IpAddress% : ログオンID: %SubjectLogonId%'
-description:
-description_jp:
-
-id: 8c6ec2b2-8dad-4996-9aba-d659afc1b919
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Security
- EventID: 5145
- filter:
- - ShareLocalPath: ""
- - ShareLocalPath: "null"
- - ShareName: "\\\\*\\IPC$"
- - RelativeTargetName: "\\"
- condition: selection and not filter
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
- - attack.t1039 # Data from network shared drive
- - attack.collection
-references:
-sample-evtx: ./EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0007-Discovery/T1135.xxx-Network Share Discovery/ID5140-5145-Bloodhound-SharpHound enumeration via SMB.evtx
-logsource: non-default
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/sysmon/alerts/1_ProcessCreationSysmonAlert.yml b/rules/hayabusa/sysmon/alerts/1_ProcessCreationSysmonAlert.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index d2dba921..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/sysmon/alerts/1_ProcessCreationSysmonAlert.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2021/12/11
-modified: 2021/12/11
-
-title: Process Creation Sysmon Rule Alert
-title_jp: プロセス起動 - Sysmonルールアラート
-details: 'Rule: %RuleName% : Command: %CommandLine% : Path: %Image% : User: %User% : Parent Command: %ParentCommandLine%'
-details_jp: 'ルール: %RuleName% : コマンド: %CommandLine% : パス: %Image% : ユーザ: %User% : 親コマンド: %ParentCommandLine%'
-description: Sysmon process creation
-description_jp: Sysmonログによるプロセス起動のログ
-
-id: d5e4fb89-b027-43bf-bd3a-2e7f74f105ac
-level: high
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection:
- Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
- EventID: 1
- filter:
- - RuleName: ""
- - RuleName: "-"
- condition: selection and not filter
-falsepositives:
- - bad sysmon rule
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: sysmon
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/sysmon/events/1_ProcessCreation.yml b/rules/hayabusa/sysmon/events/1_ProcessCreation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c186a8e3..00000000
--- a/rules/hayabusa/sysmon/events/1_ProcessCreation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-author: Zach Mathis
-date: 2021/12/11
-modified: 2021/12/11
-
-title: Process Creation
-title_jp: プロセス起動
-details: 'Command: %CommandLine% : Path: %Image% : User: %User% : Parent Command: %ParentCommandLine%'
-details_jp: 'コマンド: %CommandLine% : パス: %Image% : ユーザ: %User% : 親コマンド: %ParentCommandLine%'
-description: Sysmon process creation. Displays only commands that have not been flagged with a sysmon detection rule.
-description_jp: Sysmonログによるプロセス起動のログ
-
-id: 85790e3e-e270-499f-a6ad-f8afe85c35f1
-level: informational
-status: stable
-detection:
- selection_1:
- Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
- EventID: 1
- selection_2:
- - RuleName: ""
- - RuleName: "-"
- condition: selection_1 and selection_2
-falsepositives:
- - normal system usage
-tags:
-references:
-sample-evtx:
-logsource: sysmon
-ruletype: Hayabusa
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/rules/hayabusa/testing/.gitkeep b/rules/hayabusa/testing/.gitkeep
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29b..00000000
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_audit_cve.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_audit_cve.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 403811e7..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_audit_cve.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Audit CVE Event
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2020/01/15
-description: Detects events generated by Windows to indicate the exploitation of a
- known vulnerability (e.g. CVE-2020-0601)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE
- condition: SELECTION_1
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 48d91a3a-2363-43ba-a456-ca71ac3da5c2
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: application
-modified: 2021/10/13
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1217179698008068096
-- https://twitter.com/VM_vivisector/status/1217190929330655232
-- https://twitter.com/davisrichardg/status/1217517547576348673
-- https://twitter.com/DidierStevens/status/1217533958096924676
-- https://twitter.com/FlemmingRiis/status/1217147415482060800
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1203
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1068
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1211
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1212
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1210
-- attack.impact
-- attack.t1499.004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_av_relevant_match.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_av_relevant_match.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 15490ad7..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_av_relevant_match.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Relevant Anti-Virus Event
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/02/19
-description: This detection method points out highly relevant Antivirus events
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- - HTool-
- - Hacktool
- - ASP/Backdoor
- - JSP/Backdoor
- - PHP/Backdoor
- - Backdoor.ASP
- - Backdoor.JSP
- - Backdoor.PHP
- - Webshell
- - Portscan
- - Mimikatz
- - .WinCred.
- - PlugX
- - Korplug
- - Pwdump
- - Chopper
- - WmiExec
- - Xscan
- - Clearlog
- - ASPXSpy
- SELECTION_2:
- - Keygen
- - Crack
- condition: ((SELECTION_1) and not (SELECTION_2))
-falsepositives:
-- Some software piracy tools (key generators, cracks) are classified as hack tools
-id: 78bc5783-81d9-4d73-ac97-59f6db4f72a8
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: application
-modified: 2021/11/20
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.resource_development
-- attack.t1588
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_software_atera_rmm_agent_install.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_software_atera_rmm_agent_install.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 726066d9..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_software_atera_rmm_agent_install.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Atera Agent Installation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Bhabesh Raj
-date: 2021/09/01
-description: Detects successful installation of Atera Remote Monitoring & Management
- (RMM) agent as recently found to be used by Conti operators
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1033
- SELECTION_2:
- Provider_Name: MsiInstaller
- SELECTION_3:
- Message: '*AteraAgent*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate Atera agent installation
-id: 87261fb2-69d0-42fe-b9de-88c6b5f65a43
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: application
-modified: 2021/10/13
-references:
-- https://www.advintel.io/post/secret-backdoor-behind-conti-ransomware-operation-introducing-atera-agent
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1219
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_susp_backup_delete.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_susp_backup_delete.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8d864dfd..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_susp_backup_delete.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Backup Catalog Deleted
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth (rule), Tom U. @c_APT_ure (collection)
-date: 2017/05/12
-description: Detects backup catalog deletions
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 524
- SELECTION_2:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Backup
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 9703792d-fd9a-456d-a672-ff92efe4806a
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: application
-modified: 2021/10/13
-references:
-- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc742154(v=ws.11).aspx
-- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa?environmentId=100
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1107
-- attack.t1070.004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_susp_msmpeng_crash.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_susp_msmpeng_crash.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 7f94ca0f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_susp_msmpeng_crash.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Microsoft Malware Protection Engine Crash
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/05/09
-description: This rule detects a suspicious crash of the Microsoft Malware Protection
- Engine
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Application Error
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 1000
- SELECTION_3:
- Provider_Name: Windows Error Reporting
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 1001
- SELECTION_5:
- - MsMpEng.exe
- SELECTION_6:
- - mpengine.dll
- condition: (((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) or (SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)) and
- (SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6))
-falsepositives:
-- MsMpEng.exe can crash when C:\ is full
-id: 6c82cf5c-090d-4d57-9188-533577631108
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: application
-modified: 2021/10/13
-references:
-- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1252&desc=5
-- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/4022344
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1089
-- attack.t1211
-- attack.t1562.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_vul_cve_2020_0688.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_vul_cve_2020_0688.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4eacc7af..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_vul_cve_2020_0688.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CVE-2020-0688 Exploitation via Eventlog
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, wagga
-date: 2020/02/29
-description: Detects the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerability as described
- in CVE-2020-0688
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4
- SELECTION_2:
- Provider_Name: MSExchange Control Panel
- SELECTION_3:
- Level: Error
- SELECTION_4:
- - '&__VIEWSTATE='
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: d6266bf5-935e-4661-b477-78772735a7cb
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: application
-modified: 2021/10/13
-references:
-- https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/detecting-cve-20200688-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server/
-- https://cyberpolygon.com/materials/okhota-na-ataki-ms-exchange-chast-2-cve-2020-0688-cve-2020-16875-cve-2021-24085/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.t1190
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_vul_cve_2021_41379.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_vul_cve_2021_41379.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 5b1c801a..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/application/win_vul_cve_2021_41379.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-
-title: LPE InstallerFileTakeOver PoC CVE-2021-41379
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/11/22
-description: Detects PoC tool used to exploit LPE vulnerability CVE-2021-41379
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1033
- SELECTION_2:
- Provider_Name: MsiInstaller
- SELECTION_3:
- - test pkg
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Other MSI packages for which your admins have used that name
-id: 7dbb86de-a0cc-494c-8aa8-b2996c9ef3c8
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: application
-references:
-- https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.t1190
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_aadhealth_mon_agent_regkey_access.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_aadhealth_mon_agent_regkey_access.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b51c6f58..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_aadhealth_mon_agent_regkey_access.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Azure AD Health Monitoring Agent Registry Keys Access
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
-date: 2021/08/26
-description: |
- This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key of Azure AD Health monitoring agent.
- This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Online\Reporting\MonitoringAgent.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4656
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4663
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectType: Key
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectName: \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Online\Reporting\MonitoringAgent
- SELECTION_5:
- ProcessName:
- - '*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe*'
- - '*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe*'
- - '*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe*'
- - '*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe*'
- - '*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Common.Clients.ResourceMonitor.exe*'
- condition: (((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) and not
- (SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: ff151c33-45fa-475d-af4f-c2f93571f4fe
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-references:
-- https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
-- https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/master/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_monitoring_agent.yml
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1012
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_aadhealth_svc_agent_regkey_access.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_aadhealth_svc_agent_regkey_access.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 10e94b0d..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_aadhealth_svc_agent_regkey_access.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Azure AD Health Service Agents Registry Keys Access
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
-date: 2021/08/26
-description: |
- This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys of Azure AD Health service agents (e.g AD FS).
- Information from AD Health service agents can be used to potentially abuse some of the features provided by those services in the cloud (e.g. Federation).
- This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object: HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent.
- Make sure you set the SACL to propagate to its sub-keys.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4656
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4663
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectType: Key
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectName: \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent
- SELECTION_5:
- ProcessName:
- - '*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe*'
- - '*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe*'
- - '*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe*'
- - '*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe*'
- - '*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Common.Clients.ResourceMonitor.exe*'
- condition: (((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) and not
- (SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 1d2ab8ac-1a01-423b-9c39-001510eae8e8
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-references:
-- https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
-- https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/master/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_service_agent.yml
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1012
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_account_backdoor_dcsync_rights.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_account_backdoor_dcsync_rights.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 08327fd4..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_account_backdoor_dcsync_rights.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Samir Bousseaden; Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g; oscd.community
-date: 2019/04/03
-description: backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync
- to a regular user or machine account using Powerview\Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync
- Extended Right cmdlet, will allow to re-obtain the pwd hashes of any user/computer
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5136
- SELECTION_2:
- AttributeLDAPDisplayName: ntSecurityDescriptor
- SELECTION_3:
- AttributeValue:
- - '*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*'
- - '*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*'
- - '*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- New Domain Controller computer account, check user SIDs within the value attribute
- of event 5136 and verify if it's a regular user or DC computer account.
-id: 2c99737c-585d-4431-b61a-c911d86ff32f
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/09
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1111556090137903104
-- https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1098
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_account_discovery.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_account_discovery.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 636f3e22..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_account_discovery.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-
-title: AD Privileged Users or Groups Reconnaissance
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Samir Bousseaden
-date: 2019/04/03
-description: Detect priv users or groups recon based on 4661 eventid and known privileged
- users or groups SIDs
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4661
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectType:
- - SAM_USER
- - SAM_GROUP
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectName:
- - '*-512'
- - '*-502'
- - '*-500'
- - '*-505'
- - '*-519'
- - '*-520'
- - '*-544'
- - '*-551'
- - '*-555'
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectName: '*admin*'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and (SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- if source account name is not an admin then its super suspicious
-id: 35ba1d85-724d-42a3-889f-2e2362bcaf23
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: 'Requirements: enable Object Access SAM on your Domain Controllers'
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/08
-references:
-- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-5-detecting-enumeration.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1087
-- attack.t1087.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_ad_object_writedac_access.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_ad_object_writedac_access.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 9b8d710e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_ad_object_writedac_access.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: AD Object WriteDAC Access
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/09/12
-description: Detects WRITE_DAC access to a domain object
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4662
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectServer: DS
- SELECTION_3:
- AccessMask: '0x40000'
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectType:
- - 19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9
- - domainDNS
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 028c7842-4243-41cd-be6f-12f3cf1a26c7
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/05_defense_evasion/WIN-190101151110.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1222
-- attack.t1222.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2ddd0ae3..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/07/26
-description: Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS)
- from a non machine account to request credentials.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4662
- SELECTION_2:
- AccessMask: '0x100'
- SELECTION_3:
- Properties:
- - '*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*'
- - '*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*'
- - '*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*'
- SELECTION_4:
- SubjectUserName: '*$'
- SELECTION_5:
- SubjectUserName: MSOL_*
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4
- or SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- SubjectDomainName
-- SubjectUserName
-id: 17d619c1-e020-4347-957e-1d1207455c93
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-180815210510.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.006
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_ad_user_enumeration.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_ad_user_enumeration.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b85dee62..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_ad_user_enumeration.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: AD User Enumeration
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut)
-date: 2020/03/30
-description: Detects access to a domain user from a non-machine account
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4662
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectType: '*bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2*'
- SELECTION_3:
- SubjectUserName: '*$'
- SELECTION_4:
- SubjectUserName: MSOL_*
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Administrators configuring new users.
-id: ab6bffca-beff-4baa-af11-6733f296d57a
-level: medium
-logsource:
- definition: Requires the "Read all properties" permission on the user object to
- be audited for the "Everyone" principal
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/08/09
-references:
-- https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf
-- http://www.stuffithoughtiknew.com/2019/02/detecting-bloodhound.html
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/attributes-all
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1087
-- attack.t1087.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_adcs_certificate_template_configuration_vulnerability.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_adcs_certificate_template_configuration_vulnerability.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 92d236ac..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_adcs_certificate_template_configuration_vulnerability.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: ADCS Certificate Template Configuration Vulnerability
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Orlinum , BlueDefenZer
-date: 2021/11/17
-description: Detects certificate creation with template allowing risk permission subject
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4898
- SELECTION_2:
- TemplateContent: '*CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT*'
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 4899
- SELECTION_4:
- NewTemplateContent: '*CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT*'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) or (SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Administrator activity
-- Penetration tests
-- Proxy SSL certificate with subject modification
-- Smart card enrollement
-id: 5ee3a654-372f-11ec-8d3d-0242ac130003
-level: low
-logsource:
- definition: Certificate services loaded a template would trigger event ID 4898 and
- certificate Services template was updated would trigger event ID 4899. A risk
- permission seems to be comming if template contain specific flag.
- product: windows
- service: security
-references:
-- https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.credential_access
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_adcs_certificate_template_configuration_vulnerability_eku.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_adcs_certificate_template_configuration_vulnerability_eku.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2a7b2d8d..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_adcs_certificate_template_configuration_vulnerability_eku.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-
-title: ADCS Certificate Template Configuration Vulnerability with Risky EKU
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Orlinum , BlueDefenZer
-date: 2021/11/17
-description: Detects certificate creation with template allowing risk permission subject
- and risky EKU
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4898
- SELECTION_2:
- TemplateContent:
- - '*1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2*'
- - '*1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4*'
- - '*1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2*'
- - '*2.5.29.37.0*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TemplateContent: '*CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT*'
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 4899
- SELECTION_5:
- NewTemplateContent:
- - '*1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2*'
- - '*1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4*'
- - '*1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2*'
- - '*2.5.29.37.0*'
- SELECTION_6:
- NewTemplateContent: '*CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT*'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5
- and SELECTION_6))
-falsepositives:
-- Administrator activity
-- Penetration tests
-- Proxy SSL certificate with subject modification
-- Smart card enrollement
-id: bfbd3291-de87-4b7c-88a2-d6a5deb28668
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: Certificate services loaded a template would trigger event ID 4898 and
- certificate Services template was updated would trigger event ID 4899. A risk
- permission seems to be comming if template contain specific flag with risky EKU.
- product: windows
- service: security
-references:
-- https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.credential_access
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_admin_rdp_login.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_admin_rdp_login.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c411cac4..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_admin_rdp_login.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Admin User Remote Logon
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: juju4
-date: 2017/10/29
-description: Detect remote login by Administrator user (depending on internal pattern).
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4624
- SELECTION_2:
- LogonType: 10
- SELECTION_3:
- AuthenticationPackageName: Negotiate
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetUserName: Admin*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate administrative activity.
-id: 0f63e1ef-1eb9-4226-9d54-8927ca08520a
-level: low
-logsource:
- definition: 'Requirements: Identifiable administrators usernames (pattern or special
- unique character. ex: "Admin-*"), internal policy mandating use only as secondary
- account'
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/07
-references:
-- https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2016-04-005
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1078
-- attack.t1078.001
-- attack.t1078.002
-- attack.t1078.003
-- car.2016-04-005
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_admin_share_access.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_admin_share_access.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index cebdbb90..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_admin_share_access.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Access to ADMIN$ Share
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/03/04
-description: Detects access to $ADMIN share
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5140
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: Admin$
- SELECTION_3:
- SubjectUserName: '*$'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate administrative activity
-id: 098d7118-55bc-4912-a836-dc6483a8d150
-level: low
-logsource:
- definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit File Share"
- must be configured for Success/Failure
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1077
-- attack.t1021.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_alert_active_directory_user_control.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_alert_active_directory_user_control.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2708da57..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_alert_active_directory_user_control.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Enabled User Right in AD to Control User Objects
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: '@neu5ron'
-date: 2017/07/30
-description: Detects scenario where if a user is assigned the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege
- right in Active Directory it would allow control of other AD user objects.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4704
- SELECTION_2:
- PrivilegeList:
- - '*SeEnableDelegationPrivilege*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 311b6ce2-7890-4383-a8c2-663a9f6b43cd
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Policy Change > Audit Authorization Policy
- Change, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced
- Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Policy Change\Audit Authorization Policy
- Change'
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/12/02
-references:
-- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1098
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_alert_ad_user_backdoors.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_alert_ad_user_backdoors.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 197a353e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_alert_ad_user_backdoors.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Active Directory User Backdoors
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: '@neu5ron'
-date: 2017/04/13
-description: Detects scenarios where one can control another users or computers account
- without having to use their credentials.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4738
- SELECTION_2:
- AllowedToDelegateTo: '-'
- SELECTION_3:
- AllowedToDelegateTo|re: ^$
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 5136
- SELECTION_5:
- AttributeLDAPDisplayName: msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo
- SELECTION_6:
- ObjectClass: user
- SELECTION_7:
- AttributeLDAPDisplayName: servicePrincipalName
- SELECTION_8:
- AttributeLDAPDisplayName: msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and not (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3)) or (SELECTION_4
- and (SELECTION_5 or (SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7) or SELECTION_8)))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 300bac00-e041-4ee2-9c36-e262656a6ecc
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Account Management > Audit User Account
- Management, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced
- Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Account Management\Audit User Account
- Management, DS Access > Audit Directory Service Changes, Group Policy : Computer
- Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit
- Policies\DS Access\Audit Directory Service Changes'
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc220234.aspx
-- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
-- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/another-word-on-delegation/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.t1098
-- attack.persistence
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_alert_enable_weak_encryption.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_alert_enable_weak_encryption.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 071511b3..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_alert_enable_weak_encryption.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Weak Encryption Enabled and Kerberoast
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: '@neu5ron'
-date: 2017/07/30
-description: Detects scenario where weak encryption is enabled for a user profile
- which could be used for hash/password cracking.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4738
- SELECTION_2:
- NewUacValue:
- - '*8???'
- - '*9???'
- - '*A???'
- - '*B???'
- - '*C???'
- - '*D???'
- - '*E???'
- - '*F???'
- SELECTION_3:
- OldUacValue:
- - '*8???'
- - '*9???'
- - '*A???'
- - '*B???'
- - '*C???'
- - '*D???'
- - '*E???'
- - '*F???'
- SELECTION_4:
- NewUacValue:
- - '*1????'
- - '*3????'
- - '*5????'
- - '*7????'
- - '*9????'
- - '*B????'
- - '*D????'
- - '*F????'
- SELECTION_5:
- OldUacValue:
- - '*1????'
- - '*3????'
- - '*5????'
- - '*7????'
- - '*9????'
- - '*B????'
- - '*D????'
- - '*F????'
- SELECTION_6:
- NewUacValue:
- - '*8??'
- - '*9??'
- - '*A??'
- - '*B??'
- - '*C??'
- - '*D??'
- - '*E??'
- - '*F??'
- SELECTION_7:
- OldUacValue:
- - '*8??'
- - '*9??'
- - '*A??'
- - '*B??'
- - '*C??'
- - '*D??'
- - '*E??'
- - '*F??'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (((SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3)) or (SELECTION_4
- and not (SELECTION_5))) or (SELECTION_6 and not (SELECTION_7))))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: f6de9536-0441-4b3f-a646-f4e00f300ffd
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Account Management > Audit User Account
- Management, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced
- Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Account Management\Audit User Account
- Management'
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053
-- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1089
-- attack.t1562.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_alert_ruler.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_alert_ruler.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2c586128..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_alert_ruler.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Hacktool Ruler
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/05/31
-description: This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4776
- SELECTION_2:
- Workstation: RULER
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 4624
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 4625
- SELECTION_5:
- WorkstationName: RULER
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) or ((SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4) and SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- Go utilities that use staaldraad awesome NTLM library
-id: 24549159-ac1b-479c-8175-d42aea947cae
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/08/09
-references:
-- https://github.com/sensepost/ruler
-- https://github.com/sensepost/ruler/issues/47
-- https://github.com/staaldraad/go-ntlm/blob/master/ntlm/ntlmv1.go#L427
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1087
-- attack.t1075
-- attack.t1114
-- attack.t1059
-- attack.t1550.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_apt_chafer_mar18_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_apt_chafer_mar18_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a1f1c4b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_apt_chafer_mar18_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Chafer Activity
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
-date: 2018/03/23
-description: Detects Chafer activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report
- in March 2018
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4698
- SELECTION_2:
- TaskName:
- - SC Scheduled Scan
- - UpdatMachine
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: c0580559-a6bd-4ef6-b9b7-83703d98b561
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/19
-references:
-- https://nyotron.com/nyotron-discovers-next-generation-oilrig-attacks/
-related:
-- id: 53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.g0049
-- attack.t1053
-- attack.t1053.005
-- attack.s0111
-- attack.t1050
-- attack.t1543.003
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1112
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.t1071
-- attack.t1071.004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_apt_slingshot.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_apt_slingshot.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3a6f37d6..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_apt_slingshot.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Defrag Deactivation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Bartlomiej Czyz (@bczyz1)
-date: 2019/03/04
-description: Detects the deactivation and disabling of the Scheduled defragmentation
- task as seen by Slingshot APT group
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4701
- SELECTION_2:
- TaskName: \Microsoft\Windows\Defrag\ScheduledDefrag
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: c5a178bf-9cfb-4340-b584-e4df39b6a3e7
-level: medium
-logsource:
- definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Audit Other Object Access Events > Success'
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/19
-references:
-- https://securelist.com/apt-slingshot/84312/
-related:
-- id: 958d81aa-8566-4cea-a565-59ccd4df27b0
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1053
-- attack.s0111
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_apt_wocao.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_apt_wocao.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 083c0d73..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_apt_wocao.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Operation Wocao Activity
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, frack113
-date: 2019/12/20
-description: Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4799
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetUserName: Administr*
- SELECTION_3:
- CallerProcessName: '*\checkadmin.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Administrators that use checkadmin.exe tool to enumerate local administrators
-id: 74ad4314-482e-4c3e-b237-3f7ed3b9ca8d
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/19
-references:
-- https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/whitepapers/operation-wocao-shining-a-light-on-one-of-chinas-hidden-hacking-groups/
-- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1207671369963646976
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1012
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1036.004
-- attack.t1036
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1053.005
-- attack.t1053
-- attack.t1059.001
-- attack.t1086
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_arbitrary_shell_execution_via_settingcontent.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_arbitrary_shell_execution_via_settingcontent.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 94bfb175..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_arbitrary_shell_execution_via_settingcontent.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Arbitrary Shell Command Execution Via Settingcontent-Ms
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Sreeman
-date: 2020/03/13
-description: The .SettingContent-ms file type was introduced in Windows 10 and allows
- a user to create "shortcuts" to various Windows 10 setting pages. These files are
- simply XML and contain paths to various Windows 10 settings binaries.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- CommandLine: '*.SettingContent-ms*'
- SELECTION_2:
- FilePath: '*immersivecontrolpanel*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and not (SELECTION_2))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-fields:
-- ParentProcess
-- CommandLine
-- ParentCommandLine
-id: 24de4f3b-804c-4165-b442-5a06a2302c7e
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/08/09
-references:
-- https://posts.specterops.io/the-tale-of-settingcontent-ms-files-f1ea253e4d39
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1204
-- attack.t1193
-- attack.t1566.001
-- attack.execution
-- attack.initial_access
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_asr_bypass_via_appvlp_re.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_asr_bypass_via_appvlp_re.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 075cfacb..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_asr_bypass_via_appvlp_re.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Using AppVLP To Circumvent ASR File Path Rule
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Sreeman
-date: 2020/03/13
-description: Application Virtualization Utility is included with Microsoft Office.We
- are able to abuse “AppVLP” to execute shell commands. Normally, this binary is used
- for Application Virtualization, but we can use it as an abuse binary to circumvent
- the ASR file path rule folder or to mark a file as a system file
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- CommandLine|re: (?i).*appvlp.exe.*(cmd.exe|powershell.exe).*(.sh|.exe|.dll|.bin|.bat|.cmd|.js|.msh|.reg|.scr|.ps|.vb|.jar|.pl|.inf)
- condition: SELECTION_1
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-fields:
-- ParentProcess
-- CommandLine
-- ParentCommandLine
-id: 9c7e131a-0f2c-4ae0-9d43-b04f4e266d43
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/06/11
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1218
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.execution
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_atsvc_task.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_atsvc_task.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 7a7f0142..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_atsvc_task.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Remote Task Creation via ATSVC Named Pipe
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Samir Bousseaden
-date: 2019/04/03
-description: Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC
- namedpipe
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: \\\*\IPC$
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName: atsvc
- SELECTION_4:
- Accesses: '*WriteData*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- pentesting
-id: f6de6525-4509-495a-8a82-1f8b0ed73a00
-level: medium
-logsource:
- definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File
- Share" must be configured for Success/Failure
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/03/threat-hunting-25-scheduled-tasks-for.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1053
-- car.2013-05-004
-- car.2015-04-001
-- attack.t1053.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_camera_microphone_access.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_camera_microphone_access.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 03f32a5e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_camera_microphone_access.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Processes Accessing the Microphone and Webcam
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/06/07
-description: Potential adversaries accessing the microphone and webcam in an endpoint.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4657
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4656
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 4663
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectName:
- - '*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\microphone\NonPackaged*'
- - '*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\webcam\NonPackaged*'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 8cd538a4-62d5-4e83-810b-12d41e428d6e
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/duzvik/status/1269671601852813320
-- https://medium.com/@7a616368/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.collection
-- attack.t1123
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dce_rpc_smb_spoolss_named_pipe.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dce_rpc_smb_spoolss_named_pipe.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 5ca7f28e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dce_rpc_smb_spoolss_named_pipe.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2018/11/28
-description: Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used
- to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice
- enabled.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: \\\*\IPC$
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName: spoolss
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Domain Controllers acting as printer servers too? :)
-id: 214e8f95-100a-4e04-bb31-ef6cba8ce07e
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
-- https://dirkjanm.io/a-different-way-of-abusing-zerologon/
-- https://twitter.com/_dirkjan/status/1309214379003588608
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dcom_iertutil_dll_hijack.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dcom_iertutil_dll_hijack.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2cf27f2f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dcom_iertutil_dll_hijack.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: T1021 DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)
-date: 2020/10/12
-description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program
- Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer
- DLL Hijack scenario.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- RelativeTargetName: '*\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
- SELECTION_3:
- SubjectUserName: '*$'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: c39f0c81-7348-4965-ab27-2fde35a1b641
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-201009183000.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.002
-- attack.t1021.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dcsync.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dcsync.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ed0e0711..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dcsync.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Mimikatz DC Sync
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Benjamin Delpy, Florian Roth, Scott Dermott
-date: 2018/06/03
-description: Detects Mimikatz DC sync security events
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4662
- SELECTION_2:
- Properties:
- - '*Replicating Directory Changes All*'
- - '*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*'
- SELECTION_3:
- SubjectDomainName: Window Manager
- SELECTION_4:
- SubjectUserName:
- - NT AUTHORITY*
- - MSOL_*
- SELECTION_5:
- SubjectUserName: '*$'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not ((SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4)
- or (SELECTION_5)))
-falsepositives:
-- Valid DC Sync that is not covered by the filters; please report
-- Local Domain Admin account used for Azure AD Connect
-id: 611eab06-a145-4dfa-a295-3ccc5c20f59a
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/08/09
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/1003236624925413376
-- https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.s0002
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.006
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_defender_bypass.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_defender_bypass.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 36465b15..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_defender_bypass.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Windows Defender Exclusion Set
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: '@BarryShooshooga'
-date: 2019/10/26
-description: Detects scenarios where an windows defender exclusion was added in registry
- where an entity would want to bypass antivirus scanning from windows defender
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4657
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4656
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 4660
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 4663
- SELECTION_5:
- ObjectName: '*\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\\*'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4) and SELECTION_5)
-falsepositives:
-- Intended inclusions by administrator
-id: e9c8808f-4cfb-4ba9-97d4-e5f3beaa244d
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Security Settings/Local Policies/Audit
- Policy, Registry System Access Control (SACL): Auditing/User'
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1089
-- attack.t1562.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_disable_event_logging.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_disable_event_logging.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6a2a67ac..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_disable_event_logging.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Disabling Windows Event Auditing
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: '@neu5ron'
-date: 2017/11/19
-description: 'Detects scenarios where system auditing (ie: windows event log auditing)
- is disabled. This may be used in a scenario where an entity would want to bypass
- local logging to evade detection when windows event logging is enabled and reviewed.
- Also, it is recommended to turn off "Local Group Policy Object Processing" via GPO,
- which will make sure that Active Directory GPOs take precedence over local/edited
- computer policies via something such as "gpedit.msc". Please note, that disabling
- "Local Group Policy Object Processing" may cause an issue in scenarios of one off
- specific GPO modifications -- however it is recommended to perform these modifications
- in Active Directory anyways.'
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4719
- SELECTION_2:
- AuditPolicyChanges:
- - '*%%8448*'
- - '*%%8450*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 69aeb277-f15f-4d2d-b32a-55e883609563
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Computer Management > Audit Policy Configuration,
- Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced
- Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Policy Change\Audit Authorization Policy
- Change'
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://bit.ly/WinLogsZero2Hero
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1054
-- attack.t1562.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dpapi_domain_backupkey_extraction.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dpapi_domain_backupkey_extraction.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 7145b945..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dpapi_domain_backupkey_extraction.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: DPAPI Domain Backup Key Extraction
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/06/20
-description: Detects tools extracting LSA secret DPAPI domain backup key from Domain
- Controllers
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4662
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectType: SecretObject
- SELECTION_3:
- AccessMask: '0x2'
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectName: BCKUPKEY
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 4ac1f50b-3bd0-4968-902d-868b4647937e
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-190620024610.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dpapi_domain_masterkey_backup_attempt.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dpapi_domain_masterkey_backup_attempt.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index d7ab2519..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_dpapi_domain_masterkey_backup_attempt.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: DPAPI Domain Master Key Backup Attempt
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/08/10
-description: Detects anyone attempting a backup for the DPAPI Master Key. This events
- gets generated at the source and not the Domain Controller.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4692
- condition: SELECTION_1
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- SubjectDomainName
-- SubjectUserName
-id: 39a94fd1-8c9a-4ff6-bf22-c058762f8014
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-190620024610.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_etw_modification.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_etw_modification.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index cda0fe78..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_etw_modification.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: COMPlus_ETWEnabled Registry Modification
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/06/05
-description: Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4657
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectName: '*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework'
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectValueName: ETWEnabled
- SELECTION_4:
- NewValue: '0'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368
-- https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr
-- https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables
-- https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38
-- https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39
-- https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_
-- https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a
-- http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html
-- https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1112
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_event_log_cleared.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_event_log_cleared.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index fccfe425..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_event_log_cleared.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Security Event Log Cleared
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Saw Winn Naung
-date: 2021/08/15
-description: Checks for event id 1102 which indicates the security event log was cleared.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1102
- SELECTION_2:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate administrative activity
-fields:
-- SubjectLogonId
-- SubjectUserName
-- SubjectUserSid
-- SubjectDomainName
-id: a122ac13-daf8-4175-83a2-72c387be339d
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/10/13
-references:
-- https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/SecurityEventLogCleared.yaml
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1107
-- attack.t1070.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_exploit_cve_2021_1675_printspooler_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_exploit_cve_2021_1675_printspooler_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index dee612ff..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_exploit_cve_2021_1675_printspooler_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CVE-2021-1675 Print Spooler Exploitation IPC Access
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: INIT_6
-date: 2021/07/02
-description: Detects remote printer driver load from Detailed File Share in Security
- logs that are a sign of successful exploitation attempts against print spooler vulnerability
- CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: '5145'
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: \\\*\IPC$
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName: spoolss
- SELECTION_4:
- AccessMask: '0x3'
- SELECTION_5:
- ObjectType: File
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
-falsepositives:
-- nothing observed so far
-id: 8fe1c584-ee61-444b-be21-e9054b229694
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/INIT_3/status/1410662463641731075
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1569
-- cve.2021.1675
-- cve.2021.34527
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_external_device.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_external_device.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e5fc7ea2..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_external_device.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Keith Wright
-date: 2019/11/20
-description: Detects external diskdrives or plugged in USB devices , EventID 6416
- on windows 10 or later
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 6416
- SELECTION_2:
- ClassName: DiskDrive
- SELECTION_3:
- DeviceDescription: USB Mass Storage Device
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) or SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate administrative activity
-id: f69a87ea-955e-4fb4-adb2-bb9fd6685632
-level: low
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/08/09
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1091
-- attack.t1200
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.initial_access
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_global_catalog_enumeration.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_global_catalog_enumeration.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 44b1bf8b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_global_catalog_enumeration.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Enumeration via the Global Catalog
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah
-date: 2020/05/11
-description: Detects enumeration of the global catalog (that can be performed using
- BloodHound or others AD reconnaissance tools). Adjust Threshold according to domain
- width.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5156
- SELECTION_2:
- DestinationPort: 3268
- SELECTION_3:
- DestinationPort: 3269
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3)) | count() by SourceAddress
- > 2000
- timeframe: 1h
-falsepositives:
-- Exclude known DCs.
-id: 619b020f-0fd7-4f23-87db-3f51ef837a34
-level: medium
-logsource:
- definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Windows Filtering Platform > Filtering
- Platform Connection" must be configured for Success
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/06/01
-references:
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5156
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1087
-- attack.t1087.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_gpo_scheduledtasks.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_gpo_scheduledtasks.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c39e722e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_gpo_scheduledtasks.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Persistence and Execution at Scale via GPO Scheduled Task
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Samir Bousseaden
-date: 2019/04/03
-description: Detect lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, usually used to deploy
- ransomware at scale
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: \\\*\SYSVOL
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName: '*ScheduledTasks.xml'
- SELECTION_4:
- Accesses:
- - '*WriteData*'
- - '*%%4417*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- if the source IP is not localhost then it's super suspicious, better to monitor
- both local and remote changes to GPO scheduledtasks
-id: a8f29a7b-b137-4446-80a0-b804272f3da2
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File
- Share" must be configured for Success/Failure
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1106899890377052160
-- https://www.secureworks.com/blog/ransomware-as-a-distraction
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1053
-- attack.t1053.005
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_hidden_user_creation.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_hidden_user_creation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 418773db..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_hidden_user_creation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Hidden Local User Creation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Christian Burkard
-date: 2021/05/03
-description: Detects the creation of a local hidden user account which should not
- happen for event ID 4720.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4720
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetUserName: '*$'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-fields:
-- EventCode
-- AccountName
-id: 7b449a5e-1db5-4dd0-a2dc-4e3a67282538
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1387743867663958021
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1136.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_hybridconnectionmgr_svc_installation.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_hybridconnectionmgr_svc_installation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 056159e1..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_hybridconnectionmgr_svc_installation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: HybridConnectionManager Service Installation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2021/04/12
-description: Rule to detect the Hybrid Connection Manager service installation.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceName: HybridConnectionManager
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceFileName: '*HybridConnectionManager*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate use of Hybrid Connection Manager via Azure function apps.
-id: 0ee4d8a5-4e67-4faf-acfa-62a78457d1f2
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/08/09
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1381642789369286662
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1554
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_impacket_psexec.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_impacket_psexec.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8bdf7255..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_impacket_psexec.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Impacket PsExec Execution
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Bhabesh Raj
-date: 2020/12/14
-description: Detects execution of Impacket's psexec.py.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: \\\*\IPC$
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName:
- - '*RemCom_stdint*'
- - '*RemCom_stdoutt*'
- - '*RemCom_stderrt*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- nothing observed so far
-id: 32d56ea1-417f-44ff-822b-882873f5f43b
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File
- Share" must be configured for Success/Failure
- product: windows
- service: security
-references:
-- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_impacket_secretdump.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_impacket_secretdump.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 368afad1..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_impacket_secretdump.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Possible Impacket SecretDump Remote Activity
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Samir Bousseaden, wagga
-date: 2019/04/03
-description: Detect AD credential dumping using impacket secretdump HKTL
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: \\\*\ADMIN$
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName: '*SYSTEM32\\*'
- SELECTION_4:
- RelativeTargetName: '*.tmp*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- pentesting
-id: 252902e3-5830-4cf6-bf21-c22083dfd5cf
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File
- Share" must be configured for Success/Failure
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/06/27
-references:
-- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-huting-10-impacketsecretdump.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.002
-- attack.t1003.004
-- attack.t1003.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_clip_services_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_clip_services_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6064cbd0..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_clip_services_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/13
-description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceFileName|re: .*cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+clip(?:\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\(\s\\"\{\d\}.+\-f.+"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 4edf51e1-cb83-4e1a-bc39-800e396068e3
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-related:
-- id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_services_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_services_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4459571f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_services_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
-date: 2019/11/08
-description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated
- by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName|re: \$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\[
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceFileName|re: \$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\[
- SELECTION_4:
- ServiceFileName|re: \$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\[
- SELECTION_5:
- ServiceFileName|re: \$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}
- SELECTION_6:
- ServiceFileName|re: \\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name
- SELECTION_7:
- ServiceFileName|re: \$VerbosePreference\.ToString\(
- SELECTION_8:
- ServiceFileName|re: \String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4 or SELECTION_5
- or SELECTION_6 or SELECTION_7 or SELECTION_8))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: fd0f5778-d3cb-4c9a-9695-66759d04702a
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/16
-references:
-- https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/master/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888"
-related:
-- id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_stdin_services_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_stdin_services_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 78eb22be..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_stdin_services_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/15
-description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName|re: .*cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/17
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-related:
-- id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_var_services_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_var_services_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f5df8b62..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_var_services_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/15
-description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName|re: .*cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r)(?:\s|)"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: dcf2db1f-f091-425b-a821-c05875b8925a
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/12/02
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-related:
-- id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress_services_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress_services_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 313776cb..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress_services_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/18
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName|re: (?i).*new-object.*(?:system\.io\.compression\.deflatestream|system\.io\.streamreader).*text\.encoding\]::ascii.*readtoend
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 7a922f1b-2635-4d6c-91ef-af228b198ad3
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/18
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-related:
-- id: 175997c5-803c-4b08-8bb0-70b099f47595
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 0f99f48c..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/18
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName|re: (?i).*rundll32(?:\.exe)?(?:\s+)?shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*powershell.*"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: f241cf1b-3a6b-4e1a-b4f9-133c00dd95ca
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/18
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-related:
-- id: 11b52f18-aaec-4d60-9143-5dd8cc4706b9
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin_services_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin_services_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 606811cd..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin_services_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/12
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName|re: (?i).*(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\$\{?input).*&&.*"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 80b708f3-d034-40e4-a6c8-d23b7a7db3d1
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/18
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-related:
-- id: 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip_services_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip_services_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 39d317e2..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip_services_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/09
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName|re: (?i).*?echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?).*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 1a0a2ff1-611b-4dac-8216-8a7b47c618a6
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/18
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-related:
-- id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mshta_services_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mshta_services_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e7d33d48..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mshta_services_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/09
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName|re: (?i).*(set).*(&&).*(mshta).*(vbscript:createobject).*(\.run).*\(window\.close\).*"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 9b8d9203-4e0f-4cd9-bb06-4cc4ea6d0e9a
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/18
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-related:
-- id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 46b3056c..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/09
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName|re: (?i).*&&.*rundll32.*shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*(value|invoke|comspec|iex).*"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: cd0f7229-d16f-42de-8fe3-fba365fbcb3a
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/18
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-related:
-- id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_var_services_security.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_var_services_security.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 50578fd7..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_var_services_security.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/13
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName|re: (?i).*&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*/c
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 4c54ba8f-73d2-4d40-8890-d9cf1dca3d30
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/18
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-related:
-- id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_iso_mount.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_iso_mount.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 5ad6f89e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_iso_mount.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-
-title: ISO Image Mount
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Syed Hasan (@syedhasan009)
-date: 2021/05/29
-description: Detects the mount of ISO images on an endpoint
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4663
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectServer: Security
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectType: File
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectName: \Device\CdRom*
- SELECTION_5:
- ObjectName: \Device\CdRom0\setup.exe
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) and not
- (SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- Software installation ISO files
-id: 0248a7bc-8a9a-4cd8-a57e-3ae8e073a073
-level: medium
-logsource:
- definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Removable Storage"
- must be configured for Success/Failure
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/20
-references:
-- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk-en/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/malicious-spam-campaign-uses-iso-image-files-to-deliver-lokibot-and-nanocore
-- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/threat-actor-profile-ta2719-uses-colorful-lures-deliver-rats-local-languages
-- https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1257324139515269121
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.t1566.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_lateral_movement_condrv.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_lateral_movement_condrv.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b7b3c90b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_lateral_movement_condrv.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Lateral Movement Indicator ConDrv
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Janantha Marasinghe
-date: 2021/04/27
-description: This event was observed on the target host during lateral movement. The
- process name within the event contains the process spawned post compromise. Account
- Name within the event contains the compromised user account name. This event should
- to be correlated with 4624 and 4688 for further intrusion context.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4674
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectServer: Security
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectType: File
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectName: \Device\ConDrv
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- legal admin action
-- Penetration tests where lateral movement has occurred. This event will be created
- on the target host.
-id: 29d31aee-30f4-4006-85a9-a4a02d65306c
-level: low
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/12/09
-references:
-- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/wmiexec-vbs.htm
-- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-one.html
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1021
-- attack.t1059
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_lm_namedpipe.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_lm_namedpipe.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3ae1b55e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_lm_namedpipe.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-
-title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Samir Bousseaden
-date: 2019/04/03
-description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify
- on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using
- named pipes
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: \\\*\IPC$
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName:
- - atsvc
- - samr
- - lsarpc
- - lsass
- - winreg
- - netlogon
- - srvsvc
- - protected_storage
- - wkssvc
- - browser
- - netdfs
- - svcctl
- - spoolss
- - ntsvcs
- - LSM_API_service
- - HydraLsPipe
- - TermSrv_API_service
- - MsFteWds
- - sql\query
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
-id: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File
- Share" must be configured for Success/Failure
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/12/06
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1104489274387451904
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1077
-- attack.t1021.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_lolbas_execution_of_nltest.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_lolbas_execution_of_nltest.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 812b05b6..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_lolbas_execution_of_nltest.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Correct Execution of Nltest.exe
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Arun Chauhan
-date: 2021/10/04
-description: The attacker might use LOLBAS nltest.exe for discovery of domain controllers,
- domain trusts, parent domain and the current user permissions.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4689
- SELECTION_2:
- ProcessName: '*nltest.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- Status: '0x0'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Red team activity
-- rare legitimate use by an administrator
-fields:
-- SubjectUserName
-- SubjectDomainName
-id: eeb66bbb-3dde-4582-815a-584aee9fe6d1
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-references:
-- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/nltest.htm
-- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1482
-- attack.t1018
-- attack.t1016
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_lsass_access_non_system_account.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_lsass_access_non_system_account.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ad6da252..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_lsass_access_non_system_account.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-
-title: LSASS Access from Non System Account
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/06/20
-description: Detects potential mimikatz-like tools accessing LSASS from non system
- account
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4663
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4656
- SELECTION_3:
- AccessMask:
- - '0x40'
- - '0x1400'
- - '0x100000'
- - '0x1410'
- - '0x1010'
- - '0x1438'
- - '0x143a'
- - '0x1418'
- - '0x1f0fff'
- - '0x1f1fff'
- - '0x1f2fff'
- - '0x1f3fff'
- - '40'
- - '1400'
- - '1000'
- - '100000'
- - '1410'
- - '1010'
- - '1438'
- - 143a
- - '1418'
- - 1f0fff
- - 1f1fff
- - 1f2fff
- - 1f3fff
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectType: Process
- SELECTION_5:
- ObjectName: '*\lsass.exe'
- SELECTION_6:
- SubjectUserName: '*$'
- SELECTION_7:
- ProcessName: C:\Program Files*
- condition: (((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
- and not ((SELECTION_6) or (SELECTION_7)))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- ObjectName
-- SubjectUserName
-- ProcessName
-id: 962fe167-e48d-4fd6-9974-11e5b9a5d6d1
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/22
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-170105221010.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_mal_wceaux_dll.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_mal_wceaux_dll.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f7f788ee..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_mal_wceaux_dll.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: WCE wceaux.dll Access
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke
-date: 2017/06/14
-description: Detects wceaux.dll access while WCE pass-the-hash remote command execution
- on source host
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4656
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4658
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 4660
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 4663
- SELECTION_5:
- ObjectName: '*\wceaux.dll'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4) and SELECTION_5)
-falsepositives:
-- Penetration testing
-id: 1de68c67-af5c-4097-9c85-fe5578e09e67
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
-- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.s0005
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_metasploit_authentication.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_metasploit_authentication.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index abf79297..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_metasploit_authentication.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Metasploit SMB Authentication
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah
-date: 2020/05/06
-description: Alerts on Metasploit host's authentications on the domain.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4625
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4624
- SELECTION_3:
- LogonType: 3
- SELECTION_4:
- AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
- SELECTION_5:
- WorkstationName|re: ^[A-Za-z0-9]{16}$
- SELECTION_6:
- ProcessName|re: ^$
- SELECTION_7:
- EventID: 4776
- SELECTION_8:
- Workstation|re: ^[A-Za-z0-9]{16}$
- condition: (((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
- or (SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7 and SELECTION_8))
-falsepositives:
-- Linux hostnames composed of 16 characters.
-id: 72124974-a68b-4366-b990-d30e0b2a190d
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/07
-references:
-- https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/lib/rex/proto/smb/client.rb
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1077
-- attack.t1021.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_net_ntlm_downgrade.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_net_ntlm_downgrade.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 9505c48a..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_net_ntlm_downgrade.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: NetNTLM Downgrade Attack
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, wagga
-date: 2018/03/20
-description: Detects NetNTLM downgrade attack
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4657
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectName: '*\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM*'
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectName: '*ControlSet*'
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectName: '*\Control\Lsa*'
- SELECTION_5:
- ObjectValueName:
- - LmCompatibilityLevel
- - NtlmMinClientSec
- - RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: d3abac66-f11c-4ed0-8acb-50cc29c97eed
-level: critical
-logsource:
- definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Object Access > Audit Registry (Success)'
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/06/27
-references:
-- https://www.optiv.com/blog/post-exploitation-using-netntlm-downgrade-attacks
-related:
-- id: d67572a0-e2ec-45d6-b8db-c100d14b8ef2
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1089
-- attack.t1562.001
-- attack.t1112
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_new_or_renamed_user_account_with_dollar_sign.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_new_or_renamed_user_account_with_dollar_sign.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 862433da..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_new_or_renamed_user_account_with_dollar_sign.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: New or Renamed User Account with '$' in Attribute 'SamAccountName'.
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/25
-description: Detects possible bypass EDR and SIEM via abnormal user account name.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4720
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4781
- SELECTION_3:
- SamAccountName: '*$*'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- EventID
-- SamAccountName
-- SubjectUserName
-id: cfeed607-6aa4-4bbd-9627-b637deb723c8
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/07
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1036
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_not_allowed_rdp_access.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_not_allowed_rdp_access.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 59ee8465..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_not_allowed_rdp_access.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Denied Access To Remote Desktop
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Pushkarev Dmitry
-date: 2020/06/27
-description: This event is generated when an authenticated user who is not allowed
- to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop.
- Often, this event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows
- servers in the network.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4825
- condition: SELECTION_1
-falsepositives:
-- Valid user was not added to RDP group
-fields:
-- EventCode
-- AccountName
-- ClientAddress
-id: 8e5c03fa-b7f0-11ea-b242-07e0576828d9
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4825
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1076
-- attack.t1021.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_overpass_the_hash.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_overpass_the_hash.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 64be24e9..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_overpass_the_hash.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Successful Overpass the Hash Attempt
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (source), Dominik Schaudel (rule)
-date: 2018/02/12
-description: Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches
- the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4624
- SELECTION_2:
- LogonType: 9
- SELECTION_3:
- LogonProcessName: seclogo
- SELECTION_4:
- AuthenticationPackageName: Negotiate
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Runas command-line tool using /netonly parameter
-id: 192a0330-c20b-4356-90b6-7b7049ae0b87
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://cyberwardog.blogspot.de/2017/04/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1075
-- attack.s0002
-- attack.t1550.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_pass_the_hash.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_pass_the_hash.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a26ade8..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_pass_the_hash.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Pass the Hash Activity
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Ilias el Matani (rule), The Information Assurance Directorate at the NSA (method)
-date: 2017/03/08
-description: Detects the attack technique pass the hash which is used to move laterally
- inside the network
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4624
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4625
- SELECTION_3:
- LogonType: '3'
- SELECTION_4:
- LogonProcessName: NtLmSsp
- SELECTION_5:
- WorkstationName: '%Workstations%'
- SELECTION_6:
- ComputerName: '%Workstations%'
- SELECTION_7:
- TargetUserName: ANONYMOUS LOGON
- condition: (((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5
- and SELECTION_6) and not (SELECTION_7))
-falsepositives:
-- Administrator activity
-- Penetration tests
-id: f8d98d6c-7a07-4d74-b064-dd4a3c244528
-level: medium
-logsource:
- definition: The successful use of PtH for lateral movement between workstations
- would trigger event ID 4624, a failed logon attempt would trigger an event ID
- 4625
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://github.com/iadgov/Event-Forwarding-Guidance/tree/master/Events
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1075
-- car.2016-04-004
-- attack.t1550.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_pass_the_hash_2.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_pass_the_hash_2.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 709052b0..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_pass_the_hash_2.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Pass the Hash Activity 2
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Dave Kennedy, Jeff Warren (method) / David Vassallo (rule)
-date: 2019/06/14
-description: Detects the attack technique pass the hash which is used to move laterally
- inside the network
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4624
- SELECTION_2:
- SubjectUserSid: S-1-0-0
- SELECTION_3:
- LogonType: '3'
- SELECTION_4:
- LogonProcessName: NtLmSsp
- SELECTION_5:
- KeyLength: '0'
- SELECTION_6:
- LogonType: '9'
- SELECTION_7:
- LogonProcessName: seclogo
- SELECTION_8:
- TargetUserName: ANONYMOUS LOGON
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
- or (SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7))) and not (SELECTION_8))
-falsepositives:
-- Administrator activity
-- Penetration tests
-id: 8eef149c-bd26-49f2-9e5a-9b00e3af499b
-level: medium
-logsource:
- definition: The successful use of PtH for lateral movement between workstations
- would trigger event ID 4624
- product: windows
- service: security
-references:
-- https://github.com/iadgov/Event-Forwarding-Guidance/tree/master/Events
-- https://blog.binarydefense.com/reliably-detecting-pass-the-hash-through-event-log-analysis
-- https://blog.stealthbits.com/how-to-detect-pass-the-hash-attacks/
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1075
-- attack.t1550.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_petitpotam_network_share.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_petitpotam_network_share.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 364debae..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_petitpotam_network_share.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Possible PetitPotam Coerce Authentication Attempt
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag
-date: 2021/09/02
-description: Detect PetitPotam coerced authentication activity.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: \\\*
- SELECTION_3:
- ShareName: '*\IPC$'
- SELECTION_4:
- RelativeTargetName: lsarpc
- SELECTION_5:
- SubjectUserName: ANONYMOUS LOGON
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown. Feedback welcomed.
-id: 1ce8c8a3-2723-48ed-8246-906ac91061a6
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Detailed File Share"
- must be configured for Success/Failure
- product: windows
- service: security
-references:
-- https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
-- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/0dd6de32de2118b2818550df9e65255f4109a56d/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1187
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_petitpotam_susp_tgt_request.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_petitpotam_susp_tgt_request.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ec053441..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_petitpotam_susp_tgt_request.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-
-title: PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag
-date: 2021/09/02
-description: Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests. Once an attacer obtains a computer
- certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with
- PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes.
- One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool
- like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending
- on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name
- to the Domain Controller computer accounts.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4768
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetUserName: '*$'
- SELECTION_3:
- CertThumbprint: '*'
- SELECTION_4:
- IpAddress: ::1
- SELECTION_5:
- CertThumbprint: ''
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not ((SELECTION_4)
- or (SELECTION_5)))
-falsepositives:
-- False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication.
- We recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts.
-id: 6a53d871-682d-40b6-83e0-b7c1a6c4e3a5
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Account Logon > Kerberos Authentication
- Service" must be configured for Success/Failure
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/07
-references:
-- https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
-- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/
-- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1187
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_possible_dc_shadow.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_possible_dc_shadow.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 7dbe1f0a..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_possible_dc_shadow.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Possible DC Shadow
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community, Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah
-date: 2019/10/25
-description: Detects DCShadow via create new SPN
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4742
- SELECTION_2:
- ServicePrincipalNames: '*GC/*'
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 5136
- SELECTION_4:
- AttributeLDAPDisplayName: servicePrincipalName
- SELECTION_5:
- AttributeValue: GC/*
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) or (SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- Exclude known DCs
-id: 32e19d25-4aed-4860-a55a-be99cb0bf7ed
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/06
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/ec5bb710499caae6667c7f7311ca9e92c03b9039/rules/windows/builtin/win_dcsync.yml
-- https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/1003236624925413376
-- https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2
-- https://blog.alsid.eu/dcshadow-explained-4510f52fc19d
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1207
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_privesc_cve_2020_1472.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_privesc_cve_2020_1472.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 81b1eaf0..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_privesc_cve_2020_1472.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Possible Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) Exploitation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Aleksandr Akhremchik, @aleqs4ndr, ocsd.community
-date: 2020/10/15
-description: Detects Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability aka Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4742
- SELECTION_2:
- SubjectUserName: ANONYMOUS LOGON
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetUserName: '%DC-MACHINE-NAME%'
- SELECTION_4:
- PasswordLastSet: '-'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- automatic DC computer account password change
-- legitimate DC computer account password change
-id: dd7876d8-0f09-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/07
-references:
-- https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472
-- https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-zerologon-vulnerability-in-logpoint/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1068
-- attack.privilege_escalation
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_protected_storage_service_access.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_protected_storage_service_access.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index d650a0f8..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_protected_storage_service_access.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Protected Storage Service Access
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/08/10
-description: Detects access to a protected_storage service over the network. Potential
- abuse of DPAPI to extract domain backup keys from Domain Controllers
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: '*IPC*'
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName: protected_storage
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 45545954-4016-43c6-855e-eae8f1c369dc
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-190620024610.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021
-- attack.t1021.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rare_schtasks_creations.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rare_schtasks_creations.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b196e64d..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rare_schtasks_creations.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Rare Schtasks Creations
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/03/23
-description: Detects rare scheduled tasks creations that only appear a few times per
- time frame and could reveal password dumpers, backdoor installs or other types of
- malicious code
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4698
- condition: SELECTION_1 | count() by TaskName < 5
- timeframe: 7d
-falsepositives:
-- Software installation
-- Software updates
-id: b0d77106-7bb0-41fe-bd94-d1752164d066
-level: low
-logsource:
- definition: The Advanced Audit Policy setting Object Access > Audit Other Object
- Access Events has to be configured to allow this detection (not in the baseline
- recommendations by Microsoft). We also recommend extracting the Command field
- from the embedded XML in the event data.
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1053
-- car.2013-08-001
-- attack.t1053.005
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rdp_bluekeep_poc_scanner.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rdp_bluekeep_poc_scanner.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 0aa49f51..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rdp_bluekeep_poc_scanner.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Scanner PoC for CVE-2019-0708 RDP RCE Vuln
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth (rule), Adam Bradbury (idea)
-date: 2019/06/02
-description: Detects the use of a scanner by zerosum0x0 that discovers targets vulnerable
- to CVE-2019-0708 RDP RCE aka BlueKeep
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4625
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetUserName: AAAAAAA
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-id: 8400629e-79a9-4737-b387-5db940ab2367
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/12
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/AdamTheAnalyst/status/1134394070045003776
-- https://github.com/zerosum0x0/CVE-2019-0708
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1210
-- car.2013-07-002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rdp_localhost_login.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rdp_localhost_login.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 70f837db..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rdp_localhost_login.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: RDP Login from Localhost
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke
-date: 2019/01/28
-description: RDP login with localhost source address may be a tunnelled login
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4624
- SELECTION_2:
- LogonType: 10
- SELECTION_3:
- IpAddress:
- - ::1
- - 127.0.0.1
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 51e33403-2a37-4d66-a574-1fda1782cc31
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/07
-references:
-- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1076
-- car.2013-07-002
-- attack.t1021.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rdp_reverse_tunnel.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rdp_reverse_tunnel.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index afe66a0e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_rdp_reverse_tunnel.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-
-title: RDP over Reverse SSH Tunnel WFP
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Samir Bousseaden
-date: 2019/02/16
-description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback
- address
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5156
- SELECTION_2:
- SourcePort: 3389
- SELECTION_3:
- DestAddress:
- - 127.*
- - ::1
- SELECTION_4:
- DestPort: 3389
- SELECTION_5:
- SourceAddress:
- - 127.*
- - ::1
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 5bed80b6-b3e8-428e-a3ae-d3c757589e41
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/06
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1096148422984384514
-- https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/master/Command%20and%20Control/DE_RDP_Tunnel_5156.evtx
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1076
-- attack.t1090
-- attack.t1090.001
-- attack.t1090.002
-- attack.t1021.001
-- car.2013-07-002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_register_new_logon_process_by_rubeus.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_register_new_logon_process_by_rubeus.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2c970f82..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_register_new_logon_process_by_rubeus.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Register new Logon Process by Rubeus
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (source), Ilyas Ochkov (rule), oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/24
-description: Detects potential use of Rubeus via registered new trusted logon process
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4611
- SELECTION_2:
- LogonProcessName: User32LogonProcesss
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 12e6d621-194f-4f59-90cc-1959e21e69f7
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/08/14
-references:
-- https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1208
-- attack.t1558.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_remote_powershell_session.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_remote_powershell_session.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2ad3c1f7..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_remote_powershell_session.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Remote PowerShell Sessions Network Connections (WinRM)
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/09/12
-description: Detects basic PowerShell Remoting (WinRM) by monitoring for network inbound
- connections to ports 5985 OR 5986
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5156
- SELECTION_2:
- DestPort: 5985
- SELECTION_3:
- DestPort: 5986
- SELECTION_4:
- LayerRTID: 44
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate use of remote PowerShell execution
-id: 13acf386-b8c6-4fe0-9a6e-c4756b974698
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/05/21
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190511223310.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1086
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_remote_registry_management_using_reg_utility.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_remote_registry_management_using_reg_utility.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 493de4df..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_remote_registry_management_using_reg_utility.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Remote Registry Management Using Reg Utility
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/22
-description: Remote registry management using REG utility from non-admin workstation
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- RelativeTargetName: '*\winreg*'
- SELECTION_3:
- IpAddress: '%Admins_Workstations%'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate usage of remote registry management by administrator
-id: 68fcba0d-73a5-475e-a915-e8b4c576827e
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1112
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1012
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1552.002
-- attack.s0075
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_sam_registry_hive_handle_request.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_sam_registry_hive_handle_request.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 482ea76d..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_sam_registry_hive_handle_request.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: SAM Registry Hive Handle Request
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/08/12
-description: Detects handles requested to SAM registry hive
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4656
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectType: Key
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectName: '*\SAM'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- SubjectDomainName
-- SubjectUserName
-- ProcessName
-- ObjectName
-id: f8748f2c-89dc-4d95-afb0-5a2dfdbad332
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/07_discovery/WIN-190725024610.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1012
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1552.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_scheduled_task_deletion.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_scheduled_task_deletion.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index bbed9911..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_scheduled_task_deletion.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Scheduled Task Deletion
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: David Strassegger
-date: 2021/01/22
-description: Detects scheduled task deletion events. Scheduled tasks are likely to
- be deleted if not used for persistence. Malicious Software often creates tasks directly
- under the root node e.g. \TASKNAME
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4699
- condition: SELECTION_1
-falsepositives:
-- Software installation
-id: 4f86b304-3e02-40e3-aa5d-e88a167c9617
-level: medium
-logsource:
- definition: The Advanced Audit Policy setting Object Access > Audit Other Object
- Access Events has to be configured to allow this detection. We also recommend
- extracting the Command field from the embedded XML in the event data.
- product: windows
- service: security
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/matthewdunwoody/status/1352356685982146562
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4699
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1053
-- car.2013-08-001
-- attack.t1053.005
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_scm_database_handle_failure.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_scm_database_handle_failure.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2a22ecbe..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_scm_database_handle_failure.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: SCM Database Handle Failure
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/08/12
-description: Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4656
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectType: SC_MANAGER OBJECT
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectName: ServicesActive
- SELECTION_4:
- SubjectLogonId: '0x3e4'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 13addce7-47b2-4ca0-a98f-1de964d1d669
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/12
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/07_discovery/WIN-190826010110.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1010
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_scm_database_privileged_operation.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_scm_database_privileged_operation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ea39de1b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_scm_database_privileged_operation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: SCM Database Privileged Operation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/08/15
-description: Detects non-system users performing privileged operation os the SCM database
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4674
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectType: SC_MANAGER OBJECT
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectName: servicesactive
- SELECTION_4:
- PrivilegeList: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege
- SELECTION_5:
- SubjectLogonId: '0x3e4'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) and not
- (SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: dae8171c-5ec6-4396-b210-8466585b53e9
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/07_discovery/WIN-190826010110.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1548
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_scrcons_remote_wmi_scripteventconsumer.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_scrcons_remote_wmi_scripteventconsumer.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 7241ed31..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_scrcons_remote_wmi_scripteventconsumer.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Remote WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/09/02
-description: Detect potential adversaries leveraging WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers
- remotely to move laterally in a network
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4624
- SELECTION_2:
- LogonType: 3
- SELECTION_3:
- ProcessName: '*scrcons.exe'
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetLogonId: '0x3e7'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- SCCM
-id: 9599c180-e3a8-4743-8f92-7fb96d3be648
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-200902020333.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1546.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8b3f9357..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CobaltStrike Service Installations
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Wojciech Lesicki
-date: 2021/05/26
-description: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which
- a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName: '*ADMIN$*'
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceFileName: '*.exe*'
- SELECTION_4:
- ServiceFileName: '*%COMSPEC%*'
- SELECTION_5:
- ServiceFileName: '*start*'
- SELECTION_6:
- ServiceFileName: '*powershell*'
- SELECTION_7:
- ServiceFileName: '*powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand*'
- SELECTION_8:
- ServiceFileName:
- - '*SUVYIChOZXctT2JqZWN0IE5ldC5XZWJjbGllbnQpLkRvd25sb2FkU3RyaW5nKCdodHRwOi8vMTI3LjAuMC4xO*'
- - '*lFWCAoTmV3LU9iamVjdCBOZXQuV2ViY2xpZW50KS5Eb3dubG9hZFN0cmluZygnaHR0cDovLzEyNy4wLjAuMT*'
- - '*JRVggKE5ldy1PYmplY3QgTmV0LldlYmNsaWVudCkuRG93bmxvYWRTdHJpbmcoJ2h0dHA6Ly8xMjcuMC4wLjE6*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5
- and SELECTION_6) or SELECTION_7 or SELECTION_8))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: d7a95147-145f-4678-b85d-d1ff4a3bb3f6
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395
-- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/
-- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
-related:
-- id: 5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.002
-- attack.t1543.003
-- attack.t1569.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_mal_creddumper.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_mal_creddumper.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 5342f87f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_mal_creddumper.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
-date: 2017/03/05
-description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution
- events
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName:
- - '*fgexec*'
- - '*dumpsvc*'
- - '*cachedump*'
- - '*mimidrv*'
- - '*gsecdump*'
- - '*servpw*'
- - '*pwdump*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery
-id: f0d1feba-4344-4ca9-8121-a6c97bd6df52
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
-related:
-- id: 4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79ed
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.001
-- attack.t1003.002
-- attack.t1003.004
-- attack.t1003.005
-- attack.t1003.006
-- attack.t1035
-- attack.t1569.002
-- attack.s0005
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_mal_service_installs.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_mal_service_installs.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 93ca7395..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_mal_service_installs.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Malicious Service Installations
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community (update)
-date: 2017/03/27
-description: Detects known malicious service installs that only appear in cases of
- lateral movement, credential dumping, and other suspicious activities.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceName: javamtsup
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Penetration testing
-id: cb062102-587e-4414-8efa-dbe3c7bf19c6
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-for-paexec/
-- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html
-- https://blog.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CosmicDuke.pdf
-related:
-- id: 2cfe636e-317a-4bee-9f2c-1066d9f54d1a
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1035
-- attack.t1050
-- car.2013-09-005
-- attack.t1543.003
-- attack.t1569.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_metasploit_or_impacket_smb_psexec_service_install.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_metasploit_or_impacket_smb_psexec_service_install.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a0c5d001..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_metasploit_or_impacket_smb_psexec_service_install.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Metasploit Or Impacket Service Installation Via SMB PsExec
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Bartlomiej Czyz, Relativity
-date: 2021/01/21
-description: Detects usage of Metasploit SMB PsExec (exploit/windows/smb/psexec) and
- Impacket psexec.py by triggering on specific service installation
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName|re: ^%systemroot%\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.exe$
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceName|re: (^[a-zA-Z]{4}$)|(^[a-zA-Z]{8}$)|(^[a-zA-Z]{16}$)
- SELECTION_4:
- ServiceStartType: '3'
- SELECTION_5:
- ServiceType: '0x10'
- SELECTION_6:
- ServiceName: PSEXESVC
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
- and not (SELECTION_6))
-falsepositives:
-- Possible, different agents with a 8 character binary and a 4, 8 or 16 character
- service name
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- SubjectDomainName
-- SubjectUserName
-- ServiceName
-- ServiceFileName
-id: 6fb63b40-e02a-403e-9ffd-3bcc1d749442
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/23
-references:
-- https://bczyz1.github.io/2021/01/30/psexec.html
-related:
-- id: 1a17ce75-ff0d-4f02-9709-2b7bb5618cf0
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.002
-- attack.t1570
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1569.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_install.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_install.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index eb800446..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_install.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth
-date: 2019/10/26
-description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting
- a specific service installation
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_10:
- ServiceFileName: '*cmd.exe*'
- SELECTION_11:
- ServiceFileName: '*/c*'
- SELECTION_12:
- ServiceFileName: '*echo*'
- SELECTION_13:
- ServiceFileName: '*\pipe\\*'
- SELECTION_14:
- ServiceFileName: '*rundll32*'
- SELECTION_15:
- ServiceFileName: '*.dll,a*'
- SELECTION_16:
- ServiceFileName: '*/p:*'
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName: '*cmd*'
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceFileName: '*/c*'
- SELECTION_4:
- ServiceFileName: '*echo*'
- SELECTION_5:
- ServiceFileName: '*\pipe\\*'
- SELECTION_6:
- ServiceFileName: '*%COMSPEC%*'
- SELECTION_7:
- ServiceFileName: '*/c*'
- SELECTION_8:
- ServiceFileName: '*echo*'
- SELECTION_9:
- ServiceFileName: '*\pipe\\*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
- or (SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7 and SELECTION_8 and SELECTION_9) or (SELECTION_10
- and SELECTION_11 and SELECTION_12 and SELECTION_13) or (SELECTION_14 and SELECTION_15
- and SELECTION_16)))
-falsepositives:
-- Highly unlikely
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- SubjectDomainName
-- SubjectUserName
-- ServiceFileName
-id: ecbc5e16-58e0-4521-9c60-eb9a7ea4ad34
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
-- https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
-related:
-- id: 843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1134
-- attack.t1134.001
-- attack.t1134.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index acb6725f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: PowerShell Scripts Installed as Services
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
-date: 2020/10/06
-description: Detects powershell script installed as a Service
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName:
- - '*powershell*'
- - '*pwsh*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 2a926e6a-4b81-4011-8a96-e36cc8c04302
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
-related:
-- id: a2e5019d-a658-4c6a-92bf-7197b54e2cae
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1569.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_tap_driver_installation.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_tap_driver_installation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b30ccd9b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_tap_driver_installation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Tap Driver Installation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Ian Davis, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/24
-description: Well-known TAP software installation. Possible preparation for data exfiltration
- using tunnelling techniques
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName: '*tap0901*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate OpenVPN TAP insntallation
-id: 9c8afa4d-0022-48f0-9456-3712466f9701
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/21
-related:
-- id: 8e4cf0e5-aa5d-4dc3-beff-dc26917744a9
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.exfiltration
-- attack.t1048
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_wmi_persistence.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_wmi_persistence.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f173a0f3..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_security_wmi_persistence.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: WMI Persistence
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin oscd.community
-date: 2017/08/22
-description: Detects suspicious WMI event filter and command line event consumer based
- on WMI and Security Logs.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4662
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectType: WMI Namespace
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectName: '*subscription*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown (data set is too small; further testing needed)
-id: f033f3f3-fd24-4995-97d8-a3bb17550a88
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/899646620148539397
-- https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/
-related:
-- id: 0b7889b4-5577-4521-a60a-3376ee7f9f7b
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1084
-- attack.t1546.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_smb_file_creation_admin_shares.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_smb_file_creation_admin_shares.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f8c2606a..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_smb_file_creation_admin_shares.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: SMB Create Remote File Admin Share
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Jose Rodriguez (@Cyb3rPandaH), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/08/06
-description: Look for non-system accounts SMB accessing a file with write (0x2) access
- mask via administrative share (i.e C$).
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: '*C$'
- SELECTION_3:
- AccessMask: '0x2'
- SELECTION_4:
- SubjectUserName: '*$'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: b210394c-ba12-4f89-9117-44a2464b9511
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/master/playbooks/WIN-201012004336.yaml
-- https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/small/windows/08_lateral_movement/SDWIN-200806015757.html?highlight=create%20file
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_add_domain_trust.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_add_domain_trust.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 0f40be09..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_add_domain_trust.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Addition of Domain Trusts
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke
-date: 2019/12/03
-description: Addition of domains is seldom and should be verified for legitimacy.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4706
- condition: SELECTION_1
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate extension of domain structure
-id: 0255a820-e564-4e40-af2b-6ac61160335c
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1098
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_add_sid_history.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_add_sid_history.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e5bec11e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_add_sid_history.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Addition of SID History to Active Directory Object
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke, @atc_project (improvements)
-date: 2017/02/19
-description: An attacker can use the SID history attribute to gain additional privileges.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4765
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4766
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 4738
- SELECTION_4:
- SidHistory:
- - '-'
- - '%%1793'
- SELECTION_5:
- SidHistory|re: ^$
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) or ((SELECTION_3 and not (SELECTION_4))
- and not (SELECTION_5)))
-falsepositives:
-- Migration of an account into a new domain
-id: 2632954e-db1c-49cb-9936-67d1ef1d17d2
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-references:
-- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1178
-- attack.t1134.005
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_codeintegrity_check_failure.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_codeintegrity_check_failure.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2c0f393b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_codeintegrity_check_failure.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Failed Code Integrity Checks
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke
-date: 2019/12/03
-description: Code integrity failures may indicate tampered executables.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5038
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 6281
- condition: (SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Disk device errors
-id: 470ec5fa-7b4e-4071-b200-4c753100f49b
-level: low
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2020/08/23
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1009
-- attack.t1027.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_dsrm_password_change.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_dsrm_password_change.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 20246dd2..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_dsrm_password_change.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Password Change on Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke
-date: 2017/02/19
-description: The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator
- account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4794
- condition: SELECTION_1
-falsepositives:
-- Initial installation of a domain controller
-id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2020/08/23
-references:
-- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1714
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1098
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_eventlog_cleared.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_eventlog_cleared.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4e881719..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_eventlog_cleared.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Eventlog Cleared
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/01/10
-description: One of the Windows Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by "wevtutil
- cl" command execution
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 517
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 1102
- SELECTION_3:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Rollout of log collection agents (the setup routine often includes a reset of the
- local Eventlog)
-- System provisioning (system reset before the golden image creation)
-id: d99b79d2-0a6f-4f46-ad8b-260b6e17f982
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/10/13
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/deviouspolack/status/832535435960209408
-- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745?environmentId=100
-related:
-- id: f2f01843-e7b8-4f95-a35a-d23584476423
- type: obsoletes
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1070
-- attack.t1070.001
-- car.2016-04-002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logon_reasons.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logon_reasons.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 058712e9..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logon_reasons.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/02/19
-description: This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious
- activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4625
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4776
- SELECTION_3:
- Status:
- - '0xC0000072'
- - '0xC000006F'
- - '0xC0000070'
- - '0xC0000413'
- - '0xC000018C'
- - '0xC000015B'
- SELECTION_4:
- SubjectUserSid: S-1-0-0
- condition: (((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- User using a disabled account
-id: 9eb99343-d336-4020-a3cd-67f3819e68ee
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/10/29
-references:
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625
-- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1101431884540710913
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.t1078
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logon_source.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logon_source.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4dd27de8..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logon_source.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Failed Logon From Public IP
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: NVISO
-date: 2020/05/06
-description: A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network
- boundary.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4625
- SELECTION_2:
- IpAddress: '*-*'
- SELECTION_3:
- IpAddress:
- - 10.*
- - 192.168.*
- - 172.16.*
- - 172.17.*
- - 172.18.*
- - 172.19.*
- - 172.20.*
- - 172.21.*
- - 172.22.*
- - 172.23.*
- - 172.24.*
- - 172.25.*
- - 172.26.*
- - 172.27.*
- - 172.28.*
- - 172.29.*
- - 172.30.*
- - 172.31.*
- - 127.*
- - 169.254.*
- SELECTION_4:
- IpAddress: ::1
- SELECTION_5:
- IpAddress:
- - fe80::*
- - fc00::*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and not ((SELECTION_2) or (SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4
- or SELECTION_5)))
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate logon attempts over the internet
-- IPv4-to-IPv6 mapped IPs
-id: f88e112a-21aa-44bd-9b01-6ee2a2bbbed1
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1078
-- attack.t1190
-- attack.t1133
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_explicit_credentials.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_explicit_credentials.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 34bf0a12..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_explicit_credentials.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Mauricio Velazco
-date: 2021/06/01
-description: Detects a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using
- explicit credentials on a host.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4648
- condition: SELECTION_1 | count(Account_Name) by ComputerName > 10
- timeframe: 24h
-falsepositives:
-- Terminal servers
-- Jump servers
-- Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms
-- Workstations with frequently changing users
-id: 196a29c2-e378-48d8-ba07-8a9e61f7fab9
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/08/09
-references:
-- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1110.003
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.privilege_escalation
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_process.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_process.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1cbd1015..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_process.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Multiple Users Failing to Authenticate from Single Process
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Mauricio Velazco
-date: 2021/06/01
-description: Detects failed logins with multiple accounts from a single process on
- the system.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4625
- SELECTION_2:
- LogonType: 2
- SELECTION_3:
- ProcessName: '-'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3)) | count(TargetUserName)
- by ProcessName > 10
- timeframe: 24h
-falsepositives:
-- Terminal servers
-- Jump servers
-- Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms
-- Workstations with frequently changing users
-id: fe563ab6-ded4-4916-b49f-a3a8445fe280
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/07
-references:
-- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying
-- https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/trimarc-research-detecting-password-spraying-with-security-event-auditing
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1110.003
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.privilege_escalation
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2c36b3ab..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Failed Logins with Different Accounts from Single Source System
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/01/10
-description: Detects suspicious failed logins with different user accounts from a
- single source system
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 529
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4625
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetUserName: '*'
- SELECTION_4:
- WorkstationName: '*'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) | count(TargetUserName)
- by WorkstationName > 3
-falsepositives:
-- Terminal servers
-- Jump servers
-- Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms
-- Workstations with frequently changing users
-id: e98374a6-e2d9-4076-9b5c-11bdb2569995
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/21
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1078
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source2.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source2.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b88d9eae..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source2.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Failed Logins with Different Accounts from Single Source System
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/01/10
-description: Detects suspicious failed logins with different user accounts from a
- single source system
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4776
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetUserName: '*'
- SELECTION_3:
- Workstation: '*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) | count(TargetUserName)
- by Workstation > 3
- timeframe: 24h
-falsepositives:
-- Terminal servers
-- Jump servers
-- Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms
-- Workstations with frequently changing users
-id: 6309ffc4-8fa2-47cf-96b8-a2f72e58e538
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/09/21
-related:
-- id: e98374a6-e2d9-4076-9b5c-11bdb2569995
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1078
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 990504b1..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Valid Users Failing to Authenticate From Single Source Using Kerberos
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Mauricio Velazco, frack113
-date: 2021/06/01
-description: Detects multiple failed logins with multiple valid domain accounts from
- a single source system using the Kerberos protocol.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4771
- SELECTION_2:
- Status: '0x18'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetUserName: '*$'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3)) | count(TargetUserName)
- by IpAddress > 10
- timeframe: 24h
-falsepositives:
-- Vulnerability scanners
-- Misconfigured systems
-- Remote administration tools
-- VPN terminators
-- Multiuser systems like Citrix server farms
-id: 5d1d946e-32e6-4d9a-a0dc-0ac022c7eb98
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/06
-references:
-- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1110.003
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.privilege_escalation
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos2.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos2.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 649e0480..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos2.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Source Using Kerberos
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Mauricio Velazco, frack113
-date: 2021/06/01
-description: Detects failed logins with multiple disabled domain accounts from a single
- source system using the Kerberos protocol.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4768
- SELECTION_2:
- Status: '0x12'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetUserName: '*$'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3)) | count(TargetUserName)
- by IpAddress > 10
- timeframe: 24h
-falsepositives:
-- Vulnerability scanners
-- Misconfigured systems
-- Remote administration tools
-- VPN terminators
-- Multiuser systems like Citrix server farms
-id: 4b6fe998-b69c-46d8-901b-13677c9fb663
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/06
-references:
-- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1110.003
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.privilege_escalation
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos3.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos3.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index dac2f177..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos3.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Source Using Kerberos
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Mauricio Velazco, frack113
-date: 2021/06/01
-description: Detects failed logins with multiple invalid domain accounts from a single
- source system using the Kerberos protocol.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4768
- SELECTION_2:
- Status: '0x6'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetUserName: '*$'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3)) | count(TargetUserName)
- by IpAddress > 10
- timeframe: 24h
-falsepositives:
-- Vulnerability scanners
-- Misconfigured systems
-- Remote administration tools
-- VPN terminators
-- Multiuser systems like Citrix server farms
-id: bc93dfe6-8242-411e-a2dd-d16fa0cc8564
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/06
-references:
-- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1110.003
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.privilege_escalation
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_ntlm.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_ntlm.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 883691c6..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_ntlm.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Valid Users Failing to Authenticate from Single Source Using NTLM
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Mauricio Velazco
-date: 2021/06/01
-description: Detects failed logins with multiple valid domain accounts from a single
- source system using the NTLM protocol.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4776
- SELECTION_2:
- Status: '*0xC000006A'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetUserName: '*$'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3)) | count(TargetUserName)
- by Workstation > 10
- timeframe: 24h
-falsepositives:
-- Terminal servers
-- Jump servers
-- Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms
-- Workstations with frequently changing users
-id: f88bab7f-b1f4-41bb-bdb1-4b8af35b0470
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/07
-references:
-- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1110.003
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.privilege_escalation
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_ntlm2.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_ntlm2.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 9e48d352..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source_ntlm2.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Single Source Using NTLM
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Mauricio Velazco
-date: 2021/06/01
-description: Detects failed logins with multiple invalid domain accounts from a single
- source system using the NTLM protocol.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4776
- SELECTION_2:
- Status: '*0xC0000064'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetUserName: '*$'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3)) | count(TargetUserName)
- by Workstation > 10
- timeframe: 24h
-falsepositives:
-- Terminal servers
-- Jump servers
-- Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms
-- Workstations with frequently changing users
-id: 56d62ef8-3462-4890-9859-7b41e541f8d5
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/07
-references:
-- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1110.003
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.privilege_escalation
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_remote_logons_single_source.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_remote_logons_single_source.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1f6b011b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_failed_remote_logons_single_source.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Single Source
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Mauricio Velazco
-date: 2021/06/01
-description: Detects a source system failing to authenticate against a remote host
- with multiple users.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4625
- SELECTION_2:
- LogonType: 3
- SELECTION_3:
- IpAddress: '-'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3)) | count(TargetUserName)
- by IpAddress > 10
- timeframe: 24h
-falsepositives:
-- Terminal servers
-- Jump servers
-- Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms
-- Workstations with frequently changing users
-id: add2ef8d-dc91-4002-9e7e-f2702369f53a
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/09
-references:
-- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1110.003
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.privilege_escalation
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_interactive_logons.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_interactive_logons.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index d90af17b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_interactive_logons.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Interactive Logon to Server Systems
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/03/17
-description: Detects interactive console logons to Server Systems
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 528
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 529
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 4624
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 4625
- SELECTION_5:
- LogonType: 2
- SELECTION_6:
- ComputerName:
- - '%ServerSystems%'
- - '%DomainControllers%'
- SELECTION_7:
- LogonProcessName: Advapi
- SELECTION_8:
- ComputerName: '%Workstations%'
- condition: (((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4) and SELECTION_5
- and SELECTION_6) and not (SELECTION_7 and SELECTION_8))
-falsepositives:
-- Administrative activity via KVM or ILO board
-id: 3ff152b2-1388-4984-9cd9-a323323fdadf
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1078
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_kerberos_manipulation.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_kerberos_manipulation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 34786ccf..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_kerberos_manipulation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Kerberos Manipulation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/02/10
-description: This method triggers on rare Kerberos Failure Codes caused by manipulations
- of Kerberos messages
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 675
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4768
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 4769
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 4771
- SELECTION_5:
- FailureCode:
- - '0x9'
- - '0xA'
- - '0xB'
- - '0xF'
- - '0x10'
- - '0x11'
- - '0x13'
- - '0x14'
- - '0x1A'
- - '0x1F'
- - '0x21'
- - '0x22'
- - '0x23'
- - '0x24'
- - '0x26'
- - '0x27'
- - '0x28'
- - '0x29'
- - '0x2C'
- - '0x2D'
- - '0x2E'
- - '0x2F'
- - '0x31'
- - '0x32'
- - '0x3E'
- - '0x3F'
- - '0x40'
- - '0x41'
- - '0x43'
- - '0x44'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4) and SELECTION_5)
-falsepositives:
-- Faulty legacy applications
-id: f7644214-0eb0-4ace-9455-331ec4c09253
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1212
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_ldap_dataexchange.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_ldap_dataexchange.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 56277216..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_ldap_dataexchange.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious LDAP-Attributes Used
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: xknow @xknow_infosec
-date: 2019/03/24
-description: Detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are
- known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFragger and are additionally not
- commonly used in companies.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5136
- SELECTION_2:
- AttributeValue: '*'
- SELECTION_3:
- AttributeLDAPDisplayName:
- - primaryInternationalISDNNumber
- - otherFacsimileTelephoneNumber
- - primaryTelexNumber
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Companies, who may use these default LDAP-Attributes for personal information
-id: d00a9a72-2c09-4459-ad03-5e0a23351e36
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://medium.com/@ivecodoe/detecting-ldapfragger-a-newly-released-cobalt-strike-beacon-using-ldap-for-c2-communication-c274a7f00961
-- https://blog.fox-it.com/2020/03/19/ldapfragger-command-and-control-over-ldap-attributes/
-- https://github.com/fox-it/LDAPFragger
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.t1071
-- attack.t1001.003
-- attack.command_and_control
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_local_anon_logon_created.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_local_anon_logon_created.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 665c159f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_local_anon_logon_created.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Windows ANONYMOUS LOGON Local Account Created
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: James Pemberton / @4A616D6573
-date: 2019/10/31
-description: Detects the creation of suspicious accounts similar to ANONYMOUS LOGON,
- such as using additional spaces. Created as an covering detection for exclusion
- of Logon Type 3 from ANONYMOUS LOGON accounts.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4720
- SELECTION_2:
- SamAccountName: '*ANONYMOUS*'
- SELECTION_3:
- SamAccountName: '*LOGON*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 1bbf25b9-8038-4154-a50b-118f2a32be27
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/06
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1189469425482829824
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1136
-- attack.t1136.001
-- attack.t1136.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_logon_explicit_credentials.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_logon_explicit_credentials.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a54bce0f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_logon_explicit_credentials.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Remote Logon with Explicit Credentials
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st
-date: 2020/10/05
-description: Detects suspicious processes logging on with explicit credentials
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4648
- SELECTION_2:
- ProcessName:
- - '*\cmd.exe'
- - '*\powershell.exe'
- - '*\pwsh.exe'
- - '*\winrs.exe'
- - '*\wmic.exe'
- - '*\net.exe'
- - '*\net1.exe'
- - '*\reg.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetServerName: localhost
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Administrators that use the RunAS command or scheduled tasks
-id: 941e5c45-cda7-4864-8cea-bbb7458d194a
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/12
-references:
-- https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1078
-- attack.lateral_movement
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_lsass_dump.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_lsass_dump.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e4d5f691..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_lsass_dump.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Password Dumper Activity on LSASS
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: sigma
-date: 2017/02/12
-description: Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask and
- object type SAM_DOMAIN
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4656
- SELECTION_2:
- ProcessName: '*\lsass.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- AccessMask: '0x705'
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectType: SAM_DOMAIN
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: aa1697b7-d611-4f9a-9cb2-5125b4ccfd5c
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/06/21
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/jackcr/status/807385668833968128
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_lsass_dump_generic.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_lsass_dump_generic.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b5769d76..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_lsass_dump_generic.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Generic Password Dumper Activity on LSASS
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Dimitrios Slamaris, Mark Russinovich,
- Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community (update)
-date: 2019/11/01
-description: Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- ObjectName: '*\lsass.exe'
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4656
- SELECTION_3:
- AccessMask:
- - '*0x40*'
- - '*0x1400*'
- - '*0x100000*'
- - '*0x1410*'
- - '*0x1010*'
- - '*0x1438*'
- - '*0x143a*'
- - '*0x1418*'
- - '*0x1f0fff*'
- - '*0x1f1fff*'
- - '*0x1f2fff*'
- - '*0x1f3fff*'
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 4663
- SELECTION_5:
- AccessList:
- - '*4484*'
- - '*4416*'
- SELECTION_6:
- ProcessName:
- - '*\wmiprvse.exe'
- - '*\taskmgr.exe'
- - '*\procexp64.exe'
- - '*\procexp.exe'
- - '*\lsm.exe'
- - '*\csrss.exe'
- - '*\wininit.exe'
- - '*\vmtoolsd.exe'
- - '*\minionhost.exe'
- - '*\VsTskMgr.exe'
- - '*\thor64.exe'
- - '*\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
- - '*\GamingServices.exe'
- - '*\svchost.exe'
- - '*\MsMpEng.exe'
- SELECTION_7:
- ProcessName:
- - C:\Windows\System32\\*
- - C:\Windows\SysWow64\\*
- - C:\Windows\SysNative\\*
- - C:\Program Files\\*
- - C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\\*
- - C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\\*
- SELECTION_8:
- ProcessName:
- - C:\Program Files*
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4 and
- SELECTION_5))) and not ((SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7) or (SELECTION_8)))
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate software accessing LSASS process for legitimate reason; update the whitelist
- with it
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- SubjectDomainName
-- SubjectUserName
-- ProcessName
-- ProcessID
-id: 4a1b6da0-d94f-4fc3-98fc-2d9cb9e5ee76
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/22
-references:
-- https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
-- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- car.2019-04-004
-- attack.t1003.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_multiple_files_renamed_or_deleted.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_multiple_files_renamed_or_deleted.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3148ea5a..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_multiple_files_renamed_or_deleted.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Multiple File Rename Or Delete Occurred
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/16
-description: Detects multiple file rename or delete events occurrence within a specified
- period of time by a same user (these events may signalize about ransomware activity).
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4663
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectType: File
- SELECTION_3:
- AccessList: '%%1537'
- SELECTION_4:
- Keywords: '0x8020000000000000'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) | count()
- by SubjectLogonId > 10
- timeframe: 30s
-falsepositives:
-- Software uninstallation
-- Files restore activities
-id: 97919310-06a7-482c-9639-92b67ed63cf8
-level: medium
-logsource:
- definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Policies/Windows Settings/Security Settings/Local
- Policies/Audit Policy/Audit object access, Policies/Windows Settings/Security
- Settings/Advanced Audit Policy Configuration/Object Access'
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.manageengine.com/data-security/how-to/how-to-detect-ransomware-attacks.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.impact
-- attack.t1486
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_net_recon_activity.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_net_recon_activity.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 42ad9d67..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_net_recon_activity.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Reconnaissance Activity
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth (rule), Jack Croock (method), Jonhnathan Ribeiro (improvements),
- oscd.community
-date: 2017/03/07
-description: Detects activity as "net user administrator /domain" and "net group domain
- admins /domain"
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4661
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectType:
- - SAM_USER
- - SAM_GROUP
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectName: S-1-5-21-*
- SELECTION_4:
- AccessMask: '0x2d'
- SELECTION_5:
- ObjectName:
- - '*-500'
- - '*-512'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
-falsepositives:
-- Administrator activity
-- Penetration tests
-id: 968eef52-9cff-4454-8992-1e74b9cbad6c
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: The volume of Event ID 4661 is high on Domain Controllers and therefore
- "Audit SAM" and "Audit Kernel Object" advanced audit policy settings are not configured
- in the recommendations for server systems
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://findingbad.blogspot.de/2017/01/hunting-what-does-it-look-like.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1087
-- attack.t1087.002
-- attack.t1069
-- attack.t1069.002
-- attack.s0039
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_psexec.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_psexec.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1cde6ee1..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_psexec.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious PsExec Execution
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Samir Bousseaden
-date: 2019/04/03
-description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this
- rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker
- uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: \\\*\IPC$
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName:
- - '*-stdin'
- - '*-stdout'
- - '*-stderr'
- SELECTION_4:
- RelativeTargetName: PSEXESVC*
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- nothing observed so far
-id: c462f537-a1e3-41a6-b5fc-b2c2cef9bf82
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File
- Share" must be configured for Success/Failure
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/12/08
-references:
-- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1077
-- attack.t1021.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4066af73..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Access to Sensitive File Extensions
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Samir Bousseaden
-date: 2019/04/03
-description: Detects known sensitive file extensions accessed on a network share
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- RelativeTargetName:
- - '*.pst'
- - '*.ost'
- - '*.msg'
- - '*.nst'
- - '*.oab'
- - '*.edb'
- - '*.nsf'
- - '*.bak'
- - '*.dmp'
- - '*.kirbi'
- - '*\groups.xml'
- - '*.rdp'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or pentest or backup
- software
-- Users working with these data types or exchanging message files
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- SubjectDomainName
-- SubjectUserName
-- RelativeTargetName
-id: 91c945bc-2ad1-4799-a591-4d00198a1215
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/08/09
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.collection
-- attack.t1039
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_rc4_kerberos.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_rc4_kerberos.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b8828cac..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_rc4_kerberos.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Kerberos RC4 Ticket Encryption
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/02/06
-description: Detects service ticket requests using RC4 encryption type
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4769
- SELECTION_2:
- TicketOptions: '0x40810000'
- SELECTION_3:
- TicketEncryptionType: '0x17'
- SELECTION_4:
- ServiceName: $*
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Service accounts used on legacy systems (e.g. NetApp)
-- Windows Domains with DFL 2003 and legacy systems
-id: 496a0e47-0a33-4dca-b009-9e6ca3591f39
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/08/14
-references:
-- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3458
-- https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/TrimarcResearch/Detecting-Kerberoasting-Activity
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1208
-- attack.t1558.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_rottenpotato.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_rottenpotato.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8b37045e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_rottenpotato.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: RottenPotato Like Attack Pattern
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: '@SBousseaden, Florian Roth'
-date: 2019/11/15
-description: Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during
- an attack with RottenPotato and the like
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4624
- SELECTION_2:
- LogonType: 3
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetUserName: ANONYMOUS_LOGON
- SELECTION_4:
- WorkstationName: '-'
- SELECTION_5:
- IpAddress: 127.0.0.1
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 16f5d8ca-44bd-47c8-acbe-6fc95a16c12f
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/07/07
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1195284233729777665
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1171
-- attack.t1557.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_sdelete.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_sdelete.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e00aafcb..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_sdelete.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Secure Deletion with SDelete
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke
-date: 2017/06/14
-description: Detects renaming of file while deletion with SDelete tool.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4656
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4663
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 4658
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectName:
- - '*.AAA'
- - '*.ZZZ'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate usage of SDelete
-id: 39a80702-d7ca-4a83-b776-525b1f86a36d
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/sdelete.htm
-- https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.impact
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1107
-- attack.t1070.004
-- attack.t1066
-- attack.t1027.005
-- attack.t1485
-- attack.t1553.002
-- attack.s0195
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_time_modification.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_time_modification.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a5049586..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_time_modification.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Unauthorized System Time Modification
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: '@neu5ron'
-date: 2019/02/05
-description: Detect scenarios where a potentially unauthorized application or user
- is modifying the system time.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4616
- SELECTION_2:
- ProcessName:
- - C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe
- - C:\Windows\System32\VBoxService.exe
- SELECTION_3:
- ProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
- SELECTION_4:
- SubjectUserSid: S-1-5-19
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and not ((SELECTION_2) or (SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)))
-falsepositives:
-- HyperV or other virtualization technologies with binary not listed in filter portion
- of detection
-id: faa031b5-21ed-4e02-8881-2591f98d82ed
-level: medium
-logsource:
- definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : System > Audit Security State Change,
- Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced
- Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\System\Audit Security State Change'
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- Private Cuckoo Sandbox (from many years ago, no longer have hash, NDA as well)
-- Live environment caused by malware
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4616
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1099
-- attack.t1070.006
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_wmi_login.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_wmi_login.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1cda7b8f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_susp_wmi_login.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Login with WMI
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke
-date: 2019/12/04
-description: Detection of logins performed with WMI
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4624
- SELECTION_2:
- ProcessName: '*\WmiPrvSE.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Monitoring tools
-- Legitimate system administration
-id: 5af54681-df95-4c26-854f-2565e13cfab0
-level: low
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1047
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_suspicious_outbound_kerberos_connection.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_suspicious_outbound_kerberos_connection.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3f63fce1..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_suspicious_outbound_kerberos_connection.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Outbound Kerberos Connection
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/24
-description: Detects suspicious outbound network activity via kerberos default port
- indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5156
- SELECTION_2:
- DestinationPort: 88
- SELECTION_3:
- Image:
- - '*\lsass.exe'
- - '*\opera.exe'
- - '*\chrome.exe'
- - '*\firefox.exe'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Other browsers
-id: eca91c7c-9214-47b9-b4c5-cb1d7e4f2350
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1208
-- attack.t1558.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_svcctl_remote_service.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_svcctl_remote_service.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 5ff57b04..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_svcctl_remote_service.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Remote Service Activity via SVCCTL Named Pipe
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Samir Bousseaden
-date: 2019/04/03
-description: Detects remote service activity via remote access to the svcctl named
- pipe
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- ShareName: \\\*\IPC$
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName: svcctl
- SELECTION_4:
- Accesses: '*WriteData*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- pentesting
-id: 586a8d6b-6bfe-4ad9-9d78-888cd2fe50c3
-level: medium
-logsource:
- definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File
- Share" must be configured for Success/Failure
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/03/threat-hunting-26-remote-windows.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1077
-- attack.t1021.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_syskey_registry_access.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_syskey_registry_access.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f2d157de..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_syskey_registry_access.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: SysKey Registry Keys Access
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/08/12
-description: Detects handle requests and access operations to specific registry keys
- to calculate the SysKey
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4656
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4663
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectType: key
- SELECTION_4:
- ObjectName:
- - '*lsa\JD'
- - '*lsa\GBG'
- - '*lsa\Skew1'
- - '*lsa\Data'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 9a4ff3b8-6187-4fd2-8e8b-e0eae1129495
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/07_discovery/WIN-190625024610.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1012
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_sysmon_channel_reference_deletion.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_sysmon_channel_reference_deletion.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index cf6b74bd..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_sysmon_channel_reference_deletion.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Sysmon Channel Reference Deletion
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/07/14
-description: Potential threat actor tampering with Sysmon manifest and eventually
- disabling it
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- ObjectName:
- - '*WINEVT\Publishers\{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}*'
- - '*WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational*'
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4657
- SELECTION_3:
- ObjectValueName: Enabled
- SELECTION_4:
- NewValue: '0'
- SELECTION_5:
- EventID: 4663
- SELECTION_6:
- AccessMask: 65536
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) or (SELECTION_5
- and SELECTION_6)))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 18beca67-ab3e-4ee3-ba7a-a46ca8d7d0cc
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/Flangvik/status/1283054508084473861
-- https://twitter.com/SecurityJosh/status/1283027365770276866
-- https://securityjosh.github.io/2020/04/23/Mute-Sysmon.html
-- https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/cf08c38c61f7e46e8404b38201ca01c8
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1112
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_transferring_files_with_credential_data_via_network_shares.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_transferring_files_with_credential_data_via_network_shares.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 34d83155..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_transferring_files_with_credential_data_via_network_shares.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Transferring Files with Credential Data via Network Shares
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/22
-description: Transferring files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential
- data) using network shares
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName:
- - '*\mimidrv*'
- - '*\lsass*'
- - '*\windows\minidump\\*'
- - '*\hiberfil*'
- - '*\sqldmpr*'
- - '*\sam*'
- - '*\ntds.dit*'
- - '*\security*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Transferring sensitive files for legitimate administration work by legitimate administrator
-id: 910ab938-668b-401b-b08c-b596e80fdca5
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.002
-- attack.t1003.001
-- attack.t1003.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_added_to_local_administrators.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_added_to_local_administrators.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 991d51d6..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_added_to_local_administrators.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: User Added to Local Administrators
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/03/14
-description: This rule triggers on user accounts that are added to the local Administrators
- group, which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4732
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetUserName: Administr*
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetSid: S-1-5-32-544
- SELECTION_5:
- SubjectUserName: '*$'
- condition: (((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and (SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4)) and not
- (SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate administrative activity
-id: c265cf08-3f99-46c1-8d59-328247057d57
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/30
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1078
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1098
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_couldnt_call_privileged_service_lsaregisterlogonprocess.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_couldnt_call_privileged_service_lsaregisterlogonprocess.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 31d9c6d7..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_couldnt_call_privileged_service_lsaregisterlogonprocess.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: User Couldn't Call a Privileged Service 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess'
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (source), Ilyas Ochkov (rule), oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/24
-description: The 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess' function verifies that the application
- making the function call is a logon process by checking that it has the SeTcbPrivilege
- privilege set. Possible Rubeus tries to get a handle to LSA.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4673
- SELECTION_3:
- Service: LsaRegisterLogonProcess()
- SELECTION_4:
- Keywords: '0x8010000000000000'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 6daac7fc-77d1-449a-a71a-e6b4d59a0e54
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1208
-- attack.t1558.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_creation.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_creation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b87e5694..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_creation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Local User Creation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Patrick Bareiss
-date: 2019/04/18
-description: Detects local user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen
- in an Active Directory environment. Apply this Sigma Use Case on your windows server
- logs and not on your DC logs.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4720
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Domain Controller Logs
-- Local accounts managed by privileged account management tools
-fields:
-- EventCode
-- AccountName
-- AccountDomain
-id: 66b6be3d-55d0-4f47-9855-d69df21740ea
-level: low
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://patrick-bareiss.com/detecting-local-user-creation-in-ad-with-sigma/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1136
-- attack.t1136.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_driver_loaded.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_driver_loaded.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3dec1266..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_user_driver_loaded.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Driver Loaded By User
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)
-date: 2019/04/08
-description: Detects the loading of drivers via 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' required to
- load or unload a device driver. With this privilege, the user can dynamically load
- and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode. This user right does
- not apply to Plug and Play device drivers. If you exclude privileged users/admins
- and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs
- trying to load malicious kernel drivers. This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs)
- and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with
- a whitelist to find the bad stuff.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 4673
- SELECTION_3:
- PrivilegeList: SeLoadDriverPrivilege
- SELECTION_4:
- Service: '-'
- SELECTION_5:
- ProcessName:
- - '*\Windows\System32\Dism.exe'
- - '*\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
- - '*\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe'
- - '*\Windows\HelpPane.exe'
- - '*\Windows\System32\mmc.exe'
- - '*\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
- - '*\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe'
- - '*\procexp64.exe'
- - '*\procexp.exe'
- - '*\procmon64.exe'
- - '*\procmon.exe'
- - '*\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) and not
- (SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- 'Other legimate tools loading drivers. There are some: Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs
- etc. - but not much. You have to baseline this according to your used products and
- allowed tools. Also try to exclude users, which are allowed to load drivers.'
-id: f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.t1089
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1562.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_vssaudit_secevent_source_registration.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_vssaudit_secevent_source_registration.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index eaee906a..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_vssaudit_secevent_source_registration.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: VSSAudit Security Event Source Registration
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)
-date: 2020/10/20
-description: Detects the registration of the security event source VSSAudit. It would
- usually trigger when volume shadow copy operations happen.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
- SELECTION_2:
- AuditSourceName: VSSAudit
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 4904
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 4905
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and (SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate use of VSSVC. Maybe backup operations. It would usually be done by C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe.
-id: e9faba72-4974-4ab2-a4c5-46e25ad59e9b
-level: low
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b3655fcb..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/security/win_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: T1047 Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)
-date: 2020/10/12
-description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\`
- directory over the network for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName: '*\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
- SELECTION_4:
- SubjectUserName: '*$'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: f6c68d5f-e101-4b86-8c84-7d96851fd65c
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-201009173318.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1047
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_apt_carbonpaper_turla.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_apt_carbonpaper_turla.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 68b01e39..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_apt_carbonpaper_turla.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Turla Service Install
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/03/31
-description: This method detects a service install of malicious services mentioned
- in Carbon Paper - Turla report by ESET
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceName:
- - srservice
- - ipvpn
- - hkmsvc
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 1df8b3da-b0ac-4d8a-b7c7-6cb7c24160e4
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/03/30/carbon-paper-peering-turlas-second-stage-backdoor/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.g0010
-- attack.t1050
-- attack.t1543.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_apt_chafer_mar18_system.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_apt_chafer_mar18_system.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index dd73a21e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_apt_chafer_mar18_system.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Chafer Activity
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
-date: 2018/03/23
-description: Detects Chafer activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report
- in March 2018
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceName:
- - SC Scheduled Scan
- - UpdatMachine
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://nyotron.com/nyotron-discovers-next-generation-oilrig-attacks/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.g0049
-- attack.t1053
-- attack.t1053.005
-- attack.s0111
-- attack.t1050
-- attack.t1543.003
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1112
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.t1071
-- attack.t1071.004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_apt_stonedrill.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_apt_stonedrill.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a3a1e644..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_apt_stonedrill.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: StoneDrill Service Install
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/03/07
-description: This method detects a service install of the malicious Microsoft Network
- Realtime Inspection Service service described in StoneDrill report by Kaspersky
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceName: NtsSrv
- SELECTION_4:
- ServiceFileName: '* LocalService'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-id: 9e987c6c-4c1e-40d8-bd85-dd26fba8fdd6
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://securelist.com/blog/research/77725/from-shamoon-to-stonedrill/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.g0064
-- attack.t1050
-- attack.t1543.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_apt_turla_service_png.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_apt_turla_service_png.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 82bd70bb..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_apt_turla_service_png.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Turla PNG Dropper Service
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2018/11/23
-description: This method detects malicious services mentioned in Turla PNG dropper
- report by NCC Group in November 2018
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceName: WerFaultSvc
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- unlikely
-id: 1228f8e2-7e79-4dea-b0ad-c91f1d5016c1
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/november/turla-png-dropper-is-back/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.g0010
-- attack.t1050
-- attack.t1543.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 20b85d60..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CobaltStrike Service Installations
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Wojciech Lesicki
-date: 2021/05/26
-description: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which
- a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath: '*ADMIN$*'
- SELECTION_4:
- ImagePath: '*.exe*'
- SELECTION_5:
- ImagePath: '*%COMSPEC%*'
- SELECTION_6:
- ImagePath: '*start*'
- SELECTION_7:
- ImagePath: '*powershell*'
- SELECTION_8:
- ImagePath: '*powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand*'
- SELECTION_9:
- ImagePath:
- - '*SUVYIChOZXctT2JqZWN0IE5ldC5XZWJjbGllbnQpLkRvd25sb2FkU3RyaW5nKCdodHRwOi8vMTI3LjAuMC4xO*'
- - '*lFWCAoTmV3LU9iamVjdCBOZXQuV2ViY2xpZW50KS5Eb3dubG9hZFN0cmluZygnaHR0cDovLzEyNy4wLjAuMT*'
- - '*JRVggKE5ldy1PYmplY3QgTmV0LldlYmNsaWVudCkuRG93bmxvYWRTdHJpbmcoJ2h0dHA6Ly8xMjcuMC4wLjE6*'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and ((SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) or
- (SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7) or SELECTION_8 or SELECTION_9))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/09/30
-references:
-- https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395
-- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/
-- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.002
-- attack.t1543.003
-- attack.t1569.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_hack_smbexec.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_hack_smbexec.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a522cad..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_hack_smbexec.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: smbexec.py Service Installation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Omer Faruk Celik
-date: 2018/03/20
-description: Detects the use of smbexec.py tool by detecting a specific service installation
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceName: BTOBTO
- SELECTION_4:
- ServiceFileName: '*\execute.bat'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Penetration Test
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- ServiceName
-- ServiceFileName
-id: 52a85084-6989-40c3-8f32-091e12e13f09
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-2-psexec-and-services/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1077
-- attack.t1021.002
-- attack.t1035
-- attack.t1569.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_clip_services.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_clip_services.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6b190d78..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_clip_services.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/13
-description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath|re: .*cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+clip(?:\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\(\s\\"\{\d\}.+\-f.+"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_services.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_services.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 70fa8718..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_services.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community
-date: 2019/11/08
-description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated
- by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the following code block — https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/master/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_2:
- ImagePath|re: \$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\[
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath|re: \$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\[
- SELECTION_4:
- ImagePath|re: \$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\[
- SELECTION_5:
- ImagePath|re: \$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}
- SELECTION_6:
- ImagePath|re: \\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name
- SELECTION_7:
- ImagePath|re: \$VerbosePreference\.ToString\(
- SELECTION_8:
- ImagePath|re: \String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4 or SELECTION_5
- or SELECTION_6 or SELECTION_7 or SELECTION_8))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/09/16
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_stdin_services.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_stdin_services.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 110696e2..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_stdin_services.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/15
-description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath|re: .*cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_var_services.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_var_services.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 19df5df8..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_var_services.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/15
-description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath|re: .*cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r)(?:\s|)"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress_services.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress_services.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index be6535b4..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress_services.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/18
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath|re: (?i).*new-object.*(?:system\.io\.compression\.deflatestream|system\.io\.streamreader).*text\.encoding\]::ascii.*readtoend
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 175997c5-803c-4b08-8bb0-70b099f47595
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 80119e37..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/18
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath|re: (?i).*rundll32(?:\.exe)?(?:\s+)?shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*powershell.*"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 11b52f18-aaec-4d60-9143-5dd8cc4706b9
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin_services.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin_services.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b45b8b13..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin_services.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/12
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath|re: (?i).*(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\$\{?input).*&&.*"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip_services.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip_services.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c8e6b267..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip_services.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/09
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath|re: (?i).*?echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?).*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mshta_services.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mshta_services.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 38000dbf..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mshta_services.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/09
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath|re: (?i).*(set).*(&&).*(mshta).*(vbscript:createobject).*(\.run).*\(window\.close\).*"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6790a8fe..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/09
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath|re: (?i).*&&.*rundll32.*shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*(value|invoke|comspec|iex).*"
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_var_services.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_var_services.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e6d59ff7..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_invoke_obfuscation_via_var_services.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/13
-description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath|re: (?i).*&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*/c
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_mal_creddumper.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_mal_creddumper.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index bf15ec8f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_mal_creddumper.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
-date: 2017/03/05
-description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution
- events
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath:
- - '*fgexec*'
- - '*dumpsvc*'
- - '*cachedump*'
- - '*mimidrv*'
- - '*gsecdump*'
- - '*servpw*'
- - '*pwdump*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery
-id: 4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79ed
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.001
-- attack.t1003.002
-- attack.t1003.004
-- attack.t1003.005
-- attack.t1003.006
-- attack.t1035
-- attack.t1569.002
-- attack.s0005
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 449fa624..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth
-date: 2019/10/26
-description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting
- a specific service installation
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_10:
- ImagePath: '*\pipe\\*'
- SELECTION_11:
- ImagePath: '*cmd.exe*'
- SELECTION_12:
- ImagePath: '*/c*'
- SELECTION_13:
- ImagePath: '*echo*'
- SELECTION_14:
- ImagePath: '*\pipe\\*'
- SELECTION_15:
- ImagePath: '*rundll32*'
- SELECTION_16:
- ImagePath: '*.dll,a*'
- SELECTION_17:
- ImagePath: '*/p:*'
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath: '*cmd*'
- SELECTION_4:
- ImagePath: '*/c*'
- SELECTION_5:
- ImagePath: '*echo*'
- SELECTION_6:
- ImagePath: '*\pipe\\*'
- SELECTION_7:
- ImagePath: '*%COMSPEC%*'
- SELECTION_8:
- ImagePath: '*/c*'
- SELECTION_9:
- ImagePath: '*echo*'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and ((SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and
- SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6) or (SELECTION_7 and SELECTION_8 and SELECTION_9 and
- SELECTION_10) or (SELECTION_11 and SELECTION_12 and SELECTION_13 and SELECTION_14)
- or (SELECTION_15 and SELECTION_16 and SELECTION_17)))
-falsepositives:
-- Highly unlikely
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- SubjectDomainName
-- SubjectUserName
-- ImagePath
-id: 843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
-- https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1134
-- attack.t1134.001
-- attack.t1134.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_moriya_rootkit.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_moriya_rootkit.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 85ae98ba..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_moriya_rootkit.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Moriya Rootkit
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Bhabesh Raj
-date: 2021/05/06
-description: Detects the use of Moriya rootkit as described in the securelist's Operation
- TunnelSnake report
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceName: ZzNetSvc
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- None
-id: 25b9c01c-350d-4b95-bed1-836d04a4f324
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://securelist.com/operation-tunnelsnake-and-moriya-rootkit/101831
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1543.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_ntfs_vuln_exploit.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_ntfs_vuln_exploit.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 5c628e4a..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_ntfs_vuln_exploit.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: NTFS Vulnerability Exploitation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/01/11
-description: This the exploitation of a NTFS vulnerability as reported without many
- details via Twitter
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Ntfs
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 55
- SELECTION_3:
- Origin: File System Driver
- SELECTION_4:
- Description: '*contains a corrupted file record*'
- SELECTION_5:
- Description: '*The name of the file is "\"*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-id: f14719ce-d3ab-4e25-9ce6-2899092260b0
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/17
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/jonasLyk/status/1347900440000811010
-- https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1347958161609809921
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.impact
-- attack.t1499.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_pcap_drivers.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_pcap_drivers.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b703a1c9..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_pcap_drivers.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Windows Pcap Drivers
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Cian Heasley
-date: 2020/06/10
-description: Detects Windows Pcap driver installation based on a list of associated
- .sys files.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 4697
- SELECTION_2:
- ServiceFileName:
- - '*pcap*'
- - '*npcap*'
- - '*npf*'
- - '*nm3*'
- - '*ndiscap*'
- - '*nmnt*'
- - '*windivert*'
- - '*USBPcap*'
- - '*pktmon*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-fields:
-- EventID
-- ServiceFileName
-- Account_Name
-- Computer_Name
-- Originating_Computer
-- ServiceName
-id: 7b687634-ab20-11ea-bb37-0242ac130002
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: security
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://ragged-lab.blogspot.com/2020/06/capturing-pcap-driver-installations.html#more
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1040
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_possible_zerologon_exploitation_using_wellknown_tools.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_possible_zerologon_exploitation_using_wellknown_tools.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index bc44f5e1..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_possible_zerologon_exploitation_using_wellknown_tools.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Zerologon Exploitation Using Well-known Tools
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Demyan Sokolin @_drd0c, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/13
-description: This rule is designed to detect attempts to exploit Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472)
- vulnerability using mimikatz zerologon module or other exploits from machine with
- "kali" hostname.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID:
- - '5805'
- - '5723'
- SELECTION_2:
- - kali
- - mimikatz
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2))
-id: 18f37338-b9bd-4117-a039-280c81f7a596
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/05/30
-references:
-- https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon
-- https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-for-zerologon-f65c61586382
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.t1210
-- attack.lateral_movement
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e410a55a..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: PowerShell Scripts Installed as Services
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
-date: 2020/10/06
-description: Detects powershell script installed as a Service
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath:
- - '*powershell*'
- - '*pwsh*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: a2e5019d-a658-4c6a-92bf-7197b54e2cae
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1569.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_quarkspwdump_clearing_hive_access_history.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_quarkspwdump_clearing_hive_access_history.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 89f1bb01..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_quarkspwdump_clearing_hive_access_history.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-
-title: QuarksPwDump Clearing Access History
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/05/15
-description: Detects QuarksPwDump clearing access history in hive
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 16
- SELECTION_2:
- HiveName: '*\AppData\Local\Temp\SAM*'
- SELECTION_3:
- HiveName: '*.dmp'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 39f919f3-980b-4e6f-a975-8af7e507ef2b
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/27
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_rare_service_installs.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_rare_service_installs.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 82adf2e8..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_rare_service_installs.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Rare Service Installs
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/03/08
-description: Detects rare service installs that only appear a few times per time frame
- and could reveal password dumpers, backdoor installs or other types of malicious
- services
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) | count() by ServiceName < 5
- timeframe: 7d
-falsepositives:
-- Software installation
-- Software updates
-id: 66bfef30-22a5-4fcd-ad44-8d81e60922ae
-level: low
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1050
-- car.2013-09-005
-- attack.t1543.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_rdp_potential_cve_2019_0708.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_rdp_potential_cve_2019_0708.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4d49fa8c..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_rdp_potential_cve_2019_0708.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Potential RDP Exploit CVE-2019-0708
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Lionel PRAT, Christophe BROCAS, @atc_project (improvements)
-date: 2019/05/24
-description: Detect suspicious error on protocol RDP, potential CVE-2019-0708
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 56
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 50
- SELECTION_3:
- Provider_Name: TermDD
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Bad connections or network interruptions
-id: aaa5b30d-f418-420b-83a0-299cb6024885
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/10/13
-references:
-- https://github.com/zerosum0x0/CVE-2019-0708
-- https://github.com/Ekultek/BlueKeep
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1210
-- car.2013-07-002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_dhcp_config.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_dhcp_config.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6e1e53f0..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_dhcp_config.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Dimitrios Slamaris
-date: 2017/05/15
-description: This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in
- registry) was loaded
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1033
- SELECTION_2:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-DHCP-Server
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 13fc89a9-971e-4ca6-b9dc-aa53a445bf40
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/10/13
-references:
-- https://blog.3or.de/mimilib-dhcp-server-callout-dll-injection.html
-- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc726884(v=ws.10).aspx
-- https://msdn.microsoft.com/de-de/library/windows/desktop/aa363389(v=vs.85).aspx
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1073
-- attack.t1574.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_dhcp_config_failed.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_dhcp_config_failed.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b3fc3d9c..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_dhcp_config_failed.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: DHCP Server Error Failed Loading the CallOut DLL
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Dimitrios Slamaris, @atc_project (fix)
-date: 2017/05/15
-description: This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL
- (in registry) could not be loaded
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1031
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 1032
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 1034
- SELECTION_4:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-DHCP-Server
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 75edd3fd-7146-48e5-9848-3013d7f0282c
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/10/13
-references:
-- https://blog.3or.de/mimilib-dhcp-server-callout-dll-injection.html
-- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc726884(v=ws.10).aspx
-- https://msdn.microsoft.com/de-de/library/windows/desktop/aa363389(v=vs.85).aspx
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1073
-- attack.t1574.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_proceshacker.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_proceshacker.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e611f628..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_proceshacker.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: ProcessHacker Privilege Elevation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/05/27
-description: Detects a ProcessHacker tool that elevated privileges to a very high
- level
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceName: ProcessHacker*
- SELECTION_4:
- AccountName: LocalSystem
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-id: c4ff1eac-84ad-44dd-a6fb-d56a92fc43a9
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/1kwpeter/status/1397816101455765504
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1543.003
-- attack.t1569.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_sam_dump.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_sam_dump.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c2ff043e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_sam_dump.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: SAM Dump to AppData
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2018/01/27
-description: Detects suspicious SAM dump activity as cause by QuarksPwDump and other
- password dumpers
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 16
- SELECTION_2:
- - \AppData\Local\Temp\SAM-
- SELECTION_3:
- - .dmp
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Penetration testing
-id: 839dd1e8-eda8-4834-8145-01beeee33acd
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: The source of this type of event is Kernel-General
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/27
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_system_update_error.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_system_update_error.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 54d62d1d..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_susp_system_update_error.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Windows Update Error
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: frack113
-date: 2021/12/04
-description: Windows Update get some error Check if need a 0-days KB
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-WindowsUpdateClient
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 16
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 20
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 24
- SELECTION_5:
- EventID: 213
- SELECTION_6:
- EventID: 217
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4 or SELECTION_5
- or SELECTION_6))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 13cfeb75-9e33-4d04-b0f7-ab8faaa95a59
-level: low
-logsource:
- definition: Other error are in Microsoft-Windows-WindowsUpdateClient/Operational
- product: windows
- service: system
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.impact
-- attack.resource_development
-- attack.t1584
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_system_defender_disabled.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_system_defender_disabled.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6b65734b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_system_defender_disabled.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Windows Defender Threat Detection Disabled
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Ján Trenčanský, frack113
-date: 2020/07/28
-description: Detects disabling Windows Defender threat protection
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7036
- SELECTION_2:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_3:
- param1:
- - Windows Defender Antivirus Service
- - Service antivirus Microsoft Defender
- SELECTION_4:
- param2: stopped
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Administrator actions
-id: 6c0a7755-6d31-44fa-80e1-133e57752680
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/22
-references:
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/troubleshoot-windows-defender-antivirus
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
-related:
-- id: fe34868f-6e0e-4882-81f6-c43aa8f15b62
- type: derived
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1089
-- attack.t1562.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_system_susp_eventlog_cleared.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_system_susp_eventlog_cleared.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 99aa7cf0..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_system_susp_eventlog_cleared.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Eventlog Cleared
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/01/10
-description: One of the Windows Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by "wevtutil
- cl" command execution
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 104
- SELECTION_2:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Rollout of log collection agents (the setup routine often includes a reset of the
- local Eventlog)
-- System provisioning (system reset before the golden image creation)
-id: a62b37e0-45d3-48d9-a517-90c1a1b0186b
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/10/13
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/deviouspolack/status/832535435960209408
-- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745?environmentId=100
-related:
-- id: f2f01843-e7b8-4f95-a35a-d23584476423
- type: obsoletes
-- id: d99b79d2-0a6f-4f46-ad8b-260b6e17f982
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1070
-- attack.t1070.001
-- car.2016-04-002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_tap_driver_installation.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_tap_driver_installation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ebc88f04..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_tap_driver_installation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Tap Driver Installation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Ian Davis, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/24
-description: Well-known TAP software installation. Possible preparation for data exfiltration
- using tunnelling techniques
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Service Control Manager
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath: '*tap0901*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate OpenVPN TAP insntallation
-id: 8e4cf0e5-aa5d-4dc3-beff-dc26917744a9
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.exfiltration
-- attack.t1048
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_tool_psexec.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_tool_psexec.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4023ff3b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_tool_psexec.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-
-title: PsExec Tool Execution
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke
-date: 2017/06/12
-description: Detects PsExec service installation and execution events (service and
- Sysmon)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- ServiceName: PSEXESVC
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 7045
- SELECTION_3:
- ServiceFileName: '*\PSEXESVC.exe'
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 7036
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) or SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-fields:
-- EventID
-- CommandLine
-- ParentCommandLine
-- ServiceName
-- ServiceFileName
-- TargetFilename
-- PipeName
-id: 42c575ea-e41e-41f1-b248-8093c3e82a28
-level: low
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
-- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1035
-- attack.t1569.002
-- attack.s0029
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_volume_shadow_copy_mount.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_volume_shadow_copy_mount.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8156fb8f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_volume_shadow_copy_mount.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Volume Shadow Copy Mount
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)
-date: 2020/10/20
-description: Detects volume shadow copy mount
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 98
- SELECTION_3:
- DeviceName: '*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate use of volume shadow copy mounts (backups maybe).
-id: f512acbf-e662-4903-843e-97ce4652b740
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/10/13
-references:
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_vul_cve_2020_1472.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_vul_cve_2020_1472.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ee254256..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/system/win_vul_cve_2020_1472.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Vulnerable Netlogon Secure Channel Connection Allowed
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: NVISO
-date: 2020/09/15
-description: Detects that a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection was allowed,
- which could be an indicator of CVE-2020-1472.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Provider_Name: NetLogon
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 5829
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- SAMAccountName
-id: a0cb7110-edf0-47a4-9177-541a4083128a
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: system
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4557222/how-to-manage-the-changes-in-netlogon-secure-channel-connections-assoc
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1548
diff --git a/rules/sigma/builtin/win_alert_mimikatz_keywords.yml b/rules/sigma/builtin/win_alert_mimikatz_keywords.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4828a2c2..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/builtin/win_alert_mimikatz_keywords.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Mimikatz Use
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/01/10
-description: This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of
- them only appear in older Mimikatz version that are however still used by different
- threat groups)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- - \mimikatz
- - mimikatz.exe
- - \mimilib.dll
- - <3 eo.oe
- - eo.oe.kiwi
- - privilege::debug
- - sekurlsa::logonpasswords
- - lsadump::sam
- - mimidrv.sys
- - ' p::d '
- - ' s::l '
- - gentilkiwi.com
- - Kiwi Legit Printer
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 15
- condition: ((SELECTION_1) and not (SELECTION_2))
-falsepositives:
-- Naughty administrators
-- Penetration test
-- AV Signature updates
-- Files with Mimikatz in their filename
-id: 06d71506-7beb-4f22-8888-e2e5e2ca7fd8
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/01
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.s0002
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.credential_access
-- car.2013-07-001
-- car.2019-04-004
-- attack.t1003.002
-- attack.t1003.004
-- attack.t1003.001
-- attack.t1003.006
diff --git a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_cactustorch.yml b/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_cactustorch.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 933fb247..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_cactustorch.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CACTUSTORCH Remote Thread Creation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: '@SBousseaden (detection), Thomas Patzke (rule)'
-date: 2019/02/01
-description: Detects remote thread creation from CACTUSTORCH as described in references.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 8
- SELECTION_2:
- SourceImage:
- - '*\System32\cscript.exe'
- - '*\System32\wscript.exe'
- - '*\System32\mshta.exe'
- - '*\winword.exe'
- - '*\excel.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetImage: '*\SysWOW64\\*'
- SELECTION_4:
- StartModule|re: ^$
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 2e4e488a-6164-4811-9ea1-f960c7359c40
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: create_remote_thread
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/12
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1090588499517079552
-- https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/CACTUSTORCH
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1093
-- attack.t1055.012
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1064
-- attack.t1059.005
-- attack.t1059.007
-- attack.t1218.005
diff --git a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_cobaltstrike_process_injection.yml b/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_cobaltstrike_process_injection.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 780818b5..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_cobaltstrike_process_injection.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CobaltStrike Process Injection
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Olaf Hartong, Florian Roth, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community
-date: 2018/11/30
-description: Detects a possible remote threat creation with certain characteristics
- which are typical for Cobalt Strike beacons
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 8
- SELECTION_2:
- StartAddress:
- - '*0B80'
- - '*0C7C'
- - '*0C88'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 6309645e-122d-4c5b-bb2b-22e4f9c2fa42
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: create_remote_thread
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/20
-references:
-- https://medium.com/@olafhartong/cobalt-strike-remote-threads-detection-206372d11d0f
-- https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2018/04/09/cobalt-strike-3-11-the-snake-that-eats-its-tail/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1055
-- attack.t1055.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_createremotethread_loadlibrary.yml b/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_createremotethread_loadlibrary.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6c891bea..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_createremotethread_loadlibrary.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CreateRemoteThread API and LoadLibrary
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/08/11
-description: Detects potential use of CreateRemoteThread api and LoadLibrary function
- to inject DLL into a process
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 8
- SELECTION_2:
- StartModule: '*\kernel32.dll'
- SELECTION_3:
- StartFunction: LoadLibraryA
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 052ec6f6-1adc-41e6-907a-f1c813478bee
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: create_remote_thread
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/05_defense_evasion/WIN-180719170510.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1055
-- attack.t1055.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_password_dumper_lsass.yml b/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_password_dumper_lsass.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index af1ed3a9..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_password_dumper_lsass.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Password Dumper Remote Thread in LSASS
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke
-date: 2017/02/19
-description: Detects password dumper activity by monitoring remote thread creation
- EventID 8 in combination with the lsass.exe process as TargetImage. The process
- in field Process is the malicious program. A single execution can lead to hundreds
- of events.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 8
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetImage: '*\lsass.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- StartModule: ''
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Antivirus products
-id: f239b326-2f41-4d6b-9dfa-c846a60ef505
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: create_remote_thread
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/06/21
-references:
-- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/WCE.htm
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.s0005
-- attack.t1003.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_powershell_code_injection.yml b/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_powershell_code_injection.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a8c965d0..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_powershell_code_injection.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Accessing WinAPI in PowerShell. Code Injection.
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/06
-description: Detecting Code injection with PowerShell in another process
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 8
- SELECTION_2:
- SourceImage: '*\powershell.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: eeb2e3dc-c1f4-40dd-9bd5-149ee465ad50
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: create_remote_thread
- definition: Note that you have to configure logging for CreateRemoteThread in Symson
- config
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_susp_powershell_rundll32.yml b/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_susp_powershell_rundll32.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4f519073..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_susp_powershell_rundll32.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: PowerShell Rundll32 Remote Thread Creation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2018/06/25
-description: Detects PowerShell remote thread creation in Rundll32.exe
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 8
- SELECTION_2:
- SourceImage: '*\powershell.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetImage: '*\rundll32.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 99b97608-3e21-4bfe-8217-2a127c396a0e
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: create_remote_thread
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/12
-references:
-- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/06/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1085
-- attack.t1218.011
-- attack.t1086
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_suspicious_remote_thread.yml b/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_suspicious_remote_thread.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 32ca5703..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/create_remote_thread/sysmon_suspicious_remote_thread.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Remote Thread Created
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/27
-description: Offensive tradecraft is switching away from using APIs like "CreateRemoteThread",
- however, this is still largely observed in the wild. This rule aims to detect suspicious
- processes (those we would not expect to behave in this way like word.exe or outlook.exe)
- creating remote threads on other processes. It is a generalistic rule, but it should
- have a low FP ratio due to the selected range of processes.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 8
- SELECTION_2:
- SourceImage:
- - '*\bash.exe'
- - '*\cvtres.exe'
- - '*\defrag.exe'
- - '*\dnx.exe'
- - '*\esentutl.exe'
- - '*\excel.exe'
- - '*\expand.exe'
- - '*\explorer.exe'
- - '*\find.exe'
- - '*\findstr.exe'
- - '*\forfiles.exe'
- - '*\git.exe'
- - '*\gpupdate.exe'
- - '*\hh.exe'
- - '*\iexplore.exe'
- - '*\installutil.exe'
- - '*\lync.exe'
- - '*\makecab.exe'
- - '*\mDNSResponder.exe'
- - '*\monitoringhost.exe'
- - '*\msbuild.exe'
- - '*\mshta.exe'
- - '*\msiexec.exe'
- - '*\mspaint.exe'
- - '*\outlook.exe'
- - '*\ping.exe'
- - '*\powerpnt.exe'
- - '*\powershell.exe'
- - '*\provtool.exe'
- - '*\python.exe'
- - '*\regsvr32.exe'
- - '*\robocopy.exe'
- - '*\runonce.exe'
- - '*\sapcimc.exe'
- - '*\schtasks.exe'
- - '*\smartscreen.exe'
- - '*\spoolsv.exe'
- - '*\tstheme.exe'
- - '*\userinit.exe'
- - '*\vssadmin.exe'
- - '*\vssvc.exe'
- - '*\w3wp.exe'
- - '*\winlogon.exe'
- - '*\winscp.exe'
- - '*\wmic.exe'
- - '*\word.exe'
- - '*\wscript.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- SourceImage: '*Visual Studio*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- User
-- SourceImage
-- TargetImage
-id: 66d31e5f-52d6-40a4-9615-002d3789a119
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: create_remote_thread
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/06/27
-notes:
-- MonitoringHost.exe is a process that loads .NET CLR by default and thus a favorite
- for process injection for .NET in-memory offensive tools.
-references:
-- Personal research, statistical analysis
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1055
diff --git a/rules/sigma/create_stream_hash/sysmon_ads_executable.yml b/rules/sigma/create_stream_hash/sysmon_ads_executable.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index fcfb7db7..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/create_stream_hash/sysmon_ads_executable.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Executable in ADS
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, @0xrawsec
-date: 2018/06/03
-description: Detects the creation of an ADS data stream that contains an executable
- (non-empty imphash)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 15
- SELECTION_2:
- Hashes: '*IMPHASH=*'
- SELECTION_3:
- Hashes: '*IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-fields:
-- TargetFilename
-- Image
-id: b69888d4-380c-45ce-9cf9-d9ce46e67821
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: create_stream_hash
- definition: 'Requirements: Sysmon config with Imphash logging activated'
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/08
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/0xrawsec/status/1002478725605273600?s=21
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
-- attack.s0139
-- attack.t1564.004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/create_stream_hash/sysmon_regedit_export_to_ads.yml b/rules/sigma/create_stream_hash/sysmon_regedit_export_to_ads.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ed5d0f3b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/create_stream_hash/sysmon_regedit_export_to_ads.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Exports Registry Key To an Alternate Data Stream
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/07
-description: Exports the target Registry key and hides it in the specified alternate
- data stream.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 15
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\regedit.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- TargetFilename
-id: 0d7a9363-af70-4e7b-a3b7-1a176b7fbe84
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: create_stream_hash
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/master/yml/OSBinaries/Regedit.yml
-- https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1564.004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_suspicious_download.yml b/rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_suspicious_download.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 586b83cf..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_suspicious_download.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious PowerShell Download
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/03/05
-description: Detects suspicious PowerShell download command
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- - System.Net.WebClient
- SELECTION_2:
- - .DownloadFile(
- - .DownloadString(
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2))
-falsepositives:
-- PowerShell scripts that download content from the Internet
-id: 65531a81-a694-4e31-ae04-f8ba5bc33759
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: powershell
-modified: 2021/09/21
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
-- attack.t1086
diff --git a/rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_suspicious_invocation_generic.yml b/rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_suspicious_invocation_generic.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 76db79e5..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_suspicious_invocation_generic.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth (rule)
-date: 2017/03/12
-description: Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- - ' -enc '
- - ' -EncodedCommand '
- SELECTION_2:
- - ' -w hidden '
- - ' -window hidden '
- - ' -windowstyle hidden '
- SELECTION_3:
- - ' -noni '
- - ' -noninteractive '
- condition: ((SELECTION_1) and (SELECTION_2) and (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Penetration tests
-- Very special / sneaky PowerShell scripts
-id: 3d304fda-78aa-43ed-975c-d740798a49c1
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: powershell
-modified: 2021/12/02
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
-- attack.t1086
diff --git a/rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_suspicious_invocation_specific.yml b/rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_suspicious_invocation_specific.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 47f9fe6a..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_suspicious_invocation_specific.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth (rule), Jonhnathan Ribeiro
-date: 2017/03/05
-description: Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- - ' -w '
- SELECTION_10:
- - bypass
- SELECTION_11:
- - -Enc
- SELECTION_12:
- - powershell
- SELECTION_13:
- - reg
- SELECTION_14:
- - add
- SELECTION_15:
- - HKCU\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run
- SELECTION_16:
- - bypass
- SELECTION_17:
- - -noprofile
- SELECTION_18:
- - -windowstyle
- SELECTION_19:
- - hidden
- SELECTION_2:
- - hidden
- SELECTION_20:
- - new-object
- SELECTION_21:
- - system.net.webclient
- SELECTION_22:
- - .download
- SELECTION_23:
- - iex
- SELECTION_24:
- - New-Object
- SELECTION_25:
- - Net.WebClient
- SELECTION_26:
- - .Download
- SELECTION_3:
- - -nop
- SELECTION_4:
- - ' -c '
- SELECTION_5:
- - '[Convert]::FromBase64String'
- SELECTION_6:
- - -noni
- SELECTION_7:
- - iex
- SELECTION_8:
- - New-Object
- SELECTION_9:
- - -ep
- condition: ((((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and ((SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and
- ((SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7 and SELECTION_8) or SELECTION_5)) or (SELECTION_9
- and SELECTION_10 and SELECTION_11))) or (SELECTION_12 and SELECTION_13 and SELECTION_14
- and SELECTION_15)) or (SELECTION_16 and SELECTION_17 and SELECTION_18 and SELECTION_19
- and SELECTION_20 and SELECTION_21 and SELECTION_22)) or (SELECTION_23 and SELECTION_24
- and SELECTION_25 and SELECTION_26))
-falsepositives:
-- Penetration tests
-id: fce5f582-cc00-41e1-941a-c6fabf0fdb8c
-level: high
-logsource:
- definition: Script block logging must be enabled for 4104, Module Logging must be
- enabled for 4103
- product: windows
- service: powershell
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
-- attack.t1086
diff --git a/rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_syncappvpublishingserver_exe.yml b/rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_syncappvpublishingserver_exe.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a0ef8a13..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/deprecated/powershell_syncappvpublishingserver_exe.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-
-title: SyncAppvPublishingServer Execution to Bypass Powershell Restriction
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, OSCD Community
-date: 2020/10/05
-description: Detects SyncAppvPublishingServer process execution which usually utilized
- by adversaries to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions.
-detection:
- condition: SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe
-falsepositives:
-- App-V clients
-id: 9f7aa113-9da6-4a8d-907c-5f1a4b908299
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: powershell
-modified: 2021/09/11
-references:
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Syncappvpublishingserver/
-related:
-- id: fde7929d-8beb-4a4c-b922-be9974671667
- type: derived
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1218
diff --git a/rules/sigma/deprecated/process_creation_syncappvpublishingserver_exe.yml b/rules/sigma/deprecated/process_creation_syncappvpublishingserver_exe.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ae8dc230..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/deprecated/process_creation_syncappvpublishingserver_exe.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-
-title: SyncAppvPublishingServer Execution to Bypass Powershell Restriction
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, OSCD Community
-date: 2020/10/05
-description: Detects SyncAppvPublishingServer process execution which usually utilized
- by adversaries to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- App-V clients
-id: fde7929d-8beb-4a4c-b922-be9974671667
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: process_creation
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/11
-references:
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Syncappvpublishingserver/
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1218
diff --git a/rules/sigma/deprecated/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml b/rules/sigma/deprecated/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1ac5ab81..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/deprecated/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Mimikatz Detection LSASS Access
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Sherif Eldeeb
-date: 2017/10/18
-description: Detects process access to LSASS which is typical for Mimikatz (0x1000
- PROCESS_QUERY_ LIMITED_INFORMATION, 0x0400 PROCESS_QUERY_ INFORMATION "only old
- versions", 0x0010 PROCESS_VM_READ)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 10
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetImage: '*\lsass.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- GrantedAccess:
- - '0x1410'
- - '0x1010'
- - '0x410'
- SELECTION_4:
- SourceImage: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\\*
- SELECTION_5:
- SourceImage: '*\GamingServices.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4
- and SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- Some security products access LSASS in this way.
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- User
-- SourceImage
-id: 0d894093-71bc-43c3-8c4d-ecfc28dcf5d9
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: process_access
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow
-- https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.s0002
-- attack.credential_access
-- car.2019-04-004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/deprecated/sysmon_rclone_execution.yml b/rules/sigma/deprecated/sysmon_rclone_execution.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 50b5c4ff..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/deprecated/sysmon_rclone_execution.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-
-title: RClone Execution
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Bhabesh Raj, Sittikorn S
-date: 2021/05/10
-description: Detects execution of RClone utility for exfiltration as used by various
- ransomwares strains like REvil, Conti, FiveHands, etc
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1
- SELECTION_2:
- Description: Rsync for cloud storage
- SELECTION_3:
- CommandLine: '*--config *'
- SELECTION_4:
- CommandLine: '*--no-check-certificate *'
- SELECTION_5:
- CommandLine: '* copy *'
- SELECTION_6:
- Image:
- - '*\rclone.exe'
- SELECTION_7:
- CommandLine:
- - '*mega*'
- - '*pcloud*'
- - '*ftp*'
- - '*--progress*'
- - '*--ignore-existing*'
- - '*--auto-confirm*'
- - '*--transfers*'
- - '*--multi-thread-streams*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or (SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
- or (SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7)))
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate RClone use
-fields:
-- CommandLine
-- ParentCommandLine
-- Details
-id: a0d63692-a531-4912-ad39-4393325b2a9c
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: process_creation
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/06/29
-references:
-- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware
-- https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a
-- https://labs.sentinelone.com/egregor-raas-continues-the-chaos-with-cobalt-strike-and-rclone
-- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/darkside-ransomware-splunk-threat-update-and-detections.html
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.exfiltration
-- attack.t1567.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/deprecated/win_susp_esentutl_activity.yml b/rules/sigma/deprecated/win_susp_esentutl_activity.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a8c38b90..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/deprecated/win_susp_esentutl_activity.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Esentutl Use
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2020/05/23
-description: Detects flags often used with the LOLBAS Esentutl for malicious activity.
- It could be used in rare cases by administrators to access locked files or during
- maintenance.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1
- SELECTION_2:
- CommandLine: '* /vss *'
- SELECTION_3:
- CommandLine: '* /y *'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Administrative activity
-fields:
-- CommandLine
-- ParentCommandLine
-id: 56a8189f-11b2-48c8-8ca7-c54b03c2fbf7
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: process_creation
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/
-- https://twitter.com/chadtilbury/status/1264226341408452610
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.execution
-- attack.s0404
-- attack.t1218
diff --git a/rules/sigma/deprecated/win_susp_rclone_exec.yml b/rules/sigma/deprecated/win_susp_rclone_exec.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 58b6d4e7..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/deprecated/win_susp_rclone_exec.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Rclone Execution via Command Line or PowerShell
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Aaron Greetham (@beardofbinary) - NCC Group
-date: 2021/05/26
-description: Detects Rclone which is commonly used by ransomware groups for exfiltration
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1
- SELECTION_2:
- CommandLine:
- - '* pass *'
- - '* user *'
- - '* copy *'
- - '* mega *'
- - '* sync *'
- - '* config *'
- - '* lsd *'
- - '* remote *'
- - '* ls *'
- SELECTION_3:
- Description: Rsync for cloud storage
- SELECTION_4:
- Image: '*\rclone.exe'
- SELECTION_5:
- ParentImage:
- - '*\PowerShell.exe'
- - '*\cmd.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and (SELECTION_3 or (SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)))
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate Rclone usage (rare)
-id: cb7286ba-f207-44ab-b9e6-760d82b84253
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: process_creation
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.exfiltration
-- attack.t1567.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/deprecated/win_susp_vssadmin_ntds_activity.yml b/rules/sigma/deprecated/win_susp_vssadmin_ntds_activity.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 16d968cb..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/deprecated/win_susp_vssadmin_ntds_activity.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Activity Related to NTDS.dit Domain Hash Retrieval
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Michael Haag
-date: 2019/01/16
-description: Detects suspicious commands that could be related to activity that uses
- volume shadow copy to steal and retrieve hashes from the NTDS.dit file remotely
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1
- SELECTION_2:
- CommandLine:
- - vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows
- - 'vssadmin create shadow /for=C:'
- - copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\\*\windows\ntds\ntds.dit
- - copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\\*\config\SAM
- - 'vssadmin delete shadows /for=C:'
- - 'reg SAVE HKLM\SYSTEM '
- - esentutl.exe /y /vss *\ntds.dit*
- - esentutl.exe /y /vss *\SAM
- - esentutl.exe /y /vss *\SYSTEM
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Administrative activity
-fields:
-- CommandLine
-- ParentCommandLine
-id: b932b60f-fdda-4d53-8eda-a170c1d97bbd
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: process_creation
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://www.swordshield.com/2015/07/getting-hashes-from-ntds-dit-file/
-- https://room362.com/post/2013/2013-06-10-volume-shadow-copy-ntdsdit-domain-hashes-remotely-part-1/
-- https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Tutorial-for-NTDS-goodness-(VSSADMIN,-WMIS,-NTDS-dit,-SYSTEM)/
-- https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/new-teslacrypt-ransomware-arrives-via-spam/
-- https://dfironthemountain.wordpress.com/2018/12/06/locked-file-access-using-esentutl-exe/
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_net_mal_cobaltstrike.yml b/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_net_mal_cobaltstrike.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 67bce96f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_net_mal_cobaltstrike.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/11/09
-description: Detects a program that invoked suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt
- Strike beacons
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 22
- SELECTION_2:
- QueryName:
- - aaa.stage.*
- - post.1*
- SELECTION_3:
- QueryName: '*.stage.123456.*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- Image
-- CommandLine
-id: f356a9c4-effd-4608-bbf8-408afd5cd006
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: dns_query
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://www.icebrg.io/blog/footprints-of-fin7-tracking-actor-patterns
-- https://www.sekoia.io/en/hunting-and-detecting-cobalt-strike/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.t1071
-- attack.t1071.004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_net_susp_ipify.yml b/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_net_susp_ipify.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 83f889fa..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_net_susp_ipify.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious DNS Query for IP Lookup Service APIs
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Brandon George (blog post), Thomas Patzke (rule)
-date: 2021/07/08
-description: Detects DNS queries for ip lookup services such as api.ipify.org not
- originating from a browser process.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 22
- SELECTION_2:
- QueryName:
- - canireachthe.net
- - ipv4.icanhazip.com
- - ip.anysrc.net
- - edns.ip-api.com
- - wtfismyip.com
- - checkip.dyndns.org
- - api.2ip.ua
- - icanhazip.com
- - api.ipify.org
- - ip-api.com
- - checkip.amazonaws.com
- - ipecho.net
- - ipinfo.io
- - ipv4bot.whatismyipaddress.com
- - freegeoip.app
- SELECTION_3:
- Image:
- - '*\chrome.exe'
- - '*\iexplore.exe'
- - '*\firefox.exe'
- - '*\brave.exe'
- - '*\opera.exe'
- - '*\msedge.exe'
- - '*\vivaldi.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate usage of ip lookup services such as ipify API
-id: ec82e2a5-81ea-4211-a1f8-37a0286df2c2
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: dns_query
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/10
-references:
-- https://www.binarydefense.com/analysis-of-hancitor-when-boring-begets-beacon
-- https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1436376497980428318
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.reconnaissance
-- attack.t1590
diff --git a/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_query_hybridconnectionmgr_servicebus.yml b/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_query_hybridconnectionmgr_servicebus.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index eaa5d87c..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_query_hybridconnectionmgr_servicebus.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: DNS HybridConnectionManager Service Bus
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2021/04/12
-description: Detects Azure Hybrid Connection Manager services querying the Azure service
- bus service
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 22
- SELECTION_2:
- QueryName: '*servicebus.windows.net*'
- SELECTION_3:
- Image: '*HybridConnectionManager*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate use of Azure Hybrid Connection Manager and the Azure Service Bus service
-id: 7bd3902d-8b8b-4dd4-838a-c6862d40150d
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: dns_query
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/06/10
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1381642789369286662
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1554
diff --git a/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_query_mega_nz.yml b/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_query_mega_nz.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2ba08e54..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_query_mega_nz.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-
-title: DNS Query for MEGA.io Upload Domain
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Aaron Greetham (@beardofbinary) - NCC Group
-date: 2021/05/26
-description: Detects DNS queries for subdomains used for upload to MEGA.io
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 22
- SELECTION_2:
- QueryName: '*userstorage.mega.co.nz*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate Mega upload
-id: 613c03ba-0779-4a53-8a1f-47f914a4ded3
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: dns_query
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.exfiltration
-- attack.t1567.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_query_possible_dns_rebinding.yml b/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_query_possible_dns_rebinding.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2ce9cff0..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_query_possible_dns_rebinding.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Possible DNS Rebinding
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/25
-description: Detects several different DNS-answers by one domain with IPs from internal
- and external networks. Normally, DNS-answer contain TTL >100. (DNS-record will saved
- in host cache for a while TTL).
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 22
- SELECTION_2:
- QueryName: '*'
- SELECTION_3:
- QueryStatus: '0'
- SELECTION_4:
- QueryResults:
- - (::ffff:)?10.*
- - (::ffff:)?192.168.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.16.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.17.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.18.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.19.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.20.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.21.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.22.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.23.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.24.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.25.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.26.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.27.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.28.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.29.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.30.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.31.*
- - (::ffff:)?127.*
- SELECTION_5:
- QueryName: '*'
- SELECTION_6:
- QueryStatus: '0'
- SELECTION_7:
- QueryResults:
- - (::ffff:)?10.*
- - (::ffff:)?192.168.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.16.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.17.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.18.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.19.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.20.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.21.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.22.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.23.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.24.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.25.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.26.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.27.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.28.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.29.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.30.*
- - (::ffff:)?172.31.*
- - (::ffff:)?127.*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and (SELECTION_5
- and SELECTION_6) and not (SELECTION_7)) | count(QueryName) by ComputerName >
- 3
- timeframe: 30s
-id: eb07e747-2552-44cd-af36-b659ae0958e4
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: dns_query
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://medium.com/@brannondorsey/attacking-private-networks-from-the-internet-with-dns-rebinding-ea7098a2d325
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.t1189
diff --git a/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_query_regsvr32_network_activity.yml b/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_query_regsvr32_network_activity.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 45b83253..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/dns_query/dns_query_regsvr32_network_activity.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Regsvr32 Network Activity
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/25
-description: Detects network connections and DNS queries initiated by Regsvr32.exe
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 22
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\regsvr32.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- User
-- Image
-- DestinationIp
-- DestinationPort
-id: 36e037c4-c228-4866-b6a3-48eb292b9955
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: dns_query
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/11/applocker-bypass-regsvr32/
-- https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1117/T1117.md
-related:
-- id: c7e91a02-d771-4a6d-a700-42587e0b1095
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1559.001
-- attack.t1175
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1218.010
-- attack.t1117
diff --git a/rules/sigma/dns_query/win_dq_lobas_appinstaller.yml b/rules/sigma/dns_query/win_dq_lobas_appinstaller.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f8385b6e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/dns_query/win_dq_lobas_appinstaller.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: AppInstaller Attempts From URL by DNS
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: frack113
-date: 2021/11/24
-description: AppInstaller.exe is spawned by the default handler for the URI, it attempts
- to load/install a package from the URL
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 22
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller_*
- SELECTION_3:
- Image: '*\AppInstaller.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 7cff77e1-9663-46a3-8260-17f2e1aa9d0a
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: dns_query
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/notwhickey/status/1333900137232523264
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/AppInstaller/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.t1105
diff --git a/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_mal_creddumper.yml b/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_mal_creddumper.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 0f7b7dd3..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_mal_creddumper.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
-date: 2017/03/05
-description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution
- events
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 6
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*fgexec*'
- - '*dumpsvc*'
- - '*cachedump*'
- - '*mimidrv*'
- - '*gsecdump*'
- - '*servpw*'
- - '*pwdump*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery
-id: df5ff0a5-f83f-4a5b-bba1-3e6a3f6f6ea2
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: driver_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/10
-references:
-- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
-related:
-- id: 4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79ed
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.001
-- attack.t1003.002
-- attack.t1003.004
-- attack.t1003.005
-- attack.t1003.006
-- attack.t1035
-- attack.t1569.002
-- attack.s0005
diff --git a/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml b/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c39a0fd5..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth
-date: 2019/10/26
-description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting
- a specific service installation
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 6
- SELECTION_10:
- ImagePath: '*cmd.exe*'
- SELECTION_11:
- ImagePath: '*/c*'
- SELECTION_12:
- ImagePath: '*echo*'
- SELECTION_13:
- ImagePath: '*\pipe\\*'
- SELECTION_14:
- ImagePath: '*rundll32*'
- SELECTION_15:
- ImagePath: '*.dll,a*'
- SELECTION_16:
- ImagePath: '*/p:*'
- SELECTION_2:
- ImagePath: '*cmd*'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImagePath: '*/c*'
- SELECTION_4:
- ImagePath: '*echo*'
- SELECTION_5:
- ImagePath: '*\pipe\\*'
- SELECTION_6:
- ImagePath: '*%COMSPEC%*'
- SELECTION_7:
- ImagePath: '*/c*'
- SELECTION_8:
- ImagePath: '*echo*'
- SELECTION_9:
- ImagePath: '*\pipe\\*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
- or (SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7 and SELECTION_8 and SELECTION_9) or (SELECTION_10
- and SELECTION_11 and SELECTION_12 and SELECTION_13) or (SELECTION_14 and SELECTION_15
- and SELECTION_16)))
-falsepositives:
-- Highly unlikely
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- SubjectDomainName
-- SubjectUserName
-- ImagePath
-id: d585ab5a-6a69-49a8-96e8-4a726a54de46
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: driver_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
-- https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
-related:
-- id: 843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1134
-- attack.t1134.001
-- attack.t1134.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml b/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 55e41d08..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: PowerShell Scripts Run by a Services
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
-date: 2020/10/06
-description: Detects powershell script installed as a Service
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 6
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*powershell*'
- - '*pwsh*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 46deb5e1-28c9-4905-b2df-51cdcc9e6073
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: driver_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
-related:
-- id: a2e5019d-a658-4c6a-92bf-7197b54e2cae
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1569.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_susp_temp_use.yml b/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_susp_temp_use.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6f0a514b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_susp_temp_use.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Driver Load from Temp
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/02/12
-description: Detects a driver load from a temporary directory
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 6
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded: '*\Temp\\*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- there is a relevant set of false positives depending on applications in the environment
-id: 2c4523d5-d481-4ed0-8ec3-7fbf0cb41a75
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: driver_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1050
-- attack.t1543.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_vuln_dell_driver.yml b/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_vuln_dell_driver.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b93f3dec..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_vuln_dell_driver.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Vulnerable Dell BIOS Update Driver Load
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/05/05
-description: Detects the load of the vulnerable Dell BIOS update driver as reported
- in CVE-2021-21551
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 6
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded: '*\DBUtil_2_3.Sys*'
- SELECTION_3:
- Hashes:
- - '*0296e2ce999e67c76352613a718e11516fe1b0efc3ffdb8918fc999dd76a73a5*'
- - '*c948ae14761095e4d76b55d9de86412258be7afd*'
- - '*c996d7971c49252c582171d9380360f2*'
- - '*ddbf5ecca5c8086afde1fb4f551e9e6400e94f4428fe7fb5559da5cffa654cc1*'
- - '*10b30bdee43b3a2ec4aa63375577ade650269d25*'
- - '*d2fd132ab7bbc6bbb87a84f026fa0244*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- legitimate BIOS driver updates (should be rare)
-id: 21b23707-60d6-41bb-96e3-0f0481b0fed9
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: driver_load
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://labs.sentinelone.com/cve-2021-21551-hundreds-of-millions-of-dell-computers-at-risk-due-to-multiple-bios-driver-privilege-escalation-flaws/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- cve.2021.21551
-- attack.t1543
diff --git a/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_windivert.yml b/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_windivert.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ba31fa4e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/driver_load/driver_load_windivert.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: WinDivert Driver Load
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/07/30
-description: Detects the load of the Windiver driver, a powerful user-mode capture/sniffing/modification/blocking/re-injection
- package for Windows
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 6
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\WinDivert.sys*'
- - '*\WinDivert64.sys*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- legitimate WinDivert driver usage
-id: 679085d5-f427-4484-9f58-1dc30a7c426d
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: driver_load
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://reqrypt.org/windivert-doc.html
-- https://rastamouse.me/ntlm-relaying-via-cobalt-strike/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.collection
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1599.001
-- attack.t1557.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/edr/edr_command_execution_by_office_applications.yml b/rules/sigma/edr/edr_command_execution_by_office_applications.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 582c1483..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/edr/edr_command_execution_by_office_applications.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-title: EDR WMI Command Execution by Office Applications
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule)
-date: 2021/08/23
-description: Initial execution of malicious document calls wmic Win32_Process::Create
- to execute the file with regsvr32
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventLog: EDR
- SELECTION_2:
- EventType: WMIExecution
- SELECTION_3:
- WMIcommand: '*Win32_Process\:\:Create*'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - '*\winword.exe'
- - '*\excel.exe'
- - '*\powerpnt.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 3ee1bba8-b9e2-4e35-bec5-7fb66b6b3815
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: edr
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/09
-references:
-- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
-- https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/main/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1204.002
-- attack.t1047
-- attack.t1218.010
-- attack.execution
-- attack.defense_evasion
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_delete/sysmon_delete_prefetch.yml b/rules/sigma/file_delete/sysmon_delete_prefetch.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 5ce6b88a..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_delete/sysmon_delete_prefetch.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Prefetch File Deletion
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Cedric MAURUGEON
-date: 2021/09/29
-description: Detects the deletion of a prefetch file (AntiForensic)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 23
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 26
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: C:\Windows\Prefetch\\*
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetFilename: '*.pf'
- SELECTION_5:
- Image: C:\windows\system32\svchost.exe
- SELECTION_6:
- User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and (SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) and not
- (SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 0a1f9d29-6465-4776-b091-7f43b26e4c89
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_delete
- product: windows
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1070.004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_delete/sysmon_sysinternals_sdelete_file_deletion.yml b/rules/sigma/file_delete/sysmon_sysinternals_sdelete_file_deletion.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 258d06b6..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_delete/sysmon_sysinternals_sdelete_file_deletion.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Sysinternals SDelete File Deletion
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/05/02
-description: A General detection to trigger for the deletion of files by Sysinternals
- SDelete. It looks for the common name pattern used to rename files.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 23
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 26
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*.AAA'
- - '*.ZZZ'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitime usage of SDelete
-id: 6ddab845-b1b8-49c2-bbf7-1a11967f64bc
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: file_delete
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/9
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/4.B.4_83D62033-105A-4A02-8B75-DAB52D8D51EC.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1070.004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_delete/win_cve_2021_1675_printspooler_del.yml b/rules/sigma/file_delete/win_cve_2021_1675_printspooler_del.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 7285084e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_delete/win_cve_2021_1675_printspooler_del.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Windows Spooler Service Suspicious File Deletion
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Bhabesh Raj
-date: 2021/07/01
-description: Detect DLL deletions from Spooler Service driver folder
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 23
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 26
- SELECTION_3:
- Image: '*spoolsv.exe'
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetFilename: '*C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\\*'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 5b2bbc47-dead-4ef7-8908-0cf73fcbecbf
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_delete
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/08/24
-references:
-- https://github.com/hhlxf/PrintNightmare
-- https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1574
-- cve.2021.1675
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_advanced_ip_scanner.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_advanced_ip_scanner.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f2637068..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_advanced_ip_scanner.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Advanced IP Scanner
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: '@ROxPinTeddy'
-date: 2020/05/12
-description: Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for
- ransomware groups.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\AppData\Local\Temp\Advanced IP Scanner 2*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate administrative use
-id: fed85bf9-e075-4280-9159-fbe8a023d6fa
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/11
-references:
-- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/
-- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
-- https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/prelude-to-ransomware-systembc
-- https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20444693/fbi-pin-egregor-ransomware-bc-01062021.pdf
-- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/18/all-that-for-a-coinminer
-related:
-- id: bef37fa2-f205-4a7b-b484-0759bfd5f86f
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1046
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_apt_unidentified_nov_18.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_apt_unidentified_nov_18.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f12ba537..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_apt_unidentified_nov_18.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Unidentified Attacker November 2018
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: '@41thexplorer, Microsoft Defender ATP'
-date: 2018/11/20
-description: A sigma rule detecting an unidetefied attacker who used phishing emails
- to target high profile orgs on November 2018. The Actor shares some TTPs with YYTRIUM/APT29
- campaign in 2016.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*ds7002.lnk*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-id: 3a3f81ca-652c-482b-adeb-b1c804727f74
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/19
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/DrunkBinary/status/1063075530180886529
-related:
-- id: 7453575c-a747-40b9-839b-125a0aae324b
- type: derived
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1218.011
-- attack.t1085
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_cve_2021_31979_cve_2021_33771_exploits.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_cve_2021_31979_cve_2021_33771_exploits.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 5889ee4b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_cve_2021_31979_cve_2021_33771_exploits.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CVE-2021-31979 CVE-2021-33771 Exploits by Sourgum
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Sittikorn S
-date: 2021/07/16
-description: Detects patterns as noticed in exploitation of Windows CVE-2021-31979
- CVE-2021-33771 vulnerability and DevilsTongue malware by threat group Sourgum
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*C:\Windows\system32\physmem.sys*'
- - '*C:\Windows\System32\IME\IMEJP\imjpueact.dll*'
- - '*C:\Windows\system32\ime\IMETC\IMTCPROT.DLL*'
- - '*C:\Windows\system32\ime\SHARED\imecpmeid.dll*'
- - '*C:\Windows\system32\config\spp\ServiceState\Recovery\pac.dat*'
- - '*C:\Windows\system32\config\cy-GB\Setup\SKB\InputMethod\TupTask.dat*'
- - '*C:\Windows\system32\config\config\startwus.dat*'
- - '*C:\Windows\system32\ime\SHARED\WimBootConfigurations.ini*'
- - '*C:\Windows\system32\ime\IMEJP\WimBootConfigurations.ini*'
- - '*C:\Windows\system32\ime\IMETC\WimBootConfigurations.ini*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-id: ad7085ac-92e4-4b76-8ce2-276d2c0e68ef
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/09
-references:
-- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/15/protecting-customers-from-a-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits-and-devilstongue-malware/
-- https://citizenlab.ca/2021/07/hooking-candiru-another-mercenary-spyware-vendor-comes-into-focus/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1566
-- attack.t1203
-- cve.2021.33771
-- cve.2021.31979
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_cve_2021_41379_msi_lpe.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_cve_2021_41379_msi_lpe.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c4487c06..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_cve_2021_41379_msi_lpe.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: InstallerFileTakeOver LPE CVE-2021-41379 File Create Event
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/11/22
-description: Detects signs of the exploitation of LPE CVE-2021-41379 that include
- an msiexec process that creates an elevation_service.exe file
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\msiexec.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application*
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetFilename: '*\elevation_service.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-- Possibly some Microsoft Edge upgrades
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- TargetFilename
-id: 3be82d5d-09fe-4d6a-a275-0d40d234d324
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver
-- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-21-1308/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1068
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_hack_dumpert.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_hack_dumpert.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 88dcc5e0..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_hack_dumpert.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Dumpert Process Dumper
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2020/02/04
-description: Detects the use of Dumpert process dumper, which dumps the lsass.exe
- process memory
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: C:\Windows\Temp\dumpert.dmp
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Very unlikely
-id: 93d94efc-d7ad-4161-ad7d-1638c4f908d8
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert
-- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/actors-still-exploiting-sharepoint-vulnerability/
-related:
-- id: 2704ab9e-afe2-4854-a3b1-0c0706d03578
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_hktl_createminidump.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_hktl_createminidump.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 35b27510..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_hktl_createminidump.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CreateMiniDump Hacktool
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2019/12/22
-description: Detects the use of CreateMiniDump hack tool used to dump the LSASS process
- memory for credential extraction on the attacker's machine
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\lsass.dmp'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: db2110f3-479d-42a6-94fb-d35bc1e46492
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/19
-references:
-- https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsass-passwords-without-mimikatz-minidumpwritedump-av-signature-bypass
-related:
-- id: 36d88494-1d43-4dc0-b3fa-35c8fea0ca9d
- type: derived
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003.001
-- attack.t1003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_hktl_nppspy.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_hktl_nppspy.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index bcb38f5f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_hktl_nppspy.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: NPPSpy Hacktool Usage
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/11/29
-description: Detects the use of NPPSpy hacktool that stores cleartext passwords of
- users that logged in to a local file
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\NPPSpy.txt'
- - '*\NPPSpy.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: cad1fe90-2406-44dc-bd03-59d0b58fe722
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003/T1003.md#atomic-test-2---credential-dumping-with-nppspy
-- https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1465282548494487554
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_lsass_dump.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_lsass_dump.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3dc51d9a..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_lsass_dump.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-
-title: LSASS Process Memory Dump Files
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/11/15
-description: Detects file names used by different memory dumping tools to create a
- memory dump of the LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\lsass.dmp'
- - '*\lsass.zip'
- - '*\lsass.rar'
- - '*\Temp\dumpert.dmp'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\lsass_2*'
- - '*\lsassdump*'
- - '*\lsassdmp*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://www.google.com/search?q=procdump+lsass
-- https://medium.com/@markmotig/some-ways-to-dump-lsass-exe-c4a75fdc49bf
-related:
-- id: db2110f3-479d-42a6-94fb-d35bc1e46492
- type: obsoletes
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003.001
-- attack.t1003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_mal_adwind.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_mal_adwind.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8ec26e87..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_mal_adwind.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Adwind RAT / JRAT
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
-date: 2017/11/10
-description: Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\AppData\Roaming\Oracle\bin\java*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*.exe*'
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetFilename: '*\Retrive*'
- SELECTION_5:
- TargetFilename: '*.vbs*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)))
-id: 0bcfabcb-7929-47f4-93d6-b33fb67d34d1
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/19
-references:
-- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ba86fa0d4b6af2db0656a88b1dd29f36fe362473ae8ad04255c4e52f214a541c?environmentId=100
-- https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf
-related:
-- id: 1fac1481-2dbc-48b2-9096-753c49b4ec71
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.005
-- attack.t1059.007
-- attack.t1064
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_mal_vhd_download.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_mal_vhd_download.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6bc45b4d..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_mal_vhd_download.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious VHD Image Download From Browser
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: frack113, Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io'
-date: 2021/10/25
-description: Malware can use mountable Virtual Hard Disk .vhd file to encapsulate
- payloads and evade security controls
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*chrome.exe'
- - '*firefox.exe'
- - '*microsoftedge.exe'
- - '*microsoftedgecp.exe'
- - '*msedge.exe'
- - '*iexplorer.exe'
- - '*brave.exe'
- - '*opera.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*.vhd*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate user creation
-id: 8468111a-ef07-4654-903b-b863a80bbc95
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- definition: in sysmon add ".vhd
- "
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/10/29
-references:
-- https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/
-- https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lazarus-vhd-ransomware/36559/
-- https://securelist.com/lazarus-on-the-hunt-for-big-game/97757/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.resource_development
-- attack.t1587.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_mimikatz_kirbi_file_creation.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_mimikatz_kirbi_file_creation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1f8cce28..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_mimikatz_kirbi_file_creation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Mimikatz Kirbi File Creation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/11/08
-description: Detects the creation of files that contain Kerberos tickets based on
- an extension used by the popular tool Mimikatz
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*.kirbi'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-id: 9e099d99-44c2-42b6-a6d8-54c3545cab29
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://cobalt.io/blog/kerberoast-attack-techniques
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1558
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_moriya_rootkit.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_moriya_rootkit.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b0967a2b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_moriya_rootkit.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Moriya Rootkit
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Bhabesh Raj
-date: 2021/05/06
-description: Detects the use of Moriya rootkit as described in the securelist's Operation
- TunnelSnake report
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\MoriyaStreamWatchmen.sys
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- None
-id: a1507d71-0b60-44f6-b17c-bf53220fdd88
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://securelist.com/operation-tunnelsnake-and-moriya-rootkit/101831
-related:
-- id: 25b9c01c-350d-4b95-bed1-836d04a4f324
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1543.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_pingback_backdoor.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_pingback_backdoor.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c0ec5c1..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_pingback_backdoor.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Pingback Backdoor
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Bhabesh Raj
-date: 2021/05/05
-description: Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2
- as described in the trustwave report
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*updata.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: C:\Windows\oci.dll
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Very unlikely
-id: 2bd63d53-84d4-4210-80ff-bf0658f1bf78
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/09
-references:
-- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel
-- https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1574.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_script_creation_by_office_using_file_ext.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_script_creation_by_office_using_file_ext.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 52041907..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_script_creation_by_office_using_file_ext.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Created Files by Office Applications
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule)
-date: 2021/08/23
-description: This rule will monitor executable and script file creation by office
- applications. Please add more file extensions or magic bytes to the logic of your
- choice.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*winword.exe'
- - '*excel.exe'
- - '*powerpnt.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*.exe'
- - '*.dll'
- - '*.ocx'
- - '*.com'
- - '*.ps1'
- - '*.vbs'
- - '*.sys'
- - '*.bat'
- - '*.scr'
- - '*.proj'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/10
-references:
-- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
-- https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/main/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1204.002
-- attack.t1047
-- attack.t1218.010
-- attack.execution
-- attack.defense_evasion
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_susp_system_interactive_powershell.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_susp_system_interactive_powershell.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3ac992b2..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_susp_system_interactive_powershell.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Interactive PowerShell as SYSTEM
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/12/07
-description: Detects the creation of files that indicator an interactive use of PowerShell
- in the SYSTEM user context
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename:
- - C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
- - C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-Interactive
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Administrative activity
-- PowerShell scripts running as SYSTEM user
-id: 5b40a734-99b6-4b98-a1d0-1cea51a08ab2
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/PowerSploit_Invoke-Mimikatz.htm
-status: experimental
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_susp_task_write.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_susp_task_write.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 416a63a9..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_susp_task_write.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Writ to System32 Tasks
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/11/16
-description:
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\Windows\System32\Tasks*'
- SELECTION_3:
- Image:
- - '*\AppData\\*'
- - '*C:\PerfLogs*'
- - '*\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 80e1f67a-4596-4351-98f5-a9c3efabac95
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Desktopini+as+a+postexploitation+tool/25912/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1053
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_tool_psexec.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_tool_psexec.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index fbcf6ff0..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_tool_psexec.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: PsExec Tool Execution
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke
-date: 2017/06/12
-description: Detects PsExec service installation and execution events (service and
- Sysmon)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\PSEXESVC.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-fields:
-- EventID
-- CommandLine
-- ParentCommandLine
-- ServiceName
-- ServiceFileName
-- TargetFilename
-- PipeName
-id: 259e5a6a-b8d2-4c38-86e2-26c5e651361d
-level: low
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
-- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet
-related:
-- id: 42c575ea-e41e-41f1-b248-8093c3e82a28
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1035
-- attack.t1569.002
-- attack.s0029
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_uac_bypass_winsat.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_uac_bypass_winsat.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a2a13cef..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_uac_bypass_winsat.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: UAC Bypass Abusing Winsat Path Parsing - File
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Christian Burkard
-date: 2021/08/30
-description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a path parsing issue in winsat.exe
- (UACMe 52)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: C:\Users\\*
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\AppData\Local\Temp\system32\winsat.exe'
- - '*\AppData\Local\Temp\system32\winmm.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 155dbf56-e0a4-4dd0-8905-8a98705045e8
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1548.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_uac_bypass_wmp.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_uac_bypass_wmp.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 9063d90d..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_uac_bypass_wmp.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - File
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Christian Burkard
-date: 2021/08/23
-description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll
- (UACMe 32)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: C:\Users\\*
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\AppData\Local\Temp\OskSupport.dll'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image: C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe
- SELECTION_5:
- TargetFilename: C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 68578b43-65df-4f81-9a9b-92f32711a951
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1548.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_win_shell_write_susp_directory.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_win_shell_write_susp_directory.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 664041fb..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_win_shell_write_susp_directory.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Windows Shell File Write to Suspicious Folder
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/11/20
-description: Detects a Windows executable that writes files to suspicious folders
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\cmd.exe'
- - '*\powershell.exe'
- - '*\wscript.exe'
- - '*\cscript.exe'
- - '*\sh.exe'
- - '*\bash.exe'
- - '*\msbuild.exe'
- - '*\certutil.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*C:\Users\Public*'
- - '*C:\PerfLogs*'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - '*\schtasks.exe'
- - '*\wmic.exe'
- - '*\mshta.exe'
- - '*\forfiles.exe'
- - '*\scriptrunner.exe'
- - '*\certutil.exe'
- SELECTION_5:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*C:\Users\Public*'
- - '*C:\PerfLogs*'
- - '*\AppData\\*'
- - '*C:\Windows\Temp*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- CommandLine
-- ParentCommandLine
-id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/24
-references:
-- No references
-status: experimental
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_winrm_awl_bypass.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_winrm_awl_bypass.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 22ed7033..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_winrm_awl_bypass.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: AWL Bypass with Winrm.vbs and Malicious WsmPty.xsl/WsmTxt.xsl
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Julia Fomina, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/06
-description: Detects execution of attacker-controlled WsmPty.xsl or WsmTxt.xsl via
- winrm.vbs and copied cscript.exe (can be renamed)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*WsmPty.xsl'
- - '*WsmTxt.xsl'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename:
- - C:\Windows\System32\\*
- - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\\*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-id: d353dac0-1b41-46c2-820c-d7d2561fc6ed
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/19
-references:
-- https://posts.specterops.io/application-whitelisting-bypass-and-arbitrary-unsigned-code-execution-technique-in-winrm-vbs-c8c24fb40404
-related:
-- id: 074e0ded-6ced-4ebd-8b4d-53f55908119
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1216
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4354ebe7..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/file_event_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/10/12
-description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\`
- directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: System
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 614a7e17-5643-4d89-b6fe-f9df1a79641c
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/09
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-201009173318.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1047
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_creation_system_file.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_creation_system_file.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 031f68e2..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_creation_system_file.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-
-title: File Created with System Process Name
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Sander Wiebing
-date: 2020/05/26
-description: Detects the creation of an executable with a system process name in a
- suspicious folder
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\svchost.exe'
- - '*\rundll32.exe'
- - '*\services.exe'
- - '*\powershell.exe'
- - '*\regsvr32.exe'
- - '*\spoolsv.exe'
- - '*\lsass.exe'
- - '*\smss.exe'
- - '*\csrss.exe'
- - '*\conhost.exe'
- - '*\wininit.exe'
- - '*\lsm.exe'
- - '*\winlogon.exe'
- - '*\explorer.exe'
- - '*\taskhost.exe'
- - '*\Taskmgr.exe'
- - '*\taskmgr.exe'
- - '*\sihost.exe'
- - '*\RuntimeBroker.exe'
- - '*\runtimebroker.exe'
- - '*\smartscreen.exe'
- - '*\dllhost.exe'
- - '*\audiodg.exe'
- - '*\wlanext.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename:
- - C:\Windows\System32\\*
- - C:\Windows\system32\\*
- - C:\Windows\SysWow64\\*
- - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\\*
- - C:\Windows\winsxs\\*
- - C:\Windows\WinSxS\\*
- - \SystemRoot\System32\\*
- SELECTION_4:
- Image: '*\Windows\System32\dism.exe'
- SELECTION_5:
- TargetFilename: C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\\*
- SELECTION_6:
- Image: C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\Sources\SetupHost.exe
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4))
- and not (SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6))
-falsepositives:
-- System processes copied outside the default folder
-fields:
-- Image
-id: d5866ddf-ce8f-4aea-b28e-d96485a20d3d
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/10/28
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1036
-- attack.t1036.005
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_cred_dump_tools_dropped_files.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_cred_dump_tools_dropped_files.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 0e4ca9cb..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_cred_dump_tools_dropped_files.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Cred Dump Tools Dropped Files
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
-date: 2019/11/01
-description: Files with well-known filenames (parts of credential dump software or
- files produced by them) creation
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\pwdump*'
- - '*\kirbi*'
- - '*\pwhashes*'
- - '*\wce_ccache*'
- - '*\wce_krbtkts*'
- - '*\fgdump-log*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\test.pwd'
- - '*\lsremora64.dll'
- - '*\lsremora.dll'
- - '*\fgexec.exe'
- - '*\wceaux.dll'
- - '*\SAM.out'
- - '*\SECURITY.out'
- - '*\SYSTEM.out'
- - '*\NTDS.out'
- - '*\DumpExt.dll'
- - '*\DumpSvc.exe'
- - '*\cachedump64.exe'
- - '*\cachedump.exe'
- - '*\pstgdump.exe'
- - '*\servpw.exe'
- - '*\servpw64.exe'
- - '*\pwdump.exe'
- - '*\procdump64.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery
-id: 8fbf3271-1ef6-4e94-8210-03c2317947f6
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.001
-- attack.t1003.002
-- attack.t1003.003
-- attack.t1003.004
-- attack.t1003.005
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_cve_2021_26858_msexchange.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_cve_2021_26858_msexchange.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 97a52b96..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_cve_2021_26858_msexchange.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CVE-2021-26858 Exchange Exploitation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Bhabesh Raj
-date: 2021/03/03
-description: Detects possible successful exploitation for vulnerability described
- in CVE-2021-26858 by looking for | creation of non-standard files on disk by Exchange
- Server’s Unified Messaging service | which could indicate dropping web shells or
- other malicious content
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*UMWorkerProcess.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*CacheCleanup.bin'
- - '*.txt'
- - '*.LOG'
- - '*.cfg'
- - '*cleanup.bin'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- TargetFilename
-id: b06335b3-55ac-4b41-937e-16b7f5d57dfd
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1203
-- attack.execution
-- cve.2021.26858
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_detect_powerup_dllhijacking.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_detect_powerup_dllhijacking.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 93a25e35..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_detect_powerup_dllhijacking.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Powerup Write Hijack DLL
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Subhash Popuri (@pbssubhash)
-date: 2021/08/21
-description: Powerup tool's Write Hijack DLL exploits DLL hijacking for privilege
- escalation. In it's default mode, it builds a self deleting .bat file which executes
- malicious command. The detection rule relies on creation of the malicious bat file
- (debug.bat by default).
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\powershell.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*.bat'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Pentest
-- Any powershell script that creates bat files
-id: 602a1f13-c640-4d73-b053-be9a2fa58b96
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Privesc/Write-HijackDll/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1574.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_ghostpack_safetykatz.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_ghostpack_safetykatz.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index bb8dfdb5..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_ghostpack_safetykatz.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Detection of SafetyKatz
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Markus Neis
-date: 2018/07/24
-description: Detects possible SafetyKatz Behaviour
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\Temp\debug.bin'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: e074832a-eada-4fd7-94a1-10642b130e16
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://github.com/GhostPack/SafetyKatz
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_lsass_memory_dump_file_creation.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_lsass_memory_dump_file_creation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 913b24a5..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_lsass_memory_dump_file_creation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: LSASS Memory Dump File Creation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/22
-description: LSASS memory dump creation using operating systems utilities. Procdump
- will use process name in output file if no name is specified
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*lsass*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*dmp'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Dumping lsass memory for forensic investigation purposes by legitimate incident
- responder or forensic invetigator
-- Dumps of another process that contains lsass in its process name (substring)
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- TargetFilename
-id: 5e3d3601-0662-4af0-b1d2-36a05e90c40a
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/08/16
-references:
-- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_office_persistence.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_office_persistence.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index db267032..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_office_persistence.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Microsoft Office Add-In Loading
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: NVISO
-date: 2020/05/11
-description: Detects add-ins that load when Microsoft Word or Excel starts (.wll/.xll
- are simply .dll fit for Word or Excel).
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\Microsoft\Word\Startup\\*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*.wll'
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetFilename: '*\Microsoft\Excel\Startup\\*'
- SELECTION_5:
- TargetFilename: '*.xll'
- SELECTION_6:
- TargetFilename: '*\Microsoft\Addins\\*'
- SELECTION_7:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*.xlam'
- - '*.xla'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4 and
- SELECTION_5)) or (SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7)))
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate add-ins
-id: 8e1cb247-6cf6-42fa-b440-3f27d57e9936
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- Internal Research
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1137
-- attack.t1137.006
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_outlook_newform.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_outlook_newform.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e5d9cb33..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_outlook_newform.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Outlook Form Installation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Tobias Michalski
-date: 2021/06/10
-description: Detects the creation of new Outlook form which can contain malicious
- code
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: \outlook.exe
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\appdata\local\microsoft\FORMS\\*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-fields:
-- TargetFilename
-id: c3edc6a5-d9d4-48d8-930e-aab518390917
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/blueteamsec1/status/1401290874202382336?s=20
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1137.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_pcre_net_temp_file.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_pcre_net_temp_file.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ceccad04..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_pcre_net_temp_file.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-
-title: PCRE.NET Package Temp Files
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/10/29
-description: Detects processes creating temp files related to PCRE.NET package
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\\*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 6e90ae7a-7cd3-473f-a035-4ebb72d961da
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/08/14
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051
-- https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_powershell_exploit_scripts.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_powershell_exploit_scripts.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1e75ba4a..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_powershell_exploit_scripts.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Malicious PowerShell Commandlet Names
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Markus Neis
-date: 2018/04/07
-description: Detects the creation of known powershell scripts for exploitation
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\Invoke-DllInjection.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-WmiCommand.ps1'
- - '*\Get-GPPPassword.ps1'
- - '*\Get-Keystrokes.ps1'
- - '*\Get-VaultCredential.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-CredentialInjection.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-TokenManipulation.ps1'
- - '*\Out-Minidump.ps1'
- - '*\VolumeShadowCopyTools.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1'
- - '*\Get-TimedScreenshot.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-UserHunter.ps1'
- - '*\Find-GPOLocation.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-ACLScanner.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-DowngradeAccount.ps1'
- - '*\Get-ServiceUnquoted.ps1'
- - '*\Get-ServiceFilePermission.ps1'
- - '*\Get-ServicePermission.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-ServiceAbuse.ps1'
- - '*\Install-ServiceBinary.ps1'
- - '*\Get-RegAutoLogon.ps1'
- - '*\Get-VulnAutoRun.ps1'
- - '*\Get-VulnSchTask.ps1'
- - '*\Get-UnattendedInstallFile.ps1'
- - '*\Get-WebConfig.ps1'
- - '*\Get-ApplicationHost.ps1'
- - '*\Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated.ps1'
- - '*\Get-Unconstrained.ps1'
- - '*\Add-RegBackdoor.ps1'
- - '*\Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor.ps1'
- - '*\Gupt-Backdoor.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-ADSBackdoor.ps1'
- - '*\Enabled-DuplicateToken.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-PsUaCme.ps1'
- - '*\Remove-Update.ps1'
- - '*\Check-VM.ps1'
- - '*\Get-LSASecret.ps1'
- - '*\Get-PassHashes.ps1'
- - '*\Show-TargetScreen.ps1'
- - '*\Port-Scan.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-PoshRatHttp.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-PowerShellTCP.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-PowerShellWMI.ps1'
- - '*\Add-Exfiltration.ps1'
- - '*\Add-Persistence.ps1'
- - '*\Do-Exfiltration.ps1'
- - '*\Start-CaptureServer.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-ShellCode.ps1'
- - '*\Get-ChromeDump.ps1'
- - '*\Get-ClipboardContents.ps1'
- - '*\Get-FoxDump.ps1'
- - '*\Get-IndexedItem.ps1'
- - '*\Get-Screenshot.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-Inveigh.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-NetRipper.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-EgressCheck.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-PostExfil.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-PSInject.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-RunAs.ps1'
- - '*\MailRaider.ps1'
- - '*\New-HoneyHash.ps1'
- - '*\Set-MacAttribute.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-DCSync.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-PowerDump.ps1'
- - '*\Exploit-Jboss.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-ThunderStruck.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-VoiceTroll.ps1'
- - '*\Set-Wallpaper.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-InveighRelay.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-PsExec.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-SSHCommand.ps1'
- - '*\Get-SecurityPackages.ps1'
- - '*\Install-SSP.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-BackdoorLNK.ps1'
- - '*\PowerBreach.ps1'
- - '*\Get-SiteListPassword.ps1'
- - '*\Get-System.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-BypassUAC.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-Tater.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC.ps1'
- - '*\PowerUp.ps1'
- - '*\PowerView.ps1'
- - '*\Get-RickAstley.ps1'
- - '*\Find-Fruit.ps1'
- - '*\HTTP-Login.ps1'
- - '*\Find-TrustedDocuments.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-Paranoia.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-WinEnum.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-ARPScan.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-PortScan.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-SMBScanner.ps1'
- - '*\Invoke-Mimikittenz.ps1'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Penetration Tests
-id: f331aa1f-8c53-4fc3-b083-cc159bc971cb
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Neo23x0/sigma/f35c50049fa896dff91ff545cb199319172701e8/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_malicious_commandlets.yml
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1086
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_powershell_startup_shortcuts.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_powershell_startup_shortcuts.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ab727758..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_powershell_startup_shortcuts.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: PowerShell Writing Startup Shortcuts
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE
-date: 2021/10/24
-description: Attempts to detect PowerShell writing startup shortcuts. This procedure
- was highlighted in Red Canary Intel Insights Oct. 2021, "We frequently observe adversaries
- using PowerShell to write malicious .lnk files into the startup directory to establish
- persistence. Accordingly, this detection opportunity is likely to identify persistence
- mechanisms in multiple threats. In the context of Yellow Cockatoo, this persistence
- mechanism eventually launches the command-line script that leads to the installation
- of a malicious DLL"
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\powershell.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\start menu\programs\startup\\*'
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetFilename: '*.lnk'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-- Depending on your environment accepted applications may leverage this at times.
- It is recomended to search for anomolies inidicative of malware.
-id: 92fa78e7-4d39-45f1-91a3-8b23f3f1088d
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/36d49de4c8b00bf36054294b4a1fcbab3917d7c5/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md#atomic-test-7---add-executable-shortcut-link-to-user-startup-folder
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.registry_run_keys_/_startup_folder
-- attack.t1547.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_quarkspw_filedump.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_quarkspw_filedump.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b4c90518..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_quarkspw_filedump.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: QuarksPwDump Dump File
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2018/02/10
-description: Detects a dump file written by QuarksPwDump password dumper
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\AppData\Local\Temp\SAM-*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*.dmp*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 847def9e-924d-4e90-b7c4-5f581395a2b4
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/QuarksPWDump.htm
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_redmimicry_winnti_filedrop.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_redmimicry_winnti_filedrop.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a88b81dd..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_redmimicry_winnti_filedrop.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Dropped File
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Alexander Rausch
-date: 2020/06/24
-description: Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*gthread-3.6.dll*'
- - '*sigcmm-2.4.dll*'
- - '*\Windows\Temp\tmp.bat*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 130c9e58-28ac-4f83-8574-0a4cc913b97e
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://redmimicry.com
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_startup_folder_file_write.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_startup_folder_file_write.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 61e0a3a3..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_startup_folder_file_write.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Startup Folder File Write
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/05/02
-description: A General detection for files being created in the Windows startup directory.
- This could be an indicator of persistence.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 2aa0a6b4-a865-495b-ab51-c28249537b75
-level: low
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/12
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/5.B.1_611FCA99-97D0-4873-9E51-1C1BA2DBB40D.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1547.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_adsi_cache_usage.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_adsi_cache_usage.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1f7fa090..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_adsi_cache_usage.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious ADSI-Cache Usage By Unknown Tool
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: xknow @xknow_infosec
-date: 2019/03/24
-description: Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. This may also detect
- tools like LDAPFragger.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\Local\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache\\*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*.sch'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - C:\windows\system32\svchost.exe
- - C:\windows\system32\dllhost.exe
- - C:\windows\system32\mmc.exe
- - C:\windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
- - C:\Windows\CCM\CcmExec.exe
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Other legimate tools, which do ADSI (LDAP) operations, e.g. any remoting activity
- by MMC, Powershell, Windows etc.
-id: 75bf09fa-1dd7-4d18-9af9-dd9e492562eb
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://medium.com/@ivecodoe/detecting-ldapfragger-a-newly-released-cobalt-strike-beacon-using-ldap-for-c2-communication-c274a7f00961
-- https://blog.fox-it.com/2020/03/19/ldapfragger-command-and-control-over-ldap-attributes/
-- https://github.com/fox-it/LDAPFragger
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.t1071
-- attack.t1001.003
-- attack.command_and_control
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_clr_logs.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_clr_logs.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 0ad5e0a5..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_clr_logs.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspcious CLR Logs Creation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: omkar72, oscd.community, Wojciech Lesicki
-date: 2020/10/12
-description: Detects suspicious .NET assembly executions. Could detect using Cobalt
- Strike's command execute-assembly.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\UsageLogs\\*'
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*mshta*'
- - '*cscript*'
- - '*wscript*'
- - '*regsvr32*'
- - '*wmic*'
- - '*rundll32*'
- - '*svchost*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1388064061087260675 - rundll32.exe with zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc
- in command line and msiexec.exe as parent process
-id: e4b63079-6198-405c-abd7-3fe8b0ce3263
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- definition: Check your sysmon configuration for monitoring UsageLogs folder. In
- SwiftOnSecurity configuration we have that thanks @SBousseaden
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/17
-references:
-- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/07/interesting-difr-traces-of-net-clr.html
-- https://bohops.com/2021/03/16/investigating-net-clr-usage-log-tampering-techniques-for-edr-evasion/
-- https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular/blob/master/11_file_create/include_dotnet.xml
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1059.001
-- attack.t1218
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_desktop_ini.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_desktop_ini.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 39153c05..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_desktop_ini.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious desktop.ini Action
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut), Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)
-date: 2020/03/19
-description: Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged
- to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without
- changing them on disk.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\desktop.ini'
- SELECTION_3:
- Image:
- - C:\Windows\\*
- - C:\Program Files\\*
- - C:\Program Files (x86)\\*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Operations performed through Windows SCCM or equivalent
-- read only access list authority
-id: 81315b50-6b60-4d8f-9928-3466e1022515
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/03
-references:
-- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Desktopini+as+a+postexploitation+tool/25912/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1023
-- attack.t1547.009
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_pfx_file_creation.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_pfx_file_creation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c0e22da9..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_pfx_file_creation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious PFX File Creation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/05/02
-description: A general detection for processes creating PFX files. This could be an
- indicator of an adversary exporting a local certificate to a PFX file.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*.pfx'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- System administrators managing certififcates.
-id: dca1b3e8-e043-4ec8-85d7-867f334b5724
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/14
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/6.B.1_6392C9F1-D975-4F75-8A70-433DEDD7F622.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1552.004
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_procexplorer_driver_created_in_tmp_folder.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_procexplorer_driver_created_in_tmp_folder.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f62548b4..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_susp_procexplorer_driver_created_in_tmp_folder.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In TMP
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)
-date: 2019/04/08
-description: Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data
- local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but
- also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs),
- which uses KDU.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\AppData\Local\Temp\\*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*PROCEXP152.sys'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - '*\procexp64.exe*'
- - '*\procexp.exe*'
- - '*\procmon64.exe*'
- - '*\procmon.exe*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Other legimate tools using this driver and filename (like Sysinternals). Note -
- Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename.
- Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
-id: 3da70954-0f2c-4103-adff-b7440368f50e
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.t1089
-- attack.t1562.001
-- attack.defense_evasion
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_suspicious_powershell_profile_create.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_suspicious_powershell_profile_create.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 623fe9ac..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_suspicious_powershell_profile_create.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Powershell Profile.ps1 Modification
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: HieuTT35
-date: 2019/10/24
-description: Detects a change in profile.ps1 of the Powershell profile
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\profile.ps1*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\My Documents\PowerShell\\*'
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetFilename: '*C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\\*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and (SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- System administrator create Powershell profile manually
-id: b5b78988-486d-4a80-b991-930eff3ff8bf
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1546.013
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_tsclient_filewrite_startup.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_tsclient_filewrite_startup.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 5a4d0b16..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_tsclient_filewrite_startup.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Hijack Legit RDP Session to Move Laterally
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Samir Bousseaden
-date: 2019/02/21
-description: Detects the usage of tsclient share to place a backdoor on the RDP source
- machine's startup folder
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\mstsc.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\\*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 52753ea4-b3a0-4365-910d-36cff487b789
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.t1219
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_consent_comctl32.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_consent_comctl32.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ae94d924..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_consent_comctl32.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - File
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Christian Burkard
-date: 2021/08/23
-description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll
- (UACMe 22)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: C:\Windows\System32\consent.exe.@*
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\comctl32.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 62ed5b55-f991-406a-85d9-e8e8fdf18789
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1548.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_dotnet_profiler.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_dotnet_profiler.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 770eb059..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_dotnet_profiler.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: UAC Bypass Using .NET Code Profiler on MMC
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Christian Burkard
-date: 2021/08/30
-description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using .NET Code Profiler and mmc.exe
- DLL hijacking (UACMe 39)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: C:\Users\\*
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\AppData\Local\Temp\pe386.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 93a19907-d4f9-4deb-9f91-aac4692776a6
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1548.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_ieinstal.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_ieinstal.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2abf1d6d..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_ieinstal.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: UAC Bypass Using IEInstal - File
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Christian Burkard
-date: 2021/08/30
-description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using IEInstal.exe (UACMe 64)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEInstal.exe
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: C:\Users\\*
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetFilename: '*\AppData\Local\Temp\\*'
- SELECTION_5:
- TargetFilename: '*consent.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: bdd8157d-8e85-4397-bb82-f06cc9c71dbb
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1548.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_msconfig_gui.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_msconfig_gui.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index cc979709..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_msconfig_gui.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: UAC Bypass Using MSConfig Token Modification - File
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Christian Burkard
-date: 2021/08/30
-description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a msconfig GUI hack (UACMe 55)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: C:\Users\\*
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\AppData\Local\Temp\pkgmgr.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 41bb431f-56d8-4691-bb56-ed34e390906f
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1548.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_ntfs_reparse_point.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_ntfs_reparse_point.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 06556a65..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_uac_bypass_ntfs_reparse_point.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - File
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Christian Burkard
-date: 2021/08/30
-description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe
- DLL hijacking (UACMe 36)
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: C:\Users\\*
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\AppData\Local\Temp\api-ms-win-core-kernel32-legacy-l1.DLL'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 7fff6773-2baa-46de-a24a-b6eec1aba2d1
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1548.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_webshell_creation_detect.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_webshell_creation_detect.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 25cb8b97..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_webshell_creation_detect.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Windows Webshell Creation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/22
-description: Possible webshell file creation on a static web site
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_10:
- TargetFilename: '*.pl*'
- SELECTION_11:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\AppData\Local\Temp\\*'
- - '*\Windows\Temp\\*'
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\inetpub\wwwroot\\*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*.asp*'
- - '*.ashx*'
- - '*.ph*'
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\AppData\Local\Temp\\*'
- - '*\Windows\Temp\\*'
- SELECTION_5:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\www\\*'
- - '*\htdocs\\*'
- - '*\html\\*'
- SELECTION_6:
- TargetFilename: '*.ph*'
- SELECTION_7:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\AppData\Local\Temp\\*'
- - '*\Windows\Temp\\*'
- SELECTION_8:
- TargetFilename: '*.jsp'
- SELECTION_9:
- TargetFilename: '*\cgi-bin\\*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
- or ((SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6) and not (SELECTION_7))) or ((SELECTION_8 or
- (SELECTION_9 and SELECTION_10)) and not (SELECTION_11))))
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate administrator or developer creating legitimate executable files in a
- web application folder
-id: 39f1f9f2-9636-45de-98f6-a4046aa8e4b9
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- PT ESC rule and personal experience
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1100
-- attack.t1505.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_wmi_persistence_script_event_consumer_write.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_wmi_persistence_script_event_consumer_write.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c7dd86ac..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/sysmon_wmi_persistence_script_event_consumer_write.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-
-title: WMI Persistence - Script Event Consumer File Write
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke
-date: 2018/03/07
-description: Detects file writes of WMI script event consumer
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\scrcons.exe
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Dell Power Manager (C:\Program Files\Dell\PowerManager\DpmPowerPlanSetup.exe)
-id: 33f41cdd-35ac-4ba8-814b-c6a4244a1ad4
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.t1084
-- attack.t1546.003
-- attack.persistence
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_cve_2021_1675_printspooler.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/win_cve_2021_1675_printspooler.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index cdec5a20..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_cve_2021_1675_printspooler.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CVE-2021-1675 Print Spooler Exploitation Filename Pattern
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/06/29
-description: Detects the default filename used in PoC code against print spooler vulnerability
- CVE-2021-1675
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\old\1\123*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- TargetFilename
-id: 2131cfb3-8c12-45e8-8fa0-31f5924e9f07
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/01
-references:
-- https://github.com/hhlxf/PrintNightmare
-- https://github.com/afwu/PrintNightmare
-- https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.resource_development
-- attack.t1587
-- cve.2021.1675
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_file_winword_cve_2021_40444.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/win_file_winword_cve_2021_40444.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 08a9b1c3..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_file_winword_cve_2021_40444.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Word Cab File Write CVE-2021-40444
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Sittikorn S
-date: 2021/09/10
-description: Detects file creation patterns noticeable during the exploitation of
- CVE-2021-40444
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: \winword.exe
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*.cab'
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetFilename: '*\Windows\INetCache*'
- SELECTION_5:
- TargetFilename: '*\AppData\Local\Temp\\*'
- SELECTION_6:
- TargetFilename: '*.inf*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and ((SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) or (SELECTION_5
- and SELECTION_6)))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-fields:
-- TargetFilename
-id: 60c0a111-787a-4e8a-9262-ee485f3ef9d5
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/13
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/RonnyTNL/status/1436334640617373699?s=20
-- https://twitter.com/vanitasnk/status/1437329511142420483?s=21
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.resource_development
-- attack.t1587
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_hivenightmare_file_exports.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/win_hivenightmare_file_exports.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 26faf65c..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_hivenightmare_file_exports.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Typical HiveNightmare SAM File Export
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/07/23
-description: Detects files written by the different tools that exploit HiveNightmare
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\hive_sam_*'
- - '*\SAM-2021-*'
- - '*\SAM-2022-*'
- - '*\SAM-haxx*'
- - '*\Sam.save*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename:
- - C:\windows\temp\sam
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Files that accidentally contain these strings
-fields:
-- CommandLine
-- ParentCommandLine
-id: 6ea858a8-ba71-4a12-b2cc-5d83312404c7
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare
-- https://github.com/FireFart/hivenightmare/
-- https://github.com/WiredPulse/Invoke-HiveNightmare
-- https://twitter.com/cube0x0/status/1418920190759378944
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1552.001
-- cve.2021.36934
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_net_share_obj_susp_desktop_ini.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/win_net_share_obj_susp_desktop_ini.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f2d592d0..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_net_share_obj_susp_desktop_ini.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Windows Network Access Suspicious desktop.ini Action
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)
-date: 2021/12/06
-description: Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini remotely over network
- share, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content
- (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 5145
- SELECTION_2:
- ObjectType: File
- SELECTION_3:
- RelativeTargetName: '*\desktop.ini'
- SELECTION_4:
- AccessList:
- - '*WriteData*'
- - '*DELETE*'
- - '*WriteDAC*'
- - '*AppendData*'
- - '*AddSubdirectory*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Read only access list authority
-id: 35bc7e28-ee6b-492f-ab04-da58fcf6402e
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: security
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/06
-references:
-- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Desktopini+as+a+postexploitation+tool/25912/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1023
-- attack.t1547.009
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_outlook_c2_macro_creation.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/win_outlook_c2_macro_creation.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a8782c6b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_outlook_c2_macro_creation.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Outlook C2 Macro Creation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: '@ScoubiMtl'
-date: 2021/04/05
-description: Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook. Goes with win_outlook_c2_registry_key.
- VbaProject.OTM is explicitly mentioned in T1137. Particularly interesting if both
- events Registry & File Creation happens at the same time.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- User genuinly creates a VB Macro for their email
-id: 8c31f563-f9a7-450c-bfa8-35f8f32f1f61
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.t1137
-- attack.t1008
-- attack.t1546
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_rclone_exec_file.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/win_rclone_exec_file.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f5ea0650..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_rclone_exec_file.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Rclone Config File Creation
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Aaron Greetham (@beardofbinary) - NCC Group
-date: 2021/05/26
-description: Detects Rclone config file being created
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename: '*:\Users\\*'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\.config\rclone\\*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate Rclone usage (rare)
-id: 34986307-b7f4-49be-92f3-e7a4d01ac5db
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/10/04
-references:
-- https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.exfiltration
-- attack.t1567.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_susp_desktopimgdownldr_file.yml b/rules/sigma/file_event/win_susp_desktopimgdownldr_file.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 167968bf..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/file_event/win_susp_desktopimgdownldr_file.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Target File
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2020/07/03
-description: Detects a suspicious Microsoft desktopimgdownldr file creation that stores
- a file to a suspicious location or contains a file with a suspicious extension
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*svchost.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- TargetFilename: '*\Personalization\LockScreenImage\\*'
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetFilename: '*C:\Windows\\*'
- SELECTION_5:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*.jpg*'
- - '*.jpeg*'
- - '*.png*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
- and not (SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored
- environment
-fields:
-- CommandLine
-- ParentCommandLine
-id: fc4f4817-0c53-4683-a4ee-b17a64bc1039
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/
-- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278977301745741825
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1105
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/image_load_pingback_backdoor.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/image_load_pingback_backdoor.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 9bba2f6b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/image_load_pingback_backdoor.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Pingback Backdoor
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Bhabesh Raj
-date: 2021/05/05
-description: Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2
- as described in the trustwave report
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*msdtc.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded: C:\Windows\oci.dll
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Very unlikely
-id: 35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/09
-references:
-- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel
-- https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1574.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/image_load_silenttrinity_stage_use.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/image_load_silenttrinity_stage_use.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4e16bcd1..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/image_load_silenttrinity_stage_use.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: SILENTTRINITY Stager Execution
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/22
-description: Detects SILENTTRINITY stager use
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Description: '*st2stager*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 75c505b1-711d-4f68-a357-8c3fe37dbf2d
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/10/04
-references:
-- https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY
-related:
-- id: 03552375-cc2c-4883-bbe4-7958d5a980be
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.t1071
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/image_load_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/image_load_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index cf122def..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/image_load_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/10/12
-description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\`
- directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\wmiprvse.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded: '*\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 7707a579-e0d8-4886-a853-ce47e4575aaa
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/09
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-201009173318.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1047
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/image_load_wsman_provider_image_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/image_load_wsman_provider_image_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 75a35e6c..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/image_load_wsman_provider_image_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious WSMAN Provider Image Loads
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/06/24
-description: Detects signs of potential use of the WSMAN provider from uncommon processes
- locally and remote execution.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\WsmSvc.dll'
- - '*\WsmAuto.dll'
- - '*\Microsoft.WSMan.Management.ni.dll'
- SELECTION_3:
- OriginalFileName:
- - WsmSvc.dll
- - WSMANAUTOMATION.DLL
- - Microsoft.WSMan.Management.dll
- SELECTION_4:
- Image: '*\svchost.exe'
- SELECTION_5:
- OriginalFileName: WsmWmiPl.dll
- SELECTION_6:
- Image:
- - '*\powershell.exe'
- - '*C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe'
- SELECTION_7:
- CommandLine:
- - '*svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BITS*'
- - '*svchost.exe -k GraphicsPerfSvcGroup -s GraphicsPerfSvc*'
- SELECTION_8:
- Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\\*
- SELECTION_9:
- Image: '*\mscorsvw.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5))
- and not ((SELECTION_6) or (SELECTION_7) or (SELECTION_8 and SELECTION_9)))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: ad1f4bb9-8dfb-4765-adb6-2a7cfb6c0f94
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/03
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/chadtilbury/status/1275851297770610688
-- https://bohops.com/2020/05/12/ws-management-com-another-approach-for-winrm-lateral-movement/
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/winrm/windows-remote-management-architecture
-- https://github.com/bohops/WSMan-WinRM
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/process_creation_tttracer_mod_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/process_creation_tttracer_mod_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1f9c4029..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/process_creation_tttracer_mod_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative
-date: 2020/10/06
-description: Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute
- malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1
- SELECTION_2:
- ParentImage: '*\tttracer.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate usage by software developers/testers
-id: 0b4ae027-2a2d-4b93-8c7e-962caaba5b2a
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: process_creation
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Tttracer/
-- https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1196390321783025666
-- https://twitter.com/oulusoyum/status/1191329746069655553
-related:
-- id: e76c8240-d68f-4773-8880-5c6f63595aaf
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1218
-- attack.t1003.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_abusing_azure_browser_sso.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_abusing_azure_browser_sso.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c8020bc..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_abusing_azure_browser_sso.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Abusing Azure Browser SSO
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Den Iuzvyk
-date: 2020/07/15
-description: Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens
- for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure
- AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication
- in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser
- as that user.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded: '*MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll'
- SELECTION_3:
- Image:
- - '*\BackgroundTaskHost.exe'
- - '*\devenv.exe'
- - '*\iexplore.exe'
- - '*\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
- - '*\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
- - '*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 50f852e6-af22-4c78-9ede-42ef36aa3453
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/08
-references:
-- https://posts.specterops.io/requesting-azure-ad-request-tokens-on-azure-ad-joined-machines-for-browser-sso-2b0409caad30
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1073
-- attack.t1574.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_alternate_powershell_hosts_moduleload.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_alternate_powershell_hosts_moduleload.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 9bf932a1..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_alternate_powershell_hosts_moduleload.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Alternate PowerShell Hosts
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2019/09/12
-description: Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking
- for powershell.exe
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Description: System.Management.Automation
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded: '*System.Management.Automation*'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - '*\powershell.exe'
- - '*\mscorsvw.exe'
- SELECTION_5:
- Image:
- - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\\*
- - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\\*
- - C:\Windows\System32\\*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4
- or SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: fe6e002f-f244-4278-9263-20e4b593827f
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/07
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190610201010.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_foggyweb_nobelium.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_foggyweb_nobelium.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 22af91c4..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_foggyweb_nobelium.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-
-title: FoggyWeb Backdoor DLL Loading
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/09/27
-description: Detects DLL image load activity as used by FoggyWeb backdoor loader
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: C:\Windows\ADFS\version.dll
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-id: 640dc51c-7713-4faa-8a0e-e7c0d9d4654c
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/09/27/foggyweb-targeted-nobelium-malware-leads-to-persistent-backdoor/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.resource_development
-- attack.t1587
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_in_memory_powershell.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_in_memory_powershell.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3580ef3e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_in_memory_powershell.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-
-title: In-memory PowerShell
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Tom Kern, oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova, Tim Shelton
-date: 2019/11/14
-description: Detects loading of essential DLL used by PowerShell, but not by the process
- powershell.exe. Detects meterpreter's "load powershell" extension.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\System.Management.Automation.Dll'
- - '*\System.Management.Automation.ni.Dll'
- SELECTION_3:
- Image:
- - '*\powershell.exe'
- - '*\powershell_ise.exe'
- - '*\WINDOWS\System32\sdiagnhost.exe'
- - '*\mscorsvw.exe'
- - '*\WINDOWS\System32\RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe'
- - '*\sqlps.exe'
- - '*\wsmprovhost.exe'
- - '*\winrshost.exe'
- - '*\syncappvpublishingserver.exe'
- - '*\runscripthelper.exe'
- - '*\ServerManager.exe'
- - '*\Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio *\Common*\IDE\Ssms.exe'
- - '*\IDE\devenv.exe'
- - '*\ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe'
- - '*\ServiceHub.SettingsHost.exe'
- - '*\ServiceHub.Host.CLR.x86.exe'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\\*
- - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\\*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4))
-enrichment:
-- EN_0001_cache_sysmon_event_id_1_info
-- EN_0003_enrich_other_sysmon_events_with_event_id_1_data
-falsepositives:
-- Used by some .NET binaries, minimal on user workstation.
-- Used by Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio
-id: 092bc4b9-3d1d-43b4-a6b4-8c8acd83522f
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921
-- https://github.com/p3nt4/PowerShdll
-related:
-- id: 867613fb-fa60-4497-a017-a82df74a172c
- type: obsoletes
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.t1086
-- attack.t1059.001
-- attack.execution
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_pcre_net_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_pcre_net_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 58299b83..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_pcre_net_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-
-title: PCRE.NET Package Image Load
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/10/29
-description: Detects processes loading modules related to PCRE.NET package
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded: '*\AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\\*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 84b0a8f3-680b-4096-a45b-e9a89221727c
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/08/14
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051
-- https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_scrcons_imageload_wmi_scripteventconsumer.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_scrcons_imageload_wmi_scripteventconsumer.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4c3252c0..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_scrcons_imageload_wmi_scripteventconsumer.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-
-title: WMI Script Host Process Image Loaded
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/09/02
-description: Detects signs of the WMI script host process %SystemRoot%\system32\wbem\scrcons.exe
- functionality being used via images being loaded by a process.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\scrcons.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\vbscript.dll'
- - '*\wbemdisp.dll'
- - '*\wshom.ocx'
- - '*\scrrun.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: b439f47d-ef52-4b29-9a2f-57d8a96cb6b8
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/HunterPlaybook/status/1301207718355759107
-- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/09/i-like-to-move-it-windows-lateral-movement-part-1-wmi-event-subscription/
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-200902020333.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1546.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_spoolsv_dll_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_spoolsv_dll_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 298a3e94..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_spoolsv_dll_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Windows Spooler Service Suspicious Binary Load
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: FPT.EagleEye, Thomas Patzke (improvements)
-date: 2021/06/29
-description: Detect DLL Load from Spooler Service backup folder
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*spoolsv.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded: '*\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\\*'
- SELECTION_4:
- ImageLoaded: '*.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Loading of legitimate driver
-id: 02fb90de-c321-4e63-a6b9-25f4b03dfd14
-level: informational
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/08/24
-references:
-- https://github.com/hhlxf/PrintNightmare
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1574
-- cve.2021.1675
-- cve.2021.34527
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_fax_dll.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_fax_dll.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3d4f1404..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_fax_dll.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Fax Service DLL Search Order Hijack
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: NVISO
-date: 2020/05/04
-description: The Fax service attempts to load ualapi.dll, which is non-existent. An
- attacker can then (side)load their own malicious DLL using this service.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*fxssvc.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*ualapi.dll'
- SELECTION_4:
- ImageLoaded:
- - C:\Windows\WinSxS\\*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-id: 828af599-4c53-4ed2-ba4a-a9f835c434ea
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://windows-internals.com/faxing-your-way-to-system/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1073
-- attack.t1038
-- attack.t1574.001
-- attack.t1574.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_image_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_image_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 20117bbd..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_image_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Possible Process Hollowing Image Loading
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Markus Neis
-date: 2018/01/07
-description: Detects Loading of samlib.dll, WinSCard.dll from untypical process e.g.
- through process hollowing by Mimikatz
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\notepad.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\samlib.dll'
- - '*\WinSCard.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Very likely, needs more tuning
-id: e32ce4f5-46c6-4c47-ba69-5de3c9193cd7
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1073
-- attack.t1574.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_dotnet_assembly_dll_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_dotnet_assembly_dll_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index d164a5c7..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_dotnet_assembly_dll_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: dotNET DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Antonlovesdnb
-date: 2020/02/19
-description: Detects any assembly DLL being loaded by an Office Product
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\winword.exe'
- - '*\powerpnt.exe'
- - '*\excel.exe'
- - '*\outlook.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - C:\Windows\assembly\\*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
-id: ff0f2b05-09db-4095-b96d-1b75ca24894a
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1204
-- attack.t1204.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_dotnet_clr_dll_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_dotnet_clr_dll_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 9854363c..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_dotnet_clr_dll_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CLR DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Antonlovesdnb
-date: 2020/02/19
-description: Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an Office Product
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\winword.exe'
- - '*\powerpnt.exe'
- - '*\excel.exe'
- - '*\outlook.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\clr.dll*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
-id: d13c43f0-f66b-4279-8b2c-5912077c1780
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1204
-- attack.t1204.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_dotnet_gac_dll_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_dotnet_gac_dll_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index fa696ee2..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_dotnet_gac_dll_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: GAC DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Antonlovesdnb
-date: 2020/02/19
-description: Detects any GAC DLL being loaded by an Office Product
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\winword.exe'
- - '*\powerpnt.exe'
- - '*\excel.exe'
- - '*\outlook.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
-id: 90217a70-13fc-48e4-b3db-0d836c5824ac
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1204
-- attack.t1204.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_dsparse_dll_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_dsparse_dll_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a118584d..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_dsparse_dll_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Active Directory Parsing DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Antonlovesdnb
-date: 2020/02/19
-description: Detects DSParse DLL being loaded by an Office Product
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\winword.exe'
- - '*\powerpnt.exe'
- - '*\excel.exe'
- - '*\outlook.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\dsparse.dll*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
-id: a2a3b925-7bb0-433b-b508-db9003263cc4
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1204
-- attack.t1204.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_kerberos_dll_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_kerberos_dll_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 00f4e7bb..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_office_kerberos_dll_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Active Directory Kerberos DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Antonlovesdnb
-date: 2020/02/19
-description: Detects Kerberos DLL being loaded by an Office Product
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\winword.exe'
- - '*\powerpnt.exe'
- - '*\excel.exe'
- - '*\outlook.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\kerberos.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
-id: 7417e29e-c2e7-4cf6-a2e8-767228c64837
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1204
-- attack.t1204.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_python_image_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_python_image_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index acc9d410..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_python_image_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Python Py2Exe Image Load
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Patrick St. John, OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/05/03
-description: Detects the image load of Python Core indicative of a Python script bundled
- with Py2Exe.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Description: Python Core
- SELECTION_3:
- Image:
- - '*Python*'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - C:\Program Files\\*
- - C:\Program Files (x86)\\*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Legit Py2Exe Binaries
-fields:
-- Description
-id: cbb56d62-4060-40f7-9466-d8aaf3123f83
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/05
-references:
-- https://www.py2exe.org/
-- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit-42-technical-analysis-seaduke/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1027.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_script_dotnet_clr_dll_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_script_dotnet_clr_dll_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 44790096..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_script_dotnet_clr_dll_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-
-title: CLR DLL Loaded Via Scripting Applications
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: omkar72, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/14
-description: Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an scripting applications
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\wscript.exe'
- - '*\cscript.exe'
- - '*\mshta.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\clr.dll'
- - '*\mscoree.dll'
- - '*\mscorlib.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 4508a70e-97ef-4300-b62b-ff27992990ea
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://github.com/tyranid/DotNetToJScript
-- https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/
-- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/07/interesting-difr-traces-of-net-clr.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1055
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_system_drawing_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_system_drawing_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8fa0bf15..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_system_drawing_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious System.Drawing Load
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/05/02
-description: A General detection for processes loading System.Drawing.ni.dll. This
- could be an indicator of potential Screen Capture.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded: '*\System.Drawing.ni.dll'
- SELECTION_3:
- Image:
- - C:\Program Files\\*
- - C:\Program Files (x86)\\*
- - C:\Windows\System32\\*
- - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\\*
- - C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\\*
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - C:\Users\\*\AppData\Local\NhNotifSys\nahimic\nahimicNotifSys.exe
- - C:\Users\\*\GitHubDesktop\Update.exe
- - C:\Windows\System32\NhNotifSys.exe
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not ((SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4)))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 666ecfc7-229d-42b8-821e-1a8f8cb7057c
-level: low
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/05
-references:
-- https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/16
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/7.A.1_3B4E5808-3C71-406A-B181-17B0CE3178C9.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.collection
-- attack.t1113
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_winword_vbadll_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_winword_vbadll_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 15405864..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_winword_vbadll_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: VBA DLL Loaded Via Microsoft Word
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Antonlovesdnb
-date: 2020/02/19
-description: Detects DLL's Loaded Via Word Containing VBA Macros
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\winword.exe'
- - '*\powerpnt.exe'
- - '*\excel.exe'
- - '*\outlook.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\VBE7.DLL'
- - '*\VBEUI.DLL'
- - '*\VBE7INTL.DLL'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
-id: e6ce8457-68b1-485b-9bdd-3c2b5d679aa9
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1204
-- attack.t1204.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_winword_wmidll_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_winword_wmidll_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2c0af7fe..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_susp_winword_wmidll_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Windows Management Instrumentation DLL Loaded Via Microsoft Word
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Michael R. (@nahamike01)
-date: 2019/12/26
-description: Detects DLL's Loaded Via Word Containing VBA Macros Executing WMI Commands
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\winword.exe'
- - '*\powerpnt.exe'
- - '*\excel.exe'
- - '*\outlook.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\wmiutils.dll'
- - '*\wbemcomn.dll'
- - '*\wbemprox.dll'
- - '*\wbemdisp.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Possible. Requires further testing.
-id: a457f232-7df9-491d-898f-b5aabd2cbe2f
-level: informational
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/22
-references:
-- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
-- https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/04/24/cb-tau-threat-intelligence-notification-emotet-utilizing-wmi-to-launch-powershell-encoded-code/
-- https://media.cert.europa.eu/static/SecurityAdvisories/2019/CERT-EU-SA2019-021.pdf
-status: deprecated
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1047
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_suspicious_dbghelp_dbgcore_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_suspicious_dbghelp_dbgcore_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 44ecf3fd..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_suspicious_dbghelp_dbgcore_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL from Suspicious Process
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community, Ecco
-date: 2019/10/27
-description: Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL (used to make memory dumps) by
- suspicious processes. Tools like ProcessHacker and some attacker tradecract use
- MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll. As an example, SilentTrynity
- C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe
- and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\dbghelp.dll'
- - '*\dbgcore.dll'
- SELECTION_3:
- Image:
- - '*\msbuild.exe'
- - '*\cmd.exe'
- - '*\svchost.exe'
- - '*\rundll32.exe'
- - '*\powershell.exe'
- - '*\word.exe'
- - '*\excel.exe'
- - '*\powerpnt.exe'
- - '*\outlook.exe'
- - '*\monitoringhost.exe'
- - '*\wmic.exe'
- - '*\bash.exe'
- - '*\wscript.exe'
- - '*\cscript.exe'
- - '*\mshta.exe'
- - '*\regsvr32.exe'
- - '*\schtasks.exe'
- - '*\dnx.exe'
- - '*\regsvcs.exe'
- - '*\sc.exe'
- - '*\scriptrunner.exe'
- SELECTION_4:
- Signed: 'FALSE'
- SELECTION_5:
- Image: '*Visual Studio*'
- SELECTION_6:
- CommandLine: '*-k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted*'
- SELECTION_7:
- CommandLine: C:\WINDOWS\winsxs\*\TiWorker.exe -Embedding
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and (SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4)) and not
- (SELECTION_5 or SELECTION_6)) and not (SELECTION_7))
-falsepositives:
-- Penetration tests
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- User
-- Image
-- ImageLoaded
-id: 0e277796-5f23-4e49-a490-483131d4f6e1
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/05
-references:
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump
-- https://www.pinvoke.net/default.aspx/dbghelp/MiniDumpWriteDump.html
-- https://medium.com/@fsx30/bypass-edrs-memory-protection-introduction-to-hooking-2efb21acffd6
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_svchost_dll_search_order_hijack.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_svchost_dll_search_order_hijack.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 3ada014d..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_svchost_dll_search_order_hijack.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Svchost DLL Search Order Hijack
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: SBousseaden
-date: 2019/10/28
-description: IKEEXT and SessionEnv service, as they call LoadLibrary on files that
- do not exist within C:\Windows\System32\ by default. An attacker can place their
- malicious logic within the PROCESS_ATTACH block of their library and restart the
- aforementioned services "svchost.exe -k netsvcs" to gain code execution on a remote
- machine.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\svchost.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\tsmsisrv.dll'
- - '*\tsvipsrv.dll'
- - '*\wlbsctrl.dll'
- SELECTION_4:
- ImageLoaded:
- - C:\Windows\WinSxS\\*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Pentest
-id: 602a1f13-c640-4d73-b053-be9a2fa58b77
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://posts.specterops.io/lateral-movement-scm-and-dll-hijacking-primer-d2f61e8ab992
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1073
-- attack.t1574.002
-- attack.t1038
-- attack.t1574.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_tttracer_mod_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_tttracer_mod_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 94f8f5d7..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_tttracer_mod_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative
-date: 2020/10/06
-description: Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute
- malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\ttdrecord.dll'
- - '*\ttdwriter.dll'
- - '*\ttdloader.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate usage by software developers/testers
-id: e76c8240-d68f-4773-8880-5c6f63595aaf
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Tttracer/
-- https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1196390321783025666
-- https://twitter.com/oulusoyum/status/1191329746069655553
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1218
-- attack.t1003.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_uac_bypass_via_dism.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_uac_bypass_via_dism.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4f16760c..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_uac_bypass_via_dism.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-
-title: UAC Bypass With Fake DLL
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: oscd.community, Dmitry Uchakin
-date: 2020/10/06
-description: Attempts to load dismcore.dll after dropping it
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\dism.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\dismcore.dll'
- SELECTION_4:
- ImageLoaded:
- - C:\Windows\System32\Dism\dismcore.dll
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Pentests
-- Actions of a legitimate telnet client
-id: a5ea83a7-05a5-44c1-be2e-addccbbd8c03
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/23
-references:
-- https://steemit.com/utopian-io/@ah101/uac-bypassing-utility
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1548.002
-- attack.t1574.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_uipromptforcreds_dlls.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_uipromptforcreds_dlls.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 0e7b1fde..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_uipromptforcreds_dlls.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-
-title: UIPromptForCredentials DLLs
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/10/20
-description: Detects potential use of UIPromptForCredentials functions by looking
- for some of the DLLs needed for it.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\credui.dll'
- - '*\wincredui.dll'
- SELECTION_3:
- OriginalFileName:
- - credui.dll
- - wincredui.dll
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - C:\Windows\System32\\*
- - C:\Windows\explorer.exe*
- - C:\Program Files\\*
- - C:\Users\\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\\*\Microsoft.SharePoint.exe*
- - C:\Program Files (x86)\\*
- - C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe*
- - C:\Users\\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe*
- SELECTION_5:
- Image: '*\opera_autoupdate.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4 or
- SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- other legitimate processes loading those DLLs in your environment.
-id: 9ae01559-cf7e-4f8e-8e14-4c290a1b4784
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/03
-references:
-- https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/small/windows/06_credential_access/SDWIN-201020013208.html
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.md#atomic-test-2---powershell---prompt-user-for-password
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-creduipromptforcredentialsa
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.collection
-- attack.t1056.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_unsigned_image_loaded_into_lsass.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_unsigned_image_loaded_into_lsass.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index ffae006c..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_unsigned_image_loaded_into_lsass.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Unsigned Image Loaded Into LSASS Process
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/22
-description: Loading unsigned image (DLL, EXE) into LSASS process
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\lsass.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- Signed: 'false'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Valid user connecting using RDP
-id: 857c8db3-c89b-42fb-882b-f681c7cf4da2
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1003.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_wmi_module_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_wmi_module_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index cf9fe8a9..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_wmi_module_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-
-title: WMI Modules Loaded
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/08/10
-description: Detects non wmiprvse loading WMI modules
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\wmiclnt.dll'
- - '*\WmiApRpl.dll'
- - '*\wmiprov.dll'
- - '*\wmiutils.dll'
- - '*\wbemcomn.dll'
- - '*\wbemprox.dll'
- - '*\WMINet_Utils.dll'
- - '*\wbemsvc.dll'
- - '*\fastprox.dll'
- SELECTION_3:
- Image:
- - '*\WmiPrvSE.exe'
- - '*\WmiApSrv.exe'
- - '*\svchost.exe'
- - '*\DeviceCensus.exe'
- - '*\CompatTelRunner.exe'
- - '*\sdiagnhost.exe'
- - '*\SIHClient.exe'
- - '*\ngentask.exe'
- - '*\windows\system32\taskhostw.exe'
- - '*\windows\system32\MoUsoCoreWorker.exe'
- - '*\windows\system32\wbem\WMIADAP.exe'
- - '*C:\Windows\Sysmon64.exe'
- - '*C:\Windows\Sysmon.exe'
- - '*C:\Windows\System32\wbem\unsecapp.exe'
- - '*\logman.exe'
- - '*\systeminfo.exe'
- - '*\nvcontainer.exe'
- - '*C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WMIC.exe'
- - '*\explorer.exe'
- - '*\opera_autoupdate.exe'
- - '*\MsMpEng.exe'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - C:\Program Files\\*
- - C:\Program Files (x86)\\*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3)) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- User
-- Image
-- ImageLoaded
-id: 671bb7e3-a020-4824-a00e-2ee5b55f385e
-level: informational
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/25
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190811201010.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1047
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_wmi_persistence_commandline_event_consumer.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_wmi_persistence_commandline_event_consumer.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 28a6f9d5..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_wmi_persistence_commandline_event_consumer.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: WMI Persistence - Command Line Event Consumer
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Thomas Patzke
-date: 2018/03/07
-description: Detects WMI command line event consumers
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded: '*\wbemcons.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown (data set is too small; further testing needed)
-id: 05936ce2-ee05-4dae-9d03-9a391cf2d2c6
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.t1084
-- attack.t1546.003
-- attack.persistence
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_wmic_remote_xsl_scripting_dlls.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_wmic_remote_xsl_scripting_dlls.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 7d8ef803..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/sysmon_wmic_remote_xsl_scripting_dlls.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: WMIC Loading Scripting Libraries
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/10/17
-description: Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application
- controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argument switch to download and execute
- an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc).
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\wmic.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\jscript.dll'
- - '*\vbscript.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Apparently, wmic os get lastboottuptime loads vbscript.dll
-id: 06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/small/windows/05_defense_evasion/SDWIN-201017061100.html
-- https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944
-- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1220
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/win_susp_svchost_clfsw32.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/win_susp_svchost_clfsw32.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e1887e4b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/win_susp_svchost_clfsw32.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: APT PRIVATELOG Image Load Pattern
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/09/07
-description: Detects an image load pattern as seen when a tool named PRIVATELOG is
- used and rarely observed under legitimate circumstances
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\svchost.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- ImageLoaded: '*\clfsw32.dll'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Rarely observed
-id: 33a2d1dd-f3b0-40bd-8baf-7974468927cc
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/09/unknown-actor-using-clfs-log-files-for-stealth.html
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1055
diff --git a/rules/sigma/image_load/win_suspicious_vss_ps_load.yml b/rules/sigma/image_load/win_suspicious_vss_ps_load.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b39b51ac..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/image_load/win_suspicious_vss_ps_load.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Image Load of VSS_PS.dll by Uncommon Executable
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Markus Neis, @markus_neis
-date: 2021/07/07
-description: Detects the image load of vss_ps.dll by uncommon executables using OriginalFileName
- datapoint
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 7
- SELECTION_2:
- ImageLoaded:
- - '*\vss_ps.dll'
- SELECTION_3:
- Image:
- - '*\svchost.exe'
- - '*\msiexec.exe'
- - '*\vssvc.exe'
- - '*\srtasks.exe'
- - '*\tiworker.exe'
- - '*\dllhost.exe'
- - '*\searchindexer.exe'
- - '*dismhost.exe'
- - '*taskhostw.exe'
- - '*\clussvc.exe'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image: '*c:\windows\\*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 333cdbe8-27bb-4246-bf82-b41a0dca4b70
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: image_load
- product: windows
-references:
-- 1bd85e1caa1415ebdc8852c91e37bbb7
-- https://twitter.com/am0nsec/status/1412232114980982787
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.impact
-- attack.t1490
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/av_exploiting.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/av_exploiting.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 001c5af6..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/av_exploiting.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2018/09/09
-description: Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation
- framework
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Signature:
- - '*MeteTool*'
- - '*MPreter*'
- - '*Meterpreter*'
- - '*Metasploit*'
- - '*PowerSploit*'
- - '*CobaltSrike*'
- - '*Swrort*'
- - '*Rozena*'
- - '*Backdoor.Cobalt*'
- - '*CobaltStr*'
- - '*COBEACON*'
- - '*Cometer*'
- - '*Razy*'
- condition: SELECTION_1
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-fields:
-- FileName
-- User
-id: 238527ad-3c2c-4e4f-a1f6-92fd63adb864
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: antivirus
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.nextron-systems.com/2018/09/08/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-4/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1203
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.t1219
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/av_hacktool.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/av_hacktool.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index c577031d..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/av_hacktool.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Antivirus Hacktool Detection
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/08/16
-description: Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a hack tool or
- other attack tool
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Signature:
- - HTOOL*
- - HKTL*
- - SecurityTool*
- - ATK/*
- SELECTION_2:
- Signature:
- - '*Hacktool*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-fields:
-- FileName
-- User
-id: fa0c05b6-8ad3-468d-8231-c1cbccb64fba
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: antivirus
-references:
-- https://www.nextron-systems.com/2021/08/16/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-8-2/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1204
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/av_password_dumper.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/av_password_dumper.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8c2af18e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/av_password_dumper.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Antivirus Password Dumper Detection
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2018/09/09
-description: Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a password dumper
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Signature:
- - '*DumpCreds*'
- - '*Mimikatz*'
- - '*PWCrack*'
- - '*HTool/WCE*'
- - '*PSWtool*'
- - '*PWDump*'
- - '*SecurityTool*'
- - '*PShlSpy*'
- - '*Rubeus*'
- - '*Kekeo*'
- - '*LsassDump*'
- - '*Outflank*'
- condition: SELECTION_1
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-fields:
-- FileName
-- User
-id: 78cc2dd2-7d20-4d32-93ff-057084c38b93
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: antivirus
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.nextron-systems.com/2018/09/08/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-4/
-- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5fcda49ee7f202559a6cbbb34edb65c33c9a1e0bde9fa2af06a6f11b55ded619/detection
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1003
-- attack.t1558
-- attack.t1003.001
-- attack.t1003.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/av_printernightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/av_printernightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f08f4f69..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/av_printernightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Antivirus PrinterNightmare CVE-2021-34527 Exploit Detection
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Sittikorn S, Nuttakorn T
-date: 2021/07/01
-description: Detects the suspicious file that is created from PoC code against Windows
- Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2021-34527 (PrinterNightmare),
- CVE-2021-1675 .
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Filename: '*C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\\*'
- condition: SELECTION_1
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-fields:
-- Signature
-- Filename
-- ComputerName
-id: 6fe1719e-ecdf-4caf-bffe-4f501cb0a561
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: antivirus
-modified: 2021/11/23
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/mvelazco/status/1410291741241102338
-- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675
-- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.privilege_escalation
-- attack.t1055
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/av_relevant_files.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/av_relevant_files.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e926aa22..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/av_relevant_files.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Arnim Rupp
-date: 2018/09/09
-description: Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant
- file name
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Filename:
- - C:\Windows\\*
- - C:\Temp\\*
- - C:\PerfLogs\\*
- - C:\Users\Public\\*
- - C:\Users\Default\\*
- SELECTION_2:
- Filename:
- - '*\Client\\*'
- - '*\tsclient\\*'
- - '*\inetpub\\*'
- - '*/www/*'
- - '*apache*'
- - '*tomcat*'
- - '*nginx*'
- - '*weblogic*'
- SELECTION_3:
- Filename:
- - '*.ps1'
- - '*.psm1'
- - '*.vbs'
- - '*.bat'
- - '*.cmd'
- - '*.sh'
- - '*.chm'
- - '*.xml'
- - '*.txt'
- - '*.jsp'
- - '*.jspx'
- - '*.asp'
- - '*.aspx'
- - '*.ashx'
- - '*.asax'
- - '*.asmx'
- - '*.php'
- - '*.cfm'
- - '*.py'
- - '*.pyc'
- - '*.pl'
- - '*.rb'
- - '*.cgi'
- - '*.war'
- - '*.ear'
- - '*.hta'
- - '*.lnk'
- - '*.scf'
- - '*.sct'
- - '*.vbe'
- - '*.wsf'
- - '*.wsh'
- - '*.gif'
- - '*.png'
- - '*.jpg'
- - '*.jpeg'
- - '*.svg'
- - '*.dat'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-fields:
-- Signature
-- User
-id: c9a88268-0047-4824-ba6e-4d81ce0b907c
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: antivirus
-modified: 2021/11/23
-references:
-- https://www.nextron-systems.com/2021/03/25/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-8/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.resource_development
-- attack.t1588
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/av_webshell.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/av_webshell.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 816ae0e1..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/av_webshell.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Antivirus Web Shell Detection
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, Arnim Rupp
-date: 2018/09/09
-description: Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a web shell. It's
- highly recommended to tune this rule to the specific strings used by your anti virus
- solution by downloading a big webshell repo from e.g. github and checking the matches.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- Signature:
- - PHP/*
- - JSP/*
- - ASP/*
- - Perl/*
- - PHP.*
- - JSP.*
- - ASP.*
- - Perl.*
- - VBS/Uxor*
- - IIS/BackDoor*
- - JAVA/Backdoor*
- - Troj/ASP*
- - Troj/PHP*
- - Troj/JSP*
- SELECTION_2:
- Signature:
- - '*Webshell*'
- - '*Chopper*'
- - '*SinoChoper*'
- - '*ASPXSpy*'
- - '*Aspdoor*'
- - '*filebrowser*'
- - '*PHP_*'
- - '*JSP_*'
- - '*ASP_*'
- - '*PHP:*'
- - '*JSP:*'
- - '*ASP:*'
- - '*Perl:*'
- - '*PHPShell*'
- - '*Trojan.PHP*'
- - '*Trojan.ASP*'
- - '*Trojan.JSP*'
- - '*Trojan.VBS*'
- - '*PHP?Agent*'
- - '*ASP?Agent*'
- - '*JSP?Agent*'
- - '*VBS?Agent*'
- - '*Backdoor?PHP*'
- - '*Backdoor?JSP*'
- - '*Backdoor?ASP*'
- - '*Backdoor?VBS*'
- - '*Backdoor?Java*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-fields:
-- FileName
-- User
-id: fdf135a2-9241-4f96-a114-bb404948f736
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: antivirus
-modified: 2021/05/08
-references:
-- https://www.nextron-systems.com/2021/03/25/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-8/
-- https://github.com/tennc/webshell
-- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/bd1d52289203866645e556e2766a21d2275877fbafa056a76fe0cf884b7f8819/detection
-- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/308487ed28a3d9abc1fec7ebc812d4b5c07ab025037535421f64c60d3887a3e8/detection
-- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7d3cb8a8ff28f82b07f382789247329ad2d7782a72dde9867941f13266310c80/detection
-- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e841675a4b82250c75273ebf0861245f80c6a1c3d5803c2d995d9d3b18d5c4b5/detection
-- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a80042c61a0372eaa0c2c1e831adf0d13ef09feaf71d1d20b216156269045801/detection
-- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b219f7d3c26f8bad7e175934cd5eda4ddb5e3983503e94ff07d39c0666821b7e/detection
-- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b8702acf32fd651af9f809ed42d15135f842788cd98d81a8e1b154ee2a2b76a2/detection
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1100
-- attack.t1505.003
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/file_event_mal_octopus_scanner.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/file_event_mal_octopus_scanner.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 149d5e6e..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/file_event_mal_octopus_scanner.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Octopus Scanner Malware
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: NVISO
-date: 2020/06/09
-description: Detects Octopus Scanner Malware.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 11
- SELECTION_2:
- TargetFilename:
- - '*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Cache134.dat'
- - '*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 805c55d9-31e6-4846-9878-c34c75054fe9
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: file_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://securitylab.github.com/research/octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.t1195
-- attack.t1195.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/process_creation_mal_blue_mockingbird.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/process_creation_mal_blue_mockingbird.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 9dca8abf..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/process_creation_mal_blue_mockingbird.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Blue Mockingbird
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick)
-date: 2020/05/14
-description: Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\cmd.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- CommandLine: '*sc config*'
- SELECTION_4:
- CommandLine: '*wercplsupporte.dll*'
- SELECTION_5:
- Image: '*\wmic.exe'
- SELECTION_6:
- CommandLine: '*COR_PROFILER'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) or (SELECTION_5
- and SELECTION_6)))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: c3198a27-23a0-4c2c-af19-e5328d49680e
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: process_creation
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/11
-references:
-- https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
-related:
-- id: ce239692-aa94-41b3-b32f-9cab259c96ea
- type: merged
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1112
-- attack.t1047
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/process_creation_mal_darkside_ransomware.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/process_creation_mal_darkside_ransomware.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 87b4adda..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/process_creation_mal_darkside_ransomware.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: DarkSide Ransomware Pattern
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/05/14
-description: Detects DarkSide Ransomware and helpers
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1
- SELECTION_2:
- CommandLine:
- - "*=[char][byte]('0x'+*"
- - '* -work worker0 -path *'
- SELECTION_3:
- ParentCommandLine:
- - '*DllHost.exe /Processid:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}*'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - '*\AppData\Local\Temp\\*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or (SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-- UAC bypass method used by other malware
-id: 965fff6c-1d7e-4e25-91fd-cdccd75f7d2c
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: process_creation
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html
-- https://app.any.run/tasks/8b9a571b-bcc1-4783-ba32-df4ba623b9c0/
-- https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/411752/0/html#7048BB9A06B8F2DD9D24C77F389D7B2B58D2
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1204
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/process_creation_mal_lockergoga_ransomware.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/process_creation_mal_lockergoga_ransomware.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e47205be..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/process_creation_mal_lockergoga_ransomware.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-
-title: LockerGoga Ransomware
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/18
-description: Detects LockerGoga Ransomware command line.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1
- SELECTION_2:
- CommandLine: '*-i SM-tgytutrc -s*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-id: 74db3488-fd28-480a-95aa-b7af626de068
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: process_creation
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://medium.com/@malwaredancer/lockergoga-input-arguments-ipc-communication-and-others-bd4e5a7ba80a
-- https://blog.f-secure.com/analysis-of-lockergoga-ransomware/
-- https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.impact
-- attack.t1486
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/process_creation_mal_ryuk.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/process_creation_mal_ryuk.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b87be930..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/process_creation_mal_ryuk.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Ryuk Ransomware
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Vasiliy Burov
-date: 2019/08/06
-description: Detects Ryuk Ransomware command lines
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 1
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\net.exe'
- - '*\net1.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- CommandLine: '*stop*'
- SELECTION_4:
- CommandLine:
- - '*samss*'
- - '*audioendpointbuilder*'
- - '*unistoresvc_?????*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unlikely
-id: 0acaad27-9f02-4136-a243-c357202edd74
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: process_creation
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://research.checkpoint.com/ryuk-ransomware-targeted-campaign-break/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1204
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_azorult.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_azorult.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 046003b1..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_azorult.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Registry Entries For Azorult Malware
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Trent Liffick
-date: 2020/05/08
-description: Detects the presence of a registry key created during Azorult execution
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 12
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 13
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 14
- SELECTION_4:
- EventID: 12
- SELECTION_5:
- EventID: 13
- SELECTION_6:
- TargetObject: '*SYSTEM\\*'
- SELECTION_7:
- TargetObject: '*\services\localNETService'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) and (SELECTION_4 or SELECTION_5)
- and SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-fields:
-- Image
-- TargetObject
-- TargetDetails
-id: f7f9ab88-7557-4a69-b30e-0a8f91b3a0e7
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: registry_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.win32.azoruit.a
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1112
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_blue_mockingbird.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_blue_mockingbird.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index d886e1c2..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_blue_mockingbird.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Blue Mockingbird
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick)
-date: 2020/05/14
-description: Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 12
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 13
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 14
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetObject: '*\CurrentControlSet\Services\wercplsupport\Parameters\ServiceDll'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 92b0b372-a939-44ed-a11b-5136cf680e27
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: registry_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/11
-references:
-- https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
-related:
-- id: c3198a27-23a0-4c2c-af19-e5328d49680e
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1112
-- attack.t1047
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_flowcloud.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_flowcloud.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4c22c718..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_flowcloud.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-
-title: FlowCloud Malware
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: NVISO
-date: 2020/06/09
-description: Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 12
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 13
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 14
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetObject:
- - HKLM\HARDWARE\{804423C2-F490-4ac3-BFA5-13DEDE63A71A}
- - HKLM\HARDWARE\{A5124AF5-DF23-49bf-B0ED-A18ED3DEA027}
- - HKLM\HARDWARE\{2DB80286-1784-48b5-A751-B6ED1F490303}
- SELECTION_5:
- TargetObject:
- - HKLM\SYSTEM\Setup\PrintResponsor\\*
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) and (SELECTION_4 or SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 5118765f-6657-4ddb-a487-d7bd673abbf1
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: registry_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/07/22
-references:
-- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta410-group-behind-lookback-attacks-against-us-utilities-sector-returns-new
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.persistence
-- attack.t1112
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_netwire.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_netwire.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a5c56e82..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_netwire.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: NetWire RAT Registry Key
-ruletype: Sigma
-Note: You likely will have to change the sysmon configuration file. Per SwiftOnSecurity
- "Because Sysmon runs as a service, it has no filtering ability for, or concept of,
- HKCU or HKEY_CURRENT_USER. Use "contains" or "end with" to get around this limitation"
- Therefore I set netwire in my
- configuration.
-author: Christopher Peacock
-date: 2021/10/07
-description: Attempts to detect registry events for common NetWire key HKCU\Software\NetWire
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 12
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 13
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 14
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetObject: '*\software\NetWire*'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- No known false positives
-id: 1d218616-71b0-4c40-855b-9dbe75510f7f
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: registry_event
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-netwire-rat-variant-spread-by-phishing
-- https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/netwire-malware-what-it-is-how-it-works-and-how-to-prevent-it-malware-spotlight/
-- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/guloader-installing-netwire-rat/
-- https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/09/threat-thursday-netwire-rat-is-coming-down-the-line
-- https://app.any.run/tasks/41ecdbde-4997-4301-a350-0270448b4c8f/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1112
diff --git a/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_ursnif.yml b/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_ursnif.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index e6107092..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/malware/registry_event_mal_ursnif.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Ursnif
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: megan201296
-date: 2019/02/13
-description: Detects new registry key created by Ursnif malware.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 12
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 13
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 14
- SELECTION_4:
- TargetObject: '*\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\\*'
- SELECTION_5:
- TargetObject:
- - '*\SOFTWARE\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\\*'
- - '*\SOFTWARE\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\RepService\\*'
- - '*\SOFTWARE\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\IME\\*'
- - '*\SOFTWARE\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\Edge\\*'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) and SELECTION_4 and not
- (SELECTION_5))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: 21f17060-b282-4249-ade0-589ea3591558
-level: critical
-logsource:
- category: registry_event
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/15
-references:
-- https://blog.yoroi.company/research/ursnif-long-live-the-steganography/
-- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/phishing-campaign-uses-hijacked-emails-to-deliver-ursnif-by-replying-to-ongoing-threads/
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1112
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/silenttrinity_stager_msbuild_activity.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/silenttrinity_stager_msbuild_activity.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 19216504..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/silenttrinity_stager_msbuild_activity.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Silenttrinity Stager Msbuild Activity
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Kiran kumar s, oscd.community
-date: 2020/10/11
-description: Detects a possible remote connections to Silenttrinity c2
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\msbuild.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- DestinationPort:
- - '80'
- - '443'
- SELECTION_4:
- Initiated: 'true'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 50e54b8d-ad73-43f8-96a1-5191685b17a4
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/my-first-joyride-with-silenttrinity/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1127.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_dllhost_net_connections.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_dllhost_net_connections.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 224f7e20..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_dllhost_net_connections.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Dllhost Internet Connection
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: bartblaze
-date: 2020/07/13
-description: Detects Dllhost that communicates with public IP addresses
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\dllhost.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_4:
- DestinationIp:
- - 10.*
- - 192.168.*
- - 172.16.*
- - 172.17.*
- - 172.18.*
- - 172.19.*
- - 172.20.*
- - 172.21.*
- - 172.22.*
- - 172.23.*
- - 172.24.*
- - 172.25.*
- - 172.26.*
- - 172.27.*
- - 172.28.*
- - 172.29.*
- - 172.30.*
- - 172.31.*
- SELECTION_5:
- DestinationIp:
- - 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not ((SELECTION_4)
- or (SELECTION_5)))
-falsepositives:
-- Communication to other corporate systems that use IP addresses from public address
- spaces
-id: cfed2f44-16df-4bf3-833a-79405198b277
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/07
-references:
-- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/network_connection/sysmon_rundll32_net_connections.yml
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1218
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1559.001
-- attack.t1175
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_excel_outbound_network_connection.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_excel_outbound_network_connection.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 03ee6414..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_excel_outbound_network_connection.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Excel Network Connections
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io', Florian Roth '@Neo23x0"
-date: 2021/11/10
-description: Detects an Excel process that opens suspicious network connections to
- non-private IP addresses, and attempts to cover CVE-2021-42292. You will likely
- have to tune this rule for your organization, but it is certainly something you
- should look for and could have applications for malicious activity beyond CVE-2021-42292.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\excel.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_4:
- DestinationIsIpv6: 'false'
- SELECTION_5:
- DestinationIp:
- - 10.*
- - 192.168.*
- - 172.16.*
- - 172.17.*
- - 172.18.*
- - 172.19.*
- - 172.20.*
- - 172.21.*
- - 172.22.*
- - 172.23.*
- - 172.24.*
- - 172.25.*
- - 172.26.*
- - 172.27.*
- - 172.28.*
- - 172.29.*
- - 172.30.*
- - 172.31.*
- - 127.0.0.1*
- SELECTION_6:
- DestinationIsIpv6: 'false'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) and not
- (SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6))
-falsepositives:
-- You may have to tune certain domains out that Excel may call out to, such as microsoft
- or other business use case domains.
-- Office documents commonly have templates that refer to external addresses, like
- sharepoint.ourcompany.com may have to be tuned.
-- It is highly recomended to baseline your activity and tune out common business use
- cases.
-id: 75e33ce3-ae32-4dcc-9aa8-a2a3029d6f84
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://corelight.com/blog/detecting-cve-2021-42292
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1203
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_malware_backconnect_ports.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_malware_backconnect_ports.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 01557365..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_malware_backconnect_ports.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Typical Malware Back Connect Ports
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/03/19
-description: Detects programs that connect to typical malware back connect ports based
- on statistical analysis from two different sandbox system databases
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_3:
- DestinationPort:
- - '4443'
- - '2448'
- - '8143'
- - '1777'
- - '1443'
- - '243'
- - '65535'
- - '13506'
- - '3360'
- - '200'
- - '198'
- - '49180'
- - '13507'
- - '6625'
- - '4444'
- - '4438'
- - '1904'
- - '13505'
- - '13504'
- - '12102'
- - '9631'
- - '5445'
- - '2443'
- - '777'
- - '13394'
- - '13145'
- - '12103'
- - '5552'
- - '3939'
- - '3675'
- - '666'
- - '473'
- - '5649'
- - '4455'
- - '4433'
- - '1817'
- - '100'
- - '65520'
- - '1960'
- - '1515'
- - '743'
- - '700'
- - '14154'
- - '14103'
- - '14102'
- - '12322'
- - '10101'
- - '7210'
- - '4040'
- - '9943'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image: '*\Program Files*'
- SELECTION_5:
- DestinationIp:
- - 10.*
- - 192.168.*
- - 172.16.*
- - 172.17.*
- - 172.18.*
- - 172.19.*
- - 172.20.*
- - 172.21.*
- - 172.22.*
- - 172.23.*
- - 172.24.*
- - 172.25.*
- - 172.26.*
- - 172.27.*
- - 172.28.*
- - 172.29.*
- - 172.30.*
- - 172.31.*
- - 127.*
- SELECTION_6:
- DestinationIsIpv6: 'false'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not ((SELECTION_4
- or (SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6))))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 4b89abaa-99fe-4232-afdd-8f9aa4d20382
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- definition: 'Use the following config to generate the necessary Event ID 10 Process
- Access events: VBE7.DLLUNKNOWN'
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17pSTDNpa0sf6pHeRhusvWG6rThciE8CsXTSlDUAZDyo
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.t1571
-- attack.t1043
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_notepad_network_connection.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_notepad_network_connection.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index aa2d7042..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_notepad_network_connection.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Notepad Making Network Connection
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: EagleEye Team
-date: 2020/05/14
-description: Detects suspicious network connection by Notepad
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\notepad.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- DestinationPort: '9100'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- None observed so far
-id: e81528db-fc02-45e8-8e98-4e84aba1f10b
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive-1492186586.pdf
-- https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2013/08/08/why-is-notepad-exe-connecting-to-the-internet/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.execution
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1055
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_powershell_network_connection.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_powershell_network_connection.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 26259ef4..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_powershell_network_connection.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-
-title: PowerShell Network Connections
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/03/13
-description: Detects a Powershell process that opens network connections - check for
- suspicious target ports and target systems - adjust to your environment (e.g. extend
- filters with company's ip range')
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\powershell.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_4:
- DestinationIsIpv6: 'false'
- SELECTION_5:
- DestinationIp:
- - 10.*
- - 192.168.*
- - 172.16.*
- - 172.17.*
- - 172.18.*
- - 172.19.*
- - 172.20.*
- - 172.21.*
- - 172.22.*
- - 172.23.*
- - 172.24.*
- - 172.25.*
- - 172.26.*
- - 172.27.*
- - 172.28.*
- - 172.29.*
- - 172.30.*
- - 172.31.*
- - 127.0.0.1*
- SELECTION_6:
- User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
- SELECTION_7:
- User: '*AUT*'
- SELECTION_8:
- User: '* NT*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) and not
- (SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7 and SELECTION_8))
-falsepositives:
-- Administrative scripts
-id: 1f21ec3f-810d-4b0e-8045-322202e22b4b
-level: low
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/01
-references:
-- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DLtJTxMWZ2o
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
-- attack.t1086
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_rdp_reverse_tunnel.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_rdp_reverse_tunnel.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 61b781a9..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_rdp_reverse_tunnel.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-
-title: RDP Over Reverse SSH Tunnel
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Samir Bousseaden
-date: 2019/02/16
-description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback
- address and on TCP port 3389
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\svchost.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_4:
- SourcePort: 3389
- SELECTION_5:
- DestinationIp:
- - 127.*
- SELECTION_6:
- DestinationIp:
- - ::1
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4) and (SELECTION_5
- or SELECTION_6))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 5f699bc5-5446-4a4a-a0b7-5ef2885a3eb4
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/05/11
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1096148422984384514
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.t1572
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.001
-- attack.t1076
-- car.2013-07-002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_regsvr32_network_activity.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_regsvr32_network_activity.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index d922d938..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_regsvr32_network_activity.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Regsvr32 Network Activity
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/25
-description: Detects network connections and DNS queries initiated by Regsvr32.exe
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\regsvr32.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-fields:
-- ComputerName
-- User
-- Image
-- DestinationIp
-- DestinationPort
-id: c7e91a02-d771-4a6d-a700-42587e0b1095
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/09/21
-references:
-- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/11/applocker-bypass-regsvr32/
-- https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/
-- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1117/T1117.md
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1559.001
-- attack.t1175
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1218.010
-- attack.t1117
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_remote_powershell_session_network.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_remote_powershell_session_network.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 65e664f9..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_remote_powershell_session_network.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Remote PowerShell Session
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
-date: 2019/09/12
-description: Detects remote PowerShell connections by monitoring network outbound
- connections to ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- DestinationPort: 5985
- SELECTION_3:
- DestinationPort: 5986
- SELECTION_4:
- User: NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate usage of remote PowerShell, e.g. remote administration and monitoring.
-id: c539afac-c12a-46ed-b1bd-5a5567c9f045
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190511223310.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1059.001
-- attack.t1086
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.006
-- attack.t1028
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_rundll32_net_connections.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_rundll32_net_connections.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 13a47533..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_rundll32_net_connections.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Rundll32 Internet Connection
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/11/04
-description: Detects a rundll32 that communicates with public IP addresses
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*\rundll32.exe'
- SELECTION_3:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_4:
- DestinationIp:
- - 10.*
- - 192.168.*
- - 172.16.*
- - 172.17.*
- - 172.18.*
- - 172.19.*
- - 172.20.*
- - 172.21.*
- - 172.22.*
- - 172.23.*
- - 172.24.*
- - 172.25.*
- - 172.26.*
- - 172.27.*
- - 172.28.*
- - 172.29.*
- - 172.30.*
- - 172.31.*
- - 127.*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Communication to other corporate systems that use IP addresses from public address
- spaces
-id: cdc8da7d-c303-42f8-b08c-b4ab47230263
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/759fb4c0091a78c5ee035715afe3084686a8493f39014aea72dae36869de9ff6?environmentId=100
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1218.011
-- attack.t1085
-- attack.execution
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_susp_prog_location_network_connection.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_susp_prog_location_network_connection.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 13e687d2..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_susp_prog_location_network_connection.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Program Location with Network Connections
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/03/19
-description: Detects programs with network connections running in suspicious files
- system locations
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Image:
- - '*\Users\All Users\\*'
- - '*\Users\Default\\*'
- - '*\Users\Public\\*'
- - '*\Users\Contacts\\*'
- - '*\Users\Searches\\*'
- - '*\config\systemprofile\\*'
- - '*\Windows\Fonts\\*'
- - '*\Windows\IME\\*'
- - '*\Windows\addins\\*'
- SELECTION_3:
- Image:
- - '*\$Recycle.bin'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - C:\Perflogs\\*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- definition: Use the following config to generate the necessary Event ID 3 Network
- Connection events
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17pSTDNpa0sf6pHeRhusvWG6rThciE8CsXTSlDUAZDyo
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.t1105
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_susp_rdp.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_susp_rdp.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 54737167..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_susp_rdp.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Outbound RDP Connections
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Markus Neis - Swisscom
-date: 2019/05/15
-description: Detects Non-Standard Tools Connecting to TCP port 3389 indicating possible
- lateral movement
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- DestinationPort: 3389
- SELECTION_3:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - '*\mstsc.exe'
- - '*\RTSApp.exe'
- - '*\RTS2App.exe'
- - '*\RDCMan.exe'
- - '*\ws_TunnelService.exe'
- - '*\RSSensor.exe'
- - '*\RemoteDesktopManagerFree.exe'
- - '*\RemoteDesktopManager.exe'
- - '*\RemoteDesktopManager64.exe'
- - '*\mRemoteNG.exe'
- - '*\mRemote.exe'
- - '*\Terminals.exe'
- - '*\spiceworks-finder.exe'
- - '*\FSDiscovery.exe'
- - '*\FSAssessment.exe'
- - '*\MobaRTE.exe'
- - '*\chrome.exe'
- - '*\System32\dns.exe'
- - '*\thor.exe'
- - '*\thor64.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Other Remote Desktop RDP tools
-- domain controller using dns.exe
-id: ed74fe75-7594-4b4b-ae38-e38e3fd2eb23
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1021.001
-- attack.t1076
-- car.2013-07-002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_suspicious_outbound_kerberos_connection.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_suspicious_outbound_kerberos_connection.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b4e2697c..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_suspicious_outbound_kerberos_connection.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Suspicious Outbound Kerberos Connection
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
-date: 2019/10/24
-description: Detects suspicious outbound network activity via kerberos default port
- indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- DestinationPort: 88
- SELECTION_3:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image:
- - '*\lsass.exe'
- - '*\opera.exe'
- - '*\chrome.exe'
- - '*\firefox.exe'
- - '*\tomcat\bin\tomcat8.exe'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) and not (SELECTION_4))
-falsepositives:
-- Other browsers
-id: e54979bd-c5f9-4d6c-967b-a04b19ac4c74
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/12/02
-references:
-- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.t1558
-- attack.t1208
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1550.003
-- attack.t1097
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_win_binary_github_com.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_win_binary_github_com.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index d7289961..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_win_binary_github_com.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Microsoft Binary Github Communication
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Michael Haag (idea), Florian Roth (rule)
-date: 2017/08/24
-description: Detects an executable in the Windows folder accessing github.com
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_3:
- DestinationHostname:
- - '*.github.com'
- - '*.githubusercontent.com'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image: C:\Windows\\*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-- '@subTee in your network'
-id: 635dbb88-67b3-4b41-9ea5-a3af2dd88153
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665
-- https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752
-- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/exfil/Invoke-ExfilDataToGitHub.ps1
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1105
-- attack.exfiltration
-- attack.t1567.001
-- attack.t1048
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_win_binary_susp_com.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_win_binary_susp_com.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 03e0c5df..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_win_binary_susp_com.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Microsoft Binary Suspicious Communication Endpoint
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2018/08/30
-description: Detects an executable in the Windows folder accessing suspicious domains
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_3:
- DestinationHostname:
- - '*dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
- - '*.pastebin.com'
- - '*.githubusercontent.com'
- SELECTION_4:
- Image: C:\Windows\\*
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665
-- https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1105
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_wuauclt_network_connection.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_wuauclt_network_connection.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 8b08f247..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/sysmon_wuauclt_network_connection.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Wuauclt Network Connection
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
-date: 2020/10/12
-description: Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) to
- proxy execute code and making a network connections. One could easily make the DLL
- spawn a new process and inject to it to proxy the network connection and bypass
- this rule.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Image: '*wuauclt*'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate use of wuauclt.exe over the network.
-id: c649a6c7-cd8c-4a78-9c04-000fc76df954
-level: medium
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1218
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/win_net_crypto_mining.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/win_net_crypto_mining.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 12862266..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/win_net_crypto_mining.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Windows Crypto Mining Pool Connections
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/10/26
-description: Detects process connections to a Monero crypto mining pool
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- DestinationHostname:
- - pool.minexmr.com
- - fr.minexmr.com
- - de.minexmr.com
- - sg.minexmr.com
- - ca.minexmr.com
- - us-west.minexmr.com
- - pool.supportxmr.com
- - mine.c3pool.com
- - xmr-eu1.nanopool.org
- - xmr-eu2.nanopool.org
- - xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org
- - xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org
- - xmr-asia1.nanopool.org
- - xmr-jp1.nanopool.org
- - xmr-au1.nanopool.org
- - xmr.2miners.com
- - xmr.hashcity.org
- - xmr.f2pool.com
- - xmrpool.eu
- - pool.hashvault.pro
- - moneroocean.stream
- - monerocean.stream
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate use of crypto miners
-id: fa5b1358-b040-4403-9868-15f7d9ab6329
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero
-status: stable
-tags:
-- attack.impact
-- attack.t1496
diff --git a/rules/sigma/network_connection/win_net_mega_nz.yml b/rules/sigma/network_connection/win_net_mega_nz.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 0415712d..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/network_connection/win_net_mega_nz.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Communication To Mega.nz
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/12/06
-description: Detects an executable accessing mega.co.nz, which could be a sign of
- forbidden file sharing use of data exfiltration by malicious actors
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 3
- SELECTION_2:
- Initiated: 'true'
- SELECTION_3:
- DestinationHostname: '*api.mega.co.nz'
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate use of mega.nz uploaders and tools
-id: fdeebdf0-9f3f-4d08-84a6-4c4d13e39fe4
-level: high
-logsource:
- category: network_connection
- product: windows
-references:
-- https://megatools.megous.com/
-- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.exfiltration
-- attack.t1567.001
diff --git a/rules/sigma/other/applocker/win_applocker_file_was_not_allowed_to_run.yml b/rules/sigma/other/applocker/win_applocker_file_was_not_allowed_to_run.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 00948225..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/other/applocker/win_applocker_file_was_not_allowed_to_run.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-
-title: File Was Not Allowed To Run
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Pushkarev Dmitry
-date: 2020/06/28
-description: Detect run not allowed files. Applocker is a very useful tool, especially
- on servers where unprivileged users have access. For example terminal servers. You
- need configure applocker and log collect to receive these events.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 8004
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 8007
- condition: (SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- need tuning applocker or add exceptions in SIEM
-fields:
-- PolicyName
-- RuleId
-- RuleName
-- TargetUser
-- TargetProcessId
-- FilePath
-- FileHash
-- Fqbn
-id: 401e5d00-b944-11ea-8f9a-00163ecd60ae
-level: medium
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: applocker
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker
-- https://nxlog.co/documentation/nxlog-user-guide/applocker.html
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.execution
-- attack.t1086
-- attack.t1064
-- attack.t1204
-- attack.t1035
-- attack.t1204.002
-- attack.t1059.001
-- attack.t1059.003
-- attack.t1059.005
-- attack.t1059.006
-- attack.t1059.007
diff --git a/rules/sigma/other/dns_server/win_apt_gallium.yml b/rules/sigma/other/dns_server/win_apt_gallium.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 2bd5241f..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/other/dns_server/win_apt_gallium.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-
-title: GALLIUM Artefacts
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Tim Burrell
-date: 2020/02/07
-description: Detects artefacts associated with activity group GALLIUM - Microsoft
- Threat Intelligence Center indicators released in December 2019.
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 257
- SELECTION_2:
- QNAME:
- - asyspy256.ddns.net
- - hotkillmail9sddcc.ddns.net
- - rosaf112.ddns.net
- - cvdfhjh1231.myftp.biz
- - sz2016rose.ddns.net
- - dffwescwer4325.myftp.biz
- - cvdfhjh1231.ddns.net
- condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- unknown
-id: 3db10f25-2527-4b79-8d4b-471eb900ee29
-level: high
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: dns-server
-modified: 2021/09/19
-references:
-- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/12/12/gallium-targeting-global-telecom/
-- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800669(v=ws.11)
-related:
-- id: 440a56bf-7873-4439-940a-1c8a671073c2
- type: derived
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.credential_access
-- attack.command_and_control
-- attack.t1071
diff --git a/rules/sigma/other/dns_server/win_susp_dns_config.yml b/rules/sigma/other/dns_server/win_susp_dns_config.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c69978b..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/other/dns_server/win_susp_dns_config.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: DNS Server Error Failed Loading the ServerLevelPluginDLL
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/05/08
-description: This rule detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL
- (in registry) could not be loaded
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 150
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 770
- condition: (SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2)
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown
-id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: dns-server
-modified: 2021/11/27
-references:
-- https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83
-- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc735829(v=ws.10).aspx
-- https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/861641945944391680
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.defense_evasion
-- attack.t1073
-- attack.t1574.002
diff --git a/rules/sigma/other/driverframeworks/win_usb_device_plugged.yml b/rules/sigma/other/driverframeworks/win_usb_device_plugged.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 6d206473..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/other/driverframeworks/win_usb_device_plugged.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-
-title: USB Device Plugged
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2017/11/09
-description: Detects plugged USB devices
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 2003
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 2100
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 2102
- condition: (SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3)
-falsepositives:
-- Legitimate administrative activity
-id: 1a4bd6e3-4c6e-405d-a9a3-53a116e341d4
-level: low
-logsource:
- definition: mapping Provider_Name 'Microsoft-Windows-DriverFrameworks-UserMode/Operational'
- product: windows
- service: driver-framework
-modified: 2021/11/30
-references:
-- https://df-stream.com/2014/01/the-windows-7-event-log-and-usb-device/
-- https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-track-down-usb-flash-drive-usage-in-windows-10s-event-viewer/
-status: test
-tags:
-- attack.initial_access
-- attack.t1200
diff --git a/rules/sigma/other/ldap/win_ldap_recon.yml b/rules/sigma/other/ldap/win_ldap_recon.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1ae92ed1..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/other/ldap/win_ldap_recon.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-
-title: LDAP Reconnaissance / Active Directory Enumeration
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Adeem Mawani
-date: 2021/06/22
-description: Detects possible Active Directory enumeration via LDAP
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 30
- SELECTION_2:
- SearchFilter:
- - '*(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483648)*'
- - '*(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483656)*'
- - '*(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483652)*'
- - '*(groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483650)*'
- - '*(sAMAccountType=805306369)*'
- - '*(sAMAccountType=805306368)*'
- - '*(sAMAccountType=536870913)*'
- - '*(sAMAccountType=536870912)*'
- - '*(sAMAccountType=268435457)*'
- - '*(sAMAccountType=268435456)*'
- - '*(objectCategory=groupPolicyContainer)*'
- - '*(objectCategory=organizationalUnit)*'
- - '*(objectCategory=Computer)*'
- - '*(objectCategory=nTDSDSA)*'
- - '*(objectCategory=server)*'
- - '*(objectCategory=domain)*'
- - '*(objectCategory=person)*'
- - '*(objectCategory=group)*'
- - '*(objectCategory=user)*'
- - '*(objectClass=trustedDomain)*'
- - '*(objectClass=computer)*'
- - '*(objectClass=server)*'
- - '*(objectClass=group)*'
- - '*(objectClass=user)*'
- - '*(primaryGroupID=521)*'
- - '*(primaryGroupID=516)*'
- - '*(primaryGroupID=515)*'
- - '*(primaryGroupID=512)*'
- - '*Domain Admins*'
- SELECTION_3:
- EventID: 30
- SELECTION_4:
- SearchFilter:
- - '*(domainSid=*)*'
- - '*(objectSid=*)*'
- SELECTION_5:
- EventID: 30
- SELECTION_6:
- SearchFilter:
- - '*(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=4194304)*'
- - '*(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2097152)*'
- - '*!(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=1048574)*'
- - '*(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288)*'
- - '*(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=65536)*'
- - '*(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=8192)*'
- - '*(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=544)*'
- - '*!(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)*'
- - '*msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity*'
- - '*msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo*'
- - '*(accountExpires=9223372036854775807)*'
- - '*(accountExpires=0)*'
- - '*(adminCount=1)*'
- - '*ms-MCS-AdmPwd*'
- condition: (((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2) and not (SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4))
- or (SELECTION_5 and SELECTION_6))
-id: 31d68132-4038-47c7-8f8e-635a39a7c174
-level: medium
-logsource:
- definition: Requires Microsoft-Windows-LDAP-Client/Debug ETW logging
- product: windows
- service: ldap_debug
-references:
-- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-endpoint/hunting-for-reconnaissance-activities-using-ldap-search-filters/ba-p/824726
-- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1
-- https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3/blob/master/SharpHound3/LdapBuilder.cs
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.discovery
-- attack.t1069.002
-- attack.t1087.002
-- attack.t1482
diff --git a/rules/sigma/other/msexchange/win_exchange_cve_2021_42321.yml b/rules/sigma/other/msexchange/win_exchange_cve_2021_42321.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a3440532..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/other/msexchange/win_exchange_cve_2021_42321.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-
-title: Possible Exploitation of Exchange RCE CVE-2021-42321
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth, @testanull
-date: 2021/11/18
-description: Detects log entries that appear in exploitation attempts against MS Exchange
- RCE CVE-2021-42321
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- EventID: 6
- SELECTION_2:
- EventID: 8
- SELECTION_3:
- - 'Cmdlet failed. Cmdlet Get-App, '
- - 'Task Get-App throwing unhandled exception: System.InvalidCastException:'
- condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and (SELECTION_3))
-falsepositives:
-- Unknown, please report false positives via https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues
-id: c92f1896-d1d2-43c3-92d5-7a5b35c217bb
-level: critical
-logsource:
- product: windows
- service: msexchange-management
-references:
-- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42321
-status: experimental
-tags:
-- attack.lateral_movement
-- attack.t1210
diff --git a/rules/sigma/other/msexchange/win_exchange_proxylogon_oabvirtualdir.yml b/rules/sigma/other/msexchange/win_exchange_proxylogon_oabvirtualdir.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index a6c8be23..00000000
--- a/rules/sigma/other/msexchange/win_exchange_proxylogon_oabvirtualdir.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-
-title: ProxyLogon MSExchange OabVirtualDirectory
-ruletype: Sigma
-author: Florian Roth
-date: 2021/08/09
-description: Detects specific patterns found after a successful ProxyLogon exploitation
- in relation to a Commandlet invocation of Set-OabVirtualDirectory
-detection:
- SELECTION_1:
- - OabVirtualDirectory
- SELECTION_2:
- - ' -ExternalUrl '
- SELECTION_3:
- - eval(request
- - http://f/