Rule tuning

This commit is contained in:
Tanaka Zakku
2021-11-18 10:31:28 +09:00
parent 771c86edbf
commit bad4429ad0
44 changed files with 137 additions and 112 deletions
@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@ title: PowerShell Execution Remote Command
title_jp: Powershellのリモートコマンドの実行
description: Powershell command executed remotely.
description_jp: Powershell command executed remotely.
author: Eric Conrad
contributor: Zach Mathis
author: Eric Conrad, Zach Mathis
mitre_attack: T1059
level: medium
detection:
@@ -15,7 +14,7 @@ detection:
# condition: selection
falsepositives:
- normal system usage
output: 'Command = %ScriptBlockText%'
output: 'コマンド = %ScriptBlockText%'
output: 'Command: %ScriptBlockText%'
output: 'コマンド: %ScriptBlockText%'
creation_date: 2020/11/08
updated_date: 2021/11/06
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Command Line Logging
description: hogehoge
author: DeepblueCLI, Zach Mathis
description: Command line logging.
author: Eric Conrad, Zach Mathis
detection:
selection:
Channel: Security
@@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ detection:
# condition: selection
falsepositives:
- unknown
output: 'CommandLine:%CommandLine% ParentProcessName:%ParentProcessName%'
output: 'CommandLine:%CommandLine% : ParentProcessName:%ParentProcessName%'
creation_date: 2020/11/8
updated_date: 2020/11/8
updated_date: 2021/11/8
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
title: Hidden Local User Creation
author: Christian Burkard
date: 2021/05/03
description: Detects the creation of a local hidden user account which should not
happen for event ID 4720.
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 4720
SELECTION_2:
TargetUserName: '*$'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
falsepositives:
- unknown
fields:
- EventCode
- AccountName
id: 7b449a5e-1db5-4dd0-a2dc-4e3a67282538
level: high
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
references:
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1387743867663958021
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136.001
yml_filename: win_hidden_user_creation.yml
yml_path: /Users/user/Documents/YamatoSecurity/sigma/rules/windows/builtin
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
title: User Added to Local Administrators
author: Florian Roth
date: 2017/03/14
description: This rule triggers on user accounts that are added to the local Administrators
group, which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 4732
SELECTION_2:
TargetUserName: Administr*
SELECTION_3:
TargetSid: S-1-5-32-544
SELECTION_4:
SubjectUserName: '*$'
condition: ((SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3)) and not (SELECTION_4))
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activity
id: c265cf08-3f99-46c1-8d59-328247057d57
level: medium
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
modified: 2021/07/07
status: stable
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
yml_filename: win_user_added_to_local_administrators.yml
yml_path: /Users/user/Documents/YamatoSecurity/sigma/rules/windows/builtin
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
title: Local User Creation
author: Patrick Bareiss
date: 2019/04/18
description: Detects local user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen
in an Active Directory environment. Apply this Sigma Use Case on your windows
server logs and not on your DC logs.
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 4720
condition: SELECTION_1
falsepositives:
- Domain Controller Logs
- Local accounts managed by privileged account management tools
fields:
- EventCode
- AccountName
- AccountDomain
id: 66b6be3d-55d0-4f47-9855-d69df21740ea
level: low
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
modified: 2020/08/23
references:
- https://patrick-bareiss.com/detecting-local-user-creation-in-ad-with-sigma/
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136
- attack.t1136.001
yml_filename: win_user_creation.yml
yml_path: /Users/user/Documents/YamatoSecurity/sigma/rules/windows/builtin