Feature/rm submodule (#312)
* rm: submodule * Add: rules * Fix: hayabusa-rules to c9c10a
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title: Tasks Folder Evasion
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ruletype: Sigma
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author: Sreeman
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date: 2020/01/13
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description: The Tasks folder in system32 and syswow64 are globally writable paths.
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Adversaries can take advantage of this and load or influence any script hosts or
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ANY .NET Application in Tasks to load and execute a custom assembly into cscript,
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wscript, regsvr32, mshta, eventvwr
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detection:
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SELECTION_1:
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EventID: 1
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SELECTION_2:
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CommandLine:
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- '*echo *'
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- '*copy *'
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- '*type *'
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- '*file createnew*'
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SELECTION_3:
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CommandLine:
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- '* C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\\*'
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- '* C:\Windows\SysWow64\Tasks\\*'
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condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
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falsepositives:
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- Unknown
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fields:
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- CommandLine
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- ParentProcess
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id: cc4e02ba-9c06-48e2-b09e-2500cace9ae0
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level: high
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logsource:
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category: process_creation
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product: windows
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modified: 2021/11/06
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references:
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- https://twitter.com/subTee/status/1216465628946563073
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- https://gist.github.com/am0nsec/8378da08f848424e4ab0cc5b317fdd26
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status: experimental
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tags:
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- attack.defense_evasion
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- attack.persistence
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- attack.execution
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- attack.t1574.002
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- attack.t1059
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- attack.t1064
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