Feature/rm submodule (#312)

* rm: submodule

* Add: rules

* Fix: hayabusa-rules to c9c10a
This commit is contained in:
itiB
2021-12-20 21:14:32 +09:00
committed by GitHub
parent 1aebdca160
commit 83d891b2fa
1196 changed files with 46186 additions and 4 deletions

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title: CACTUSTORCH Remote Thread Creation
ruletype: Sigma
author: '@SBousseaden (detection), Thomas Patzke (rule)'
date: 2019/02/01
description: Detects remote thread creation from CACTUSTORCH as described in references.
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 8
SELECTION_2:
SourceImage:
- '*\System32\cscript.exe'
- '*\System32\wscript.exe'
- '*\System32\mshta.exe'
- '*\winword.exe'
- '*\excel.exe'
SELECTION_3:
TargetImage: '*\SysWOW64\\*'
SELECTION_4:
StartModule|re: ^$
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
falsepositives:
- unknown
id: 2e4e488a-6164-4811-9ea1-f960c7359c40
level: high
logsource:
category: create_remote_thread
product: windows
modified: 2021/11/12
references:
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1090588499517079552
- https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/CACTUSTORCH
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1093
- attack.t1055.012
- attack.execution
- attack.t1064
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.007
- attack.t1218.005

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title: CobaltStrike Process Injection
ruletype: Sigma
author: Olaf Hartong, Florian Roth, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community
date: 2018/11/30
description: Detects a possible remote threat creation with certain characteristics
which are typical for Cobalt Strike beacons
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 8
SELECTION_2:
StartAddress:
- '*0B80'
- '*0C7C'
- '*0C88'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
falsepositives:
- unknown
id: 6309645e-122d-4c5b-bb2b-22e4f9c2fa42
level: high
logsource:
category: create_remote_thread
product: windows
modified: 2021/11/20
references:
- https://medium.com/@olafhartong/cobalt-strike-remote-threads-detection-206372d11d0f
- https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2018/04/09/cobalt-strike-3-11-the-snake-that-eats-its-tail/
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1055.001

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title: CreateRemoteThread API and LoadLibrary
ruletype: Sigma
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019/08/11
description: Detects potential use of CreateRemoteThread api and LoadLibrary function
to inject DLL into a process
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 8
SELECTION_2:
StartModule: '*\kernel32.dll'
SELECTION_3:
StartFunction: LoadLibraryA
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
id: 052ec6f6-1adc-41e6-907a-f1c813478bee
level: critical
logsource:
category: create_remote_thread
product: windows
modified: 2021/11/27
references:
- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/05_defense_evasion/WIN-180719170510.html
status: test
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1055.001

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title: Password Dumper Remote Thread in LSASS
ruletype: Sigma
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017/02/19
description: Detects password dumper activity by monitoring remote thread creation
EventID 8 in combination with the lsass.exe process as TargetImage. The process
in field Process is the malicious program. A single execution can lead to hundreds
of events.
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 8
SELECTION_2:
TargetImage: '*\lsass.exe'
SELECTION_3:
StartModule: ''
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
falsepositives:
- Antivirus products
id: f239b326-2f41-4d6b-9dfa-c846a60ef505
level: high
logsource:
category: create_remote_thread
product: windows
modified: 2021/06/21
references:
- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/WCE.htm
status: stable
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003
- attack.s0005
- attack.t1003.001

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title: Accessing WinAPI in PowerShell. Code Injection.
ruletype: Sigma
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020/10/06
description: Detecting Code injection with PowerShell in another process
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 8
SELECTION_2:
SourceImage: '*\powershell.exe'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
id: eeb2e3dc-c1f4-40dd-9bd5-149ee465ad50
level: high
logsource:
category: create_remote_thread
definition: Note that you have to configure logging for CreateRemoteThread in Symson
config
product: windows
modified: 2021/11/27
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
status: test
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001

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title: PowerShell Rundll32 Remote Thread Creation
ruletype: Sigma
author: Florian Roth
date: 2018/06/25
description: Detects PowerShell remote thread creation in Rundll32.exe
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 8
SELECTION_2:
SourceImage: '*\powershell.exe'
SELECTION_3:
TargetImage: '*\rundll32.exe'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
id: 99b97608-3e21-4bfe-8217-2a127c396a0e
level: high
logsource:
category: create_remote_thread
product: windows
modified: 2021/11/12
references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/06/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique.html
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.execution
- attack.t1085
- attack.t1218.011
- attack.t1086
- attack.t1059.001

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title: Suspicious Remote Thread Created
ruletype: Sigma
author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community
date: 2019/10/27
description: Offensive tradecraft is switching away from using APIs like "CreateRemoteThread",
however, this is still largely observed in the wild. This rule aims to detect suspicious
processes (those we would not expect to behave in this way like word.exe or outlook.exe)
creating remote threads on other processes. It is a generalistic rule, but it should
have a low FP ratio due to the selected range of processes.
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 8
SELECTION_2:
SourceImage:
- '*\bash.exe'
- '*\cvtres.exe'
- '*\defrag.exe'
- '*\dnx.exe'
- '*\esentutl.exe'
- '*\excel.exe'
- '*\expand.exe'
- '*\explorer.exe'
- '*\find.exe'
- '*\findstr.exe'
- '*\forfiles.exe'
- '*\git.exe'
- '*\gpupdate.exe'
- '*\hh.exe'
- '*\iexplore.exe'
- '*\installutil.exe'
- '*\lync.exe'
- '*\makecab.exe'
- '*\mDNSResponder.exe'
- '*\monitoringhost.exe'
- '*\msbuild.exe'
- '*\mshta.exe'
- '*\msiexec.exe'
- '*\mspaint.exe'
- '*\outlook.exe'
- '*\ping.exe'
- '*\powerpnt.exe'
- '*\powershell.exe'
- '*\provtool.exe'
- '*\python.exe'
- '*\regsvr32.exe'
- '*\robocopy.exe'
- '*\runonce.exe'
- '*\sapcimc.exe'
- '*\schtasks.exe'
- '*\smartscreen.exe'
- '*\spoolsv.exe'
- '*\tstheme.exe'
- '*\userinit.exe'
- '*\vssadmin.exe'
- '*\vssvc.exe'
- '*\w3wp.exe'
- '*\winlogon.exe'
- '*\winscp.exe'
- '*\wmic.exe'
- '*\word.exe'
- '*\wscript.exe'
SELECTION_3:
SourceImage: '*Visual Studio*'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and not (SELECTION_3))
falsepositives:
- Unknown
fields:
- ComputerName
- User
- SourceImage
- TargetImage
id: 66d31e5f-52d6-40a4-9615-002d3789a119
level: high
logsource:
category: create_remote_thread
product: windows
modified: 2021/06/27
notes:
- MonitoringHost.exe is a process that loads .NET CLR by default and thus a favorite
for process injection for .NET in-memory offensive tools.
references:
- Personal research, statistical analysis
- https://lolbas-project.github.io
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1055