Add: sigma rules (#175)

rules/sigma/windows/sysmon/sysmon_accessing_winapi_in_powershell_credentials_dumping.yml

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+
+title: Accessing WinAPI in PowerShell for Credentials Dumping
+author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
+date: 2020/10/06
+description: Detects Accessing to lsass.exe by Powershell
+detection:
+  SELECTION_1:
+    EventID: 8
+  SELECTION_2:
+    EventID: 10
+  SELECTION_3:
+    SourceImage: '*\powershell.exe'
+  SELECTION_4:
+    TargetImage: '*\lsass.exe'
+  condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4)
+falsepositives:
+- Unknown
+id: 3f07b9d1-2082-4c56-9277-613a621983cc
+level: high
+logsource:
+  product: windows
+  service: sysmon
+modified: 2021/05/24
+references:
+- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
+status: experimental
+tags:
+- attack.credential_access
+- attack.t1003.001

rules/sigma/windows/sysmon/sysmon_config_modification_error.yml

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+
+title: Sysmon Configuration Error
+author: frack113
+date: 2021/06/04
+description: Someone try to hide from Sysmon
+detection:
+  SELECTION_1:
+    EventID: 255
+  SELECTION_2:
+    Description:
+    - '*Failed to open service configuration with error*'
+    - '*Failed to connect to the driver to update configuration*'
+  condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
+falsepositives:
+- legitimate administrative action
+id: 815cd91b-7dbc-4247-841a-d7dd1392b0a8
+level: high
+logsource:
+  category: sysmon_error
+  product: windows
+modified: 2021/09/07
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
+- https://talesfrominfosec.blogspot.com/2017/12/killing-sysmon-silently.html
+status: experimental
+tags:
+- attack.defense_evasion
+- attack.t1564

rules/sigma/windows/sysmon/sysmon_config_modification_status.yml

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+
+title: Sysmon Configuration Modification
+author: frack113
+date: 2021/06/04
+description: Someone try to hide from Sysmon
+detection:
+  SELECTION_1:
+    EventID: 4
+  SELECTION_2:
+    EventID: 16
+  SELECTION_3:
+    State: Stopped
+  SELECTION_4:
+  - Sysmon config state changed
+  condition: ((SELECTION_1 or SELECTION_2) and (SELECTION_3 or SELECTION_4))
+falsepositives:
+- legitimate administrative action
+id: 1f2b5353-573f-4880-8e33-7d04dcf97744
+level: high
+logsource:
+  category: sysmon_status
+  product: windows
+modified: 2021/09/07
+references:
+- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
+- https://talesfrominfosec.blogspot.com/2017/12/killing-sysmon-silently.html
+status: experimental
+tags:
+- attack.defense_evasion
+- attack.t1564

rules/sigma/windows/sysmon/sysmon_dcom_iertutil_dll_hijack.yml

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+
+title: T1021 DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack
+author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga
+date: 2020/10/12
+description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program
+  Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over the network and loading it for a DCOM InternetExplorer
+  DLL Hijack scenario.
+detection:
+  SELECTION_1:
+    EventID: 11
+  SELECTION_2:
+    Image: System
+  SELECTION_3:
+    TargetFilename: '*\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
+  SELECTION_4:
+    EventID: 7
+  SELECTION_5:
+    Image: '*\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
+  SELECTION_6:
+    ImageLoaded: '*\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
+  condition: ((SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3) or (SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5
+    and SELECTION_6))
+falsepositives:
+- Unknown
+id: e554f142-5cf3-4e55-ace9-a1b59e0def65
+level: critical
+logsource:
+  product: windows
+  service: sysmon
+modified: 2021/06/27
+references:
+- https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-201009183000.html
+status: experimental
+tags:
+- attack.lateral_movement
+- attack.t1021.002
+- attack.t1021.003