Add: sigma rules (#175)

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2021-11-22 08:45:44 +09:00
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commit 034f9c0957
1086 changed files with 40715 additions and 192 deletions

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title: Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution
author: Florian Roth, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2017/03/05
description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution
events
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 6
SELECTION_2:
ImagePath:
- '*fgexec*'
- '*dumpsvc*'
- '*cachedump*'
- '*mimidrv*'
- '*gsecdump*'
- '*servpw*'
- '*pwdump*'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery
id: df5ff0a5-f83f-4a5b-bba1-3e6a3f6f6ea2
level: critical
logsource:
category: driver_load
product: windows
modified: 2021/10/14
references:
- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
related:
- id: 4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79ed
type: derived
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.execution
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1003.002
- attack.t1003.004
- attack.t1003.005
- attack.t1003.006
- attack.t1035
- attack.t1569.002
- attack.s0005

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title: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth
date: 2019/10/26
description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting
a specific service installation
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 6
SELECTION_10:
ImagePath: '*cmd.exe*'
SELECTION_11:
ImagePath: '*/c*'
SELECTION_12:
ImagePath: '*echo*'
SELECTION_13:
ImagePath: '*\pipe\\*'
SELECTION_14:
ImagePath: '*rundll32*'
SELECTION_15:
ImagePath: '*.dll,a*'
SELECTION_16:
ImagePath: '*/p:*'
SELECTION_2:
ImagePath: '*cmd*'
SELECTION_3:
ImagePath: '*/c*'
SELECTION_4:
ImagePath: '*echo*'
SELECTION_5:
ImagePath: '*\pipe\\*'
SELECTION_6:
ImagePath: '*%COMSPEC%*'
SELECTION_7:
ImagePath: '*/c*'
SELECTION_8:
ImagePath: '*echo*'
SELECTION_9:
ImagePath: '*\pipe\\*'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and ((SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3 and SELECTION_4 and SELECTION_5)
or (SELECTION_6 and SELECTION_7 and SELECTION_8 and SELECTION_9) or (SELECTION_10
and SELECTION_11 and SELECTION_12 and SELECTION_13) or (SELECTION_14 and SELECTION_15
and SELECTION_16)))
falsepositives:
- Highly unlikely
fields:
- ComputerName
- SubjectDomainName
- SubjectUserName
- ImagePath
id: d585ab5a-6a69-49a8-96e8-4a726a54de46
level: critical
logsource:
category: driver_load
product: windows
modified: 2021/09/21
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
- https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
related:
- id: 843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6
type: derived
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1134
- attack.t1134.001
- attack.t1134.002

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title: PowerShell Scripts Run by a Services
author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2020/10/06
description: Detects powershell script installed as a Service
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 6
SELECTION_2:
ImageLoaded:
- '*powershell*'
- '*pwsh*'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
id: 46deb5e1-28c9-4905-b2df-51cdcc9e6073
level: high
logsource:
category: driver_load
product: windows
modified: 2021/09/21
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
related:
- id: a2e5019d-a658-4c6a-92bf-7197b54e2cae
type: derived
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1569.002

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title: Suspicious Driver Load from Temp
author: Florian Roth
date: 2017/02/12
description: Detects a driver load from a temporary directory
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 6
SELECTION_2:
ImageLoaded: '*\Temp\\*'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
falsepositives:
- there is a relevant set of false positives depending on applications in the environment
id: 2c4523d5-d481-4ed0-8ec3-7fbf0cb41a75
level: high
logsource:
category: driver_load
product: windows
modified: 2020/08/23
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1050
- attack.t1543.003

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title: Vulnerable Dell BIOS Update Driver Load
author: Florian Roth
date: 2021/05/05
description: Detects the load of the vulnerable Dell BIOS update driver as reported
in CVE-2021-21551
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 6
SELECTION_2:
ImageLoaded: '*\DBUtil_2_3.Sys*'
SELECTION_3:
Hashes:
- '*0296e2ce999e67c76352613a718e11516fe1b0efc3ffdb8918fc999dd76a73a5*'
- '*c948ae14761095e4d76b55d9de86412258be7afd*'
- '*c996d7971c49252c582171d9380360f2*'
- '*ddbf5ecca5c8086afde1fb4f551e9e6400e94f4428fe7fb5559da5cffa654cc1*'
- '*10b30bdee43b3a2ec4aa63375577ade650269d25*'
- '*d2fd132ab7bbc6bbb87a84f026fa0244*'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and (SELECTION_2 or SELECTION_3))
falsepositives:
- legitimate BIOS driver updates (should be rare)
id: 21b23707-60d6-41bb-96e3-0f0481b0fed9
level: high
logsource:
category: driver_load
product: windows
references:
- https://labs.sentinelone.com/cve-2021-21551-hundreds-of-millions-of-dell-computers-at-risk-due-to-multiple-bios-driver-privilege-escalation-flaws/
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2021-21551
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation

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title: WinDivert Driver Load
author: Florian Roth
date: 2021/07/30
description: Detects the load of the Windiver driver, a powerful user-mode capture/sniffing/modification/blocking/re-injection
package for Windows
detection:
SELECTION_1:
EventID: 6
SELECTION_2:
ImageLoaded:
- '*\WinDivert.sys*'
- '*\WinDivert64.sys*'
condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2)
falsepositives:
- legitimate WinDivert driver usage
id: 679085d5-f427-4484-9f58-1dc30a7c426d
level: high
logsource:
category: driver_load
product: windows
references:
- https://reqrypt.org/windivert-doc.html
- https://rastamouse.me/ntlm-relaying-via-cobalt-strike/
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1599.001
- attack.t1557.001