
title: MSHTA Suspicious Execution 01
author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule)
date: 2019/02/22
description: Detection for mshta.exe suspicious execution patterns sometimes involving
  file polyglotism
detection:
  SELECTION_1:
    EventID: 1
  SELECTION_2:
    Image: '*\mshta.exe'
  SELECTION_3:
    CommandLine:
    - '*vbscript*'
    - '*.jpg*'
    - '*.png*'
    - '*.lnk*'
    - '*.xls*'
    - '*.doc*'
    - '*.zip*'
  condition: (SELECTION_1 and SELECTION_2 and SELECTION_3)
falsepositives:
- False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored
  environment
id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3
level: high
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
modified: 2020/08/23
references:
- http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files
- https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script
- https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997
status: experimental
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1140
- attack.t1218.005
ruletype: SIGMA
