Merge latest dev before registry probe merge

docs/powershell-logging.md

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+# Scoped Windows PowerShell event logging
+
+`powershell-logging` audits, plans and explicitly enables selected **Windows PowerShell 5.1** module or script-block logging. This is separate from [text transcription](powershell-transcription.md), advanced Security audit profiles, 4688 command-line capture and the broader `configure` command. It changes no channel, execution policy, service, invocation-logging preference, audit mask or transcript setting. Sysmon is excluded.
+
+```powershell
+# Read-only inventory of machine/current-user Windows PowerShell policy,
+# PowerShell Core policy, protected-event policy and the Operational channel.
+./WELA.ps1 powershell-logging -ResultsPath new-audit.json
+
+# Select exactly the requested controls and module names.
+./WELA.ps1 powershell-logging -PowerShellLoggingAction Plan `
+  -PowerShellLoggingControl Module,ScriptBlock `
+  -PowerShellLoggingModuleName Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility -ResultsPath new-plan.json
+./WELA.ps1 powershell-logging -PowerShellLoggingAction Configure `
+  -PowerShellLoggingControl Module,ScriptBlock `
+  -PowerShellLoggingModuleName Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility -DryRun
+
+# After reviewing existing module names and the before-state:
+./WELA.ps1 powershell-logging -PowerShellLoggingAction Configure `
+  -PowerShellLoggingControl Module,ScriptBlock `
+  -PowerShellLoggingModuleName Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility `
+  -Auto -BackupPath C:\WELA-Recovery\new-run -ResultsPath new-result.json
+```
+
+Use a native 64-bit Windows PowerShell 5.1 or PowerShell 7 host. The actual process SID, Windows role, build, patch and installed Windows PowerShell engine are read; impersonated callers are refused and caller role/build overrides are refused. Reviewed families are Windows 11 builds 22000, 22621, 22631, 26100 and 26200, and Server 2022/2025 builds 20348/26100. Native client, joined-member, DC and AD CS acceptance remains separate from hosted standalone-server tests. `Winmgmt` and `EventLog` must already run; the command starts no service. Configure requires elevation and a fresh recovery directory. Plan and Configure require explicit controls; there is no implicit enable-everything selection. Audit without selection inventories existing policy only.
+
+The array examples are PowerShell syntax. When launching `powershell.exe -File` from another shell, use a reviewed PowerShell wrapper to bind multiple array elements correctly. Literal module names can contain ASCII letters, digits, dots, underscores and hyphens, up to 128 characters each. Up to 32 unique names can be selected. Paths and wildcard patterns are refused; the exact `*` value is accepted **only when explicitly supplied** to request all modules. Installation and execution of arbitrary selected modules are not performed or asserted.
+
+## Requested values and preserved scope
+
+Under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell`:
+
+| Selection | Requested values |
+|---|---|
+| `ScriptBlock` | `ScriptBlockLogging\EnableScriptBlockLogging` = DWORD 1 |
+| `Module` | An explicit REG_SZ entry under `ModuleLogging\ModuleNames` for each selected module (name and data both equal the selected literal), then `ModuleLogging\EnableModuleLogging` = DWORD 1 |
+
+An existing matching module entry is retained. The command does not delete or replace other module names: **enabling Module logging also activates the existing configured module list**, which can already include `*` or broader patterns. Review the entire `Plan.Before.Machine` tree, not just the newly selected names. A collision between a selected value name and different existing data is refused. Unknown DWORD values, incorrect selected types, and non-string/empty existing module entries block the complete preflight. Unselected existing values and key access descriptors are preserved. Missing selected keys may be created below the existing Microsoft Windows policy parent; their absence is recorded in the original snapshot.
+
+Microsoft documents machine policy precedence over user policy, module pipeline logging, script-block logging, and the additional volume generated by invocation start/stop logging in [Windows PowerShell Group Policy settings](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_group_policy_settings?view=powershell-5.1). The [ADMX mapping](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-powershellexecutionpolicy#enablemodulelogging) documents the ModuleLogging registry location. This command offers explicit source controls; it does not import a Microsoft/CIS/ASD baseline or claim complete compliance with one.
+
+`SOFTWARE\Policies` is [shared across registry views](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/winprog64/shared-registry-keys). Both views are compared before a native-view write; no literal `Wow6432Node` policy tree is created. Snapshots include the Windows PowerShell machine and current-user policy trees, each bounded to 64 keys, eight levels, 128 values per key and one Mi character serialized data. Incomplete, denied, unstable or excessive trees are refused. Preflight projects all selected additions and refuses predictable key/value-count or serialized-value growth beyond these limits before any journal or write. New keys' inherited descriptor sizes remain subject to native readback. Existing owner/group/DACL observations are recorded; these snapshots do not claim registry SACL enumeration or effective access for other principals.
+
+PowerShell 7 has [separate PowerShell Core settings and an optional Windows-policy fallback](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_group_policy_settings?view=powershell-7.5). Its registry policy trees are observed and preserved; `powershell.config.json`, session behavior and fallback selection are not assessed. **A PowerShell 7 deployment using that fallback may inherit changes to Windows PowerShell policy.** Running WELA under PowerShell 7 does not establish PowerShell 7 event coverage. Existing sessions are not restarted or asserted to adopt the changes.
+
+Script-block and module event content can include command arguments and script text. Existing protected-event settings are observed and preserved; the command does not provision encryption certificates, decrypt events, change event-reader permissions or assess whether a collector can read the resulting content.
+
+## Journals, drift and recovery
+
+Every changed value has an original `before.jsonl` entry containing the full typed observed state, requested value and source fingerprints before its native setter runs. Module entries are added before the enable DWORD. The shared configuration runner handles DryRun, declined changes, immediate readback and final verification. The command compares host/engine/source hashes, channel metadata and all observed policy trees again after approval and journaling, then validates that only the one requested value and required new ancestor keys changed. Failed reads, partial writes, wrong readback or unrelated drift stop later operations. Available original/results evidence remains; no automatic rollback overwrites later policy.
+
+This is not an atomic registry transaction. Another administrator or GPO can change state between observations. Local registry compliance does not identify the current authoritative GPO/MDM source, prove persistence after refresh or imply provider event generation. `-Auto` skips ordinary per-value prompts only. No group-policy refresh is invoked. A skipped/dry-run result is not configuration evidence; failures produce a nonzero exit. Each explicit ResultsPath must be a new file and is created without overwrite; protect the recovery parent and resulting host/policy evidence.
+
+For manual recovery, compare the original journal, confirmed results and current state. Restore only each proven changed value, using its original registry type/data or removing that exact value when it was absent. Preserve other module names and all unrelated values. Remove a newly created key only when it was originally absent and remains empty. Never delete the whole PowerShell policy tree or restore old full descriptors. Determine whether a newer authoritative policy has superseded the recorded state before restoration.
+
+## Native validation and limits
+
+The focused suite covers explicit selection, exact types, module-name collisions, preservation, journal-before-write, missing-key creation, inventory-capacity boundaries, idempotence, dry runs, refused output reuse, partial failures and approval-time drift. Public CLI tests reject unrelated/profile/role options before dispatch.
+
+The opt-in disposable Server 2022/2025 matrix runs WELA under Windows PowerShell 5.1 and PowerShell 7. It saves native state, prepares selected disabled values, exercises the public Audit/Plan/DryRun/Configure path, checks original journals and idempotence, then launches a new fixed **native Windows PowerShell 5.1** utility command with a unique benign marker. Native Operational event XML must match the owned child PID, provider GUID/name, actual SID, computer, record boundary and measured process-lifetime interval; script-block evidence additionally matches the exact script path/text and complete fragment counts. Only the fixture prepares policy or generates events. Wrong-type refusal and exact typed policy/key, channel and all-59-mask cleanup are required. Native event artifacts must be reviewed before claiming a matrix run passed.
+
+These are configuration and local benign-event checks, not a Sigma rule match. Windows 11, managed clients, DC/CA hosts, x86 Windows PowerShell, PowerShell 7 event generation, forwarding, backend normalization/queries, retention and volume remain separate acceptance. Reports retain `ReadyRuleCredit=0`; issues #364, #366 and #387 remain open for their broader requirements.

docs/process-commandline.md

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+# Scoped Security 4688 command-line policy
+
+`process-commandline` reads or enables only the native `ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled` DWORD under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit`. Its default Audit action is read-only. Configure is an explicit choice and requires an administrator; it does not invoke the broad `configure` workflow.
+
+```powershell
+./WELA.ps1 process-commandline -ResultsPath commandline-audit.json
+./WELA.ps1 process-commandline -ProcessCommandlineAction Plan -ResultsPath commandline-plan.json
+./WELA.ps1 process-commandline -ProcessCommandlineAction Configure -DryRun
+./WELA.ps1 process-commandline -ProcessCommandlineAction Configure -Auto -BackupPath C:\WelaBackups\commandline-001 -ResultsPath commandline-result.json
+```
+
+The supported host processes are native 64-bit Windows PowerShell 5.1 and PowerShell 7. The policy applies to Windows process creation, including programs launched from either engine; it is independent of PowerShell script-block/module logging and transcription. Actual Windows build, product type, join state and domain role must agree. Reviewed build families are Windows 11 22000/22621/22631/26100/26200 and Server 2022/2025 20348/26100. WMI must already be running; the command does not start it. Unknown or contradictory observations refuse configuration. Role/build overrides, source-profile selection and other command options are rejected.
+
+[Microsoft documents the exact registry mapping](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-auditsettings). The independent [Audit Process Creation prerequisite](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing) must have success auditing enabled to generate 4688. The report reads its effective mask and audit precedence separately, without changing either. `SuccessMissing` or `Unknown` remains visible even if the command-line DWORD is enabled. Policy values absent/0 require change; DWORD1 is already compliant. Other values/types are preserved as unknown. If needed, only the final `Audit` subkey may be created beneath the existing `System` policy key, without `New-Item -Force`.
+
+Command-line arguments are recorded as plain text in Security events and can include passwords or personal data. Review access to the Security log and avoid passing secrets as arguments. This is a property of the requested logging setting, not a claim that WELA filters sensitive data.
+
+Before a write, `before.jsonl` stores the exact typed prior value/absence and observed host/unrelated child-key state. A new backup directory is required. Plan-to-read and prewrite comparisons reject drift; immediate and final readbacks distinguish Applied, AlreadyCompliant, Skipped, Failed and Overridden. DryRun makes no registry or recovery-directory changes. Unknown reads, failed writes, journal failures and result serialization failures cannot report success. Operations are not an atomic transaction with GPO/MDM/other administrators. The winning policy source and future persistence remain unknown; the command neither refreshes GPO nor edits domain policy. Unrelated values/subkeys are preserved and checked, not replaced.
+
+For manual recovery, protect the journal and results, verify which write completed and compare the current value with the recorded After state. Restore only this exact DWORD's original type/value or absence if no later policy owns the change. Remove a newly created key only when the journal proves prior absence and the current key is still empty. Never replace the whole System policy key or restore unrelated values.
+
+## Native validation
+
+The disposable hosted Windows test exercises the public CLI on actual standalone Server 2022/2025 under both engines: absent/disabled state, Plan, DryRun, one-value Configure, exact original journal, idempotence, native readback and separate missing-prerequisite reporting. The fixture independently prepares Process Creation success and audit precedence, then verifies that the public command leaves all59 masks, precedence, other values, Security channel and service states unchanged. A separate existing fixed `cmd.exe /d /c echo` probe collects a precisely matched 4688 with command line. Artifact hashes, source fingerprints, exact builds/engines and final cleanup are retained. The fixture restores typed policies/key absence and all original audit masks; failed cleanup fails CI.
+
+The command itself generates no probe event. Policy compliance is not proof of event generation, forwarding, backend normalization or a complete Sigma rule. `ReadyRuleCredit=0`. Hosted standalone-server evidence does not establish Windows11, domain-member, DC, ADCS, GPO or cross-host behavior. Sysmon is out of scope. See the [4688 schema](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688) and [native validation guide](native-validation.md).