diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml
index 9e0460fa..c76e9667 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/release.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ jobs:
           Copy-Item -Recurse -Path ./scripts -Destination release-binaries/
           Copy-Item -Recurse -Path ./modules -Destination release-binaries/
           New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path release-binaries/docs -Force | Out-Null
-          Copy-Item -Path ./docs/gpo-audit-packages.md, ./docs/gpo-package-deployment.md, ./docs/gpo-creation.md, ./docs/wmi-probe.md, ./docs/firewall-logging.md, ./docs/firewall-logging-recovery.md, ./docs/ipsec-prerequisites.md, ./docs/wec-state.md, ./docs/wec-update.md, ./docs/wec-runtime.md, ./docs/wef-deployment.md, ./docs/native-channel-access.md, ./docs/eventlog-settings.md, ./docs/channel-read.md, ./docs/native-rule-eligibility.md, ./docs/native-validation.md, ./docs/wef-arrival.md, ./docs/smb-runtime-activation.md, ./docs/smb-auditing.md, ./docs/wec-ingress.md, ./docs/capi2-probe.md, ./docs/powershell-transcription.md, ./docs/transcription-recovery.md, ./docs/eventlog-recovery.md, ./docs/failed-logon-probe.md, ./docs/wec-listener.md, ./docs/file-access-probe.md, ./docs/applocker-script-probe.md, ./docs/applocker-probe.md, ./docs/selected-sacl-configuration.md, ./docs/targeted-sacl-planning.md, ./docs/native-registry-sacl-validation.md, ./docs/wec-authorization.md, ./docs/channel-recovery.md -Destination release-binaries/docs/
+          Copy-Item -Path ./docs/gpo-audit-packages.md, ./docs/gpo-package-deployment.md, ./docs/gpo-creation.md, ./docs/wmi-probe.md, ./docs/firewall-logging.md, ./docs/firewall-logging-recovery.md, ./docs/ipsec-prerequisites.md, ./docs/wec-state.md, ./docs/wec-update.md, ./docs/wec-runtime.md, ./docs/wef-deployment.md, ./docs/native-channel-access.md, ./docs/eventlog-settings.md, ./docs/channel-read.md, ./docs/native-rule-eligibility.md, ./docs/native-validation.md, ./docs/wef-arrival.md, ./docs/smb-runtime-activation.md, ./docs/smb-auditing.md, ./docs/wec-ingress.md, ./docs/capi2-probe.md, ./docs/powershell-transcription.md, ./docs/transcription-recovery.md, ./docs/eventlog-recovery.md, ./docs/failed-logon-probe.md, ./docs/wec-listener.md, ./docs/file-access-probe.md, ./docs/applocker-script-probe.md, ./docs/applocker-probe.md, ./docs/selected-sacl-configuration.md, ./docs/targeted-sacl-planning.md, ./docs/native-registry-sacl-validation.md, ./docs/wec-authorization.md, ./docs/channel-recovery.md, ./docs/outgoing-ntlm.md -Destination release-binaries/docs/
 
       - name: Set Artifact Name
         if: contains(matrix.info.os, 'windows') == true
diff --git a/.github/workflows/scoped-outgoing-ntlm.yml b/.github/workflows/scoped-outgoing-ntlm.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2353c399
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/scoped-outgoing-ntlm.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+name: Scoped outgoing NTLM auditing
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: ['**']
+  pull_request:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+jobs:
+  scoped-outgoing-ntlm:
+    timeout-minutes: 20
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        os: [windows-2022, windows-2025]
+        engine: [powershell, pwsh]
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd
+      - name: Fixtures and public guards in Windows PowerShell5.1
+        if: matrix.engine == 'powershell'
+        shell: powershell
+        run: |
+          ./tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Tests.ps1
+          ./tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Cli.Tests.ps1
+      - name: Scoped outgoing NTLM auditing in Windows PowerShell5.1
+        if: matrix.engine == 'powershell'
+        shell: powershell
+        run: ./tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Windows.Tests.ps1 -AllowDisposableAuditWrite
+      - name: Fixtures and public guards in PowerShell7
+        if: matrix.engine == 'pwsh'
+        shell: pwsh
+        run: |
+          ./tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Tests.ps1
+          ./tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Cli.Tests.ps1
+      - name: Scoped outgoing NTLM auditing in PowerShell7
+        if: matrix.engine == 'pwsh'
+        shell: pwsh
+        run: ./tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Windows.Tests.ps1 -AllowDisposableAuditWrite
+      - name: Retain owned fixture evidence
+        if: always()
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02
+        with:
+          name: scoped-outgoing-ntlm-${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.engine }}
+          path: ${{ runner.temp }}/wela-outgoing-audit-*/
+          if-no-files-found: warn
+          retention-days: 7
diff --git a/CHANGELOG-Japanese.md b/CHANGELOG-Japanese.md
index ef9b8bad..a58bfd14 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG-Japanese.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG-Japanese.md
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 
 **改善:**
 
+- `outgoing-ntlm` のAudit/Plan/Configureを追加し、送信NTLM監査DWORDを個別に設定できます。既存の拒否設定は既定で維持し、置換には明示的なAuditを要求します。不明な型・値や書込直前の変化を拒否し、元の型付き記録と再読取を保持します。Server 2022/2025のテストで範囲と復元を確認し、認証・イベント生成は未検証として報告します。(関連 #362) (@Shirofune-Security)
+
 - Server 2022/2025 と Windows PowerShell 5.1/PowerShell 7 の破棄可能な環境で、Securityログ警告設定の公開CLIを検証します。未設定・0・高いしきい値、早い警告値の維持、DryRun、再実行、不正型の拒否と完全な復元を確認し、無関係な設定は保持します。ログ枯渇や警告イベント生成は検証範囲外です。 (@Shirofune-Security)
 
 - Server 2022/2025 と両 PowerShell エンジンで、公開 `targeted-sacl` のレジストリ操作を検証する使い捨てテストを追加しました。テスト専用の新規ハイブをマウントし、対象選択、DryRun、監査 ACE の追加、古い計画・前提条件不足の拒否、冪等性と厳密に対応付けた Security4657 を確認します。無関係な ACE・型付き値の保持、監査ポリシー・トークンの復元、所有ハイブのアンロードと削除の証跡を保存します。製品側のハイブ読み込みや Sigma 準備完了の判定は追加しません。(関連 #373) (@Shirofune-Security)
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 80d66a87..d59feaf0 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 
 **Improvements:**
 
+- Add `outgoing-ntlm` Audit/Plan/Configure to manage the outgoing audit DWORD independently of broad configuration. Preserve existing deny by default, require explicit Audit to replace it, refuse unknown types/values and pre-write drift, and retain typed original journals plus native readback. Native Server 2022/2025 tests verify narrow scope and exact cleanup; authentication/event generation remain unverified. (Related #362) (@Shirofune-Security)
+
 - Verify public Security-log warning configuration on disposable Server 2022/2025 hosts under Windows PowerShell 5.1/PowerShell 7: absent/zero/higher thresholds, earlier-threshold preservation, dry run, idempotence, wrong-type refusal and exact cleanup. Preserve unrelated registry values, channel configuration, audit masks and CrashOnAuditFail; no log-exhaustion or warning-event claim. (@Shirofune-Security)
 
 - Added disposable public `targeted-sacl` registry lifecycle validation on Server 2022/2025 and both PowerShell engines. A fixture-owned mounted hive exercises reviewed selection, DryRun, additive configuration, stale/prerequisite refusal and idempotence, followed by one precisely attributed Security4657. Retained native receipts verify unrelated ACE/value preservation and exact audit-policy, token and owned-hive cleanup; production does not load hives or gain Sigma credit. (Related #373) (@Shirofune-Security)
diff --git a/WELA.ps1 b/WELA.ps1
index 7cbe077d..6e51edb3 100644
--- a/WELA.ps1
+++ b/WELA.ps1
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
     [switch]$Auto,
     [ValidateSet("PreserveOrAudit", "Audit", "Deny")]
     [string]$OutgoingNtlmMode = "PreserveOrAudit",
+    [ValidateSet("Audit","Plan","Configure")][string]$NtlmAction = "Audit",
     [switch]$DryRun,
     [string]$BackupPath,
     [string]$ResultsPath,
@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ $EidMappingPath     = Join-Path $ScriptRoot "config/eid_subcategory_mapping.csv"
 $AuditpolTxtPath    = Join-Path $ScriptRoot "auditpol.txt"
 $SaclTargetsPath    = Join-Path $ScriptRoot "config/audit_sacl_targets.json"
 . (Join-Path $ScriptRoot "scripts/Configuration.ps1")
+. (Join-Path $ScriptRoot "scripts/OutgoingNtlmAudit.ps1")
 . (Join-Path $ScriptRoot "scripts/AdcsAuditing.ps1")
 . (Join-Path $ScriptRoot "scripts/AdcsRestartResume.ps1")
 . (Join-Path $ScriptRoot "scripts/AuditIntegrity.ps1")
@@ -2064,6 +2066,7 @@ Usage:
   ./WELA.ps1 eventlog-recovery -Help # Review restoration of one completed log size/mode write
   ./WELA.ps1 wec-listener -Help      # Review one fixed-address native HTTP5985 listener
   ./WELA.ps1 wec-ingress -Help       # Review scoped collector firewall rule creation
+  ./WELA.ps1 outgoing-ntlm -Help    # Configure outgoing NTLM auditing independently
   ./WELA.ps1 wec-authorization -Help # Review source SID authorization on a disabled subscription
   ./WELA.ps1 wec-state -Help         # Review enable/disable of one existing subscription
   ./WELA.ps1 wec-update -Help        # Review query/description updates on a disabled subscription
@@ -2161,6 +2164,12 @@ if ($Cmd -ne 'wec-listener' -and @($PSBoundParameters.Keys | Where-Object {$_ -l
 if ($Cmd -eq 'wec-listener' -and ($args.Count -or @($PSBoundParameters.Keys | Where-Object {$_ -notin @('Cmd','WecListenerAction','WecListenerComputerName','WecListenerLocalAddress','WecListenerPlanPath','WecListenerPlanHash','WecListenerOutputPath','Help')}).Count)) {throw 'wec-listener accepts only dedicated options.'}
 if ($Cmd -ne 'wec-ingress' -and @($PSBoundParameters.Keys | Where-Object {$_ -like 'WecIngress*'}).Count) {throw 'WecIngress options require wec-ingress.'}
 if ($Cmd -eq 'wec-ingress' -and @($PSBoundParameters.Keys | Where-Object {$_ -notin @('Cmd','WecIngressAction','WecIngressName','WecIngressLocalAddress','WecIngressRemoteAddress','WecIngressPlanPath','WecIngressPlanHash','WecIngressOutputPath','Help')}).Count) {throw 'wec-ingress accepts only dedicated options.'}
+if ($Cmd -ne 'outgoing-ntlm' -and $PSBoundParameters.ContainsKey('NtlmAction')) {throw 'NtlmAction requires outgoing-ntlm.'}
+if ($Cmd -eq 'outgoing-ntlm') {
+    if (@($PSBoundParameters.Keys | Where-Object {$_ -notin @('Cmd','NtlmAction','OutgoingNtlmMode','Auto','DryRun','BackupPath','ResultsPath','Help')}).Count) {throw 'outgoing-ntlm accepts only its dedicated options.'}
+    if ($OutgoingNtlmMode -eq 'Deny') {throw 'outgoing-ntlm configures auditing only; Deny enforcement is not accepted.'}
+    if ($NtlmAction -ne 'Configure' -and ($Auto -or $DryRun -or $BackupPath)) {throw 'Consent, dry-run and backup options require NtlmAction Configure.'}
+}
 if ($Cmd -ne 'wec-authorization' -and @($PSBoundParameters.Keys | Where-Object {$_ -like 'WecAuthorization*'}).Count) {throw 'WecAuthorization options require wec-authorization.'}
 if ($Cmd -eq 'wec-authorization' -and ($args.Count -or @($PSBoundParameters.Keys | Where-Object {$_ -notin @('Cmd','WecAuthorizationAction','WecAuthorizationId','WecAuthorizationSourceSid','WecAuthorizationPlanPath','WecAuthorizationPlanHash','WecAuthorizationOutputPath','Help')}).Count)) {throw 'wec-authorization accepts only dedicated options.'}
 if ($Cmd -ne 'wec-state' -and @($PSBoundParameters.Keys | Where-Object {$_ -like 'WecState*'}).Count) {throw 'WecState options require wec-state.'}
@@ -2249,7 +2258,7 @@ if ($Cmd -ne 'ad-object-sacl' -and @($PSBoundParameters.Keys | Where-Object {
 }).Count) {
     throw 'AD object SACL options require the dedicated ad-object-sacl command. No command was run.'
 }
-if ($DryRun -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'transcription-recovery' -and $TranscriptRecoveryAction -eq 'Restore') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'adcs-auditing' -and $AdcsAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'adcs-resume' -and $AdcsResumeAction -eq 'Resume') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'gpo-create' -and $GpoCreateAction -eq 'Create') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'dns-analytical' -and $DnsAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'targeted-sacl' -and $TargetSaclAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'audit-recovery' -and $RecoveryAction -eq 'Restore') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'gpo-package' -and $GpoAction -eq 'Export') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'audit-integrity' -and $IntegrityAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'audit-notifications' -and $NotificationAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'ldap-diagnostics' -and $LdapAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'applocker-readiness' -and $AppLockerAction -eq 'Import') -and $Cmd -notin @('configure', 'configure-eventlogs') -and
+if ($DryRun -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'outgoing-ntlm' -and $NtlmAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'transcription-recovery' -and $TranscriptRecoveryAction -eq 'Restore') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'adcs-auditing' -and $AdcsAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'adcs-resume' -and $AdcsResumeAction -eq 'Resume') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'gpo-create' -and $GpoCreateAction -eq 'Create') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'dns-analytical' -and $DnsAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'targeted-sacl' -and $TargetSaclAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'audit-recovery' -and $RecoveryAction -eq 'Restore') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'gpo-package' -and $GpoAction -eq 'Export') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'audit-integrity' -and $IntegrityAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'audit-notifications' -and $NotificationAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'ldap-diagnostics' -and $LdapAction -eq 'Configure') -and -not ($Cmd -eq 'applocker-readiness' -and $AppLockerAction -eq 'Import') -and $Cmd -notin @('configure', 'configure-eventlogs') -and
     -not ($Cmd -eq 'provider-packs' -and $ProviderAction -eq 'Configure') -and
     -not ($Cmd -eq 'firewall-logging' -and $FirewallAction -eq 'Configure') -and
     -not ($Cmd -eq 'firewall-recovery' -and $FirewallRecoveryAction -eq 'Restore') -and
@@ -2428,6 +2437,13 @@ switch ($Cmd.ToLower()) {
         $report=Invoke-WelaWecIngress @arguments;$report
         if($report.ExitCode){exit $report.ExitCode}
     }
+    'outgoing-ntlm' {
+        if ($Help) {Write-Host 'Usage: outgoing-ntlm [-NtlmAction Audit|Plan|Configure] [-OutgoingNtlmMode PreserveOrAudit|Audit] [-Auto] [-DryRun] [-BackupPath new-directory] [-ResultsPath report.json]. Changes only the outgoing audit DWORD. Existing deny is preserved by default; explicit Audit authorizes replacing it. See docs/outgoing-ntlm.md.';return}
+        if ($NtlmAction -eq 'Configure' -and -not (TestAdministrator)) {throw 'Outgoing NTLM configuration requires Administrator privileges.'}
+        $report=Invoke-WelaOutgoingAuditCommand -Action $NtlmAction -Mode $OutgoingNtlmMode -Auto:$Auto -DryRun:$DryRun -BackupPath $BackupPath -ResultsPath $ResultsPath
+        $report
+        if ($report.ExitCode) {exit $report.ExitCode}
+    }
     'wec-authorization' {
         if ($Help) {Write-Host 'Usage: wec-authorization [-WecAuthorizationAction Plan] -WecAuthorizationId ID -WecAuthorizationSourceSid desired-SID1,desired-SID2 -WecAuthorizationOutputPath new-directory; then Apply with -WecAuthorizationPlanPath plan.json -WecAuthorizationPlanHash SHA256 -WecAuthorizationOutputPath new-directory. Only the explicit source SID authorization of one already disabled subscription. No SID resolution or forwarding proof. See docs/wec-authorization.md.';return}
         $arguments=@{Action=$WecAuthorizationAction;OutputPath=$WecAuthorizationOutputPath}
diff --git a/docs/outgoing-ntlm.md b/docs/outgoing-ntlm.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8ba701c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/outgoing-ntlm.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Scoped outgoing NTLM auditing
+
+`outgoing-ntlm` audits or configures only `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0\RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic`. The separate broad `configure` workflow retains its existing behavior. Use elevated 64-bit PowerShell for Configure on reviewed Windows 11 builds (22000/22621/22631/26100/26200) or Server 2022/2025 (20348/26100); observed role/build and the existing key are required. Role overrides are refused.
+
+```powershell
+./WELA.ps1 outgoing-ntlm -NtlmAction Audit -ResultsPath audit.json
+./WELA.ps1 outgoing-ntlm -NtlmAction Plan -ResultsPath plan.json
+./WELA.ps1 outgoing-ntlm -NtlmAction Configure -DryRun -ResultsPath preview.json
+./WELA.ps1 outgoing-ntlm -NtlmAction Configure -Auto -BackupPath ./before -ResultsPath result.json
+# Explicitly replace a previously reviewed Deny all value with auditing:
+./WELA.ps1 outgoing-ntlm -NtlmAction Configure -OutgoingNtlmMode Audit -BackupPath ./before-reviewed -ResultsPath reviewed.json
+```
+
+The default `PreserveOrAudit` mode sets only DWORD **1 (Audit all)** when absent or DWORD0. Existing DWORD1 is already compliant. Existing DWORD **2 (Deny all)** is reported as `PreservedEnforcement` and skipped; exit0 for this preserved case does not mean auditing was enabled. Explicit `Audit` authorizes replacing a known DWORD2 with1. Unknown types/values fail without writes in either mode. `Deny` is refused by this scoped command. It never changes incoming/domain NTLM policy, exceptions, audit subcategories, channel settings, services, or authentication restrictions other than the explicit conversion of a known outgoing deny to audit.
+
+Plan is a live read-only assessment, not an importable authorization file. Audit/Plan reject mutation options. Configure re-reads the actual host and typed value, journals before mutation, refuses pre-write drift, and verifies immediate/final readback. A race after the final pre-write read remains possible; these observations are not atomic with GPO or another administrator. RSoP is explicitly last-applied and potentially stale, never proof of the current registry writer. Skipped, Failed and Overridden results remain distinct. No automatic rollback occurs.
+
+For manual recovery, inspect the selected successful result and its original `before.jsonl` entry. The original typed registry state is `Before.Policy`; preserve current policy ownership and review drift before restoring that one value/type or removing that value if it was originally absent. Never remove the parent MSV1_0 key or replay another journal kind. Failed/partial attempts require individual inspection. Keep the original journal and result together.
+
+Native acceptance uses disposable unjoined Server2022/2025 hosts under PowerShell5.1/7, exercises actual absence/allow→audit, original journals, dry run, repeat, readback and exact cleanup. Existing enforcement and malformed values are never installed on a native runner merely for testing; portable regressions verify those preservation/refusal paths, prompt-time drift and failures. Native tests preserve incoming/domain policy, siblings/access descriptor, channels, service and all59 audit masks. Windows11/DC/ADCS acceptance, authentication behavior, representative NTLM events, GPO persistence and collector delivery remain separate work for #362. No Sigma credit is inferred. Built-in Windows only; Sysmon is excluded.
+
+Microsoft distinguishes outgoing audit from deny, describes GPO precedence and identifies the NTLM Operational log for validation: [outgoing NTLM policy](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-outgoing-ntlm-traffic-to-remote-servers).
diff --git a/scripts/Configuration.ps1 b/scripts/Configuration.ps1
index 6e5297fa..c44d2de1 100644
--- a/scripts/Configuration.ps1
+++ b/scripts/Configuration.ps1
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ function Invoke-WelaConfigurationControl {
 
 function Complete-WelaConfiguration {
     param($Context, [string]$ResultsPath, $Plan,
-          [ValidateSet("native-windows-configuration", "advanced-audit-policy-only", "advanced-audit-policy-and-precedence", "firewall-text-logging-only", "event-log-size-and-mode-only", "smb-audit-policies-only", "native-channel-settings-only", "wmi-namespace-sacl-only", "ad-object-sacl-only", "windows-powershell-transcription-policy-only", "wef-source-configuration-only", "wec-collector-subscriptions-only", "audit-integrity-local-policy-only", "adcs-audit-settings-only", "disabled-unlinked-gpo-creation-only")]
+          [ValidateSet("native-windows-configuration", "outgoing-ntlm-audit-policy-only", "advanced-audit-policy-only", "advanced-audit-policy-and-precedence", "firewall-text-logging-only", "event-log-size-and-mode-only", "smb-audit-policies-only", "native-channel-settings-only", "wmi-namespace-sacl-only", "ad-object-sacl-only", "windows-powershell-transcription-policy-only", "wef-source-configuration-only", "wec-collector-subscriptions-only", "audit-integrity-local-policy-only", "adcs-audit-settings-only", "disabled-unlinked-gpo-creation-only")]
           [string]$Scope = "native-windows-configuration",
           [string]$SuccessMessage = 'Configuration completed; all requested controls verified.')
     if ($Context.PSObject.Properties['CustomProfileGuard']) {
diff --git a/scripts/OutgoingNtlmAudit.ps1 b/scripts/OutgoingNtlmAudit.ps1
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4bbe8e67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/OutgoingNtlmAudit.ps1
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Explicit outgoing audit policy; does not invoke the broad configure workflow.
+function Get-WelaOutgoingAuditSnapshot {
+    if ($env:OS -ne 'Windows_NT' -or -not [Environment]::Is64BitProcess) { throw 'Use 64-bit PowerShell on Windows.' }
+    $os=Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem -Property BuildNumber,ProductType -ErrorAction Stop
+    $computer=Get-CimInstance Win32_ComputerSystem -Property DomainRole,PartOfDomain -ErrorAction Stop
+    $build=[int]$os.BuildNumber;$product=[int]$os.ProductType
+    if (-not (($product -eq 1 -and $build -in @(22000,22621,22631,26100,26200)) -or ($product -in @(2,3) -and $build -in @(20348,26100)))) { throw 'This Windows role/build has not been reviewed for the scoped command.' }
+    if ($computer.DomainRole -notin @(0,1,2,3,4,5) -or $computer.PartOfDomain -isnot [bool]) {throw 'Computer role/join context is unavailable.'}
+    $policy=Get-WelaRegistryState 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0' RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic
+    if (-not $policy.KeyExists) {throw 'The existing MSV1_0 policy key is required; no parent key will be created.'}
+    [pscustomobject][ordered]@{Host=[pscustomobject][ordered]@{Build=$build;ProductType=$product;DomainRole=[int]$computer.DomainRole;PartOfDomain=$computer.PartOfDomain};Policy=$policy}
+}
+
+function Get-WelaOutgoingAuditDisposition {
+    param($Snapshot,[ValidateSet('PreserveOrAudit','Audit')][string]$Mode)
+    $p=$Snapshot.Policy
+    if ($p.ValueExists -and ($p.Type -cne 'DWord' -or $p.Value -notin @(0,1,2))) {return 'Unknown'}
+    if ($p.ValueExists -and $p.Value -eq 1) {return 'AlreadyCompliant'}
+    if ($p.ValueExists -and $p.Value -eq 2 -and $Mode -eq 'PreserveOrAudit') {return 'PreservedEnforcement'}
+    return 'ChangeRequired'
+}
+
+function Get-WelaOutgoingAuditPlan {
+    param([ValidateSet('PreserveOrAudit','Audit')][string]$Mode='PreserveOrAudit')
+    try {
+        $snapshot=Get-WelaOutgoingAuditSnapshot
+        $status=Get-WelaOutgoingAuditDisposition $snapshot $Mode
+        $diagnostic=switch($status){
+            Unknown {'Unknown registry type/value is preserved; investigate it before configuration.'}
+            PreservedEnforcement {'Deny all (2) is authentication enforcement, preserved by default. Explicit -OutgoingNtlmMode Audit authorizes replacing it with Audit all (1).'}
+            AlreadyCompliant {'Audit all (1) is configured; authentication, events and policy persistence are unverified.'}
+            default {'Set only outgoing NTLM Audit all (DWORD 1).'}
+        }
+        [pscustomobject]@{Status=$status;Mode=$Mode;Desired=1;Before=$snapshot;Diagnostic=$diagnostic;PolicySource=Get-WelaOutgoingNtlmPolicySource}
+    }catch{[pscustomobject]@{Status='Unknown';Mode=$Mode;Desired=1;Before=$null;Diagnostic=$_.ToString();PolicySource='Unknown'}}
+}
+
+function Invoke-WelaOutgoingAuditCommand {
+    param([ValidateSet('Audit','Plan','Configure')][string]$Action='Audit',[ValidateSet('PreserveOrAudit','Audit')][string]$Mode='PreserveOrAudit',[switch]$Auto,[switch]$DryRun,[string]$BackupPath,[string]$ResultsPath)
+    if ($Action -ne 'Configure' -and ($Auto -or $DryRun -or $BackupPath)) {throw 'Consent, dry-run and backup options require Configure.'}
+    $plan=Get-WelaOutgoingAuditPlan $Mode
+    if ($Action -eq 'Configure') {
+        $context=New-WelaConfigurationContext -Auto:$Auto -DryRun:$DryRun -BackupPath $BackupPath
+        $path='HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0';$name='RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic'
+        if ($plan.Status -eq 'Unknown') {
+            $context.Results.Add([pscustomobject]@{Id="Registry/$path/$name";Kind='Registry';Target=@{Path=$path;Name=$name};Desired=@{Value=1;Type='DWord'};Before=$plan.Before;After=$null;Status='Failed';Diagnostic=$plan.Diagnostic})
+        }else{
+            $state=@{Observed=$null;PlannedHost=($plan.Before.Host|ConvertTo-Json -Compress);Mode=$Mode;Path=$path;Name=$name}
+            $read={param($s)
+                $snapshot=Get-WelaOutgoingAuditSnapshot
+                if (($snapshot.Host|ConvertTo-Json -Compress) -cne $s.PlannedHost) {throw 'Observed host context changed; review a new plan.'}
+                if ((Get-WelaOutgoingAuditDisposition $snapshot $s.Mode) -eq 'Unknown') {throw 'Unknown registry type/value is preserved.'}
+                $s.Observed=$snapshot
+                return $snapshot
+            }
+            $test={param($snapshot) $snapshot.Policy.ValueExists -and $snapshot.Policy.Type -ceq 'DWord' -and $snapshot.Policy.Value -eq 1}
+            $preserve=if($Mode -eq 'PreserveOrAudit'){{param($snapshot) if($snapshot.Policy.ValueExists -and $snapshot.Policy.Type -ceq 'DWord' -and $snapshot.Policy.Value -eq 2){'Preserved Deny all enforcement; explicit Audit mode is required to replace it.'}}}else{$null}
+            $apply={param($s)
+                $fresh=Get-WelaOutgoingAuditSnapshot
+                if (($fresh|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 8 -Compress) -cne ($s.Observed|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 8 -Compress)) {throw 'Outgoing NTLM state changed after the original journal snapshot; no write was attempted.'}
+                if ((Get-WelaOutgoingAuditDisposition $fresh $s.Mode) -ne 'ChangeRequired') {throw 'The current state no longer authorizes this write.'}
+                Set-ItemProperty -LiteralPath $s.Path -Name $s.Name -Value 1 -Type DWord -ErrorAction Stop
+                'Only outgoing NTLM Audit all (1) was requested; no authentication or event-generation test was performed.'
+            }
+            Invoke-WelaConfigurationControl -Context $context -Id "Registry/$path/$name" -Kind Registry -Target @{Path=$path;Name=$name} -Desired @{Value=1;Type='DWord'} -Read $read -Compliant $test -PreserveWhen $preserve -Apply $apply -CallbackState $state -Description $plan.Diagnostic
+        }
+        $report=Complete-WelaConfiguration -Context $context -Scope 'outgoing-ntlm-audit-policy-only' -SuccessMessage 'Outgoing NTLM configuration results recorded; inspect preserved/skipped controls separately.'
+        $report|Add-Member NoteProperty Plan $plan
+    }else{$report=[pscustomobject]@{ExitCode=$(if($plan.Status -eq 'Unknown'){1}else{0});Scope='outgoing-ntlm-audit-policy-only';Action=$Action;Plan=$plan}}
+    $report|Add-Member NoteProperty EventGeneration 'Not verified; registry compliance does not establish authentication, NTLM events, forwarding, GPO persistence or Sigma readiness.'
+    $report|Add-Member NoteProperty ReadyRuleCredit 0
+    if ($ResultsPath) {
+        try {$report|ConvertTo-Json -Depth 16|Set-Content -LiteralPath $ResultsPath -Encoding UTF8 -ErrorAction Stop}
+        catch {$report.ExitCode=1;Write-Host "[Failed] Writing outgoing NTLM results: $_" -ForegroundColor Red}
+    }
+    return $report
+}
diff --git a/tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Cli.Tests.ps1 b/tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Cli.Tests.ps1
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c8195578
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Cli.Tests.ps1
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+$ErrorActionPreference='Stop';$repo=Split-Path $PSScriptRoot -Parent;$engine=(Get-Process -Id $PID).Path;$count=0
+$root=Join-Path ([IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) ('wela-ntlm-cli-'+[guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))
+$cases=@(
+ @{Args=@('outgoing-ntlm','-Help');Code=0;Pattern='Changes only'},
+ @{Args=@('configure','-NtlmAction','Configure');Code=1;Pattern='requires outgoing-ntlm'},
+ @{Args=@('outgoing-ntlm','-OutgoingNtlmMode','Deny');Code=1;Pattern='enforcement is not accepted'},
+ @{Args=@('outgoing-ntlm','-Role','Client');Code=1;Pattern='dedicated options'},
+ @{Args=@('outgoing-ntlm','-Profile','wela-2.2.0');Code=1;Pattern='dedicated options'},
+ @{Args=@('outgoing-ntlm','-Auto');Code=1;Pattern='require NtlmAction Configure'},
+ @{Args=@('outgoing-ntlm','-DryRun');Code=1;Pattern='require NtlmAction Configure'},
+ @{Args=@('outgoing-ntlm','-BackupPath',$root);Code=1;Pattern='require NtlmAction Configure'},
+ @{Args=@('outgoing-ntlm','-Help','-ProviderAction','Configure');Code=1;Pattern='dedicated options'},
+ @{Args=@('outgoing-ntlm','-NtlmAction','Configure','-Typo');Code=1;Pattern='Unsupported trailing arguments'}
+)
+foreach($case in $cases){$prior=$ErrorActionPreference;try{$ErrorActionPreference='Continue';$text=@(&$engine -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -File "$repo/WELA.ps1" @($case.Args) 2>&1);$code=$LASTEXITCODE}finally{$ErrorActionPreference=$prior};if(($code -eq 0) -ne ($case.Code -eq 0) -or ($text -join "`n") -notmatch $case.Pattern){throw "CLI failed: $($case.Args -join ' ') -> $code / $($text -join ' ')"};$count++}
+if(Test-Path $root){throw 'Refused CLI input created unexpected output.'}
+Write-Host "PASS: $count scoped outgoing NTLM CLI guards."
+exit 0
diff --git a/tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Tests.ps1 b/tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Tests.ps1
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..95c5c577
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Tests.ps1
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+$ErrorActionPreference='Stop';$repo=Split-Path $PSScriptRoot -Parent
+. (Join-Path $repo 'scripts/Configuration.ps1')
+. (Join-Path $repo 'scripts/OutgoingNtlmAudit.ps1')
+$root=Join-Path ([IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) ('wela-ntlm-test-'+[guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'));$null=New-Item -ItemType Directory $root
+$count=0;$sequence=0
+function Assert($Value,$Message){if(-not $Value){throw $Message};$script:count++}
+function Key($Value){ConvertTo-Json -InputObject $Value -Depth 12 -Compress}
+function Reset($Value,$Type='DWord'){
+    $script:policy=[pscustomobject][ordered]@{KeyExists=$true;ValueExists=($null -ne $Value);Value=$Value;Type=$(if($null -ne $Value){$Type}else{$null})}
+    $script:writes=0;$script:reads=0;$script:failRead=$false;$script:failWrite=$false;$script:ignoreWrite=$false;$script:promptChange=$null;$script:onRead=$null
+}
+function Get-WelaOutgoingAuditSnapshot {
+    $script:reads++;if($script:onRead){& $script:onRead};if($script:failRead){throw 'Access denied'}
+    [pscustomobject][ordered]@{Host=[pscustomobject][ordered]@{Build=26100;ProductType=3;DomainRole=2;PartOfDomain=$false};Policy=($script:policy|ConvertTo-Json|ConvertFrom-Json)}
+}
+function Get-WelaOutgoingNtlmPolicySource {'Unknown (fixture has no RSoP ownership evidence)'}
+function Set-ItemProperty {param($LiteralPath,$Name,$Value,$Type,$ErrorAction)
+    Assert ($LiteralPath -ceq 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0' -and $Name -ceq 'RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic' -and $Value -eq 1 -and $Type -ceq 'DWord') 'Only the one exact audit-only target may be written.'
+    $script:writes++;if($script:failWrite){throw 'Write denied'};if(-not $script:ignoreWrite){$script:policy.ValueExists=$true;$script:policy.Value=1;$script:policy.Type='DWord'}
+}
+function Read-Host {param($Prompt) if($script:promptChange){& $script:promptChange};return 'Y'}
+function Configure([string]$Mode='PreserveOrAudit',[switch]$DryRun,[switch]$Prompt){
+    $script:sequence++;$script:backup=Join-Path $root ('case-'+$script:sequence)
+    Invoke-WelaOutgoingAuditCommand -Action Configure -Mode $Mode -Auto:(-not $Prompt) -DryRun:$DryRun -BackupPath $script:backup
+}
+try{
+    foreach($initial in @($null,0,1)){
+        Reset $initial;$old=Key $script:policy;$r=Configure
+        Assert ($r.ExitCode -eq 0 -and $r.Scope -ceq 'outgoing-ntlm-audit-policy-only' -and $r.ReadyRuleCredit -eq 0) 'Public report scopes success to one policy, without detection credit.'
+        Assert ($script:policy.Value -eq 1 -and $script:writes -eq $(if($initial -eq 1){0}else{1})) 'Absent/allow are audited; existing audit is idempotent.'
+        if($initial -ne 1){$j=@(Get-Content (Join-Path $backup 'before.jsonl')|ConvertFrom-Json);Assert ($j.Count -eq 1 -and (Key $j[0].Before.Policy) -ceq $old) 'Typed original snapshot is durable before the one write.'}
+        else{Assert (-not(Test-Path (Join-Path $backup 'before.jsonl'))) 'Already configured mode does not journal a write.'}
+    }
+    Reset 2;$r=Configure;Assert ($script:writes -eq 0 -and $r.Results[0].Status -ceq 'Skipped' -and $r.Plan.Status -ceq 'PreservedEnforcement' -and $script:policy.Value -eq 2) 'Default mode preserves and identifies authentication enforcement.'
+    Reset 2;$r=Configure Audit;Assert ($script:writes -eq 1 -and $script:policy.Value -eq 1 -and $r.Results[0].Status -ceq 'Applied') 'Explicit audit mode authorizes replacing deny with auditing.'
+    foreach($value in @(42,'1')){foreach($mode in @('PreserveOrAudit','Audit')){
+        Reset $value $(if($value -is [string]){'String'}else{'DWord'});$r=Configure $mode
+        Assert ($r.ExitCode -eq 1 -and $script:writes -eq 0 -and $r.Results[0].Status -ceq 'Failed') 'Unknown values/types remain untouched even in explicit Audit mode.'
+    }}
+    Reset 0;$r=Configure -DryRun;Assert ($script:writes -eq 0 -and $r.DryRun -and -not(Test-Path $backup)) 'Dry run has no policy or journal-directory mutation.'
+    Reset 0;$script:failRead=$true;$r=Configure;Assert ($r.ExitCode -eq 1 -and $script:writes -eq 0) 'An unreadable policy fails closed.'
+    foreach($kind in @('failWrite','ignoreWrite')){
+        Reset 0;Set-Variable -Scope Script -Name $kind -Value $true;$r=Configure
+        Assert ($r.ExitCode -eq 1 -and $r.Results[0].Status -ceq 'Failed') 'Native failure and ignored-write readback cannot report success.'
+    }
+    foreach($changed in @(1,2,42)){
+        Reset 0;$script:changed=$changed;$script:promptChange={$script:policy.Value=$script:changed};$r=Configure -Prompt
+        Assert ($r.ExitCode -eq 1 -and $script:writes -eq 0 -and $script:policy.Value -eq $changed) 'Prompt-time drift refuses writes after preserving the exact original receipt.'
+    }
+    Reset 0;$script:onRead={if($script:reads -eq 5){$script:policy.Value=0}};$r=Configure
+    Assert ($script:writes -eq 1 -and $r.ExitCode -eq 1 -and $r.Results[0].Status -ceq 'Overridden') 'A later policy change fails final verification.'
+    Reset 0;$r=Invoke-WelaOutgoingAuditCommand -Action Plan;Assert ($r.Plan.Status -ceq 'ChangeRequired' -and $script:writes -eq 0) 'Plan is current-host assessment and does not mutate policy.'
+    foreach($action in @('Audit','Plan')){foreach($option in @('Auto','DryRun','BackupPath')){
+        $a=@{Action=$action};$a[$option]=$(if($option -eq 'BackupPath'){'unused'}else{$true});$threw=$false;try{Invoke-WelaOutgoingAuditCommand @a}catch{$threw=$true};Assert $threw 'Read-only actions reject mutation-only options.'
+    }}
+}finally{Remove-Item -LiteralPath $root -Recurse -Force}
+Write-Host "PASS: $count scoped outgoing NTLM assertions."
+exit 0
diff --git a/tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Windows.Tests.ps1 b/tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Windows.Tests.ps1
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f544ce04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/OutgoingNtlmAudit.Windows.Tests.ps1
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+param([switch]$AllowDisposableAuditWrite)
+$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'
+if(-not $AllowDisposableAuditWrite -or $env:GITHUB_ACTIONS -ne 'true' -or $env:RUNNER_ENVIRONMENT -ne 'github-hosted'){throw 'Explicit opt-in on a disposable GitHub-hosted Windows runner is required.'}
+$repo=Split-Path $PSScriptRoot -Parent
+. (Join-Path $repo 'scripts/Configuration.ps1')
+. (Join-Path $repo 'scripts/OutgoingNtlmAudit.ps1')
+Import-Module (Join-Path $repo 'modules/AuditProfiles.psm1') -Force
+Import-Module (Join-Path $repo 'modules/NativeProviders.psm1') -Force
+$engine=(Get-Process -Id $PID).Path;$count=0;$failure=$null;$errors=@()
+$root=Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP ('wela-outgoing-audit-'+[guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'));$null=New-Item -ItemType Directory $root
+$path='HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0';$name='RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic'
+function Assert($Value,$Message){if(-not $Value){throw $Message};$script:count++}
+function Key($Value){ConvertTo-Json -InputObject $Value -Depth 24 -Compress}
+function Save($Name,$Value){ConvertTo-Json -InputObject $Value -Depth 24|Set-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $root $Name) -Encoding UTF8}
+function Masks {$m=Get-WelaEffectiveAuditPolicy;@($m.Keys|Sort-Object|ForEach-Object{"$_=$($m[$_])"}) -join ';'}
+function Other {
+    $base=[Microsoft.Win32.RegistryKey]::OpenBaseKey([Microsoft.Win32.RegistryHive]::LocalMachine,[Microsoft.Win32.RegistryView]::Registry64);$k=$null
+    try{
+        $k=$base.OpenSubKey('SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0');if(-not $k){throw 'Existing MSV1_0 key required.'}
+        $values=@($k.GetValueNames()|Sort-Object|Where-Object {$_ -ine $name}|ForEach-Object{[pscustomobject][ordered]@{Name=$_;Type=$k.GetValueKind($_).ToString();Value=$k.GetValue($_,$null,[Microsoft.Win32.RegistryValueOptions]::DoNotExpandEnvironmentNames)}})
+        $children=@($k.GetSubKeyNames()|Sort-Object)
+        $security=if($PSVersionTable.PSVersion.Major -ge 6){[Microsoft.Win32.RegistryAclExtensions]::GetAccessControl($k)}else{$k.GetAccessControl()}
+        $acl=$security.GetSecurityDescriptorSddlForm([Security.AccessControl.AccessControlSections]::Access -bor [Security.AccessControl.AccessControlSections]::Owner -bor [Security.AccessControl.AccessControlSections]::Group)
+    }finally{if($k){$k.Dispose()};$base.Dispose()}
+    [pscustomobject][ordered]@{Values=$values;Children=$children;Access=$acl;DomainPolicy=Get-WelaRegistryState 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters' AuditNTLMInDomain;NtlmChannel=Get-WelaNativeChannel 'Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational';SecurityChannel=Get-WelaNativeChannel Security;NetlogonService=[string](Get-Service Netlogon).Status}
+}
+function Public([string]$Label,[string[]]$Arguments){
+    $prior=$ErrorActionPreference
+    try{$ErrorActionPreference='Continue';$output=& $engine -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -File (Join-Path $repo 'WELA.ps1') outgoing-ntlm @Arguments 2>&1|Out-String;$code=$LASTEXITCODE}finally{$ErrorActionPreference=$prior}
+    $output|Set-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $root ($Label+'.txt')) -Encoding UTF8
+    Assert ($code -eq 0) "Public $Label exited $code : $output"
+    Get-Content -Raw -LiteralPath (Join-Path $root ($Label+'.json'))|ConvertFrom-Json
+}
+$original=Get-WelaOutgoingAuditSnapshot
+Assert ($original.Host.ProductType -eq 3 -and $original.Host.DomainRole -eq 2 -and -not $original.Host.PartOfDomain) 'Actual unjoined disposable Server is required.'
+Assert (-not $original.Policy.ValueExists -or ($original.Policy.Type -ceq 'DWord' -and $original.Policy.Value -in @(0,1))) 'Fixture never replaces pre-existing enforcement or an unknown policy.'
+$other=Other;$masks=Masks
+Save 'original.json' @{Snapshot=$original;Unselected=$other;Masks=$masks;UBR=(Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion').UBR;Engine=$PSVersionTable.PSVersion.ToString();Commit=$env:GITHUB_SHA}
+try{
+    foreach($case in @('absent','allow')){
+        if((Get-WelaRegistryState $path $name).ValueExists){Remove-ItemProperty -LiteralPath $path -Name $name -ErrorAction Stop}
+        if($case -eq 'allow'){$null=New-ItemProperty -LiteralPath $path -Name $name -PropertyType DWord -Value 0}
+        $prepared=Get-WelaOutgoingAuditSnapshot
+        $plan=Public ($case+'-plan') @('-NtlmAction','Plan','-ResultsPath',(Join-Path $root ($case+'-plan.json')))
+        Assert ($plan.Plan.Status -ceq 'ChangeRequired' -and (Key $plan.Plan.Before) -ceq (Key $prepared)) 'Public plan retains the exact native absence/allow state and actual host.'
+        $dryBackup=Join-Path $root ($case+'-dry-backup')
+        $dry=Public ($case+'-dry') @('-NtlmAction','Configure','-Auto','-DryRun','-BackupPath',$dryBackup,'-ResultsPath',(Join-Path $root ($case+'-dry.json')))
+        Assert ($dry.DryRun -and $dry.Results[0].Status -ceq 'Skipped' -and -not(Test-Path $dryBackup) -and (Key (Get-WelaOutgoingAuditSnapshot)) -ceq (Key $prepared)) 'Dry run preserves policy and creates no journal directory.'
+        $backup=Join-Path $root ($case+'-backup')
+        $report=Public $case @('-NtlmAction','Configure','-Auto','-BackupPath',$backup,'-ResultsPath',(Join-Path $root ($case+'.json')))
+        $after=Get-WelaOutgoingAuditSnapshot
+        Assert ($report.Scope -ceq 'outgoing-ntlm-audit-policy-only' -and $report.Results.Count -eq 1 -and $report.Results[0].Status -ceq 'Applied') 'Exactly one native outgoing policy is applied through public CLI.'
+        Assert ($after.Policy.Type -ceq 'DWord' -and $after.Policy.Value -eq 1 -and (Key $report.Results[0].After) -ceq (Key $after)) 'Native audit-only readback matches the public result.'
+        $journal=@(Get-Content (Join-Path $backup 'before.jsonl')|ConvertFrom-Json)
+        Assert ($journal.Count -eq 1 -and (Key $journal[0].Before) -ceq (Key $prepared) -and $journal[0].Target.Path -ceq $path -and $journal[0].Target.Name -ceq $name) 'One original journal retains the actual typed policy and native context.'
+        $repeatBackup=Join-Path $root ($case+'-repeat-backup')
+        $repeat=Public ($case+'-repeat') @('-NtlmAction','Configure','-Auto','-BackupPath',$repeatBackup,'-ResultsPath',(Join-Path $root ($case+'-repeat.json')))
+        Assert ($repeat.Results[0].Status -ceq 'AlreadyCompliant' -and -not(Test-Path (Join-Path $repeatBackup 'before.jsonl'))) 'Repeated configuration is idempotent without another original journal.'
+        $audit=Public ($case+'-audit') @('-NtlmAction','Audit','-ResultsPath',(Join-Path $root ($case+'-audit.json')))
+        Assert ($audit.Plan.Status -ceq 'AlreadyCompliant' -and $audit.ReadyRuleCredit -eq 0 -and $audit.EventGeneration -like 'Not verified*') 'Audit distinguishes registry compliance from event or authentication proof.'
+        Assert ((Key (Other)) -ceq (Key $other) -and (Masks) -ceq $masks) 'Incoming/domain policies, siblings, access descriptor, channels, service and all59 masks remain unchanged.'
+    }
+    Save 'completed.json' @{Status='Passed';Assertions=$count;NativeWrites=2;Scope='Only outgoing audit DWORD1. No network authentication attempt, enforcement, event generation, GPO refresh or Sigma proof.'}
+}catch{$failure=$_.ToString();throw}finally{
+    try{
+        if((Get-WelaRegistryState $path $name).ValueExists){Remove-ItemProperty -LiteralPath $path -Name $name -ErrorAction Stop}
+        if($original.Policy.ValueExists){$null=New-ItemProperty -LiteralPath $path -Name $name -Value $original.Policy.Value -PropertyType $original.Policy.Type}
+    }catch{$errors+=$_.ToString()}
+    $checks=[ordered]@{}
+    foreach($pair in @(@('Policy',{(Key (Get-WelaOutgoingAuditSnapshot)) -ceq (Key $original)}),@('Unselected',{(Key (Other)) -ceq (Key $other)}),@('All59Masks',{(Masks) -ceq $masks}))){try{$checks[$pair[0]]=& $pair[1]}catch{$checks[$pair[0]]=$false;$errors+=$_.ToString()}}
+    $complete=$errors.Count -eq 0 -and @($checks.Values|Where-Object {-not $_}).Count -eq 0
+    Save 'cleanup.json' @{Complete=$complete;Checks=$checks;Errors=$errors;Failure=$failure;Assertions=$count}
+    if(-not $complete){throw 'Outgoing NTLM native fixture cleanup failed.'}
+}
+Write-Host "PASS: $count native public outgoing NTLM assertions and exact cleanup."
+exit 0
diff --git a/website/docs/resources/changelog.ja.md b/website/docs/resources/changelog.ja.md
index b4f75fc6..eeb7d40a 100644
--- a/website/docs/resources/changelog.ja.md
+++ b/website/docs/resources/changelog.ja.md
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 
 **改善:**
 
+- `outgoing-ntlm` のAudit/Plan/Configureを追加し、送信NTLM監査DWORDを個別に設定できます。既存の拒否設定は既定で維持し、置換には明示的なAuditを要求します。不明な型・値や書込直前の変化を拒否し、元の型付き記録と再読取を保持します。Server 2022/2025のテストで範囲と復元を確認し、認証・イベント生成は未検証として報告します。(関連 #362) (@Shirofune-Security)
+
 - Server 2022/2025 と Windows PowerShell 5.1/PowerShell 7 の破棄可能な環境で、Securityログ警告設定の公開CLIを検証します。未設定・0・高いしきい値、早い警告値の維持、DryRun、再実行、不正型の拒否と完全な復元を確認し、無関係な設定は保持します。ログ枯渇や警告イベント生成は検証範囲外です。 (@Shirofune-Security)
 
 - Server 2022/2025 と両 PowerShell エンジンで、公開 `targeted-sacl` のレジストリ操作を検証する使い捨てテストを追加しました。テスト専用の新規ハイブをマウントし、対象選択、DryRun、監査 ACE の追加、古い計画・前提条件不足の拒否、冪等性と厳密に対応付けた Security4657 を確認します。無関係な ACE・型付き値の保持、監査ポリシー・トークンの復元、所有ハイブのアンロードと削除の証跡を保存します。製品側のハイブ読み込みや Sigma 準備完了の判定は追加しません。(関連 #373) (@Shirofune-Security)
diff --git a/website/docs/resources/changelog.md b/website/docs/resources/changelog.md
index 1ba91895..589feb83 100644
--- a/website/docs/resources/changelog.md
+++ b/website/docs/resources/changelog.md
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 
 **Improvements:**
 
+- Add `outgoing-ntlm` Audit/Plan/Configure to manage the outgoing audit DWORD independently of broad configuration. Preserve existing deny by default, require explicit Audit to replace it, refuse unknown types/values and pre-write drift, and retain typed original journals plus native readback. Native Server 2022/2025 tests verify narrow scope and exact cleanup; authentication/event generation remain unverified. (Related #362) (@Shirofune-Security)
+
 - Verify public Security-log warning configuration on disposable Server 2022/2025 hosts under Windows PowerShell 5.1/PowerShell 7: absent/zero/higher thresholds, earlier-threshold preservation, dry run, idempotence, wrong-type refusal and exact cleanup. Preserve unrelated registry values, channel configuration, audit masks and CrashOnAuditFail; no log-exhaustion or warning-event claim. (@Shirofune-Security)
 
 - Added disposable public `targeted-sacl` registry lifecycle validation on Server 2022/2025 and both PowerShell engines. A fixture-owned mounted hive exercises reviewed selection, DryRun, additive configuration, stale/prerequisite refusal and idempotence, followed by one precisely attributed Security4657. Retained native receipts verify unrelated ACE/value preservation and exact audit-policy, token and owned-hive cleanup; production does not load hives or gain Sigma credit. (Related #373) (@Shirofune-Security)