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Update SSH Compression recommendation to reflect modern OpenSSH behavior
OpenSSH moved to delayed (post-authentication) compression by default in 6.7, and removed pre-authentication compression support entirely in 7.4 (2016). The compression-oracle attack surface that motivated the original `Compression no` recommendation no longer exists on any currently supported OpenSSH version, so `Compression yes` is safe. Fixes #117
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@@ -573,7 +573,11 @@ SSH is a door into your server. This is especially true if you are opening ports
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# verify hostname matches IP
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# verify hostname matches IP
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UseDNS yes
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UseDNS yes
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Compression no
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# OpenSSH only supports delayed (post-authentication) compression since
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# 6.7, and removed pre-auth compression support entirely in 7.4 (2016),
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# so the old compression-oracle attack surface this setting guarded
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# against no longer exists on any currently supported OpenSSH version
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Compression yes
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# TCP keepalive is spoofable (runs outside the encrypted channel)
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# TCP keepalive is spoofable (runs outside the encrypted channel)
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# Use ClientAlive instead (runs inside the encrypted channel)
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# Use ClientAlive instead (runs inside the encrypted channel)
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